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ABSTRACT 

The following thesis presents an analysis of power and control in the English 
National Health Service. Notably, it focuses upon power and control over 
knowledge; over defining what is 'valid' knowledge; over the production of that 
valid knowledge; and over how, what, when and where that knowledge is used in 
everyday clinical practice. The issue reaches to the heart of professional 
conception and definition and hence, control over professions themselves. The 
thesis attempts to demonstrate the relationship between the different professional 
groups in the NHS, through the analysis of national, regional and local documents, 
and interviews with managers, doctors, nurses, dietitians and physiotherapists in 
three case studies, the thesis shows the complex pattern of relations and behaviour 
at play. Particular attention is paid to Michael Power's notion of audit and the 
'Audit Explosion', which provides a framework for the thesis, and to the work of 
Michel Foucault, especially his ideas about power, control and panopticism. These 
are used as a useful metaphor to understand and explain NBS research and audit in 
relation to the NHS professions. The thesis ends with a cross-case analysis which 
draws together the rich variety of data and concludes with an analysis of the wider 
sociological implications of the thesis. 
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RECENT REFORMS AFFECTING THE ENGLISH NHS 
1979 Conservative Government elected. 

Initiated various measures relating to efficiency. 

1983 Griffiths Report published. 

Replaced team managers with general managers. 

1987-88 New review of the organisation and financing of the NBS undertaken. 
1989 Caring for People White Paper published. 

Aimed at making improvements in social and community care. 

Priorities in Medical Research published. 
Working for Patients White Paper published. 

Aimed to clarify the relationship between health authorities and the central departments. 

Separated the purchaser and provider functions of the NHS. 

Objectives achieved through a competitive market on the supply side. 

Created GP and District General Management budget holders. 

Created NBS trusts. 

1991 NBS and Community Care Act received royal assent. 

Legislation to operationalise Workingfor Patients and Caring for People. 

Research for Health strategy published. 
1992 Tomlinson Report into the future of the London health services published. 

Reviewed health service provision, medical education and research in London. 

Health ofthe Nation published. 

Set out health targets for the NHS. Health Authorities charged with ensuring these targets were 

met. 

Patient's Charter published. 

Introduced performance measures for the NHS in the name of patient -centred quality measures 

Functions and manpower review released. 
1993 Reorganisation of the 13 RHAs into 6 NHS Executive Regional Offices 
Thompson review of Special Health Authorities published. 
Researchfor Health strategy re-drafted and published. 
1994 Culyer Report published. 

Reviewed NHS R&D and introduced a research market to run alongside the NHS market. 

Afanaging the New NUS Functions and Responsibilities in the New NHS published. 

Consolidated the management of the NHS E to take on responsibility for all stages of NHS 

services. 

xii 
Research and Development in the New NHS. Functions and Responsibilities published. 
Explained the organisation of R&D in the new NBS, in response to Managing the New NHS, and 
as a supplement to Researchfor Health and until the new arrangements following the 
implementation of Culyer' s recommendations were enacted. 
1995 Implementation plan for implementing the recommendations of the Culyer Report, 

published. 

1996 The National Health Service: A Service with Ambitions presented to Parliament. 

Professor Michael Peckham replaced by Professor John Swales as NHS Director of R&D. 

1997 Labour Government elected 

The New NHS. Modern. Dependable presented to Parliament. 

1998 Our Healthier Nation. public health Green Paper presented to Parliament. 

1999 Review of NBS R&D commissioned by the Labour Government, chaired by Professor 

Michael Clarke. 

NHS Bill presented to Parliament 
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NHS STRUCTURES AND FUNCTIONS 
Department of Health 
Secretary of State for Health 

Supported by Minister of State and junior ministers. 

Secretary of State for Health chaired the Policy Board, which set the broad strategic direction for 

the NHS. 

NHS Management Executive (NHS ME) dealt with operational issues in the strategy and 

objectives set by the Policy Board. Later became the NBS Executive. 

Chief Executive of the NHS led the work of the NHS ME. 

Chief Executive, Chief Medical Officer and Permanent Secretary were the most senior civil 

servants in the Department of Health. 

Secretary of State for Health was responsible to Parliament for the provision of health services 

and responded to questions from individual tviPs. 

Committees, such as the Public Accounts Committee, were intended to reinforce accountability. 

Ombudsman (or Health Service Commissioner) was an important role, as s/he was responsible 

for the 'policing' of the service. 

Audit Commission operated (and continues to operate) in conjunction with all of the above and 

was an independent unit set up to audit NHS accounts and look at efficiency. 

Regional Health Authorities 
Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) were the administrative 'agents' of the Secretary of State for 

Health. Populations covered ranged from 2-5 million. 

They consisted of a chairperson and five non-executive directors. 

A major function of the RHAs was to be a vehicle for implementing national policies. They also 

held District Health Authorities (DHAs) and Family Health Service Authorities (FHSAs) to 

account, on behalf of the Department of Health. 

Role of the RHAs. 

Changed after 1993. 

Previously had some providing function, but later concentrated on purchasing and allocating 

resources to DHAs and FHSAs. 

Appointed non-executive directors ofDHAs and FHSAs and two non-executive directors of each 

NHS trust. 

Funded and planned training and education for non-medical staff. 

Managed regional research and development programmes. 

Regulated the purchaser/provider relationship. 

No formal relationship with trusts, who were directly responsible to the NHS Management 

Executive. 

Since 1993, the RHAs were consolidated and reduced in number, and trust accountability has 

been through 6 Outposts of the NHS Management Executive. 
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District Health Authorities 
Purchased community and hospital health services. 

Populations co.vered ranged from about 100 ~ 800 000 people. 

Chairperson appointed by the Secretary of State for Health. 

Each had five non-executive directors appointed by the RHA and up to five executive directors. 

Functions of DHAs 

Assessed the need for health care in their area to make purchasing decisions. 

Liaised with GPs. FHSAs and the voluntary sector, local authorities and others to make an 

assessment of the health of their residents. 

Director of Public Health produced an annual report of the health in the community. 

Some DHAs also used to manage services organised through Directly Managed Units. 

DHAs were encouraged to merge, then form purchasing consortia (Health Commissions, also 

called Health Authorities) after the purchaser/provider split was made. FHSAs were also 

encouraged to join them. 

Family Health Service Authorities 
Managed primary health care services - GPs, retail pharmacies, dentists and opticians, who were 

all independent. 

Implement national contracts in their areas. 

FHSAs had different geographical boundaries to DHAs, with populations of about 130 - 1600 000 

people. About half of the FHSAs were related to one DHA. 

Membership consisted of a Secretary of State for Health appointed chair, five RHA-appointed lay 

non-executive directors, 4 RHA-appointed professional non-executives (a GP, a community 

nurse, a pharmacist and a dentist) and a general manager, who was the only executive director. 

Functions of FHSAs 

Manage Family Practitioner contracts, although family practitioners were still in control of their 

own services. 

Pay GPs according to those contracts. 

Provide infonnation to the public. 

Deal with public complaints about services. 

Allocate funds for GP practice developments. 

Local Medical Committees were an important influence for GPs. These were elected by GPs to 

liaise and act as national negotiators. the Committee operated alongside other Family 

Practitioner committees, such as the Local Dentist Committees. 

NHS Trusts 
Established from 1991. 

Performance monitored by NHS E Outposts. 

Must provide an annual business plan. 

Most service providers in England had become NHS trusts by 1996, which led to the total 

separation of the purchaser and provider functions in the NHS. 

Main Functions of NHS Tusts 

Provide secondary and community care services. 

Break even. 

Earn 6% return on their capital. 

Work within the financial limitations set by the Secretary of State for Health. 
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NHS E Outposts regularly monitored trust financial performance and reviewed their published 
accounts and annual reports. 
Special Health Authorities 
Directly accountable to the Secretary of State for Health. 

An example of an SHA was the 8 London postgraduate teaching hospitals, the Health Education 

Authority and the Mental Health Act Commission. 

GP Fundholders 
Accountable to FHSAs and involved groups of GPs holding budgets with which they could 

purchase specific services for the population they served and provide primary care services 

themselves. 

Allocated a budget to pay for certain services, such as x-rays, outpatient services, lab tests etc., 

drugs and staff. 

Resources allocated to GP Fundholders were deducted from tlle DHA allocations. 

Functions of GP Fundholders 

Provide primary health care services. 

FHSAs, subsequently incorporated into HAs, took an increasing responsibility from RHAs for 

managing fundholding and monitoring resource use by fundholders. 

Fundholders and DHAs were expected to share responsibility for service provision. 

Community Health Councils 
Formed in 1974. 

Intended to represent the public interest in the NHS. 

Statutory bodies fonned by RHAs and there was normally one per District. 

CHCs have no executive powers. 

Membership consisted oflocal authorities, community and voluntary organisations. 

Supported by a full-time secretary or chief officer and one or two assistants. 

Functions of Community Health Councils 

Primarily to advise DHAs, FHSAs, then HAs on the public and patients' concerns and views. 

The view of the role of the CHC varies between different organisations. 

It was decreed by Parliament that CHCs should have access to relevant information from Health 

Authorities; have access to NHS premises; be included in talks on major service variation or 

developments; and be able to send observers to FHSA and DHA meetings. 
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INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS 
The following thesis is a study of research and development policy in the English National Health 
Service (NBS). It was triggered by the publication in 1991 of the Research for Health strategy 
(DH 1991b) which was the first official attempt to create an overall strategy for research and 
development in the NHS. The intention is to assess whether the issues it addresses are relevant to 
those people employed in the health service and whether it could ultimately contribute to the 
health gain of the popUlation. It is intended that this analysis will, in addition, provide a 
theoretical framework and a way of analysing change in the NHS which could be adopted by 
other analysts attempting to explain change in the modern 'marketised' state. 
Specifically, the thesis is based on a multiple case study analysis of the implementation of the 
Research for Health strategy (DH 1991b) over the five years following its launch in 1991 and 
revision in 1993 (DH 1993a). The actual subject of R&D policy in the NHS, itself, has been 
relatively neglected and very little literature has been found which directly relates to it. The 
literature search revealed a large number of reviews, editorials and features concerning NHS 
R&D, but no research-based analyses were found (see bibliography and references). The only 
study which came closest was an unpublished DPhil thesis but this concentrated upon the United 
Kingdon government food R&D policy (Eames 1993). Rudolf Klein, one of the few authors who 
has addressed the subject, acknowledged this fact and confirmed the desirability of conducting a 
detailed study of the issue]. Additionally, the public bodies (as evidence in the minutes of the 
North West and Anglia and Oxford Regional Health Authorities, Regional Research and 
Development Committees confirms) indicate that the implementation of R&D is an important 
area which has been relatively neglected. This issue was, subsequently, adopted by the 
Department of Health as a priority for NHS R&D (DH 1995n), but the commissioned studies are 
still, on the whole. ongoing. This highlights both the novelty and desirability of this thesis and 
its continued relevance to NHS policy-makers. 
This thesis, therefore, is a contribution towards new knowledge as it presents the findings from 
primary evidence, consisting of interviews conducted with 58 staff working in Regional Health 
Authorities, Health Authorities, NHS Trusts and universities. Secondly, it does not restrict itself 
to policy analysis, but places these policy developments in the wider political context. Thirdly, 
1991-5, the period under examination in this thesis, was a very intersting period because under 
previous Conservative Governments' major changes in the organization and structure of the NHS 
had been initiated and were well underway. A series of reforms were introduced after the 
Conservatives took office in 1979 aimed at making management in the health service more 
efficient. During this time, there had been a shift from a corporatist model, previously dominant 
in the public sector towards a more marketised framework in which audit and regulation have 
been increasingly prominent. Likewise, research and development have also increasingly played 
a part in this process of regulation. 
However, before progressing further, it is essential that the terms research and development are 
adequately defined. Drummond et at (1992) defined research as 'those activities linked to the 
gaining of new knowledge that could be applied to a broader setting in which the research took 
place'. Development, in contrast, was defined as 'the utilisation of existing knowledge, 
occasionally having particular relevance to the place of its origin.' Audit can be described as the 
(retrospective) testing to see whether knowledge has been put into practice. 
Chapter 1 outlines the policy context for the thesis, illustrating the major policy initiatives for the 
NHS, leading up to the publication of the first Research for Health strategy (DH 1991b). The key 
points of this strategy are also described. Chapter 2 provides a review of the principal approaches 
to health policy analysis, and concludes by arguing for a wider, more sociological approach to the 
1 Personal communication 
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analysis. Chapter 3 provides a framework for such an analysis, drawing on the work of Michael 
Power. The thesis attempts to evaluate Power's work against the evidence. Power's work is also 
expanded, in the context of the English NHS, to include research policy and politics, specifically, 
the rise of health services research, as an additional element of the audit society. This is 
important. Re'search policy, as will become apparent, is intrinsically tied to the changing nature 
of health service provision. There was increasing awareness of its contribution to the 
development and support of government poilicy during the 1980s and 1990s. However, how the 
professions have reacted to this change and oriented agendas for themselves is significant and a 
central element of this thesis. 
This thesis began as a single case study analysis of the implementation of the Research for 
Health strategy (DH 1991b, 1993a) in Bedfordshire. It was later expanded to include two further 
case studies (in Suffolk, and Cambridge and Huntingdon) in response to organisational and 
structural changes to the NBS. The reasons for this decision are considered in chapter 4; ­
methodology. This chapter outlines and evaluates the various methodological approaches that are 
available to social researchers. The choice of methodology and techniques used in the research is 
explained and justified. The chapter also describes the process of doing research, the nature and 
problems encountered, and how these were resolved. In order to keep the thesis manageable, the 
fieldwork was confined to the acute and community care sectors. Clearly, this has meant that 
primary care issues are not comprehensively covered in the thesis, although the sector has not 
been entirely neglected, as primary and secondary care do overlap to some extent. Where 
primary care issues have been addressed, it has been from the perspective of those in acute and 
community care organisations, and from purchasers. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 describe the case studies themselves and summarise the key findings. 
Chapter 8 presents a cross-case analysis in which the differences and similarities between the 
three cases are assessed and draws out some of the main conclusions. The movement from a 
corporatist state to a marketised state and the resultant NHS reforms promoted an 
entrepreneurial, competitive and individualistic culture in the NBS. The conclusions discuss how 
these have affected individuals and organisations within the three case studies and in the light of 
these, evaluate the impact of the Research for Health strategy (op.cit.) at grass roots level. It 
goes on to assess the degree to which research and development has been re-defined and what 
influence it has had upon the NBS more generally. A postscript is provided, which illustrates the 
continued relevance of the thesis to the NHS under the new Labour Government. 
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CHAPTER 1 

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE NBS REFORMS 
The following section will assess the nature and development of the many strategic and policy 
changes to affect the National Health Service (NBS), leading to the publication in 1991 of the 
Research for "Health strategy in England (DR 1991b). The intention is to contextualise the 
development of the research strategy, so that the reader will fully understand the then 
Conservative Government's aims and intentions in fonnulating it. What will become apparent to 
the reader is that the research strategy was one of a series of initiatives which have re-defined the 
nature and provision of health, and, indeed, social care in the UK. Particular attention will be 
paid to the Health of the Nation (DH 1992a) initiative, which Research Jor Health (op.cit.) was 
intended to support and enhance. The section will conclude with an in-depth summary of the 
actual research strategy itself. 
The changes affecting the NHS since the 1979 have been much discussed (for example, Gabe et 
a1. 1991, Butler 1992). Government policy has promoted and enforced the privatization of 
public services and utilities, with the NBS proving no exception to this rule. Mohan (1991) 
argued that the scope of state activities had been challenged by the Conservative Government and 
that there had been the creation of a climate of opinion where initiative and effort of the 
community and the individual were viewed as bolstering the state's limited resources. 
1.1 The Griffiths Report 
Cox (1993) outlined how in 1978 a Royal Commission was established to look at the 
organisational structure of the health service, which led to its reorganisation in 1982. Area 
health authorities were abolished at this time and the role of District Health Authorities (DHA's) 
given greater prominance. The call was made for the delegation of services to community units 
or hospitals. However, even before these changes were implemented, the then Conservative 
Government had commissioned the Griffiths Report. which was published in 1983 (DHSS 1983). 
The conclusions of the report can be summarised as follows: 
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• 	 the setting up of a national supervisory and management board; 
• 	 the appointment of a general manager at unit, district and regional levels; 
• 	 the delegation of decision-making; 
• the inclusion of doctors in management; 

.,. more emphasis upon the needs and satisfaction of consumers; 

• 	 the introduction of management budgeting; 
• 	 financial devolution to organisations offering services. 
The Griffiths Report (op.cit.) contained what is often regarded as one of the most significant 
changes to occur in the NBS since its establishment in 1947; the replacement of team 
management with general managers. Butler (1992) saw this as important for later reforms in 
that it: 
• 	 demonstrated the impracticality of separating the politics from the management of health 
care; 
• 	 laid down the foundations of a management culture of command and obedience that 
increased the responsiveness of the NHS to political direction; 
• 	 gave the managers new skills and powers in planning and managing clinical services, and a 
growing confidence in exercising them; 
• 	 created a climate of opinion and practice that finally enabled the Govenunent to implement 
its plans for the internal market in the face of unremitting opposition from almost all the 
professional groups within the NBS. (Butler 1992: 18) 
According to Cox (1991), the objective of the Griffiths Report (op.cit.) was to secure a tighter 
control of manual and professional perfonnance and labour costs through a more determined and 
infonned approach to budget control. Recurring themes throughout the report were those of 
'action, effectiveness, thrust, urgency and vitality, management budgeting, sensitivity to 
consumer satisfaction and an approach to management of personnel which would reward good 
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performance and ultimately sanction poor performance with dismissal' (Cox 1991). Structural 
and ideological factors were seen as underlying these changes. A concentration upon the 
efficiency and effectiveness of caring and social service provision was a natural step for 
governments to make when they wanted to limit public spending. particularly as populations 
were ageing and, therefore, using services more intensively, and as increasingly expensive new 
technology was used in clinical care. 
Nurses, midwives and the professions allied to medicine (PAMS) were largely ignored in the 
Griffiths Report. It was mainly concerned with the management of services and with managers 
and doctors in particular. The development of clinical budgeting and information systems could 
be seen as elements in the building of management control. The power of managers over 
consultants was still weak, but seemingly on the agenda. Cox (1991) noted that there was little 
evidence relating to the perspective of other staff, such as dietitians and therapists in the Griffiths 
Report as they had no influence upon top-level management because of unitization. 
A particular point concerning general management was that it involved the devolution of 
decision-making down to the lowest level. Cox (1991) observed that managers were responsible 
for action, with the centre retaining control through the processes of monitoring. review and 
accountability. The basic principle underlying the then Conservative Government's reforms 'was 
that the generation of a market was better than a bureaucracy at promoting and managing the 
efficient production of goods and services and at delivering them to the customer who ,,>,'anted 
them. A sound economy and a strong currency were the main concerns of the Thatcher 
Government over and above other concerns (Cox 1991). Consequently, economic policy was 
more important to them than social policy. Indeed, as Butler (199~) rema.rked 'the interna.! 
market in the NHS was the product of a political environment that valued wealth above V't-elfare. 
markets above bureaucracies, and competition above patronage; and it was the steady application 
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of these preferences to the NHS throughout the 1980s that made possible the introduction of the 
internal market in the 1990s' (Butler 1994: 14 ). 
1.2 The marketisation of the NHS 
From the 1980s onwards, a series of further measures were introduced by the Conservative 
Government of a similar kind. A particularly significant event, however, was the publication of 
Enthoven's book Reflections on the management of the National Health Service (Enthoven 
1985). This had a profound effect upon Margaret Thatcher and her government's thinking. 
Enthoven devised a system in which he believed the principle of free health care could co-exist 
with market competition, what he termed 'market socialism'. Towards the latter half of the 
1980s, there was a mounting pressure on the government to tackle the problem of underfunding 
in the NHS. The British Medical Association (BMA), for instance, had launched a staunch 
media campaign attacking the governments record regarding funding. The two parties, the 
Thatcher Government and the doctors, were locked in battle, a battle which it appeared the 
government had lost in the eyes of the public. 
Pressure from the BMA increased, aided and abetted by the media coverage which fanned stories 
concerning closures of wards and facilities, and the suffering and harm caused to patients. An 
increasing number of difficult questions, motions and debates in Parliament added to this. The 
government's response was a review of the NHS, announced in January 1988 by Margaret 
Thatcher. By this time she was, reportedly, supportive of the concept of a competitive market in 
the NHS. The working group met in private, away from the public gaze and considered their 
options in the light of the impending crisis. The result was the 1989 White Paper Working for 
Patients (DH 1989), which was subsequently developed into the NHS Community Care Act 
(1990). The Act came into force in April 1991. In effect, the government working group had 
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shifted its focus from looking at new ways of funding the NBS, towards issues concerning the 
efficiency of the service itself. 
A basic principle stipulated in the White Paper was the separation of purchaser and provider 
functions within the NBS. Purchasers were to be District Health Authorities (DHAs) and GP 
budget-holding practices. Providers, on the other hand, were to be independent or private 
hospitals, self-governing trusts and hospitals remaining under DHA control. The needs and cost­
effective ways of meeting these needs were to be assessed by all purchasers, and the pattern of 
health care delivery was to be prioritised by establishing how much should be spent on anyone 
service. Budgets were to be limited and pre-<ietermined but the London regions were given 
preferential funding. Purchasers subsequently were to contract with providers of health care. 
There was also some restructuring at a national level. Responsibility for developing and 
implementing operational policy was taken over by the NHS Management Executive (NHS:tvlE) 
from the Department of Health, which in turn, was detatched from the ministerially-led Policy 
Board. 
Butler (1992, 1993a) outlined the government's stated objectives of the White Paper. These were: 
to improve efficiency; devolve power locally and include clinicians in budgeting, let health 
authorities concentrate upon measuring the needs of their populations, improve incentives to 
providers to perform, improve standards of management in the NHS, and provide better 
information systems. Butler (1992) also outlined what were believed to be the covert objectives 
and hidden agendas behind the reforms. These were the introduction of real competition within 
the health service, an attack on the professions, specifically the medical profession, the 
destabilisation and the breaking-up of the NHS in its present form, and finally, privatisation. 
Implementation of these reforms was strongly resisted by most of the professional groups and 
associations in the NHS but proceeded nevertheless without any trials and with minimal 
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consultation. Shortly after, mergers of DRAs began to occur, something only hinted at in 
Working for Patients (DH 1989). This was because of a shortage of staff who had been joining 
providers, and the relative small size of DHAs. Butler (1992) noted that there was still some 
confusion over the relationship between the Management Executive and the Department's civil 
servants and between the Department's Permanent Secretary and the Chief Executive. 
Additionally, in the run-up to the 1992 general election, the management of the market became 
increasingly centralised. However, there were what could be seen as positive and negative 
aspects of the NHS reforms. Indeed, Butler (1992) listed some of these. He commented that 
Working for Patients could be championed more for what it initiated, such as auditing, 
improving information technology, measuring costs and outcomes, and improving planning. It 
could also be credited, as Allsop and May (1993) agreed, with changing the ethos of the NHS to 
encourage initiative and innovation, with managers re-examining and re-assessing the way they 
operate. Mohan (1993) argued that the effects of the changes were probably to aid managers 
against claims for additional funds and decentralise blame to local management from central 
government. Allsop and May (ibid.) added that despite claims of devolution, central 
management persisted in dictating the agendas of managers. 
1.3 The Patient's Charter and the Health ofthe Nation 
Further changes have ensued in the health service, most notably the Patient's Charter (DH 
1992b) and the health strategy The Health ofthe Nation (DH 1992a). The Health of the Nation 
(ibid) was released firstly as a Green Paper (DH 1991a) and then a White Paper (DH 1992a), the 
latter White Paper (which the Research for Health strategy (DH 1991b, 1993a) was meant to 
support) identified (for the first time for the NHS) long-term targets and objectives for reducing 
morbidity and mortality. However, it made no commitment to the resources and policies needed 
to achieve therp. The strategy was an important one and set the likely priorities for future 
investment in the health service. A significant difference between the Green (policy options for 
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discussion) and White (preferred option) Papers related to the number of key areas identified, in 
which objectives for improved health were designated and targets with set dates made. The 
former (Green) Paper listed sixteen such key areas. However, some of these were subsequently 
dismissed by the Tory Government. Some, such as child and matemal health, food safety, oral 
health and child immunisation were seen by the government to have already been sufficiently 
developed through other initiatives. Other areas such as rehabilitation, health of elderly people, 
asthma, back pain and drug misuse were seen as requiring further R&D before targets could be 
set (DH 1992a). In addition, breast feeding, diabetes and hospital acquired infection were not 
selected as 'Key Areas'. According to the government, some work had been instigated in these 
latter three areas (DH 1992a) but no reason was given for their omission as 'Key Areas' in the 
White Paper. Instead, five 'Key Areas' were identified and taken forward in the White Paper; 
coronary heart disease and strokes, cancers, mental illness, mY/AIDS and sexual health, and 
accident prevention. These five 'Key Areas' were used to frame the Research for Health strategy 
when it was published (DH 1991b, 1993a). A series of priority R&D working groups were 
subsequently established by Professor Michael Peckham, the national director of R&D, to help 
reach these targets. In addition, many of the areas in the Green Paper which were identified as 
requiring further research, were the subject of attention of national and regional NHS R&D 
bodies. This is discussed below. 
Roles and responsibilities were clearly identified in The Health of the Nation and new positions 
of (District) Directors of Public Health were created. These Directors were charged with 
performing initial assessments of the health status of the population and analysing and deciding 
upon the effective use of resources. The establishment and monitoring of health targets at a local 
level was made and the DH was charged with publishing appraisals of information and 
indicators, in order to monitor the progress of Key Areas. Periodic reviews concerning progress 
of the Health of the Nation strategy were also required by the Conservative Government from 
8 

HAs. Indeed, a number of words and phrases were repeatedly used throughout both the Green 
and the White Papers, such as monitoring, evaluation, effectiveness, information, support and 
involvement. These were to provide some indication of the Conservative Government's new 
direction for future health (and social) policy, and, indeed, set the context for future health policy 
developments, most notably research policy. 
1.4 	Research and Development policy and the Research for 
Health strategy 
In 1988 the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology published the report 
"Priorities in Medical Research" (House of Lords Select Committee 1988). This identified the 
need to focus research on NHS priorities. The lack of a coherent organisation for the NHS to 
outline its research needs and ensure that the benefits of research were systematically and 
effectively transferred into service was observed. The 1988 report (ibid) subsequently 
recommended an increase in public health research and in research into the organisation and 
management of health services, forming the basis for the forthcoming Research for Health 
strategy (DH 1991b). A more detailed account of the specific development of the Research for 
Health strategy, and its relationship to the Select Committee's report, can be found in chapter 3. 
However, the discussion below will provide a detailed appraisal of the content of the original 
Research for Health strategy. 
The history surrounding the development of research activity in the health service has been 
analysed, and the first section of this has been published (Twelvetree 1994). Although research 
in the NHS has been recognised as important, as illustrated, for example, in the Guillebaud 
Report (Committee of Enquiry 1956), it had played little part in infonning government policy 
decisions, even from the early period of the NHS. Sir Kenneth Stowe (the Permanent Secretary 
of the Department of Health from 1981-87), explained that through a lack of resources and 
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confused central government roles and policy, health services research had not developed into a 
force with any particular power base in the Department of Health. or established a research 
community of its own (Stowe 1989). Consequently, there was little connection between 
government policy and health services research. 
Rudolf Klein (1990) argued that the erosion of the consensus over the NBS that had occurred 
over recent years WOUld, ironically, encourage greater use of research, albeit partisan research. A 
more critical attitude to the work of doctors would increase the use of research in clinical 
practice, particularly where it would be likely to lead to savings within increasingly tighter 
financial constraints. Klein identified a number of factors he saw as defining the health care 
system in 1990, where a lack of recognition from policy-makers had led to low morale and 
discontentment amongst the research community. 
Research policy and utilisation varies in relation to the changing economic, political and social 
environment. Klein (ibid.) argued that a new policy arena was developing, leading to a market 
for research directed at basic issues. Such research concentrated upon the financing and 
organisation of health care. Consequently, the major developments to affect the NHS in the 
1980s, in combination with the changing economic and political environment, heightened the 
awareness of the role ofR&D and led to it becoming an 'official' issue. 
On the first of January 1991, Professor Michael Peckham was appointed to the new post of 
Director of Research and Development, heading up the NHS Research and Development 
Division and chairing the newly-formed Central Research and Development Committee. 
Professor Peckham's initial role was to find ways of changing people's ovm attitudes and 
perceptions towards research and development. Peckham started from the asswnption, 
articulated in the Select Committee report, that research and development were concepts foreign 
to most workers and professionals in the NHS, so far as current practice was concerned. His first 
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responsibility was to formulate a strategy to combat these problems. The four decades over 
which the NHS had operated, Peckham argued, had often seen new developments 'superimposed 
on existing practice, creating a kind of medical archaeology where the remnants of earlier 
practices are discernible among the newer acquisitions' (peckham 1991a: 367). While new 
methods of care had been developed, other areas had been neglected and this was not properly 
coordinated. Similarly, medical research was not seen as adequately related to the major health 
issues confronting the NHS and, therefore, was to be more focused and directed. The challenge, 
Peckham continued, was to introduce an appropriate way to use research methods to enable the 
analysis of the nature and delivery of health care. In April 1991, the initial R&D strategy was 
announced. This was seen as the first stage in the development of an R&D programme and 
infrastructure in the NBS (DH 1991b). As Peckham commented in the strategy: 
The prime objective is to see that R&D becomes an integral part of health care so that 
clinicians, managers and other staff find it natural to rely on the results of research in their 
day to day decision making and longer term strategic planning (DH 1991b: 1). 
The success of the strategy was to depend largely upon the creation of a new culture within the 
NBS at all levels (DR 1991b). The NBS programme was formulated to integrate with 
biomedical research (although not to provide major funds for it), to mirror NHS priorities and to 
facilitate the subsequent implementation of research findings. The wider framework was 
intended to ensure that R&D would contribute to the Health ofthe Nation objectives (DR 1992a), 
to the setting of definite quantifiable health targets, and would improve links between all those 
involved in health research, including Department of Health and NHS programmes, universities, 
industry, charities and the research councils. In addition, the information that would be gained 
from R&D was intended to become a basic element in thinking about organisational, managerial 
and clinical issues. 
The strategy outlined how medical research and the NBS had travelled along similar, parallel 
paths. The NHS supported and financed clinical research but research resources operated under 
11 

E 
no real strategic framework (DR 1991b). The NHS had essentially operated as a submissive ally 
to the funding bodies. Research and development data had often failed to be of benefit to the 
policies and strategies of the NHS, causing missed opportunities, inefficiency and neglect, 
specifically of the development phase of R&D. As a result, good research developments were 
often not exploited as well as they should have been; a situation the Conservative Government 
wanted to see remedied. The government stated in the strategy that the establishment of a 
national framework for research, required a coordinated effort. The medical schools, therefore, 
were subsequently chosen to act as a link between the clinic, science (including social science) 
and industry. In addition, collaboration between the research funding bodies and the NHS was 
deemed to have been lacking, with the NHS only recently becoming an active partner. 
Consequently research liaison committees were believed necessary to remedy this situation. 
Various advisory groups were also to be set up (such as a Health Technology Assessment Group) 
covering relevant aspects of research methodology, infrastructure, and the classification of R&D 
priorities. 
Within this R&D framework a new Central Research and Development Committee (CROe) 
was established, whose role was to act as a central coordinating body. Its job was to review 
relevant R&D and identify other areas of work and estimate their value to the NHS. It was also 
expected to provide advice, oversee the development of a broad R&D framework., and identify 
several nationally important priority R&D issues from which the regions would be expected to 
formulate R&D plans of their own (DH 1991b). In 1991-92, Regional Health Authorities 
(RHAs) were asked for the first time to produce R&D plans and identify how existing resources 
and additional funds would be used to bring regional and national priorities forward. The 
regions, in addition to managing and funding their own programmes, were also expected to 
contract (enter bids) to manage centrally funded work, in competition with the London 
Postgraduate Special Health Authorities (SHAs), in various areas identified as nationally 
important. 
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1.5 Research functions of the Regional Health Authorities 
The research functions of the RHAs were expected to emanate from their requirement to publish 
and implement research and development plans, for which they would be held accountable. In 
order to manage this, new regional directors of R&D were to be appointed, to act as chairpersons 
to regional R&D committees. These directors were consequently responsible for offering 
guidance on the allocation of regional R&D budgets and showing how existing resources were 
being used effectively. Regional committees were expected to ensure that opportunities for 
research were identified, to provide assistance in the quality control and assurance of their 
regions' activities, and to give advice on research priorities identified by them as of national 
(nationally funded) or regional (regionally funded) importance. Once priorities were set, the 
regions were expected to develop them into proposals and progranunes for R&D contracts. 
These were put out to tender on a competitive basis. 
1.6 Regional research and development plans 
Plans formulated were expected to outline the region's financial and management contribution to 
the national framework for R&D. They were to cover the following elements: 
• 	 R&D priorities, aims and objectives; 
• 	 the intended progranune of activities; 
• 	 how the specific infrastructure was to be developed; 
• 	 any other R&D which was managed and financed with NBS money from other bodies in the 
region; 
• 	 more specifically, they were to explain the role of relevant NBS providers (such as trusts) in 
the overall R&D framework; 
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• ensure that the research needs of the NHS are identified, by gaining input from purchasers, 
providers and academics; 
.. contain a 'report on the previous year's progress and events in the region; and 
• provide infonnation about the regional R&D programmes strategic direction. 
1.7 Funding for NHS research 
At the time the Researchfor Health strategy was published (1991) there were regional variations 
in R&D expenditure due to historical factors and the traditional, existing physical location of 
researchers. However, the intention to move to a national target was to involve making RHA 
target percentage expenditures equal. RHAs were to provide information on existing R&D 
finances for their own plans and to help plan towards the R&D national target expenditure. 
Resources for research and research-related activities from the DHlNHS included the Service 
Increment for Teaching and Research (SIFT -R), awarded to regions in view of the increased 
costs of patient care in teaching hospitals. A similar scheme was set up by the DH for hospitals 
with significant research records, but who did not receive the service increments. 
All in all, in 1989-90 the Department of Health spent £225m on health research (DH 1991: 6). 
This amounted to about 15% of the total amount of £1.5 billion spent on health research 
nationally (DH 1991: 6). Although most of the funds were already committed, their inclusion in 
the general R&D programme meant that it was essential that the funds be used to good effect 
within the general framework. Each aspect, starting with the R&D priorities of the Special 
Health Authorities (SHAs) were to be addressed and reviewed and it was proposed to include the 
Locally Organised Research Scheme (LORS) within the new R&D programme. The Secretary of 
State had made it an objective to move to an expenditure of about 1.5% of the NHS budget on 
research within 5 years to enable the development of the R&D programme (DH 1991: 6). 
14 
1.8 Content and scope of Research/or Health 
The NHS programme was to focus upon applied research, taking a combined approach, placed in 
the context of advances in applicable basic research, as it was believed that it would have been be 
a mistake to concentrate on one area of research at the expense of aU others. The planning and 
setting of priorities was to be formulated in accordance with the priorities defined in Health of 
the Nation (DR 1992a), of which mental health and cardiovascular disease were of greatest 
expense to the NHS. Peckham argued for a horizontal 'stratum' view of ill-health and disease 
prevention to promote a new approach to community based research, which included the analysis 
of professional roles (Peckham 1991a: 369). 
A new method to deal with novel developments and their use and effectiveness was called for. 
Clinical audit was used as a model. Reproducible before and after treatment measures were also 
demanded, in order to assess the quality of treatment. The impact of new discoveries was also 
expected to be assessed quickly, to shorten the time between research and practical development. 
The dissemination of research findings both internally and externally was another important 
issue defined by Peckham. An emphasis was placed upon cost-effective practice, and advances in 
medicine and clinical research were to be supported, focussed and co-ordinated and regulated 
with other funding bodies, such as the "MRc. 
Two specific forms of research in the NHS programme were regarded as worthy of note and, 
therefore, were expected to feature highly in regional R&D programmes. These were, firstly, the 
investigation of new methods of disease prevention, diagnosis and treatment (including ideas 
relating to staffing, education, methods of service delivery and facilities) and, secondly, 
'evaluative science', that is, research into the assessment of health care and health practice 
methods. In addition to these forms of research, attention was to be focussed on the 
dissemination of information to ensure that good. relevant research findings were utilised by 
managers and clinicians. Three stages were noted to ensure this: the development of new 
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methods of care, the experimental introduction of these into service and evaluation in trials, and, 
finally, the establishment of their use throughout the NHS. An NHS information centre was to 
be established. This was intended to achieve this final stage, holding data gathered from existing 
local, national and international data centres on the outcomes of evaluation, cost effective 
practice methods and the type and nature of trials in progress. Information technology had a 
special role to play in research as might be expeted and, consequently, its inclusion in the R&D 
framework was important. 
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CHAPTER 2 

KEY APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF HEALTH POLICY 
2.1 Introduction 
The following chapter consists of a brief overview of the nature anci scope of policy analysis and 
how this approach has been applied in the health care field. What is significant is the lack of 
theoretical literature relating to policy analysis of research in the NBS. In the absence of such 
literature, this chapter will assess the work of Chris Ham and Michael Hill, in particular, to 
provide a framework for the subsequent analysis. Ham and Hill, in their various collaborative 
and individual work, outlined the main approaches characterising developments in policy 
analysis. In the book The Policy Process and the Modern Capitalist State, Ham and Hill (1993) 
combined both the so-called 'top down' and 'bottom-up' features of policy analysis. They argued 
that the researcber should focus in turn upon different levels of analysis; for example, at 
decision-making within organisations, at policy formation and the role of society and the state. 
However, the policy analysis approach is more of a methodology than a theory and because of 
this there was a need to find a suitable theoretical approach. Policy analysis is linked to political 
perspectives, although the political perspective of these analyst is rarely recognised by them. In 
the second part of this chapter, four key political theories are briefly examined: Marxism, 
pluralism, corporatism and elitism. The intention is not to provide a definitive review of the 
literature, but rather to explore those theories which could be relevant to the thesis. 
2.2 Defining 'health' and 'policy' 
Before embarking upon this analysis, it is worth spending some time defining what is meant by 
the terms 'health' and 'policy'. The topic of defining what health is has received much attention 
over the years; whether health 'is' something, or the 'absence' of something, such as disease. In 
this instance, however, it is taken to mean a state of complete mental, physical, spiritual and 
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social well-being, not simply the absence of disease. This is the definition adopted by the World 
Health Organisation (WHO 1978) and widely accepted by governments and agencies. This 
WHO definition relates to enabling everyone to lead an economically and socially productive life. 
The work of writers such as Illich (1976) and McKeown (1976) has indicated that health 
development cannot be extracted from the context of general development policy~ that good 
health is not simply a product of medicine and medical services. However, despite this. the 
medical model of health still predominates, although models relating to the promotion of health 
and prevention of ill health are being adopted by governments. Specifically, in England, this was 
most notable in the development of the Health of the Nation (DH 1992a) and later, in the 
acceptance of the findings of the Black Report (DHSS 1980). The problems inherent in defining 
health and in establishing the determinants of ill health are apparent. This means that the 
organisation of health services is related to the values and value judgements concerning what is 
health and consequently what health services should provide. Two basic interpretations of what 
is policy have emerged over the years. The first, which is most commonly used, is that health 
policy is an authoritative statement of intent. More often than not, this is a centrally-defined, 
government adopted policy, taken up on behalf of the public. Its aim is to improve the health and 
welfare of the population, through changing behaviours, a system, practice or situation to achieve 
specified ends. The second conceptualisation of policy can be characterised as what agencies 
actually do, not what governments would like them to do. From this point of view, there are a 
wide number of decision-makers and health policy can only be established by analysing the 
outcomes of decision-making. Policy, therefore, is actual behaviour, i.e. the goals and 
achievements of an action. These definitions are significant for future analysis because they 
shape present and future policy debates. 
Governments, therefore, inevitably make political choices regarding the nature and orientation of 
health policy and resources. How these resources are used to best effect, to ma.:'i.imise the health 
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of the population, is a long-running issue in the discipline of health policy. This debate has 
gained increasing impetus over the last few years, particularly as the cost of medicine has risen, 
as has the number of elderly people in the country (who are intensive users of health services). 
This has placed considerable financial pressures on governments. What will become apparent to 
the reader during the course of this analysis is the central role the issues of resource allocation 
and use, power and politics play in the (health) policy process and how they relate to NHS 
research and development policy in particular. 
2.3 The analysis of health policy 
In their book The Dynamics of British Health Policy Harrison et al. (1990) provided a brief 
review of the health policy literature. They noted that since 1970 there had been a steady flow of 
health policy literature but, prior to that date, there was nex1-to-nothing. Much of the literature 
relating to the foreground of NHS decision-making promoted a similar picture, a 'shared version' 
of how the health sector operated in the 1960s and 1970s. They outlined the features of this as: 
• 	 health care politics were basically incrementalist so that outputs in the health service were 
usually slow and/or of fixed scope as opposed to radical and systematic; 
• 	 the policy process is by Partisan Mutual Adjustment (PMA) which means that no single 
institution or actor can force change, but a number may be able to block it. Within PMA, the 
medical profession is extremely powerful through defensive tactics; 
• 	 the power of lay authority members is relatively very weak; 
• 	 the power of consumer organisations is even weaker; 
• 	 central health departments, such as the NHS Executive, have little control over national 
policy implementation. However, they do have control of total NHS resources and their 
allocation, approve large capital schemes and 'earmark' funds for specific uses; 
• 	 within PMA, health service managers are largely reactive in the way they work; 
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• 	 the complex organisation of occupational groups compounds policy inertia, which arises from 
the distribution of power in the NHS; and 
• 	 internal and e:-..1ernal consensus underpins this whole (Harrison et al. 1990: 6). 
For Harrison et al. (1990) 'Policy is... understood as the product of a bargaining process between 
a limited number of groups each one of which is interdependent (in a rich variety of ways) with 
the others' (Harrison et al. 1990: 5). The authors claimed that, whilst membership of a policy 
network (or community) does change, it is essentially resilient and stable, and that this network 
and the bargaining taking place within it should be placed in a wider social and economic 
context. For them, the researcher must, at any level of analysis, explain the range of 
issues/relationships being investigated and the major conditions which appear to constrain them. 
The implications of their analysis are that a number of theories should be used to explain the 
health policy process, and that macro issues should be linked to particular policy issues. 
In the light of Harrison et af. 's analysis, the following section will assess the key approaches to 
policy analysis. Both definitions of policy outlined at the beginning of this chapter (policy as an 
authoritative statement of intentJor policy, defined as what agencies actually do) imply clear sets 
of underlying values, and in discussing the analysis of the development and implementation of 
policy, two related types of analysis can be identified. These can be characterised as 'top-down', 
presciptive studies, focusing upon analysis .fJ2r. policy and how policies should be made. and 
'bottom-up', descriptive studies, focusing upon analysis g.f policy i.e. how policies are made. The 
following section will include an assessment of both these top-down and bottom-up perspectives 
of policy analysis. The chapter will conclude that the top-d.own and bottom-up perspectives 
should be combined to provide a holistic analysis ofpoHcy. 
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2.4 Top-down approaches to policy analysis 
Essentially, implementation studies taking a 'top-down', or 'implementation deficit'! approach 
begin with a government formulated policy decision. They then go on to ask: 
• 	 to what extent did the policy 'outputs' and impacts, and the actions of target groups and 
implementing officials, vary from the objectives and procedures outlined in the policy 
decision?; 
• 	 what were the major elemenis that affected policy impacts and outputs?; and 
• 	 how was the policy reformulated over time? 
This top-down method of analysis is exemplified in the work of Hogwood and Gunn (1990). 
Hogwood and Gunn looked at the preconditions required for perfect implementation and the 
reasons why they were unlikely to be met. They outlined ten preconditions which were not 
prescriptive or 'ideal', but necessary none-the-Iess (Hogwood and Gunn 1993: 196). These were: 
• 	 factors outside the implementing agency do not impose crippling constraints. These could be 
obstacles (physical or political) outside of the control of an administrator because they are 
external to the implementing agency and policy; 
• 	 an appropriate amount of time and resources are available; 
• 	 the requisite combination of resources are actually available. This is necessary at each stage 
of the implementation process; 
• 	 the policy being implemented is based upon a valid theory of cause and effect i.e it can 
reasonably be expected to work; 
• 	 that there is a direct relationship between cause and effect with few intervening links, if any. 
The larger the number of links in the chain of events leading to implementation, the more 
likely the policy is to fail; 
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.. 	 dependency relationships are minimal; there should be a single independent implementation 
agency, or, at least. if there are other agencies, there should be as few as possible and they 
. 
should have limited influence; 
• an understanding of, and agreement on, objectives is required from all involved parties; 

.. tasks are completely specified in the correct sequence; 

.. there is perfect communication and co-ordination; 

.. those in authority can command and receive absolute compliance. 

On the basis of these preconditions, Hagwood and Gunn (ibid.) devised nine stages of analysis, 
listed below, of the policy process to be used as an analytical framework. They argued that this 
framework could be used for both prescriptive and descriptive analysis but adopted a prescriptive 
approach themselves. 
• 	 Deciding to decide (issue search or agenda setting) 
This is the Identification and anticipation of opportunities and problems; -how do some 
things get on agendas and others not? 
• 	 Deciding how to decide (or issue filtration) 
When an opportunity/problem has been identified and a decision believed appropriate, how 
should the decision be made? Issue filtration requires making a calculated choice of which 
issues should be addressed by the organisation involved. 
• 	 Issue definition 
Once a policy issue has been identified, it needs more definition to explain how it has arisen 
and what causes and effects are in operation. 
.. 	 Forecasting 
Hogwood and Gunn argued that it is important to have an appreciation of the models used in 
forecasting how a situation will develop. 
• 	 Setting objectives and priorities 
• 	 Options analysis 
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All the possible routes to reach policy objectives should be analysed. 
• 	 Policy implementation, monitoring and control 
Once a 'preferred option' has arisen from the options analysis stage, these processes can be 
introduced. 
• 	 Evaluation and review 
There should be periodic reviews of policy, analysing outcomes depending upon the prior 
specification of what the desired outcomes were, and designing the programme to facilitate 
one or more evaluation methods. 
• 	 Policy maintenance, succession, or termination 
Factors to achieve policy maintenance, succession or termination should be built into policy 
from the outset. 
Hogwood and Gunn noted that these stages, in practice, often overlap and could be performed in 
a different order. They argued that their framework emphasised the need to study the 
implications of each stage ahead of doing it and that the process of analysis was often iterative. 
The authors' model is a contingent model in that it recognises that appropriate decision-making 
and the mode of analysis would vary according to the issue and the context. 
Pressman and Wildavsky's (1973) study is seen as characteristic of the top-down approach, and 
is probably best summed up in the title of their work 'Implementation. How great expectations in 
Washington are dashed in Oakland; or, why it's amazing that federal programs work at all this 
being a saga of the economic development administration as told by two sympathetic observers 
who seek to build morals on a formulation of ruined hopes' (pressman and Wildavsky 1973). 
The raison d'etre of this approach was to provide advice to those people in authority on how to 
minimise the implementation deficit. Policy, in this instance, is seen as the 'property' of those at 
the top and, therefore. fits the first definition of policy outlined earlier. 
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2.5 Bottom-up analyses of policy 
Criticism of this 'top-down' approach to policy implementation came particularly from those 
analysts taking a 'bottom-up' approach. In such an approach, the key (central) actors and 
managers were not necessarily seen as the people framing policy decisions. Policy analysts using 
the top-down methodology, therefore, ignored the possibility of policy decisions being made from 
below. The approach was difficult to use where there was no one dominant policy and where 
there were a number of actors and directives. It also underestimated or ignored the ability of 
'street-level' bureaucrats (the public sector workers who directly interacted with citizens, such as 
social security clerks) and others, to get around or modifY central policy, and blurred the 
distinction between policy formulation and implementation (Lipsky 1980). 
Bottom-up approaches to the study of policy implementation, as characterised by Hjern and 
Porter (1993), begin with the supposition that using individuals or organisations as the basic unit 
of analysis in the analytic framework distorts perceptions of implementation deficit. Hjern and 
Porter (1993) argued that a theory should be used to unite atomistic and comprehensive 
management and planning, and public administration theories. They believed that an 
'organisational society' had emerged, in which multi-organisational programmes provided many 
of the state services. Within these programmes, they went on to argue, were interconnected 
clusters of governments, associations and companies, and these were the core implementation 
structures. It is these that should form the basic units of analysis. 
Using a number of examples from the USA, Lipsky (1980) claimed that the actions of 'street­
level' bureaucrats formed a major element of public activity, and as citizens experienced 
government through them, the bureaucrats' actions and behaviour, were, effectively public 
policy. Rejecting the top-down notion, therefore, Lipsky's view was that action and decisions 
were the result of the responsive, negotiated nature of action. This occured because decisions 
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were often too complicated to systematise; the work of the 'street-level' bureaucrats required 
them to make decisions based upon observation and judgement. In addition, such discretion 
helped legitimise the welfare state by increasing the self-regard of workers and focus the 
attention of clients on them as the key to their own well-being. This had the added advantage, of 
course, of enabling policy-makers to avoid decision-making problems and blame the workers for 
any that might arise. Additionally, 'street-level' bureaucrats do not necessarily hold the same 
values and objectives as their superiors, and may operate 'formal' and 'informal' routines of 
work. As such, as Lipsky (1980) put it: 
... policy implementation analysis must question assumptions that influence flows with 
authority from higher to lower levels, and that there is an intrinsic shared interest in 
achieving agency objectives. This situation requires analysis that starts from an 
understanding of the working conditions and priorities of those who deliver policy and the 
limits on circumscribing those jobs by recombining conventional sanctions and incentives 
(Lipsky 1980: 25). 
Another issue of note is that in Britain, unlike the USA, in which Lipsky based his analysis, 
many government actions are adaptations of old programmes rather than new ones. Increased 
complexity occurs from the indirect relationship between resource adjustment and substantive 
programmes. Structural changes, such as changes of government, could also alter the context in 
which decisions are made. These 'meta policy' adjustments, or changes in the 'programme shell' 
were common top-down interventions. Ham and Hill (1993) argued that changes in Britain 
should be seen as both transforming the actual policies and restructuring the policy delivery 
system. They emphasised that the concretisation of policy goes beyond the legislative process, 
that the policy-making process continues into the implementation phase, with interaction and 
negotiation taking place between those trying to make policy into action, and those upon whom 
action depends. 
Analysis from the bottom-up perspective, begins then, with the identification of the network of 
actors involved and asking them about their goals, strategies, contacts and activities. The next 
step is twofold:' firstly, to use these contacts to formulate a network method, so as to be able to 
identify the actors at a national, regional and local level who are concerned with the financing, 
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execution and planning of programmes; and, secondly, to identify the implementation structures. 
This approach to analysis has advantages in that it begins with the problems of the actors as 
eX'Perienced by them and, subsequently, looks at ways they might be dealt with. Unlike the top-
down approach, it also allows for the unintended and intended side-effects of a programme to be 
observed. 
Specific problems involved with the bottom-up approach include the fact that studies such as 
Hjern and Porter's fail to account for the action and behaviour of previous actors, that they place 
too much emphasis on the periphery, and may under-estimate the indirect influence of the centre 
upon individuals. In addition, as the bottom-up approach fails to start with a specific theory, it 
is, allegedly, the prisoner of the actors' perceptions and activities. Consequently, unnoticed 
factors effecting them may evade analysis. An understanding of the bargaining process is 
essential if one is to provide a convincing analysis of health policy. Whereas Sabatier (1993) 
argued that a top-down analysis could be adopted in some circumstances, where clear aims, 
objectives and finances were identified, a more coherent approach to take, especially in the case 
of this analysis of the Research for Health (DH 1991b, 1993a) strategy is a synthesis of the two 
approaches. The emphasis of the PhD research, therefore, would be on the policy process as 
opposed to the study of policy implementation. As Minogue (1993) noted: 
The policy analyst, who seeks to provide description of and prescription for specific decisions 
on particular policies, cannot ignore the overall policy process which is created by the 
interaction of decisions, policy networks, organisations, actors and events. Nor can he avoid 
the broader environment within which the public policy process is located; that is, he must 
pay due regard to the interaction of society and economy, in the effort to understand the 
political consequences of this interaction (Minogue 1993: 11). 
Minogue (ibid.) added that the researcher should question what relationships of cause and effect 
fonn the basis of relationships of action and interaction, that if policy-making and 
implementation were not seen as a political process, abstract, ill-fitting recommendations would 
be produced. Almost by definition, therefore, in analysing health policy, a variety of theoretical 
approaches will need to be considered and evaluated in order to explain action and behaviour at 
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these different levels. This was a viewpoint taken up by Ham and Hill (1993), Hill (1985) and by 
Harrison et ai. (1990) in their analysis of health policy. However, the major problem with Ham 
and Hill's approach to policy analysis is that it provides a comprehensive account of the policy 
process but fails to give adequate consideration to the substance of national (central) policy itself. 
Consequently, national policy is arguably absolved from blame and, to some extent, even from 
scrutiny in favour of a detailed concentration on the weaknesses of delivery. In addition, Ham 
and Hill (1993) still worked within a corporatist framework, in which intervention by 
government, what some would describe as 'interference' in the policy process was assumed not to 
be an issue. Such a corporatist framework for policy analysis was apolitical and free from 
conflict. Implementation, therefore, still ignored the notion of conflict in the policy process and 
analysis and for this reason does not offer an adequate analysis of policy formulation and 
implementation. It is to this theory of corporatism and other major political theories that this 
chapter will now tum. 
2.6 The policy process and political theory 
The following section will briefly evaluate some of the major aspects of political theory used in 
the debate to expain the policy process. The approach taken is a selective one. Nevertheless, the 
section will initially focus on what have become the four dominant political theoretical 
perspectives which have provided the franlework for the analysis of the policy process in modem 
capitalist states: Marxism, corporatism, pluralism, and elitism. Marx saw history as propelled 
by material, productive forces. These forces compel the creation and destruction of successive 
systems of economic structure. These systems, or economic structures, form the material base of 
society upon which the many tiered superstructure of institutions is erected (Scruton 1983: 289­
90). Both pluralism and corporatism, on the other hand, are concerned with the operation of 
interest groups, their relations with government and their influence on policy. Elitism is related 
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to and, indeed, can be seen as a form of corporatism. Nevertheless, the intention of these 
political philosophies is to provide an understanding of the relationship between society and the 
state and professional organisations. 
2.6.1 Marxism and neo-Marxism 
Marxist (structuralist) accounts emphasise the merging of economic and political power, which 
maintains the domination of capital and a basic conflict between class interests. This is in 
contrast to pluralist and elitist approaches, discussed later, which focus attention on competing 
interests and groups who are denied influence. Class, however, is the ultimate focus for 
Marxists. They see business, therefore, as an interest, but it also has a role similar to that of a 
dominant elite or ruling class. Marx himself, did not have a very subtle understanding of 
government and politics, seeing government as the 'poodle of capitalists'. 
Neo-Marxists have a rather more flexible, but complex view, with class structure seen in a more 
variable and fractured way (Blowers 1984). Elites may be prominant, but are still always related 
to the underlying class structure. The state for neo-Marxists, is a kind of battIe ground, where 
the various class interests do battle, although by and large, the state is seen as relatively 
autonomous from anyone class interest. The level of this autonomy is hotly debated, however, 
by Marxists. For them, the political sympathy and organisation of the state was questioned, as it 
was seen as bound up into the maintenance and reproduction of inequalities in society. The state, 
therefore, is the captive of capitalism and in reality, government and the state is still viewed in 
the same rather crude way that Marx saw it. 
Neo-Marxists have begun to make distinctions between different categories of public expenditure, 
identifying three basic categories: 
• social expenses, used to maintain order, by, for example, providing a police force~ 
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• social investment, which supports capital accumulation by, for example, providing an 
efficient transport system. This, of course, is favourable to the owners of capital; 
• 	 social corisumption eX"Penditure, including welfare and health expenditure, which would 
maintain the workforce in a functionable order, and 'legitimate' the capitalist system, by 
making the state appear to be 'caring'. 
Power, from a Marxist perspective, relates to the ability of a group or class to attain its own 
objectives. This would make the medical profession, for instance, representative of the capitalist 
class (Blowers 1984). For Marxists, production processes cannot be seen in isolation, but have to 
be linked to meso and macro levels of analysis. For local NBS research policy, therefore, 
research funding and strategy would also have to be analysed at a national level. This introduces 
another key feature of Marxist accounts; the role of the state, which is seen as semi-autonomous 
from, but functioning in the interests of, capital. A final feature of Marxism is it emphasises on 
the underlying economic determinants of social change, although the political implications of 
these determinants are widely debated by Marxists themself. 
Society's solution for neo-Marxists is increased public involvement and political participation in 
the state, the workplace, and the local community. This was expected to lead to the broader 
social transformation they aim for. However, such nea-Marxists generally see this change as 
unlikely to be quietly achieved, and see the elite groups (unlike neo-elitists) as requiring some 
coercion and class struggle, to relinquish their privileged position. Elites, such as the medical 
profession, would be made fully accountable and have to work in accordance with public health 
priorities (Harrison et aL 1990). The Marxist approach, and concentration on class means that, 
generally, they have not concerned themselves with pressure groups. They see them as 
representing capitalist interests, but not as a primary channel through which political power is 
expressed. What is paramount for Marxists, is the capitalists' social and economic power and 
control over the means of production (Baggott 1995). However, there are variations in the 
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Marxist camp, with some recognising that there are differences in the two major classes, and that 
different groups acting in their own specific interests are significant (Baggott 1995). 
Nevertheless, 'pressure groups representing the interests of the working classes operate within an. 
environment dominated by capitalist interests. 
The Marxist approach is oriented towards answering questions which focus upon class interests 
and class conflict. As a result, it does not give adequate consideration to professional groups, 
their relationship to each other and to society. The Marxist writer Harry Braverman's thesis on 
de-professionalisation is explored in Chapter three. The section describes the limitations of 
Braverman's and, hence, the Marxist approach. As such, these limitations will not be repeated 
here. Nevertheless, in following the Marxist approach, three conceptual problems need to be 
considered: 
• 	 the resources available. How were agendas defined to win political victories and maximise 
personal benefits; 
• 	 the nature of interests. What are the conscious and unconscious interests of people? 
However, interests for Marxists, as they are based on class interest, are deducible and are, 
therefore, not testable; 
• 	 the outcomes of conflict. Marxist analyses focus on outcomes, which unlike interests, appear 
to be able to be empirically tested to establish who benefits and who loses. This is in contrast 
to elitist and pluralist concerns, which focus on who wins and who loses. However, 
consequences may reach further afield than the population being studied. As such, they are 
difficult to measure. 
Marxism is a macro theory, with a strong historical perspective. However, it is of little use in 
explaining changes at a macro level, and has not really been empirically tested. The result is that 
Marxism on its own is of little value to this thesis and it is for this reason I now turn to the 
theories of pluralism and neo-pluralism. 
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2.6.2 Pluralism and neo-pluralism 
Pluralism is a concept which developed in the early twentieth century within a liberal model of 
democratic politics. It arose to describe a system of diffuse power in a social organisation, be it a 
company or society, for example, where power is divided amongst a wide number of non-
hierarchical, voluntary, equally competing groups. Within the pluralist model, a large number of 
interest groups each compete on equal tenns for influence, members and resources. The state 
takes a passive or reactive role regarding such interest groups, making a clear distinction 
between public and private realms and between the state and society. Pluralism, therefore, does 
not utilise an explicit theory of the state but relies on a theory of government, that regards civil 
servants as having no power or independent interests of their own. 
Power for pluralists is understood as the ability to influence government policy. In his analysis of 
'sub-central' government, Rhodes (1986, 1988) characterised pluralist groups as bargaining for 
resources, such that: 
the relationship between the national community of local government and central 
departments takes on the aspects of a "garne" .. .in which both sides manoever for advantage, 
deploying the resources they control to maximise their influence over outcomes, and trying to 
avoid (where they can) becornming dependent on the other "player" (Rhodes 1986: 18). 
The domination of anyone elite in a pluralistic system is avoided through a system of polyarchy, 
and is embedded in a foundation of consensus of basic values. Power, therefore, is expressed in a 
rather mechanistic way and analysable through observable conflict. 
power involves a focus on behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which there is 
an observable conflict of (subjective) interests, seen as express policy preferences, revealed by 
political participation (Lukes 1981: 15). 
2.6.3 Corporatist and neo-corporatist models 
Corporatism arose largely as a critique of the Marxist and especially the pluralist models of 
society. It can be summed up as a 'singular, concentrated,. functionally differentiated 
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hierarchical and compulsory type of intermediation' (Schmitter 1982: 263). It was derived from 
the study of economic-corporate groups and their role in democratic political systems and 
challenged the notions of pluralism on three basic fronts. Firstly, rather than there being a large 
number of voluntary interest groups competing on equal terms for influence, members and 
resources, competition was seen to be confined toa small number of large (corporate) interest 
groups. Membership of these groups cannot be seen as voluntary, as exclusion from them is, to 
all intents and purposes, to be excluded from the fundamental aspects of the policy process. Such 
groups become, therefore, only preference groups. These preference groups are only able to 
exercise power through influencing the political, pluralist sphere. Successful producers, in 
contrast to campaigning groups, (for example, car consumer groups), therefore, achieve power 
over the market and are incorporated into the political process. 
Secondly, pluralism failed to differentiate between the different types of interest groups on the 
basis of their functional relationship to the means of production. It therefore failed to account for 
inherent structural differences in the organisational capacities of different interests. Rather than 
playing a passive, or reactive role in relation to interest (producer) groups, the modem state plays 
a very active role in the formation of groups and their interests. This it does through licensing 
and regulating their very existence, and including or excluding them from the policy-making 
process. Funding for professional bodies such as the Medical Research Council, for instance, 
comes primarily from the government and representatives from the MRC are given privileged 
access to research committees, such as regional research and development committees. However, 
in return, the government obviously can exhert control over the MRC through varying its 
funding and through having some control over recruitment. 
Thirdly, rather than there being clear distinctions between the private and public realms, or 
between state and society as pluralism posits, corporatist theory maintains the opposite. Publici 
private distinctions are blurred; governments constantly enter the private sphere to participate in 
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interest politics and interest groups develop a quasi-public role. This they do through their 
privileged position in policy formation and through their delegated powers (O'Sullivan 1988). 
Interest groups for corporatists, therefore, were generally state recognised or licensed and granted 
representational monopoly in their specific field. In return for the privileges granted such 
corporatist 'representational bodies', the selection of their leaders, and articulation of demands 
and supports, are controlled to a certain extent by the state. Incorporated organisations can, 
therefore, be seen as semi-autonomous. Corporatist control was intended as a method of 
achieving collective success; it was not simply a corrective device of the state. It was based on 
the idea of there never being a purely political (or economic) marketplace. However, the notion 
of corporatism, as O'Sullivan (1988) noted, has been criticised as 'fascism with a human face'. 
However, unlike fascism, corporatism does accept diversity, so long as it does not conflict with 
notions of political stability and economic growth. 
Later writers such as Cawson (1986) and Schmitter (1982) developed the corporatist theory 
further. Such neo-corporatists limited corporatism to a specific form of the bargaining process, 
characteristic of modern society, and claimed that there had been a dissolution of the sovereign 
state since the seventeenth century. Sovereignty was seen as moving from the state to society and 
was increasingly shared by private groups. Pluralist theory was unable to explain this change, 
due to the limited role that pressure groups, who had no political status and who were seen by the 
state as external partners. Neo-corporatism, therefore, was defined by decentralisation and 
horizontal ties, rather than the traditional vertical 'command-obedience' ones. 
Again, interest groups are integral to the administration of the state, combining representation 
and intervention in a single process of 'policy intermediation', referred to as macro-corporatism. 
Further levels of meso and micro corporatism were identified by Cawson, although his main 
interest appeared to be at the meso level. Such meso corporatism described the process whereby 
functional interest groups such as trade unions developed on the basis of specific sectoral 
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interests. Such groups achieved monopoly representation to negotiate with the state, where they 
also played a part in implementing the negotiated policies. The system of 'micro corporatism', 
identified by 'Cawson (1986), centres upon analysis of tripartite arrangements between 'peak 
associations', that is organisations representing business, functional interest groups and the state, 
but focused at a local level. 
A number of criticisms can be levelled at the corporatist approach, however. It has been argued 
that corporatist theory has not been sufficiently defined; that it can be a form of state or a theory 
of the state; that it has not been found in its ideal form (which has led to a variety of categories 
of corporatism made to fit each specific case); and, finally, that corporatism implies 
unambiguous relations and hierarchy (Rhodes 1988). Similarly, a number of further criticisms 
have been made. Firstly, the notion of interest intermediation is weak. Corporatism is indirectly, 
not directly interventionist, with state action made in conjunction with organisation based on the 
division of labour. However, the differentiation between direct and indirect action is vague, to 
the extent that it is difficult to differentiate neo-corporatism from another version of pluralism. 
Secondly, whether 'interest intermediation' (or 'concertation') can be achieved by consensus 
alone, or allows various forms of authoritarian 'central' pressure, is not made clear. Neo­
corporatists have ignored the issue of coercion, as it fosters the major weakness of traditional 
corporatism; the notion that there is a basic harmony amongst those in British society in general. 
Thirdly, the theory allows the larger dominant groups to use corporatist 'intermediation' 
procedures as a way of using the state for their own purpose, at the expense of others so that 
those outside the area of concertation are left to rely on the established political order, and 
offered meagre protection from the state. Fourthly, neo-corporatism was seen by neo-Marxists, 
such as Habermas as a new strategy of capitalist society in recession to maintain profitability 
(Pusey 1987). The state was now an indirect oppressor of the masses working as the sustainer of 
an oppressive social system rather than as an instrument of the oppressive capitalist class. The 
state now sanctioned and protected the institutions and social relationships required for the 
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domination of the capitalist class. So, there is a system of overall systematic oppression using 
corporatist techniques of 'intermediation'. 
The riposte from the neo-Marxists was that this system would only to survive as long as there 
was sufficient growth. Once this growth stopped, or slowed down, the neo-corporatist consensus 
was threatened, forcing a 'legitimisation crisis'. However, by following this route, Marxists 
move away from the notion of class, which is not necessarily associated with neo-corporatist 
groups, such as the medical profeSSion. Such groups often oppose corporatist measures, which 
according to Marxists should be in their interest. The Marxists, therefore, retreat from empirical 
reality and offer no sound theoretical basis for the notion of a 'legitimisation crisis' through 
economic recession. Fifthly, the lack of a distinction between the notions of authority and power 
is a criticism of both neo-Marxism and neo-corporatism. The latter follows a largely 
functionalist perspective and is ultimately simplistic in its treatment of recent history and in its 
view of the state, by treating it in managerial tenns, where no objections are raised to the notion 
of control by semi-public interest groups. 
2.6.4 Neo-pluralism revisited 
In response to neo-corporatist criticism neo-pluralists, such as Rhodes (1988), developed the 
notion of policy communities, that is, a policy network or organisation connected by resource 
dependencies and distinguishable from other networks by fractures in the structure of those 
resource dependencies. Policy communities, therefore, are 'stable integrated policy networks' 
(Rhodes 1988: 23), small groups of individuals brought together by common purpose and interest 
by civil servants, to look at a policy issue, through closed consultation. 
If policy networks are seen as networks of resource-dependent organisations, they can be 
distinguished by their structures of dependencies ... variations in the distribution of resources 
and the patteI!l of exchange will be central to the explanation ofvariations in the behaviour of 
actors within communities (Rhodes 1988: 29). 
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Like all pluralists, Rhodes saw a general bargaining for resources amongst essentially equal 
parties. The relationship between central and local government departments was an inter­
dependent orie, with both parties manoevering for advantage and trying to avoid becoming 
dependent upon the other. The political context of such decision-making played a more overt 
role in Rhodes analysis, at a micro-level (focusing on the roles of individual organisations), at a 
meso-level (focussing on the 'recurrent pattern of interaction' between regional and central 
organisations) and at a macro-level (focusing on the relationships between national networks and 
local government). The result for Rhodes was a focus on the exchange of resources, following a 
mechanistic model of relationships, that emphasised decision-makers' values, interests and 
expectations on the process of exchange. Exercise of power, therefore, was dependent upon 
organisational resources, the effective deployment of those resources, the particular rules of the 
'game' in question, and organisational choice of strategies. The outome of this bargaining for 
Rhodes, was 'not perpetual conflict but a shifting mosaic of relationships' (Rhodes 1986: 19). 
2.6.5 Elitism and neo-elitism 
This chapter will now turn to the fourth major political philosophy: elitism. Elitist (often called 
neo-elitist) analysts distinguish between two particular factors that they claim pluralists fail to 
take into account: 
• 	 interests involved in conflict do not necessarily compete on equal terms: 
• 	 interests involved in conflict can exercise power in ways that are not visible and are 
unavailable to less powerful interests. 
Both pluralist and corporatist notions focused exclusively on observable conflict and behaviour, 
but power does not exist only where actual conflict can be identified. One of the most effective 
uses of power, as Lukes (1981) noted, is to stop conflict arising in the first place. By studying the 
way that important decisions are made, pluralists and corporatists take over and replicate the 
inherent bias in the system they are investigating. It is important to note that non decision­
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making power is not just above preventing grievances from entering political processes as issues, 
but also that what might appear as a genuine consensus may well be a manipulated or false 
consensus. LUkes's 'third dimensional' view of power adds considerably to our understanding of 
the policy process. He explores, for example, ways in which potential issues are prevented from 
entering the political arena, for example, by analysing how the inactivity of leaders and the 
strength of institutions, prevent certain issues from entering the public arena and being aired at 
all, not to mention difficulties over getting them addressed. 
Writers such as Lukes (1981) concentrate their attention upon non-<iecision-making and upon 
group behaviour. In this way, they focus on the way power can be exercised, either by purposely 
suppressing, controlling and manipulating infonnation, or consciously through inaction, 
reputation and the manipulation of bias. Corporatism can be seen as one form of elite theory. 
However, a problem with elitist approaches is their ambiguity. As such, a number of 
characteristics of neo-elitist theory can be identified: Firstly, elitists attacked the conservative 
assumptions of pluralism and provided explanations which had commonalities with Marxist 
approaches. However, they also attacked the Marxist notion of the withering away of the state, 
and could be firmly sited within liberal political analysis. The medical profession can be seen as 
one state-licenced elite (at a national level, anyhow). The state prevents non-members from 
practising medicine, whilst the profession controls and disciplines its members. The British 
Medical Association, General Medical Council and others are, as chapter four indicates, in close 
contact with the government and its ministers and are widely consulted by them. Other 
professions, such as nurses, receive similar recognition from the state, but do not play such a 
close role in policy making as the medical profession. The unequal nature of elite groups means 
that the power elite is not representative of the community. The elitist system can be 
characterised as having limited consultation with affected groups, limited numbers, some 
continuity and communality of interests, and disproportionate control over information, money 
and skills. It would be expected, therefore, that if a controlling elite were found, there would be 
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evidence of coherence, conspiracy, or consciousness, and an overall success in achieving policy 
outcomes. 
A second characteristic of the neo-elitism is that it recognises that key issues are not necessarily 
visible. Pluralist analysis adopts the inbuilt biases and values of the systems they analyse, and 
indirect influences are, therefore, ignored. For elitists, those individuals holding power will try to 
prevent issues from arising, preferring attention to be focused upon relatively innocuous issues. 
Generally elitists favour corporatist decision-making strategies, according to Blowers (1984). I 
The emphasis of elitists on the concentration of power and its hidden nature had led them to their 
concentrating on non-decision-making. Those affecting non-decisions engage in negative 
decision-making, co-opting, not acting at all, or deferring, as they recognise that by doing I 
nothing, their objectives will be achieved; the rules of the game favour them. Then again, the 
elites may just be unaware of the biases, so that acting is not premeditated. However, the 
unpremeditated action or inaction is contestable; passivity is a decision. Inaction could be 
conscious, because action was unnecessary. 
For those affected by non-decisions, there are a number of possible reasons for not raising an 
issue which might be in their interest: 
• 	 they may see themselves as powerless and see little point in doing anything themself 
However, this inaction is difficult to establish, as it is possible to believe that people may 
make their feelings felt, even if they see no results occuring; 
• 	 abstention, for which there can be two explanations. Non-decisions could be suppressed, or 
people may just not see them as an issue. The majority of people, it can be assumed, would 
rather spend their time, money and effort on things other than moulding public policy; 
• 	 mobilisation of bias. Under this notion, there are certain 'rules of the game' inherent within 
society's rituals, beliefs. values and procedures. These operate to the benefit of some people 
and to the detriment of others. Non-participants under this notion, can be viewed as suffering 
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from a false consciousness, and are, consequently, unaware of the possibility of action. This 
concept brings neo-elitists close to Marxist conceptions and indicates a lack of clarity in their 
thinking regarding interests. This is because like pluralists, they also tend to apply a 
subjective concept of interest, as shown by preference. 
2.6.6 Problems with neo-elitism 
A number of problems with the elitist approach can be identified. The following discussion will, 
therefore, briefly assess these problems. The first problem with neo-elitism is that like pluralists, 
with neo-elitists, it is impossible to recognise what interests exist when individuals themself 
don't recongnise them. The counter-argument from pluralists is that values often remain 
uncontested but once a problem is identified, otherwise latent interests become mobilised. This 
leads to conflict, which an open and responsive decision-making process arbitrates. The second 
problem is that non-decisions, elitists argue, are as open to analysis as decisions. However, non­
decisions are non events. As non-events cannot be studied empirically, how can non-decisions? 
However, non-decisions do not necessarily mean that no decision is taken, or interest evinced. 
Thirdly, there are methodological problems with elitist theory; theory is difficult to relate to the 
evidence. Fourthly, how can one discover that a non-issue is problematic? Accounts of non­
decision-making rely on the retrospective analysis of decisions that subsequently became issues of 
concern. Fifthly, like pluralist accounts, elitist accounts concentrate on describing the 
distribution of power, rather than the underlying reasons for conflict and a concern with 
outcomes, and largely ignore issues of technological and economic change. This is what 
structuralists concentrate their attention on. 
Elite theory concentrates attention, therefore, on peak associations and their respective 
departments of government. This is not to say that the two sides sometimes disagree, but they 
are mutually supportive. However, this does suggest that original points of contention in the 
initial 'bargain' between the government and medical profession could be difficult to resolve. 
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Some authors who take an elitist perspective, such as Aldford (1975) do allow for major 
competition between elites. Aldford's work is explained in chapter four, where the dominant, 
challenging and repressed interest groups he identified are described. 
A sixth identified problem with neo-elitism is that there is no agreement concerning how much 
and what type of elitism will exist in any given circumstances. Elite theory is, therefore, divided 
itself, and like pluralism, a broad church in the sense that a number of factors may be utilised, to 
explain a certain case. However, this flexibility allows elite theory to explain the real world in 
ways which are consistent with the facts. Finally, elite theory suggests a homogeneity amongst 
elite groups, but this may not be the case. This thesis, for example, highlights some of the 
divisions in the ranks of the medical profession over issues related to research. The medical 
profession is an elite, but a divided one, which operates in different ways, at different levels. The 
theories of decision-making explained are useful, but not enough in their own right for the 
purposes of this thesis. Equally important as explanations of decision-making are explanations 
of non-decision making and discussion of how issues are kept from appearing on public agendas. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the policy analysis approaches and how they are linked to different 
political theories. What was clear was that none would be sufficient on its own to explain the 
development of research activity in the NHS. Instead a combination of approaches it was argued, 
would provide a more comprehensive and coherent explanation. Taking Lukes' <three 
dimensional' view of power into account, and combining it with Ham and Hill's and some of the 
prescriptive elements of Hogwood and Gunn's models, would offer a more holistic framework. 
This would allow us to analyse the formulation of policy at national level, help us evaluate its 
development, official reactions to it, and its relation to other policy developments. It would also 
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help us in evaluating such factors as options analysis, policy implementation, monitoring and 
control, evaluation and review, policy maintenance, succession and termination. 
The corporatist perspective in which policy analysis can, arguably, be situated, would be a useful 
model for describing society, in which decision-making and policy-making takes place (or does 
not), were it not for the fact that the corporatist arrangements have broken down since 1979. 
Ham and Hill wrote at a time when the bureaucratic 'corporate state' model was still 
predominant (although it has since been updated). Corporatism was under challenge by 
Thatcherite reformers, but the full impact of the new public management recreated in the image 
of private sector administration had not yet come about in the NHS. Between 1979-1995 the 
NHS was subjected to a number of reforms as a result of successivel Conservative Governments' 
attempts to make it operate on new marketised lines. A system of hospital trusts, purchasers and 
providers, and GP fundholders was created. This has generated something of a power struggle 
between new managers and older dominant professions such as medicine and interfered with the 
traditional division of labour and associated hierarchical structures within the NHS. The impact 
of the NHS research strategy can only be understood within the context of these changes. Ham 
and Hill did not address these major issues of marketisation, auditing and regulation in the public 
sector. 
Instead the author has turned his attention to consideration of what Michael Power calls the 
'audit explosion' and the 'reinvention of government' (power 1994). By the latter he refers to 
the adoption by the public sector, and impact on it, of private sector business methods, including 
goal definition, efficient resource allocation, financial performance and competition. Power also 
refers to another key development in the public sector. While service delivery remains an ideal, 
it has actually become less prominent and now often forms but a subordinate component of 
managerial language and practice. 
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In attempting to understand how and why the Research for Health strategy (DH 1991b, 1993a) 
was introduced and what its consequences are, or will be, the author draws a distinction, as does 
Klein, between traditional biomedical research and the newer health services research (Klein 
1990). Much of the latter may be seen as concerning itself with the audit approach focusing 
upon effectiveness, efficiency and economy. Arguably, policy analysis may be seen as one arm of 
the auditing eX"plosion. Another is the rapid expansion and adoption of the science of health 
economics, which purports to offer health solutions by measuring health and related activities. 
Culyer, whose work on the health research strategy is of crucial importance, is himself a health 
economist His work strengthens the audit approach within the NHS. 
However, a key question arose as how this process can be understood in theoretical terms. For 
this reason, the work of Michel Foucault was turned to, as a way to conceptualise and explain the 
changes to the NHS and to NBS research and development policy. The limitations of the policy 
analysis approach are, therefore, addressed, to provide a more complete, sociological explanation. 
It is to the work of Power and Foucault that I now turn to in chapter 3. 
I An approach which attempts to show how the difference between central policy aims and outcomes can be minimised. 
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CHAPTER 3 

fHEORETICAL APPROACHES TO 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE NHS 
1 
I 
I 
I 
3.1 Introduction j 
j 
The following chapter will specifically examine the the work of Michel Foucault and Michael I 
Power to provide a macro theory in which to locate research in the NBS. Their work will be 
evaluated against the nature and characteristics of the changing NHS and will be used to frame 
subsequent discussions. The changes affecting the NHS since the 1979 have been much 
discussed (Mohan 1991, Butler 1992, Ranade 1997). Conservative Government policy promoted 
and enforced the privatisation of public services and utilities, with the NBS proving no exception 
to this rule. The scope of state activities was questioned by successive Conservative 
administrations. A climate of opinion in which the re-engagement of initiative and effort on the 
part of the community and the individual was created, which was viewed as being necessary to 
bolster the state's limited resources (Mohan 1991). Since the Labour Government came to power 
in 1997, there has not been a fundamental change of direction. With regard to health services 
research, Rupert Klein (1990) noted that he expected a new research market to arise as a result of 
two factors: Firstly, Tory Government plans had stirred up a political 'hornet's nest', giving a 
new prominence to health policies because of the now fragile nature of the political consensus 
over the health service. Secondly, a new policy arena was opening up. leading to a market for 
research addressing basic issues concerning the financing and organising of health care. At the 
time when the NBS was created. these issues were thought to have been resolved.. The 
separation of the purchasing and providing functions arising from the White Paper Working for 
Patients (DH 1989) would probably lead to an increased call for an 'economising model' of 
research, helping purchasers to calculate contract costs, assess quality and economise (Klein 
1990). 
Michael Power. whose work is ex-plored later in this chapter, characterised a society in which 
new systems of management had been established, such that management was now by oversight 
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and rule setting. Such oversight and rule setting bears a close resemblance to Foucault's notion 
of power and control through normalisation and the power of the 'gaze', ideas formulated by 
Foucault through his reconceptualisation of Jeremy Bentham's panopticon. Foucault's work will 
be referred to several times throughout the course of this chapter, to explain the pre-eminence of 
the medical profession and the hospital as the centre for the care of the ill. The background and 
influences of Foucault will, therefore. be analysed, and the issue of power, through the 
architecture of the panopticon, regulation, individualisation and normalisation. The chapter will 
then explore and appraise the major points arising from Power's work and examine the key 
theoretical issues arising from them. It is hoped that the reader will notice a number of instances 
where Foucault's work is particularly applicable. I will return to Foucault in the final section of 
this chapter and will make these instances explicit, evaluating Foucault's notion of the 
panopticon as a useful metaphor to explain change in the modem NHS. 
3.2 	 Regulation and individualisation; the internalisation of norms 
and their self-enforcement 
Michel Foucault has become a very influential figure in British sociology. Foucault is more 
commonly referred to as a philospher, rather than a historian because his work does not lend 
itself easily to empirical testing. Nevertheless, Foucault attempted to combine the disciplines of 
history and philosophy to develop a critique of modem society which took two forms: 
• 	 a description of the historical conditions in the West leading to 'modem' forms of 'rational' 
knowledge, which is organised into 'disciplines'; 
• 	 the analysis of the present, the individual and modem state in relation to this knowledge and 
discipline. 
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Foucault saw his analogy as a mixture of French and German forms of analysis, deriving from 
Kant's question 'what is the Enlightenment?' (Merquior 1991). Since Comte, Foucault 
believed, this question in France had been translated into a questioning of the history of science. 
However, in Germany, from Weber to Habermas, it was related to the problem of social 
rationality. Foucault took from the Comtean approach a concentration on reason as knowledge 
but also took from the Weberian approach the acknowledgement of the multitude of social forms 
of reason: a 'pluralist' conception of rationality in modern culture. Foucault's central concern, 
therefore, was the relationship between knowledge and power (Merquior 1991). 
Foucault's work emanated from a crisis in the 'Iitero-philosphic' tradition of French philosophy 1 
(Merquior 1991). The 'new' philosophers like Foucault and Derrida were influenced by the 
human sciences such as linguistics, Freudian psychology, avante-garde literature and art rather 
than basing their works upon empirical evidence. This is an important point as it illustrates the 
fact that Foucault was more of a philospher than a sociologist. His work, therefore, was rather 
metaphysical, rather than based upon any methodologically-sound evidence. Indeed, this has 
been and is a particular criticism of Foucault and his followers, such as Larson (1990) who are 
interested and write about the history and sociology of the professions (Macdonald 1995). This is 
probably because Foucault's interest was in the body and doctors' relationship to it via the 'gaze' 
(Foucault 1977a). As a result, the work is of particular concern to sociologists of health and 
illness, and of medicine, such as Armstrong (1983). The importance of this is evident, in the 
following chapter. 
Foucault observed new areas of history in the West, such as the history of modern medicine and 
the evolution of social attitudes towards madness. He became associated with the structuralists 
and later was seen as a leader of the 'post-structuralist' movement. Foucault's intention was to 
analyse the foundations of social science through his enquiry into modem rationality. This 
analysis, he argued. should encompass the complex multitude of elements including class 
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relations, modalities of knowledge, professional conflicts, institutional game-playing and a 
complete history of rationality. 
Foucault applied his general argument about power, knowledge and discipline to the history of 
modern medicine. In The Birth a/the Clinic (Foucault 1977a), Foucault became interested in the 
medical gaze and how it was institutionalised, inscribed in social space, and how the new 
hospitals of the eighteenth century supported and were also the result of this gaze. This led him 
to examine the architecture of these hospitals and how a directing principle of them was the 
observation of bodies, individuals and things under a centralised system of observation. 
Foucault's subsequent analysis of the penal system, in Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1977b) 
confirmed his interest in the system of observation - in this case, prison 'reform' from the early 
nineteenth century. However, this reorganisation of the prison system was invariably associated 
with Jeremy Bentham. The principle of panopticism existed before Bentham wrote about it, a 
pOint which Foucault admitted, but nonetheless, attributed to Bentham (Semple 1993). Foucault 
(1980) argued that the word 'panopticon' related to the principle of the system. He noted that 
Bentham did not just create an architectural design, but invented a technology of power 
formulated to uncover the problems of surveillance. However, this was not strictly the case. 
Bentham did not succeed in applying his idea of the panopticon and the closest the idea came to 
being put into practice was in the design of a prison built at Millbank in London. However, this 
still did not represent a panopticon as Bentham envisaged. The prison was beset with problems, 
the prison population was too high to be able to afford one prisoner to a cell and the actual prison 
was built on marshy ground, which led to structural problems in the actual building itself 
(Ignatieff 1978, Macdonald 1995). In practice, the principles of panoptic ism were probably more 
evident in an increased use of solitary confinement as a form of punishment. Nevertheless, the 
concept of panopticism which Foucault developed is still of interest and is deserving of further 
analysis. 
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-3.2.1 Panopticism 
The aim ofdiscipline according to Foucault, was to: 
• 	 obtain power at the lowest cost, economically and politically; 
• 	 ma'<imise and e:-..1end the effects of this social power constantly and successfully; 
• 	 link this expansion of power with the output of institutions such as medical schools where 
such power was exercised and, therefore, increase their utility and conformity. 
Foucault argued that at face value, the disciplinary mechanisms he identified seemed to be a way 
to get individuals to adopt general patterns of behaviour as defined in law. However, these 
mechanisms tended. to emphasise differences and minimise similarities between people. At the 
point of expression, there is a relative suspension of the law. The discipline in this respect is a 
'counter law'. Although law limits power, the widespread nature of panopticism works invisibly, 
behind laws to reinforce, support and increase power. 'In the genealogy of modem society [the 
disciplines] ... have been, with the class domination that traverses it, the political counterpart of 
the juridical norms according to which power was redistributed' (Foucault 1977b: 223). 
Foucault argued that no specific individual, class or group decided to form this system of power 
but it arose randomly out of local conditions and needs before a class strategy could co-ordinate it 
into a structural form. Power was not a superstructure, but it did form part of the forces of 
production and does change with them. He argued that bourgeois power was self amplifying in 
a manner of successive transformations. 
One has to reckon with its [the bourgeoisie's] strokes of genius, and among these is precisely 
the fact of its managing to construct machines of power allowing circuits of profit, which in 
tum re-inforced and modified the power apparatuses in a mobile and circular manner 
(Foucault 1980: 60). 
However, this notion does imply a conceptualisation of the state which reflects Foucault's past as 
a Marxist, where a powerful bourgeoisie are in control of society through some form of self-
amplifying power. According to Foucault (1977b), the power to punish was characterised by the 
panoptic network as opposed to a general consciousness of the law in each individual. It. 
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therefore. if Foucault is to be believed, operated at some kind of a metaphysical level. For 
Foucault, power, or disciplinary power, operated through five principle modes: 
• it differentiates individuals; 
• it relates action to the whole; 
• it quantitatively measures and orders the level, nature and abilities of individuals; 
• it promotes conformity; 
• it normalises. 
Norms (prescriptions serving as common guidelines of social action) were seen as a basis of 
coercion for Foucault, with the panoptic network promoting the power of the norm. The norm 
acts as a benchmark to measure individual differences and thus maintain homogeneity, wherein 
lies its power. Foucault argued that at the end of the classical age, normalisation, along with 
surveillance, became a great instrument of power. 
In a sense, the power of normalisation imposes homogeneity; but it individualises by making 
it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialities and to render the 
differences useful by fitting them one to another (Foucault 1977b: 184). 
Foucault developed Bentham's concept of the panopticon (Foucault 1977a, 1977b) and argued 
that its theoretical architecture could be used as an illustrative metaphor for the exercise of power 
and the norm in society. In this model, visibility of the individual is the trap. A basic, simplified 
representation of this can be seen below. 
50 
Figure 1. The architecture ofthe panoptlcon 
Each prisoner is lit from the back by the light from a window so that they can be clearly observed 
at any time by the guard in the central watchtower. They are, then, constantly visible and 
individualised in their own space; they are seen but cannot see others. They are simply objects 
of information. Consequently, power is expressed through the visibility of the inmate to the 
guard but is unverifiable as the inmate never knows when the guard is actually looking at 
himlher. Power is consequently automised and disindividualised. Foucault argued that discipline 
worked to counter the advantages of groups of people, to neutralise counter-power and prevent 
the formation of potentially devisive groups. At the same time, it introduced compact 
hierarchical networks so that there was an individualising pyramid. 
The disciplines are the ensemble of minute technical inventions that made it possible to 
increase the useful size of multiplicities by decreasing the inconveniences of the power which, 
in order to make them useful, must control them (Foucault 1977b: 220). 
The separation of the cells implied a lateral invisibility and a guarantee of order. The result was 
that the collective effects of a crowd would be replaced by a group of separated individualities 
who could be supervised and numbered by the guardian and who see themselves as detached and 
in an observed solitude. As power is e:o..llressed through the architecture of the machine, it does 
not matter who operates it or who exercises the power. Foucault praised the panopticon as it 
produced an homogenous effect of power. Force was not needed and the panopticon also acted as 
a source of knowledge on the individual inmate. It was a laboratory able to be used to alter 
51 

individual behaviour and for experimentation. Foucault argued that it could also be used by a 
director to spy on the whole establishment. "vorkers and inmates. He noted that the panopticon 
was an ideal type. a form of political technology which should not be seen as being given a 
specific use. He saw its application in all areas. 
It is a type of location of bodies in space, of distribution of individuals in relation to one 
another, of hierarchical organisation, of disposition of centres and channels of power, of 
definition of the instruments and modes of intervention and power, which can be 
implemented in hospitals, workshops, schools, prisons (Foucault 1977b: 205). 
According to Foucault, the panopticon's strength was that it never intervened, it was in constant 
operation and silent. The structure intensified power, assuring its effectiveness and efficiency 
through its preventive nature, automatic and continuous operation, and through its economic 
controls. Foucault claimed that any panoptic institution could easily be inspected at any time by 
any member of the public. Consequently, this guarded against tyrannical regimes; observers 
could always be observed by society as a whole. For power to increase and the power of society 
also to increase, the panopticon's solution he described as follows: 
the productive increase of power can be assured only if, on the one hand, it can be exercised 
continuously in the very foundations of society, in the subtlest possible way, and if, on the 
other hand, it functions outside these sudden, violent, discontinuous forms that are bound up 
with the exercise of sovereignty (Foucault 1977b: 208). 
Foucault argued that disciplinary power was invisible, but imposed compulsory visibility on those 
subjected to it. This principle of always being able to be seen, kept the individual under 
subjection of power. 'Subjects' become 'objects' to be observed by a power only operating 
through the gaze. This also results in individual's being enveloped in a complex bureaucratic 
network of paperwork: 
The examination that places individuals in a field of surveillance also situates them in a 
network of writing; it engages them in a whole mass of documents that capture and fix 
them ... A 'power of writing' was constituted as an essential part in the mechanisms of 
discipline (Foucault 1977b: 189). 
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Foucault argued that in the modern age, the community and public life no longer constitute the 
basic elements of society, and that there were now only individuals and the state. He stated that 
there was an increasing influence of the state from the nineteenth century, and an increased 
intervention in all areas and details of social life. As a consequence, there had, indeed, been an 
increase in the amount of panopticons, acting to justify and refine the state. These panopticons 
constitute the 'circuits of communication [which} are the supports of an accumulation and a 
centralisation of knowledge' (Foucault 1997b: 217). 
For Foucault, power and control needed to be equally balanced against each other in order to 
maintain equality. And this was a paradox contained within the confines of his work; that 
greater equality would result from greater surveillance and, hence, a more 'repressive' 
environment. Foucault argued that the emergence of these disciplinary methods resulted in a 
level of describable individuality which turned this description into a form of control and 
domination. In his view, discipline had changed in nature, in order to take on a positive role of 
increasing the potential use of individuals. In other words, power produces, rather than represses 
or conceals; it produces reality, rituals of truth and domains of objects. As such, the individual 
and knowledge gained of the individual, belongs to this production. 
Foucault noted that Bentham underestimated the ability of 'prisoners' to resist this power. 
Foucault (1980) acknowledged that there was, indeed, resistance from an early stage in the 
factories and that the systems of micro-power expanded over time, starting with the factories 
peopled with children and women's labour-people who, due to the patriarchal nature of society, 
were already used to obeying. Power was more difficult to exercise in other sectors, however, so 
it was delegated, with a chief acting as a negotiator. Countervailing power existed, therefore, 
that was directed at bosses by the workers and occasionally at the workers by the chief. This 
would continue until the 'mechanisation' of the functions that management were unable to 
control was achieved. 
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In The Birth of the Clinic (Foucault 1977a) Foucault eXlllained how he believed power and 
knowledge were mutually supportive. Discipline expanded throughout society according to 
, 
Foucault. into such areas as production and knowledge transmission. More and more 
information was gathered on factors e:-.ternal to the immediate concerns of the hospitals and 
other agencies. As the panoptic network spread, professional specialisms were re-ordered and 
became vehicles in which any process of objectivisation could be used as a tool of subjection. 
Different branches of knowledge, such as clinical medicine, grew from the expansion of these 
networks, enabling 'an epistemological 'thaw' through a refinement of power relations: a 
multiplication of the effects of power through the formation and accumulation of new forms of 
knowledge' (Foucault 1977a: 224). The state came to control these methods of discipline and 
although the police2 were a state apparatus linked to the central political powers, the type of 
power exercised was specific as were the mechanisms it operated and elements constituting it. 
Foucault believed that resistance to power should be analysed through the observation of the 
positions occupied and action used by each competing force and at the strategies of counter­
attack and resistance used. 'This theme of struggle only really becomes operative if one 
establishes concretely - in each particular case - who is engaged in struggle, what the struggle is 
about, and how, where, by what means and according to what rationality it evolves' (Foucault, 
1980: 164). Foucault's interest, therefore, was very much on the individual and the impact of 
power upon the individual. The implication is that the individual is portrayed rather as a victim, 
and an isolated victom of the state at that, reflecting Foucault's Durkheimian influence. This has 
its problems in this thesis, as the corporatist conception of the NHS outlined in chapter two relies 
upon a relationship of corporate groups with the state. It therefore challenges Foucault's model 
of modem society. 
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1 
3.2.2 The'Audit Society' 

The chapter will now go on to evaluate each of the major contentions made by Power, but with 

. 
specific reference to the English National Health Service (NBS). The discussion is important, as 
it provides a framework for the susequent analysis. The chapter will assess the rise of health 
services research as an additional feature in the changing nature of health service provision and 
the 'audit society'. This is important and something Power did not adequately cover. Power did 
not give any consideration to the role that research and development plays in the audit process 
and how government funded R&D has been oriented to reflect and support the changes in the 
nature of health service provision and the needs of the new public managers. These factors are 
all intrinsically linked, as will become clear to the reader as the chapter progresses. As such, the 
thesis builds upon and develops Power's works and finnly contextualises research and 
development policy and its implementation in the wider context of the NHS. 
Power (1994, 1996. 1997) has described a situation where there has spread throughout British 
society a system of checking, assessment, scrutiny, verification and evaluation (power 1996). 
This is what he refers to as the 'audit society' and very much describes Britain of the 1990s. 
Audit, he argued, has become an idea and not just a technique of observation. It has become 
implicit in the ways that policy-makers and practitioners understand what they are doing. Its 
expansion has reflected a basic shift in the nature of government, from a changing conception of 
administration and governance and marks a movement away from running public services on the 
basis of trust, towards one of questioning and mistrust. The influence of private sector 
administration has created a 'new public management' and facilitated the ore-invention of 
government'. This re-invention was characterised, according to Power, by centrifugal pressure 
pushing for the devolution and decentralisation of services through privatisation or 
'enterprisation'. The style of government then is shifted towards oversight and rule setting rather 
than direct prov~sion. However, an equally strong alternative pressure exists to keep control over 
these devolved functions so that in practice the state retains control over functions that it appears 
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to have devolved to autonomous bodies. The state, then, often becomes regulator of last resort, 
indirectly operating through new forms of control which appear to be apolitical. 
Power (1994) argued that these 'centrifugal' and 'centripetal' forces appeared to be reconciled by 
audit and accounting practices better than any other method of assessment and control. The 
enthusiasm for the audit in every sphere of life has undermined service-specific values such as 
caring and teaching and these are being displaced by more abstract quantitative and financial 
categories. The word 'audit' has come to represent a number of values such as efficiency, 
visibility, independent validation, rationality and the promise of control regardless of whether or 
not it can actually achieve them. Audit. therefore, appears invulnerable to failure. Transparency 
and accountability were two concepts which Power believed were used interchangeably. Audit 
was often justified because it has increased the transparency of corporate and individual actions. 
However, audit does not automatically contribute to organisational transparency, as it is 
concerned with control over the systems of control, rather than direct, first-hand observations and 
control over each and every individual. The Conservative Government believed that this would 
result in a shift in power towards the public from the professionals, and towards the 
'stakeholders' and away from the experts and professionals. For example, through the agency of 
bodies such as the Audit Commission (set up in 1982) and the National Audit Office (NAO), 
public sector audits officially enable government bodies to 'observe themselves critically and 
objectively in the service of initiatives in public financial management and policy accountability' 
(power 1994: 33). Value For Money (VFM) auditing, which forms the basis of these changes 
concerns more than monitoring. It is also meant to mould and evaluate performance in terms of 
economy, effectiveness and efficiency. However, Power (1994) outlined how effectiveness was 
not easily measurable in this way. In contrast, efficiency and economy, which can be measured 
and audited in economic terms, are instead prioritised by VFM. He argued that there was a 
movement towards 'management by numbers'. This allowed a movement towards 'centralised 
forms of control and the displacement of concerns about good policy by concerns about good 
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management' (Power 1994: 34) and illustrated the demand of managers on clinicians to verify 
their clinical decisions. The result was the displacement of experts of the 'first order', such as 
doctors and nurses with experts. of the 'second order', such as managers and accountants. This is 
because the managers and accountants increasingly control the tenns of public discourse and 
because their power means that if people express reservations about audit, they appear to be 
defending their secrecy and privileges, emphasising the lack of trust inherent within the system. 
Power was an accountant by training. His work, therefore, came very much from an accountancy 
and public administration stable. The social and sociological implications of his work have not 
been explored as well as they might have been. Power based his analysis on secondary sources 
and documents, rather than from primary data. In the light of the changes as described, the 
following discussion will take each of the points raised by Power (1994) and examine whether 
they can be used to explain adequately the philosophy behind these reforms and their nature. 
3.2.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the previous section has focused upon the work of Michel Foucault and Michael 
Power, notably on Foucault's conception of power, knowledge and discipline and the relationship 
of these concepts to the audit society envisaged by Power (1994). A key feature of Foucault's 
conception was the panopticon, a concept based upon Jeremy Bentham's ideas for ensuring the 
economic and effective operation of prisons. The use of audit as a form of control over the 
functions devolved by managers was seen to strongly resemble this notion of panopticism 
developed by Foucault. The audit measures, outcome indicators and associated measures, such as 
Health ofthe Nation targets (DH 1992a) were seen to closely resemble the notion and processes 
of normalisation, as these were not measures of direct control. Targets were published and the 
methods to reach them - devolved to local managers and clinicians. Targets were to be achieved, 
therefore, through clinicians normalising their behaviour. As such, the concept of panopticism 
and normalisation are clearly of significance and worthy of further investigation as part of this 
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thesis, therefore, and in casting light on our understanding of the operation of the NHS and how 
R&D policy relates to it. 
In the light of the discussion above, the chapter will proceed, to take each of the major elements 
constituting Power's 'audit explosion' (power 1994) and evaluate them in the light of the 
literature concerning the Conservative Government's reforms of the NHS. In addition, it will 
also add to Power's thesis, the changes to, and association of, research and development policy, 
as an additional element of the audit explosion. This is also seen to further link the work of 
Power to the NHS and to Foucault, as the panopticon was seen by Foucault as a site for 
experimentation. as well as observation. Research, therefore. is intrinsically linked to the 
establishment of the panoptic network constituting the NHS. The chapter will, initially, focus on 
the marketisation of the NHS, characterised by the successive Conservative Governments' calls 
for the devolution of accountability and the organisation and management responsibility for 
service provision, but which, in fact, masked a centralisation in the NHS. This equates to the 
establishment of the framework in which panopticism could flourish. The changing nature of 
what is deemed 'relevant' knowledge was a second characteristic of the audit explosion, such that 
there was, according to Power (1994, 1997) an increased emphasis on the three e's - economy, 
efficiency, and effectiveness. This is evaluated in section 3.4. and the connection made with 
Foucault's analogy of the medical profession, medical knowledge and the process of gaining 
knowledge over the inmates of the panopticon. Section 3.5. focuses on the role of research policy 
and politics in the NHS. Section 3.6. takes Power's (1994) contention that there has been a 
displacement and subordination of traditional experts, and evaluates it in the context of the NHS. 
This relates to Foucault and social scientists influenced by Foucault, such as Larson (1990), who 
see the control of knowledge producers (those who know) as central to the control of the 
provision of health care services. The chapter concludes with a re-evaluation of the work of 
Foucault in the light of the preceding debate. The intention is to provide a theoretical 
framework for the thesis, and, therefore, for the subsequent analysis. 
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3.3 Marketisation, centralisation, devolution and accountability 
The following section is an examination of the issues of centralisation, devolution and 
accountability in the NHS. It is the first of the principal characteristics of power's 'audit 
explosion' (Power 1994) identified and evaluated in this chapter. The section will examine how 
the rhetoric of the devolution of accountability and decision-making espoused by the 
Conservative Governments between 1979 and 1997 masked an increased centralisation in the 
NHS. The section will illustrate the realities and consequences of these changes and examine the 
role of research and development in them. Virginia Bottomley, the former Secretary of State for 
Health, saw accountability as one of the major issues in the health service in 1994 (Bottomley 
1994a). Bottomley was continuing a trend characterised by Klein: 'While in the post-war era of 
economic growth governments were anxious to centralise credit-to claim responsibility for the 
improvements made possible by increasing prosperity-the stress now is on diffusing blame for the 
inevitable shortcomings in an era of economic crisis: to decentralise responsibility is also to 
disclaim blame' (Klein 1989: 140). It has continued to be a major issue up until the time of 
writing. Bottomley believed that the Patient's Charter (DH 1989) was important in achieving 
the goal of accountability because it heightened public expectations of service by attempting to 
define standards. The NBS reforms gave individual trusts their own corporate identity, giving 
the public, Bottomley claimed, a 'clearer idea of who is in charge' (Bottomley 1994a: 21). 
The Griffiths Report (DHSS 1983) as noted in chapter one, led to the replacement of elected 
managers at unit, district and regional levels. This could in fact be seen as the reduction of 
accountability in the health service and a general trend in domestic politics in the UK towards a 
'democratic deficit'. It was an indication again of an increasing centralisation of government 
and the erosion of its accountability. In 1994 William Waldergrave, the Minister responsible for 
the Office of ?ublic Service and Science. argued the opposite was the case and that the 
government was strengthening citizens' rights through developing a purchaser-provider split in 
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the NBS, local government and Whitehall departments (Gray and Jenkins 1994). These 
developments were characterised by Power (1994) and were what Hood (1991) termed New 
Public Management (NPM). This devolution as proposed in the Griffiths Report (op.cit.) and, 
later, in Working for Patients (DH 1989) was promoted by the then Conservative Government as 
a means to 'empower' citizens. It consequently attempted to present its policy as practical and 
pro-community in contrast to being one ideologically obsessed with the free-market. The 
attempt, therefore, was to separate policy from the politics of the NBS. However, the government 
had not empowered individual citizens, but acquired additional powers and/or given them to a 
'new magistracy' (Gray and Jenkins 1994). This new magistracy, which acted as the 
government's agents, consisted of members of the health authority boards. It was they who were 
now appointed managers, replacing elected representatives. However, Paton (1993) argued that 
in the 1980's political control of the health boards was blatant and that if this continued, 
devolved responsibilities would simply be seen as centrally mandated. He claimed that the only 
gain from this would be secrecy. At the same time, the government had formed quasi-markets, 
creating the illusion of empowerment, it was, in fact, another version of NPM, where the 
individual also had no power 
The NHS and Community Care Act (1990) (NBS CCA) introduced an extra level of reporting 
responsibility between trusts and FHPs and RHAs (namely, district health authorities) and 
between RHAs and the DH (namely, the NBS Managment Executive). It did not cover 
accountability requirements in primary care though. However, in response to this, from April 
1990 a new GP contract was introduced which (unsurprisingly) followed the same political 
agenda as the NBS CCA. All this amounted to centralisation, although the government would 
not admit it. The problem for the Conservative Government was to prevent the market from 
producing socially or economically unacceptable outcomes, whilst, at the same time, not 
imposing such tight constraints that effective incentives to efficient behaviour were stiffled. 
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The inclusion of doctors into the realms of management through the formation of clinical 
directorates was an attempt to make them accountable for the resources allocated to them. This 
was strategic management in the strictest sense: clinical directorates were set objectives (working 
with purchasers), which they were expected to achieve within the agreed budgets, and made 
accountable for any not met. Doctors were also expected to be accountable for ensuring that the 
treatment provided by the NHS worked (Timmins 1994b: 8). The result was that GP fundholders 
and purchasers were increasingly likely to insist that trust-based doctors adhered to clinical 
guidelines and audit their work when setting contracts. This could simply be seen as a method of 
bureaucratic regulation rather than a way of making providers incorporate quality into their 
work. Paton (1993) argued that ifDHAs and RHAs were involved in Medical Audit Committees, 
they were not contracting on the basis of quality, but regulating or controlling the quality 
assurance function. He noted that problems in practice were being worked out 'on the hoof in 
the NHS. Indeed, quality and defining quality were key issues to the NHS. There was a distinct 
lack of information available to indicate what effective, quality services were. This was a major 
factor in the government's desire to reform and take control over research and development in 
the NHS. The government wanted to reorientate R&D so that it supported NBS policy, but also 
so that it produced information which could easily be used by clinicians and managers to help 
them make their decisions based upon quality information (DH 1991b). 
R&D in the NBS was organised almost as an ideal version of how the government would liked 
to have seen all public services organised. A research market was created, with a clear 
separation made between purchasers, who would establish research priorities, and providers, who 
would complete to develop and conduct research in these priority areas. Priorities were to be 
established so that research and development would support government health policy in the 
form of targets set out in the Health of the Nation (DH 1991a). The (purchaser) committees set 
up in each of these priority areas were supposed to represent a broad range of views in the NHS. 
As such, research policy was intended to be seen as clearly separated from the politics of research 
61 

in the NBS. This government's aim, through the marketisation of the NHS and NPM, to 
separate policy from organisation and management, was patently clear: to attempt to focus public 
attention on managers and clinicians as accountable for the service rather than itself. The 
purchasers, Bottomley argued, were also coming under public scrutiny and they were responsible 
for explaining local changes in the health service arising from the shift to community care. As 
Bottomley put it: 'HAs and their chairs need to be persuader-leaders. They need to involve the 
community in the decisions they take - working, for example, with community health councils. 
They need to be open and accessible. This is the root of accountability. People in grey suits must 
have public faces.' (Bottomley 1994a: 21). 
Bottomley did accept that there should be national (central) accountability and accepted 
responsibility for the rise in the number of NBS managers; she claimed that managerial 
appointments were increased because the NHS was previously under-managed. She saw her role 
as 'to ensure that every part of the service is responsible and fully accountable for how money is 
spent' (Bottomley 1994a: 21). Thus, attention was deflected away from herself and back onto 
the managers and clinicians, indicating that she would ensure that they were accountable for the 
service, not her. Rhodes (1994) characterised several features which defined accountability in the 
modern state. These were that: 
• 	 the basic complexity of an institution such as the NHS makes it difficult to identify who is 
accountable and for what; 
• 	 the expansion of service delivery systems further complicates the NBS; it lowers general 
understanding of the system, public participation and access to decision-makers; 
• 	 (as previously stated), the influence of elected representatives was curtailed through the 
imposition of health boards of purchasers and providers. 
The health reforms, through the separation of the purchasing and providing functions in 
particular, created incentives to hide and distort information and erected barriers to 
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communication between units. This was highlighted in several high-profile cases concerning 
secrecy and 'gagging' clauses in contracts. Graham Pink, a so-called NHS 'whistle-blower' was 
sacked by Stockport HA for criticising care conditions at a hospital geriatric unit (Jones 1993). 
Likewise, Helen Zeitlin, a consultant haematologist, experienced a similar fate (Myers 1992). 
The DH responded with a set of draft guidelines in 1992, then released them in full in June 1993. 
However, these still allowed hospital trusts to retain confidentiality ('gagging') clauses in staff 
contracts as long as they were not at odds with the guidelines. According to the guidelines, staff 
who wished to express a concern or make a complaint had initially to go through their line 
manager, and if this failed, to take the matter up, in confidence, with their MP. As a last resort, 
they were allowed to consult the media but, if this was seen as unjustifiable, they risked 
dismissal. Consequently, the guidelines could be used cynically by managers to punish whistle­
blowers and gag staff in the name of commercial confidentiality. In an interview with Miller 
(1993), Guy Dehn, a barrister and director of the charity Public Concern at Work argued that 
'Many hospitals do not have a culture which allows staff to raise serious concerns. There is no 
sense of mutual trust between the employee groups within the organisation. (Millar 1993).' 
Sally Sheard, of the Department of Public Health in Liverpool, argued that public health doctors 
had traditionally been able to voice concerns about government and public opinion. Later, 
however, with the abolition of the RHAs, regional directors of public health were informed that 
they were to become civil servants, and, consequently, were restrained from publicly voicing their 
opinions. The new NHS E regional offices also marked a reduction in accountability in that they 
were managed by the NHS ME, which met in private. These changes were seen by some as a 
return to the central, hierarchical and bureaucratic NHS (Butler and Chadda 1993: 5). However, 
in addition, the emphasis placed upon outcomes increased. This was because the Patient's 
Charter (DH 1989) allowed the government to fine hospitals for each patient who waited longer 
for treatment than the Charter permitted. Rhodes (1994) argued, however, that this limited 
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accountability in the service actually reduced the extent of political control that the centre was 
able to exercise. 
Further developments ensued in 1995 with Alan Langlands, the NHS Chief Executive, calling for 
all trust chief executives to become 'accountable officers' (Crail 1995: II). This was seen as the 
next step in the devolution of power and decision-making. From April 1995 all chief executives 
were expected to follow guidelines which would mean that 'Each chief executive will have to 
ensure their board receives appropriate advice on matters of probity and value for money, that 
they will personally sign the annual accounts, and that they may have to "account" to MFs.' 
(Crail 1995: 11). The NBS Finance Director, Colin Reeves, conceded that this would give chief 
executives more power (Crail 1994). A simplified pattern of accountability from the level of trust 
chief executive is illustrated in Figure 2 below: 
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Figure 2. Accountability in the NHS (sbnpl1fled) 
More power and decision-making has been handed to trust chief executives, with the NHS Chief 
Executive managing all the trusts. Potential conflict between chief executives and their boards, 
however, could lead to a peculiar situation if trust chairmen/women won the backing of ministers 
for their side of a story and a chief executive won the backing of the NHS Chief Executive for his 
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or hers. As long as a command model of the NBS is in place, it seems that the government 
would be blamed for its poor performance, especially as the public become more aware of what to 
expect from public expenditure. One way around this, therefore, has been for the government to 
distance itself from responsibility for the public services and make managers and clinicians 
accountable themselves. 
3.3.1 Conclusion 
The previous section assessed the policy changes in the NBS to illustrate that there was an 
increasing attempt to portray centrally-defined NBS policy as apolitical. The Griffith's Report 
(DHSS 1983) and Working for Patient's (DH 1989) were presented as practical and pro­
community, rather than as ideologically obsessed with the free market. Similarly, the creation of 
supervisory and management boards, as recommended by Griffiths, resulted in the imposition of 
board members for HAs and RHAs, to allegedly act as the 'voice' of the consumer. Policy was 
formulated in private, away from the public gaze, thus avoiding political debate, as the 
development of Working for Patient's (DH 1989) demonstrated. An aim of this policy was to 
divert public attention away from the government, towards managers and practitioners. 
Gathering and accessing information on the quality of service provision was a central element to 
all these policy-makers, as it could, and would, be used to hold providers accountable for the 
services they provided. It was no surprise, therefore, that the management of NBS-funded 
research followed a similar vein and was reorganised along the same principles as the rest of the 
NBS. Funding priorities were reorganised so that they supported government policy and 
management in the establishment of outcome indicators. The day-to-day management of 
research was, however, devolved through the system, although an increasing amount of 
bureaucratic demands were made upon research workers. 
65 

There was also some restructuring at a national level, resulting from the 1989 White Paper. 
Responsibility for developing and implementing opertional policy was taken over by the NHS 
Management Executive (NHS ME) from the Department of Health. As all members of the NHS 
ME were civil servants, it was allegedly less political. In addition, an NHS Policy Board was also 
created. Separate from the DH and Ministerially-led, this board was responsible for setting the 
strategy, finances and objectives of the NHS within government policy. It was also charged with 
establishing objectives for the NHS ME and monitoring their progress. Although the NHS ME's 
membership could arguably be seen as less politically motivated, its direct control by the NHS 
Policy Board meant that in reality it was simply charged with implementing government policy. 
Again, therefore, central policy was depicted as non-politically oriented, although the reality was 
quite the opposite. 
Of course, what is clear from the above discussion is that this apparent depoliticisation did, in 
fact, belie an increased centralisation and increased political interference in the organisation and 
management of the NBS. Board members were appointed by the government and replaced 
elected representatives. Policy was formulated in private but without consultation, and the NHS 
ME, by being directly accountable to the NHS policy board, was in fact under control of its 
political masters - government. What remained, was a concentration upon the economy and 
efficiency of service provision, and it was on this that the public focused, rather than on funding 
issues (specifically, rationing). Policy was, of course, increasingly portrayed as distinct from the 
organisation and management of NHS services. The Griffiths Report (DHSS 1983) introduced 
clear management structures, gave 'new public managers' more power and devolved financial 
responsibility for service provision to them. The separation of purchaser and provider functions 
and other changes emanating from Working for Patient's (DH 1989) continued the trend towards 
devolution. The creation of performance indicators, such as the Patient's Charter (DH 1992b) 
and the Health of the Nation (DH 1992a) were established and managers and clinicians made 
responsible for attaining them. All this amounted to an intensification of the debate concerning 
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the nature and implications of accountability in the NBS, and where accountability for service 
provision really lay. Although it appeared that accountability had been devolved to organisations 
working in the health service, in practice, this masked a high degree of centralised management 
in the NBS, with government ministers in the driving seat. 
3.4 Knowledge, economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
The following section will examine the role of knowledge in the NHS. It represents the second of 
the features of the 'audit explosion', characterised by Power (1994); that service-specific values, 
such as those held by nurses and physiotherapists, for instance, were being replaced by more 
abstract financial and quantitative categories of knowledge. In fact, Power (ibid.) argued that 
there had been a concentration on what he called the three e's - economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness issues, but particularly on economy and efficiency. The section will, therefore, 
evaluate Power's contention, in the context of the English NBS. 
In The Birth ofthe Clinic, Foucault (1977a) described how he saw the rise of the modern hospital 
and the associated dominance of the medical profession and medical knowledge. Foucault 
argued that professional and medical discourses evolved as part of the expansion of surveillance 
in society, through discipline over the body and over populations as a whole. Doctors' access to a 
'scientific' body of knowledge from the end of the 19th century gave them vast influence and 
social prestige. Medical power (the 'clinical gaze') allowed doctors to gain much social power in 
the definition of social order and deviance. For Foucault, Western society had become more 
standardised (rationalised) and uniform through the rejection of deviation from the 'norm' as 
primarily defined by medicine. This indicates an increasing medical control and medicalisation 
of disease and deviance, related to the bureaucratic policing of society. 
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Medical dominance grew in the twentieth century, associated with urbanisation, improvements 
in medicine, the development of health insurance and the rise of the hospital as the position of 
scientific meaicine, and the main setting of medical technology and practice. As outlined in 
chapter two, through her exploration of the concepts of health, Stacey (1991) was able to explain 
the continued dominance of the medical profession. However, the individualistic, curative, 
functional fitness model of health and disease described by Stacey, has been challenged by a more 
interventionist, preventative model of health. This is because in the twentieth century, the nature 
of diseases confronting doctors has changed, as a result of lifestyle changes and an increasingly 
aged population (who have comparatively high rates of morbidity). Now, long-term chronic 
disorders not amenable to hospital-based curative care predominate. The paradox is that as 
medicine is more successful in delaying death, morbidity increases. Life is longer but health is 
worse. The desire to shift service provision from secondary to primary care has been a central 
element in the reforms of the health service in the UK, instigated by the Conservative 
Governments of the 19805 and 1990s. This means that conventional medical practices and 
curricula are not enough. There is a need for an input from social scientists. As a result, Turner 
(1988) argued that: 
The age of heroic medicine has been replaced by the mundane medical management of 
chronic as opposed to acute illness. The problem of long-term illness and its management 
will be addressed more effectively by sociological perspectives than by purely bio-medical 
perspectives (Turner 1988: 8), 
Indeed, it appears that social scientists may be one of the winners out of the NHS reforms, not 
only through the desire for their knowledge and eXlJertise regarding community and social care, 
but also as a result of the challenge to medical dominance from managers, foreshadowed by 
Aldford (1975), The Conservative Governments reforms of the health service described in this 
thesis, have called for more accountability, transparency and responsibility, with the provision of 
information regarding the costs, organisation and management of services central to achieving 
this (for example, DH 1992a, 1993e, 1994b). This information was vital to the government and 
the new managers in the health service to challenge medical dominance and cut costs. 
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The emphasis on preventive medicine has led to a new perception of the individual regarding 
health. Individuals are now increasingly made responsible for their own health and well-being, 
as the increased emphasis on health promotion in, for instance, the Health oj the Nation (DH 
1992a) indicates. Hospital-based care is also being transformed by the increasing cost of modem 
medicine and the fragmentation of the medical profession with an increasing division of labour. 
There is now a greater willingness to criticise the use of large general hospitals and high 
technology medicine primarily developed in them. 
Turner (1988) argued that there has been a globalisation of medicine. Influenced by Weber's 
work, Turner claimed that this could be seen as the rationalisation of medical knowledge and 
practice and the exclusion of religious attitudes and belief towards illness. This involves the 
expanding bureaucratisation of health care. 'The technological and bureaucratic imperatives of 
modern medicine have resulted in the search for more effective administration of health-care 
systems and a more rational approach to the organisation and rationing of health care' (Turner 
1988: 210) 
Economic recessions, according to Turner (1988), erode the government's capacity to provide 
high standards of health care. Contradictions between this, and high health expectations have 
made governments unstable and veer towards crises. Expectations have risen, along with the 
demand for equality. Cox (1993) argued that a concentration upon the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the caring and public health services would be a natural step to take when 
increased costs and demands on the NHS are combined with a curb on public spending. 
However, with regard to community and continuous care, many services previously provided and 
paid for by the NBS are now means tested, with social services departments paying the public 
share of costs. Nevertheless, the financial burden to the NBS of the growing number of elderly 
people is considerable and growing, and Cox's comments remain salient today. What Cox (ibid.) 
offers, is an explanation for the origination of the NHS reforms and Power's 'audit explosion 
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(Power 1994). This broadly mirrors a neo-Marxist 'crisis of the welfare state' explanation, 
whereby the immediacy of a crisis is dependent upon the relationship between the finances spent 
on the welfare state and the amount of legitimacy that it buys. It could be argued that a crisis 
could be avoided or delayed by claiming to increase the efficiency of the welfare state3• 
Consequently, if services can be seen to be extended without expenditure increasing, all political 
parties would (at least partly) be satisfied. Over the 1990s, the successive Conservative 
Governments' reactions to the calls for additional resources could be seen in the form of their 
demands for efficiency savings, performance indicators etc. which promised greater output, 
whilst curbing financial investment. 
Before continuing, however, it is important that these terms are adequately defined, to inform the 
subsequent analysis, and so that the distinctions between them and their implications on the NBS 
are made clear. Harrison, Hunter and Pollitt (1990) investigated the history of evaluation in the 
NHS, identifying four criteria defining it; quality, efficiency, responsiveness and equity. Quality 
was seen by the authors as closely related to effectiveness, as a feature of health care processes 
and outcomes. It was a broader notion than effectiveness, concerning both clinical and non-
clinical care. Figure 3 (below) provides a simple guide to the definition of these evaluative 
criteria. 
Efficiency (ratio of 

inputs to outputs) 

~ ~ 
Policy Policy Policy Policy External Policy 
Aims Inputs Implementing Outputs Environment Outcomes 
A Agencies (Impacts) 
B X 
C y 
Z 
Effectiveness (consistency of aims and outcomes) 
Figure 3. DetlnitlQruI of efficiency, effectiveness and cost effedlveness 
(Source: Harrison, Hunter and Pollitt 1990: 120) 
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In 1993, Virginia Bottomley, the Secretary of State for Health, argued for all expenditure to be 
rigorously scrutinised, identifying the drug bill, clinical effectiveness, hospital bed usage and 
staff mixes in particular (Brindle 1993k). These categories were broadly substantiated as 
categories adhered to in the health service by Dr Ron Zimmern, director of health policy at 
Cambridge and Huntingdon Health Authority (Hall 1995) who stated that he worked under six 
policy considerations, directed by his health authority: effectiveness, equity, clinical 
appropriateness, efficiency, responsiveness and responsibility. 
Harrison, Hunter and Pollitt concluded that up until 1990 there wasn't much of a history of 
evaluation in the NHS and that there was no Department of Health strategy for ensuring the 
effectiveness of clinical care. The effectiveness of a number of basic medical procedures was not 
substantiated, and were difficult to demonstrate, as Cochrane (1971) had argued in the seventies, 
and there was no monitoring of the skills of hospital consultants or GPs. Effectiveness 
monitoring was seen as the province of the medical profession. However, complicating this issue 
was the fact that trained doctors, were, largely independent, consultants had lifetime 
appointments and GPs worked as independent contractors not subject to review. However, the 
authors noted that there were local schemes around the country monitoring quality and 
effectiveness, but most of the results of these were kept secret. 
In 1960 the Hospital Advisory Service, an inspectorate was formed and in 1976 this was 
renamed the Health Advisory Service (HAS). The HAS's remit was extended to cover community 
services and long-stay facilities for children. The HAS provided non-enforceable advice and 
consequently local reactions to this advice varied widely. Its remit was limited, according to 
Harrison, Hunter and Pollitt (1990), with no comparative information concerning the NHS as a 
whole, reflecting the DH's desire to have information on scandal-prone areas. Information 
gathered was also in the least prestigious areas for the medical profession and in areas where 
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doctors had a comparatively reduced role. The HAS was consequently not seen as a threat by 
them. 
Measures of responsiveness were also seen to have followed a similar trend. Sir Roy Griffiths 
was keen on meeting the needs of customers and many 'consumerist' initiatives were developed 
in the 1980s. However, many of these were superficial and few actually empowered citizens. 
The Griffiths Report (DHSS 1983) argued for more emphasis upon the needs and satisfaction of 
consumers and the introduction of management budgeting. Nurses were largely ignored in the 
Griffiths Report (ibid.), with management and the medical profession-the main focus for 
attention. Similarly, Cox (1993) noted that there was little evidence relating to the perspective of 
other staff, such as dietitians and therapists, as it was claimed that they had no influence upon 
top-level management because of unitisation (the creation of clinical directorates and locality 
management, for instance). The development of clinical budgeting and information systems 
could be seen as elements in the building of management control, but the power of managers over 
consultants was still weak, but, allegedly, on the agenda. 
Harrison, Hunter and Pollitt (1990) noted how measures of equity received much attention in the 
1970s, which led (in 1976) to the Resource Allocation Working Party's (RA WP) formula for 
funding. Social equity has been the focus of academic research for some time, but this had not 
had a role in policy formation. There appears to have been a general consensus that equity was 
satisfied by the notion of right of access to care on demand. Measurement of efficiency has 
received more attention. The Guillebaud Committee report of 1956 (Committee of enquiry 1956) 
was the first investigation into NBS costs, concluding that the NBS was neither extravagant nor 
inefficient. Many similar reports have been published over the years, most concentrating on costs 
and, consequently, not fully investigating efficiency (for example, Audit commission 1994, 
1995b). Output figures produced have also been limited. However, from the early 1980s there 
was a sharp rise in monitoring and evaluation exercises. For example, from 1982 a system of 
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review was initiated in England. This entailed an examination once a year whereby each 
respective layer in the health service had its objectives and plans reviewed by the layer above. 
This DHA review included individual health care units from 1984 and from 1986, performance 
reviews of RHAs were initiated. The result was that the review pro.::ess shifted in nature from a 
general monitoring of broad strategies to a deeper monitoring of control systems and short-term 
operational plans, from unit level upwards. This occurred at a time when central departments of 
the NBS were increasingly eamlarking funds towards projects. Many of these had their own 
monitoring requirements, which resulted in a denser network of accountability and an increase 
in central control. Such increased evaluation, however, was focused upon economy, efficiency 
and conformity to plans. Effectiveness and responsiveness were rarely addressed by the review 
process. 
A series of national performance indicators were introduced for the first time, by the Department 
of Health and Social Security in 1983, which were subsequently updated and expanded (Harrison, 
Hunter and Pollitt 1990: 130). However, a lack of outcome (effectiveness) data meant that they 
still had fundamental limitations. Essentially they constituted a system which the Department of 
Health and Social Security used to focus upon efficiency issues. However, they were largely 
criticised and ignored by clinicians and the pUblic. Rayner scrutinies, introduced in 1982 were 
more direct in that they were quick, focused, efficiency reviews of targeted services, conducted by 
individuals or small teams with the aim of enabling immediate, highest level attention to ensure 
implementation (Webster 1998: 166). 
There were some initiatives instigated by professionals, such as the Confidential Enquiry into 
Perioperative Deaths (CEPOD), conducted exclusively by the medical profession in 1987 
(Confidential Enquiry 1987). The CEPOD investigated all deaths within 30 days of an 
operation, initially in tl1ree regions, and, subsequently, nation-wide. Each district was required 
to have clinical audit committees, managed by doctors. It represented a voluntary monitoring of 
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quality practice by the profession, with outcomes - anonymised. Little effectiveness work was 
~ 
conducted in primary care but, in 1985, the Royal College of General Practice (RCGP) published j 
What Sort ofDoctor (RCGP 1985), a similar report to the CEPOD. This was followed in 1987 l 
by the White Paper Promoting Better Health (DHSS 1987), \\hich was an attempt by the 1 
1 
IThatcher Government to respond to the variance in quality, effectiveness and responsiveness of I 
I 
GPs through pay incentives. This was rejected by GPs, but the government unilaterally imposed 
a new contract on them in 1989, following the same line as Working for Patients (DH 1989). 
Objectives of Working for Patients (ibid.) included the improvement of efficiency, the strict 
control and monitoring of drug prescription budgets, the emphasis on purchasers to meet the 
health needs of their catchment populations, the introduction of new systems of business 
management to the NHS and an emphasis on the use of audit throughout the health service. The 
separation of the purchasing and provider functions sanctioned in the 1990 White Paper meant 
that the needs and cost-effective ways of meeting those needs would have to be assessed by all 
budget holders and the pattern of health care delivery would need to be prioritised by establishing 
how much would be spent on any service. Budget holders, the government argued, would then 
sign contracts with purchasers for services, once they had made their evaluation. 
The principle of peer review as epitomised by the CEPOD review (Confidential Enquiry 1987) 
was extolled in Working for Patient's (op. cit.), and led to the formation of Medical Audit 
Commissions in each district. The use of audit was to be extended throughout the health service 
to ensure that optimum medical services were offered.4 Initiatives aimed at management included 
individual performance reviews and performance related pay for general managers, which were 
implemented from 1986 onwards. The personal objectives of managers could now be defined and 
aligned with those of their unit or health authority. Once again, these were designed with 
economy and efficiency in mind, as a centrally imposed monitOring scheme. The medical 
profession, however, was largely immune from the effects of these measures. 
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Implementation of these reforms was strongly resisted by most of the professional groups and 
associations in the NHS but proceeded, nevertheless, v"ithout any trials, and with minimal 
consultation. However, despite the many criticisms hurled at the Conservative (Thatcher) 
Government, some of its critics supported some of the initiatives developed in the White Paper. 
Butler (1992) saw audit, improved information technology. the measurement of costs and 
outcomes and improved planning as all beneficial. It could also be credited, as Allsop and May 
(1993) claimed, with changing the ethos of the NHS to encourage initiative and innovation, with 
managers re-examining and re-assessing the way they operated. 
Harrison, Hunter and Pollitt (1990) concluded their analysis, by arguing that the main concern in 
the 19805, as in the 1950s, was economy and efficiency, but this concern was one principally laid 
at the door of Parliament, the government and health authority managers. The medical 
profession was almost exclusively entrusted with measures of clinical quality and effectiveness, 
with similar studies conducted by others attacked by them and receiving next to no government 
support. The only exception to this arrangement were in areas where doctors were not so 
numerous or dominant, such as health promotion. 
Doctors are not as numerous or dominant in community care settings as they are in acute trusts. 
The increasing prevalence of chronic health problems not amenable to hospital-based care, and 
the subsequent movement towards the provision of health care in primary and community 
settings, have challenged the power of the medical profession. This challenge can also be 
attributed to the increased emphasis on (preventive) health promotion. Rather than attempt to 
challenge and control doctors as the Conservative Government did at the end of the 1980s (a 
battle which they lost), these challenges shifted the focus of care away from the traditional (acute) 
medical power bases, into areas where their collective power was weaker, and where the 
government was able to gain more information and power itself. 
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Nevertheless, efficiency and economy issues in the NBS, have continued to receive attention. 
The Audit Commission have produced a series of reports looking at working practices in the 
public services, for example, an investigation of the work of hospital doctors (Audit Commission 
1995b). In the report, the Audit Commission called for tighter controls on the work of doctors to 
improve efficiency. It made a number of recommendations relating to changing their work 
practices, training and remuneration package. The report was criticised without being totally 
dismissed by the BMA (Brindle 1995d) but stated that a number of the working practices of 
doctors were outdated. This has been recognised by many of the new managers in the NHS 
whom, Maynard claimed, have come to realise that in the NHS, medical practice 'is not evidence 
based and that improvements in efficiency are often blocked by medical arrogance' (Maynard 
1994: 26) 
Performance indicators, The Health ofthe Nation, (DH 1992a) the Patient's Charter (DH 1992b) 
and league tables were all measures aimed at controlling the health service through the setting of 
output/outcome targets, which health care workers were expected to meet. The concentration on 
this data along with the rise of audit and accounting practices is intended, as Power (1994, 1997) 
noted, to monitor, mould and evaluate performance and has resulted in service-specific values 
such as care and teaching being replaced by more abstract quantitative and financial categories of 
knowledge. The increasing emphasis and publicity given to this information in the health service 
and in the media additionally appears to support Power's (1994) notion that managers are 
increasingly controlling the terms of public discourse. Together this finally indicates that there 
has been a certain displacement of experts of the first order, such as doctors, nurses, dietitians 
etc. with experts of the second order. such as accountants and managers. This contention is 
explored in depth in section 3.6. However, before embarking on this debate, the following 
section will assess a new dimension to Power's audit explosion; research policy and politics. 
This is associated with changing conceptions of knowledge, of course, but also with the 
displacement of experts. This is because research is used to define the effectiveness of services. 
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Control over the nature, production, and utilisation of research knowledge, therefore, reaches to 
the heart of control over the work of the professions. 
3.5 Research policy and politics 
Taking the elements and trends this chapter has explored into account, the following section will 
analyse the effects they have had upon the research agenda in the NHS. Most notably it will 
focus on the changing conception of health and disease, the changing political and social 
consensus concerning the NBS, increasing costs of treatment and the successive Conservative 
Governments' curbs on public spending. This has led to a change in the emphasis placed upon 
the nature and setting in which research and development takes place in the NBS; from medical 
(clinical) research to health services research; from basic to applied research and from research 
conducted in secondary care settings (principally medical teaching hospitals) to research 
conducted in primary and community settings. 
Changing conceptions of health and disease were discussed in the preceding section of this 
thesis. The section explained how doctors gained ascendancy, in large part through the access 
and control of a 'scientific' body of knowledge and how the hospital became the main site of 
scientific medicine and the principal setting of medical technology and practice. The medical 
model of disease became the dominant concept, focusing upon the biomedical cure of the 
individual and the restoration of himlher to the workplace. However, in recent times, this model 
of disease has been challenged by a preventive model of health and a shift in the nature of disease 
towards long-term chronic disorders. This has resulted in a shift in the provision of health 
services from secondary to primary and community care. 
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This trend has been echoed in the NHS research agenda. Much of the research conducted in the 
health service in the past has been conducted by hospital scientists and consultants with a 
particular interest in diseases and treatment Until recently, research priorities reflected this 
emphasis. However, as a result of the changes in the nature and setting of health care 
provision, explained in this thesis. there has been an increasing awareness of the need to conduct 
research in primary and community care settings. In addition, the greater concern over primary 
care has given a new prominence to research conducted into management and organisational 
issues, as the emphasis of care is being shifted towards the medical management of chronic 
illness. This has meant that different research methodologies and skills are needed in 
comparison to the traditional medical approaches. At the same time, it was explained above, 
how successive Conservative Government reforms of the NHS between 1979 and 1995 have led 
to a concentration on measures of economy, efficiency and effectiveness, and the setting and 
attainment of outcome measures. Consequently, abstract quantitative and financial categories of 
knowledge have come to the fore at the expense of service specific values. This has been 
reflected in the NBS research agenda by the rise of health services research, defined by the :MRC 
as 'the investigation of the health needs of the community and the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the provision of services to meet those needs' (MRC 1994a: 2). 
Klein (1990) argued that the political and social consensus over the NHS in its first decades 
discouraged the use of analysis but that as the consensus was eroded, more research, albeit 
partisan was used. According to Klein (ibid.),the view was, initially, that there was no need to 
examine the working practices of people dedicated to the public good. However, as a more 
critical attitude towards professionals increased, particularly towards doctors, research in clinical 
practice would also increase. This was especially so when financial constraints were tight. 
Indeed, as Klein (ibid.) pointed out, the use of research was dependent upon the economic, 
political and social environment and, as this changed, so would the character of the research 
community. As early as 1956, the Guillebaud report (Committee of Enquiry 1956) had suggested 
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that ignorance was incorporated into the structure of the NHS. It called for research to be 
conducted into the nation-wide causes in morbidity, for differences by region to be identified, and 
for research'into areas of unsatisfied demand, taking the umeliability of waiting list statistics into 
account. However, although the formation of an Institute of Health Services Research had been 
requested as early as 1979 by the Royal Commission on the NHS, there had been little connection 
between the government and health services research. This was confirmed by Sir Kenneth 
Stowe, (Stowe 1989) who was the Permanent Secretary of the Department of Health from 1981­
87. The explanation for this situation - and one accepted by most people - was that health 
services research had never appeared to develop into a major force in the Department of Health, 
or the scientific research community itself. 
In 1988, however, research became an 'official' issue with the publication, in that year, of the 
House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology's Priorities in lvJedica/ Research 
report (House of Lords 1988). This report was a comprehensive review of all aspects of R&D in 
the NHS. The Committee stated their desire for the continued support of the science-led 
approach to research, but that it should be more focused. It argued for a primary focus on the 
formation of a solid research infrastructure, well-funded laboratories and the provision of a well-
trained and motivated research community. The main recommendation of the Committee was 
that the NHS should be incorporated into the mainstream of medical research. 
The NHS should articulate its research needs; it should assist in meeting those needs; and it 
should ensure that the fruits of research are systematically transferred into service (House of 
Lords Select Committee 1988: 31). 
The creation of a new special health authority within the NHS (the National Health Research 
Authority-NHRA) was recommended. This would have a multi-disciplinary membership. Its 
functions would be to identify research priorities and be a centre to administer, organise and 
monitor research, rather than act as a regulatory body. Basic research, it was stated, should 
remain funded by the rvmc and medical research by the UFC and MRC. However, the NHRA 
79 

should, in view of its role in applied science, have a major role in the funding of public health 
and operational research, and should fund training fellowships in these research areas. The shift 
towards prifuary care, it was further noted, should also be underpinned by research programmes, 
with the NHRA responsible for building a research base in primary care and general practice. It 
was suggested that this could be achieved collaboratively with Family Practitioner Committees. 
Health services research and research into primary and community care was, consequently, 
clearly separated and ring-fenced from basic and medical research. A case was made for the 
increase in spending and training in research in the health service in general, although by this 
stage the Conservative Government's commitment to it had waned somewhat. 
The slowness of putting beneficial research results into practice (if at all) was noted by the 
Committee of Vice Chancellors and Principles, amongst others. South West Thames RHA put 
this down to the conservatism of health service workers and North West Thames RHA argued 
that performance indicators and the NHS management review system should be used to combat 
it. A Department of Health and regional planning group was also called for to assess potential 
changes and conduct research into the resultant changes in practice and their cost (House of 
Lords Select Committee 1988). The report was greeted quite favourably, as a very critical review 
of the state of medical science providing the basis for relevant, better medical research (Lancet 
1988). However, the question of how the Conservative Government would provide adequate 
funds to support R&D was paramount. The Conservative Government's response was an 
intention to employ a Chief of R&D, which was wlecomed by the Select Committee in April 1990 
(House of Lords Select Committee 1990), given the recent changes in the NHS, but the Select 
Committee raised a number of concerns. These included how much power and influence would 
the appointee have and the level and type of support, in terms of staff and resources. The 
apparent desire for the Department of Health to plan and commission all NHS research was 
another concern. The Select Committee were worried that the government would be too 
prescriptive in their approach to research. Additional concern was expressed regarding the 
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government's apparent disregard of public health and operational research. The Secretary of 
State for Health, Kenneth Clarke, responded by stating that it was decided to increase the power 
of the Chie(of R&D to make him the Director of R&D (DRD) and a full member of the NHS 
tvIE. The Secretary of State saw the DRD as part of his department with management 
respo nsibili ty. 
The arrangements we are proposing are that this Management Executive will deliver the 
service in response to national priorities determined by the Government for which the 
Government is accountable to Parliament, and we need his support necessarily in research 
and development in evolving our priorities (Select Committee on Science and Technology 
1990: 6). 
Between the publication of Priorities in Medical Research and its supplementary report (1988­
90), Working for Patients (DB 1989) and the NHS And Community Care Act (1990) had been 
published. The NHS was being reorganised and this was reflected in the Conservative 
Government's proposals for the organisation of R&D, separating R&D policy (priorities) from 
their organisation and management. Lord Nelson expressed concern about the lack of reference 
to public health and organisational research, perhaps not realising that this was exactly where the 
government's priorities lay (House of Lords Select Committee 1990: 5). Kenneth Clarke 
responded, stating that: 
In so far as the NHS is involved, and that stands for the Executive ... the DRD's responsibility 
[is to] make sure the NHS is properly organised to co-operate with local authorities and 
deliver its share of the necessary support for that area as far as the social services are 
concerned.. .I think there is a lot of need for operational research and developing better 
methods of getting co-operation at grass roots level between the different authorities, the 
different professions, and developing cost-effective methods of delivering care (House of 
Lords Select Committee 1990: 8). 
Mr Clarke stated that one of the first things the DRD would do was assess exactly what sort of 
research should be commissioned. He would then decide upon what resources were required. 
Probably what will happen is that as you get less dependent on consultants there will be more 
developments of operational research for the Management Executive because having some 
direct role to play in controlling this development in the information technology field is going 
to be absolutely key, it seems to me (House of Lords Select Committee 1990: 15). 
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As described at the beginning of this thesis, in Chapter one, Research for Health (DH 1991b) 
was the Conservative Government's response to Priorities in kfedical Research. It made a clear 
distinction between biomedical research and health services research. It was the latter that would 
underpin the Research for Health strategy. The first national Director of Research and 
Development, Professor Michael Peckham outlined what he expected of Research for Health, 
calling for improvements in ways to implement research, update audits and introduce change 
(Peckham 1991a). He noted the formation of a national R&D centre (the Cochrane Centre) to 
hold data on evaluation outcomes, cost-effective practice and on the type and nature of trials in 
progress. The success of the strategy, Peckham (ibid.) claimed, would depend largely upon the 
creation of a new culture within the NHS at all levels. The wider framework was intended to 
ensure that R&D and would contribute to the Health ofthe Nation objectives (DH 1992a), to the 
setting of definite quantifiable health targets, and would improve links between all those involved 
in health research. The R&D strategy was aligned to focus upon issues which would support 
government health policy, and reflect the changing emphasis of knowledge in the health service. 
The actual organisation of the strategy was oriented to operate along the same lines as health 
policy, with policy separated from organisation and management and a clear emphasis on 
devolution and accountability. 
Harris (1993) saw the research strategy, along with medical audit and the purchaser/provider 
split, as providing research on the primary care needs of the population. However, he noted that 
in South East Thames RHA in 1993, only 0.03% of the money spent on R&D was spent on 
primary care. He claimed that approximately 20% of care was shown to be inappropriate and 
only about 15% of medical interventions were based upon solid scientific evidence (Harris 1993). 
Harris also claimed that a significant amount of clinical practice was not up-to-date and that it 
was based on knowledge gained when doctors did their training, modified by their clinical 
experience. 
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Concern was also expressed over the role of nursing in setting research agendas (Gaze 1991) but 
this appeared to largely be allayed with the production of a research strategy for nursing, 
midwifery and health visiting in April 1993 (DR 1993d). The major impetus of the strategy 
appeared to be the placing of nursing research within the mainstream of health services research 
and were broadly welcomed by the nursing community (Allen 1993, Nursing Standard 1993a). 
The response to the nursing strategy (DR 1993d) and Research for Health (DR 1991b, 1993a), 
from members of the therapy professions came in September 1993, when a 'Therapy Professions' 
Research Group' was convened by the Department of Health (DR 1994f). This consisted of 
members from the speech and language therapy, physiotherapy and occupational therapy 
professions, each supported by their respective professional associations. The groups remit was 
to establish: 
• a relevant position statement; 
• the contribution of therapists to the developement of health services research; 
• identify key priorities and major areas of concern for the future of therapy research; and 
• formulate a co-ordinated response to the report of the nursing taskforce (DR 1 994f). 
The result of this group's work was the publication, Research and development in occupational 
therapy, physiotherapy and speech and language therapy: A position statement (DH 1994f). A 
whole range of recomendations were made, and are listed in Appendix 1. 
In July 1993, Virginia Bottomley, the Secretary of State for Realth launched the second edition of 
Research for Health (DH 1993a), This called for nurses and doctors to improve the use of 
research in their everyday practice by forming an evaluative culture. R&D within this new 
strategy was much more explicitly linked to the ta.rgets set out in the Health of the Nation (DH 
1992a) and more applied, focusing on efficiency and effectiveness measures rather than what 
Michael Peckham called 'ephemeral, or ineffectual' (Health Service Journal 1993). The R&D 
agenda had, therefore, become increasingly devoted to applied research, clearly making a 
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distinction between this and basic 'blue sky' research, which was expected to be funded by the 
research councils and the.MRc. The exploratory nature of traditional R&D was being replaced 
\vith a centrally-developed and controlled agenda and priorities. However, it appears that the 
strategy did not adequately address central (government) agendas vr fit in enough with the new 
market -based reforms of the NHS. In November 1993 the government assembled an NHS 
research task force (DH 1993c), headed by Anthony Culyer, a health economist, to look at the 
conduct and support of research in the NHS. The terms of reference for the task force were to 
'consider whether to recommend changes in the conduct and support of Research and 
Development (R&D) in and by the NBS, and if so to advise on alternative funding and support 
mechanisms for R&D. including transitional measures, within available resources' (Culyer 1994: 
7). The group reported to ministers in April 1994 and the report Supporting Research and 
Development in the NHS (Culyer 1994a) was published in September 1994. Appendix 2 lists the 
key recommendations of Culyer. 
Although as Harrison, Hunter and Pollitt (1990) explained, the medical profession had 
traditionally controlled effectiveness studies, the government was keen to ensure that the 
improvement in effectiveness within the NHS was directed and controlled by the DH. Virginia 
Bottomley's 1994 New Year's message to NBS staff placed an emphasis upon the service to 
apply more knowledge concerning the effectiveness of clinical interventions and, in particular, 
for purchasers to take account of this knowledge in making their purchasing decisions. Clinical 
audit and the R&D strategy were seen as particularly useful in achieving this (DH 1994c). 
Culyer (op.cit.) noted the problems offitting the research strategy, as it stood, into the marketised 
health service. He argued that the strategy was oriented towards teaching hospitals when it 
should have been following the trend towards community and primary care-based treatment. 
Culyer (1994) believed that a system of managed and manageable competition for research funds 
should exist alongside the health care market, using a contractual system to ensure that funds 
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were properly spent. Culyer's report suggested further substantial changes in NBS research 
policy and practice. There were indications that the Health of the Nation targets (DH 1991a) 
were not being met. If this were true, as NBS research strategy targets were closely linked to 
them, then the research strategy would be bound to fail too. May (1994) noted that Peckham was 
also responsible for the centrally-controlled ministerially-led DH policy research but, Dr 
Mawhinney, the Minister for Health at the time (February 1994), was approving all DH research 
projects personally. Peckham stated that R&D was a core function of the NBS but ministers were 
trying to move towards a 'research market in relation to the existing care market' (May ibid.). 
There was, therefore, some conflict of interest detectable between the Conservative Government 
on the one hand, and Peckham and the research 'establishment' which was concerned about the 
potential loss of funding through increased competition, on the other. 
According to Culyer, 'It is time to place R&D in primary and community care settings on an 
equal footing with the acute sector' (Culyer 1994a: 11). The government responded by 
announcing that it would look sympathetically at ring-fencing more funds from 1996/97 to build 
up the research capacity in these services (DH 1994e). The taskforce reported that R&D-related 
investment was being squeezed out as a result of short-term cost pressures. There had been an 
erosion of the clinical science base as purchasers and providers of health care were deemed only 
likely to invest in the direct costs of R&D if it was directed at meeting short-term needs. Even 
this had risks, as it took time to prepare a quality proposal. Rushing them could adversely affect 
their scientific quality, applicability and generalisability, it could be argued. Most of the 
commentators to the taskforce were reported as wanting to see a balance between clinical 
research and research of immediate relevance to the delivery of health care, with more emphasis 
upon research focusing on cost-effectiveness and effectiveness of health service provision. There 
was a widespread demand for research activity to be spread throughout the service, in line with 
the shift in service provision from secondary to primary care. However, Culyer (1994a) reported 
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that resources should still be concentrated in a few centres where the bulk of the requisite 
experience and academic links were found. 
R&D was further organised to operate on the same marketised principles as the rest of the NHS. 
A stress was placed on the need for the financial accountability through the precise costing and 
management of research projects and service support. Scientific accountability was stressed, with 
the Thompson review of the London postgraduate Special Health Authorities (Thompson 1993) 
or the HEFCE research ratings exercise suggested as models for the quality assessment of R&D 
in the NBS. The contribution and role of peer review was also seen as important in this area to 
the extent that the Conservative Government would only fund research adequately reviewed 
throught this mechanism. 
Our aim is to create a framework of managed competition for NHS resources associated with 
R&D. Much can be achieved through explicit commissioning of R&D and through 
contractual processes. These focus attention on inputs and outputs, timescales and measures 
of success. A contract also provides a means by which to monitor and review activity against 
particular benchmarks (Culyer 1994: 45). 
Later, in 1994, there was yet another review of management in the NBS (DH 1994g). This 
consolidated the management role of the NHSE, to enable it to take responsibility at all stages for 
NHS services, from policy to implementation, monitoring and review. The Department of Health 
was structured into three principal 'business areas': health services, social care and public 
health. In the report, the Conservative Government pledged its support for the arrangement of 
NHS R&D, but recommended that public health and social care issues were given adequate 
weight in research programmes. In response, R&D in the New NHS was published (NHSE 
1994d). This report was intended to be updated following the enactment of Culyer's 
recommendations. The roles and responsibilities in the NHS regarding R&D are illustrated in 
Appendix 3. NHS R&D policy was becoming even more overtly oriented to fit management 
agendas. Indeed, the aim ofthe NHS R&D strategy was now described as to: 
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secure a knowledge-based health service in which clinical, managerial and policy decisions 
are based on sound and pertinent information about research findings and scientific and 
technological advance. This provides the basis for maximising the effectiveness, efficiency 
and appr?priateness of patient services (NHSE 1994d). 
One of the most important implications of the Culyer Report (op.cit.) was to establish a single 
R&D budget, to be used to fund R&D in the NHS. This would involve all NHS R&D activity 
being accounted for and costed and returned in the form of 'Culyer declarations'. More 
specifically, these were declarations by research providers of their R&D activity, including the 
allocation and attribution of costs (DH 1995i). Two distinct budgets were identified: 
• 	 the NHSE R&D Programme, used to commission research to meet regionally and nationally-
defined research activity; and 
• 	 R&D support funding for NHS providers, available to all NBS providers to meet the costs of 
their own R&D activity and their service support costs. 
NHS providers were allocated two methods to secure R&D support funding: 
• 	 portfolio funding, for a period of four years. This was intended for those providers whose 
R&D costs were expected to be reasonably predictable; in essence, the teaching hospitals; and 
• task-linked funding, for a period covering four years, but providers would be able to bid 
annually for specific R&D activity, or blocks of activity. This was intended for all providers not 
eligible for portfolio funding. 
Recipients of funds were to contract directly with the NHSE, but funding was competitively 
distributed, in accordance with a National Strategic Framework for the use of the R&D levy. An 
implementation plan was released in April 1995 (DH 1995i) and the initial guidance on 
declaring NHS activity and costs - published later, in September 1995 (DH (1995j). The 
intention was that an initial levy would be established by April 1996, initial 'declarations' made 
by May 1996, the first full levy - established by April 1997, and a revised levy assessment 
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arrangement operational from April 1998. The majority of the implementation work was to be 
conducted by NBS Executive regional office staff. 
3.5.1 Conclusion 
The purchaser/provider split has encouraged the use of research by making providers prove the 
benefits of certain methods of treatment and technology to the purchasers before the purchasers 
agree to contract them. The emphasis within the reforms has been to link information 
concerning diagnosis with treatment costs so that doctors are made accountable for the treatment 
they provide. Managers have to have knowledge of their costs and activities and of the quality 
and efficiency of their services. With purchasers insisting that doctors adhere to clinical 
guidelines, the use of research on which to base purchasing decisions will increasingly become 
the norm, with purchasers also insisting that the work is audited. 
The preceding section has explained the rise in prominence of health services research in the 
NHS at the expense of clinical and basic scientific research. The initial radical step of 
introducing Research for Health (DR 1991b) was followed by a series of incremental steps to 
make the strategy more explicitly oriented to support and operate in the same way as other 
Conservative Government health policy. The Research for Health strategy Cop. cit) specifically 
focused upon health services research in contrast to biomedical research, and was oriented 
towards meeting the standards set out in the Health of the Nation (DR 1992a). Such health 
services research largely confined itself to the audit approach, concentrating upon 'effectiveness, 
efficiency and economy'. Its development, along with health economics and, arguably, policy 
analysis (which could be seen as part of the audit explosion) can consequently also be firmly 
placed in context by the recent developments in the health service. Similarly, the devolution of 
human resource management has led to an increase in research looking at issues such as skill 
mixes and the nursing workforce, but these initiatives have principally been centrally-led. This 
appears to lend support to the notion that research was being commissioned in specific areas by 
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central government departments, from 1991-99, in order to formulate national policy and norms, 
including employment aspects. It was up to local managers were asked to implement and meet 
these. 
Research has consequently shifted in nature from researcher-driven 'basic' research towards 
applied research. Finally, in line with the changing nature of health and disease, the setting in 
which research is conducted is shifting towards primary and community settings. The actual 
management of research itself has also changed so that it operates on the same principles as the 
rest of the health service. However, despite these developments, the committees and funded 
research teams have been dominated by key professionals from the medical profession. 
Similarly, the control of effectiveness studies has been in the hands of the medical profession. 
The dominance of the medical profession and their control of health care agendas, knowledge 
and type of research funded has meant there was, and continued to be, a large group of 
researchers from a medical background which is much larger than those from other backgrounds. 
From the 1988 House of Lords Select Committee Report onwards, the call for the increase in the 
critical mass of health services and other non-medical researchers has been loud, and has been 
repeated on both national and regional R&D agendas. Training strategies have been in 
development for some time, but the fact that this message keeps being uttered suggests that there 
is still a long way to ge before achieving a better balance between the non-medical and 
biomedical research. Consequently, the dominance of research teams and committees has 
continued. and appears to be self-perpetuating, although not necessarily conspiratorial. However, 
this notwithstanding, a 'corporate rationalising' (Aldford 1975) approach is developing in NBS 
research and is beginning to challenge medical research and its practitioners. 
In terms of R&D, this came from the successive Conservative Governments and managers in the 
health service who ironically have sought to enlist the help of social scientists. However, many 
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of the ideas behind the reforms of the health service, such as the Patient's Charter (DH 1992b) 
and the stated emphasis on preventive medicine, have originated from left-wing critiques. It was 
noted earlier that social scientists may be the ones to really gain out of this process and this claim 
would appear to have some substance to it. The critical mass of researchers with the necessary 
skills may be relatively low but it is rising and as the health care agenda further changes, the 
need for such researchers, who are able to satisfy the demand for information from the ascending 
managerial profession, win mean that a genuine challenge to the medical profession is likely to 
be made. The research agenda in the NHS is intrinsically linked to the issue of knowledge and 
the state. The research agenda has moved in line with these conceptions of knowledge. All this 
amounts to is the increasing rationalisation and systematisation of the NHS and clinical 
knowledge in the quest to cut costs and increase effectiveness. In the light of this analysis, the 
following section will focus upon the last of the features characterising Michael Power's 'audit 
explosion' (Power 1994): the displacement and subordination of traditional experts, as part of an 
overall analysis of professional relations in the NHS. 
3.6 Professions, experts and control 
3.6.1 Introduction 
The two preceding sections have focused upon the role and control of knowledge and of the 
production and utilisation of knowledge in the NHS. These issues go to the heart of what defines 
a professional and how professionals are able to maintain their position and role in society. The 
following analysis builds on, and expands these two sections. It will examine Power's (1994) 
notion that there has been a displacement and subordination of traditional experts, in this case in 
the NHS (Power 1994). Experts of the second order, such as managers and accountants, 
according to Power, are in the ascendant over experts of the first order, such as doctors. This has 
been characterised, according to Power, as the replacement of service-specific values by more 
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abstract quantitative and financial categories and the increasing control over public discourse by 
managers. 
The section will begin with a brief definition of what professionalism is and provide a historical 
analysis of how the traditional experts in the health service, particularly the medical profession, 
attained their professional status. Intrinsic to this analysis is the control over professional 
knowledge and the production and utilisation of that knowledge. The relationship of the medical 
profession to other occupational groups and their place in the division of labour will also be 
examined as part of this analysis. The effects of new public management (NPM) and the recent 
changes to the structure and organisation of the NBS upon this occupation structure, and upon 
the professional groups in the health service will then be assessed. This includes an assessment 
of whether the Conservative Government and new public managers have, as Power (1994) 
contended, gained control over NBS knowledge and values, as part of a strategy to gain pO'wer 
and control over the traditional NBS professions. The work of Aldford (1975) will be compared 
to the available evidence, as will the notions of de-skilling, de-professionalisation and 
proletarianisation, as part of an overall analysis concerning the subordination of traditional 
experts. What will be demonstrated, is that there was an attempt by the Conservative 
Governments from 1987 to 1997 to exercise control over health service workers and ensure their 
subordination to a New Public Management (Hood 1991). However, these changes affected those 
in the lower occupations far more than the professions. The medical profession, itself, whose 
power the Tory Governments would have most liked to curb, has experienced some erosion of its 
individual autonomy, but collectively, remains strong. 
The evidence from the literature, discussed in this section, suggested that the professions have 
become bureaucratised, not proletarianised, de-professionalised or de-skilled. What appeared 
more important, at this time, was that the changing nature of health and disease had led to a shift 
in the nature of service delivery towards primary and community care. This meant that the main 
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concerns in health care politics were now concentrated in an area where professional power has 
always been weaker. Consequently, rather than directly confront the professions in an attempt to 
control them, as it did in the late 1980s (an attempt which failed), the Conservative Governments 
of the 1980s to 1990s were now able to shift the emphasis of care away from the traditional 
hospital power bases. The medical management of chronic illness was becoming the dominant 
form of care and the government, and the new public managers were, consequently, able to take 
control of health care provision as never before. 
3.6.2 Professionalism 
Professionalism for Parry and Parry (1976) was 'one typical collective strategy of the middle 
class. or of those with aspirations to join the middle class. It involves control of an occupation by 
colleagues who, in a fonnal sense, are equal and who set up a system of self-government for 
which they seek the legal recognition of the state' (parry and Parry 1976: 252). Through this 
strategy, they could maintain specific monopolistic privileges and rewards. Drawing on a 
Weberian perspective, Parry and Parry (1976) offer a theoretical framework which links 
professionalism to social class, to the economy and to social structure. The rise of the medical 
profession in England was used to demonstrate the thesis. Professionalism as an occupational 
strategy has provided such groups as doctors with the opportunities of achieving collective as 
well as individual mobility. Witz (1992), however, criticised this approach for giving insufficient 
consideration to the issue of gender. If professionalism is intrinsically linked to the class 
structure, Witz argued, how can one discuss issues of nurse professionalisation for instance, as 
most nurses are female and consequently have no place in class analysis? A similar criticism can 
be made of Witz, however, for her neglect of issues of ethnicity. 
Margareta Bertilsson (1990) argued that the study of professions should be conducted in relation 
to the socio-economic political context. The modem professions, she argued, have played a 
major role in the administration of the welfare state, especially with regard. to citizen rights. 
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Bertilsson argued that the educator-reformers of the nineteenth century, such as teachers and 
journalists, fostered the same role as the legal profession in the eighteenth century, through the 
enhancing and consolidation of citizenship amongst the population. The resultant emergence of 
an enlightened public arose when the notion of participatory democracy had established itself. 
Wide social inequality could not now be concealed. The social extension of citizenship required 
the reasoning and calculation of the SCientifically-trained modern professional to reproduce the 
social rights of the individual in law. This would only occur, however, if professional actors, 
collectively, had enough subjective interest at stake. Nevertheless, what Bertilsson wanted to 
show was that the construction of citizenship was closely linked to the professions, the rise of 
modern bureaucracy, and, consequently, to the associated 'power of professional practices as 
devices of legitimation' (Bertilsson 1990: 126). The questioning society professionals created, 
also helped raise questions regarding their own accountability to the wider population. The 
relationship between a professional (a doctor for instance) and hislher client is asymmetrical, as 
the doctor is in possession of medical knowledge, which the patient is not. The relationship has 
to be based on trust, but, Bertilsson (1990: 129) claimed, the gap in status and power between 
professions and clients/patients has been closed in modem society. Professions nowadays are 
made more accountable, either by the state, insurance companies, or patient organisations. This 
provides us with a dimension to add to the definition of 'professional' which can incorporate the 
increasing pressure for professionals to justify themselves and be accountable. Professional 
representation should be seen in terms of the wider discursive society which it has helped to 
generate. The challenge to representativeness from feminists and ethnic minorities should, 
therefore, be seen as emanating from this increased discourse. 
The success of the professionalized society results paradoxically in the 'de­
professionalization' of modern society; organizations among citizens and clients will force 
upon professional practitioners the necessity to review their own actions from the point of 
view of the larger citizenry and even of humanity as such (Bertilsson 1990: 130). 
Bertilsson was not arguing that professions were irrelevant; in fact she claimed the opposite. 
After all, each person cannot be their own doctor, nurse, or dietitian. Instead, Bertilsson meant 
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that increased specialisation in knowledge and practice should not lead to a state of alienation, 
ignorance and passivity amongst the population. Rather, the very discursive nature of the society 
that the professions have helped generate should produce more enlightened professional cultures 
and patients. 
Larson (1990) looked at the issue ofprofessionalisation in several countries. Larson noted that in 
Britain and the USA the main reason for encouraging professional leaders to take up the mantle 
and organise the closure and protective measures around their respective fields was the inaction 
of the state. Larson went on to argue that with both the French-European or Anglo-US 
ex-perience: 
A theory of professions should be centrally concerned with the conditions under which 
knowledge is produced and applied in ways that make a difference for the life of others 
(Larson 1990: 32). 
For Larson (1990), 'profession' was a name attributable to historically particular groups that 
form structural ties, linking quite high rewards with quite a high level of education. Central to 
this notion was control over access to credentials, connected to the protection of scarcity. 
Drawing on Foucault's work, Larson argued that the control of knowledge was dependent upon 
the control of those who know. Structurally, there was a link between practice and codified 
knowledge, with professions seeking institutional guarantees from the state to legitimise their 
involvement and management of their educational and occupational structures. Professions were, 
consequently, a structural, material link between the state and the distribution of particular 
knowledge in civil society. Power and authorisation, argued Larson, define the truth of a 
discourse and this includes the power to make necessary scientific demonstrations to which 
capitalist society nearly always attributes higher validity. Power was heightened by the structural 
links between knowledge and practice in modem capitalist society. 
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Larson argued that credentialled experts, whether their expertise was really scientific or not, 
generally controlled positions within discursive fields in our society (core regions\ Within these 
core regions, speakers are differentiated by the authority given to their positions, to their name, 
or by their relation to the true discourse itself. In the case of the professions, core regions were 
generally coterminous with their training and research systems. At the centre were the 
knowledge 'creators' -such as researchers-surrounded by teachers of apprentices, who in tum 
were surrounded by the disseminators of knowledge, who made the professions visible to the 
media. Managers exist to disseminate codes and maintain institutional functions which support 
outlying and core regions. In outlying regions, practitioners act out the consequences of the core 
discourses, meeting the lay public. Managers speak with overseeing and funding agencies and, at 
this level, the various 'truths' (discourses) meet the codes of practice practitioners use as their 
central foundation, the core 'true' discourse. The keeping of an issue within professionally­
controlled discursive fields is a method of de-politicisation according to Larson. 
Larson (1990) argued that professional groups have 'typical' or 'proper' modes of address 
contained within their particular discursive fields. Certain principles applied to these. These 
include the notion that the knowledge field, where all claims for truth are acknowledged and 
evaluated, is protected; that there is a normative protection of the boundaries of all fields by 
members of the profession; that contained with each of the principles above is the defence of 
professional authority, professionals have the ability to de-authorise non-expert speakers. The 
result is technocratic solutions to 'proper' or 'typical' professional programmes, but conflicts 
which do become political are generally promoted by outsiders or those on the margins of the 
profession. Larson showed that in a number of nations, all technocratic projects share the defence 
of a discursive field with professionalism and that whenever professionals are challenged, they 
withdraw into the centre of their respective discursive fields, towards the core. 
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3.6.3 The rise of the medical profession and history of professional groups in the NHS 
3.6.3.1 The medical, nursing and midwifery professions 
As explained above, the medical profession acquired pre-eminence through the possession of a 
specific body of knowledge, through the medical classification of illness, and through 
surveillance, the 'clinical gaze' over the patient. The hospital, as Foucault (1977a) explained, 
became increasingly important as the major medical institution and formed the basis for elite 
control by consultants. The control of medical education played a central role in this, with the 
establishment of hospital schools. The dominance of a profession, as Larson has emphasised, is 
based upon the possession of a systematic body of knowledge. This knowledge creates a distance 
between the professional and client as the client has no access to the knowledge of the 
professional group. However, this systematic knowledge could debase the profession as it could 
lead to de-skilling through task fragmentation. This was avoided by the medical and other 
professions leaving room for interpretation in the application of that knowledge (Turner 1990). 
In Britain, the 1858 Medical Act, defined a qualified medical practitioner and established a 
register of qualified practitioners. This set up the boundaries of the medical profession in the UK 
by distinguishing the qualified from all others. The General Medical Council was foroled under 
the terms of this Act to set up and maintain the register and to strike off those who by reason of 
their unethical conduct were no longer deemed fit to practice. Witz (1992) argued that the 
passing of this legislation marked a turning point. It indicated a shift from pre-modem to 
modem medical practice, and with it, the mascu1inisation and professionalisation of medicine. 
Although the Act itself contained nothing to exclude women from registering as medical 
practitioners, gender exclusion was a feature of the institutions of civil society, such as the 
universities and the Royal Colleges. In medicine, male power was institutionalised through 
credential ism. Witz detailed the long struggle endured by women to gain equal access to the 
profession, concluding that: 
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It was the organisation of civil society which provided the 'outer ditches' of the 
institutionalisation of male power in professional projects and which assumed central 
importance in facilitating and sustaining the institutionalisation of male privilege within 
professional hierarchy. The state proved the weaker link in the institutional chain of male 
privilege which sustained patriarchal closure in the context of professionalisation (Witz 1992: 
209-10). ' 
However, although patriarchal closure was a feature of medical professionalisation, nowadays 
approximately half the candidates accepted into medical school are female (Lambert et aJ 1996: 
136). The number of females entering the profession has consequently risen (despite the Sex 
Discrimination Act of 1975, which banned the establishment of employment quotas) although the 
majority of doctors are still men (Levitt et af. 1996: 172). However, these women are looking to 
specialise in particular areas; paediatrics, obstetrics and gynaecology, general practice and 
geriatrics are all proportionately more popular choices for women than men who attend the 
medical schools (Lambert et al 1996: 138). In contrast, the more prestigious surgical 
specialisations are far more popular career choices for males (Lambert et aJ ibid.). Levitt et af. 
(1996) claimed that women enter the specialisations they have, because they were, generally, the 
least popular ones. The proportion of women who become consultants is also low (Levitt et aJ. 
1996: 172). There is, therefore, still a marked gender divide within the medical profession. 
The maintenance of open access to clients at the expense of other occupational groups was also a 
central element of medical dominance. The medical profession historically excluded women and 
limited and subordinated adjacent occupations, such as midwifery and nursing (Witz 1992; Parry 
and Parry op.cit.). Midwives, for instance, gave in to attempts by the male-dominated Obstetrics 
Society to deskill them, in an attempt to escape constant medical supervision and preserve some 
autonomy. The deskilling strategy used by the doctors, Witz argued, was achieved through 
gendered social closure between medical and midwifery, practical and gender-specific discursive 
strategies: GPs supported nurse registration but opposed it for midwives. Witz argued that this 
was because of economic fears over competition. However, the independent midwife was not 
totally eradicated in Britain (as it was in some states in the USA, such as California) as the 
demarcation of work tasks between doctors and nurses succeeded as a result of this deskilling. 
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Midwives were firmly kept in their place by the medical profession. Witz suggested that doctors 
could not meet demand and consequently tried to divide the market according to the class of the 
client and gender of the practitioner. 
Demand from the poor was met by midwives and from the higher classes by doctors, who would 
also deal with any abnormalities. As a result of the latter, the doctors believed it important to 
control, monitor and determine the midwifery knowledge base and practice to ensure midwives 
knew when they should call a doctor. They achieved this through the pre-emptive credentialling 
of midwifery by the Obstetrics Society, their support of midwifery registration and by having a 
majority representation on midwifery boards. The midwives stood to gain from this through 
being able to use the medically introduced education and examination system as a system of 
credentialism, and through using legal tactics to enable them to rely on male doctors to represent 
them at state level. This enabled them to achieve a degree of occupational closure and gain 
recognition from the state for their work, which at the same time, gave the male dominated 
medical profession both control over service delivery and occupational autonomy. 
3.6.3.2 Dietitians 
The establishment and history of the dietetics profession has not been adequately defined, and the 
literature on it is, comparatively, poor. This is probably a reflection of its relatively low profile in 
the NHS and the small number of professionals employed. However, a brief summary can be 
found in Levitt et. al. 's book The Reorganized National Health Service (Levitt et al. 1996: 221). 
Levitt et al. docoment how in the USA in the 1920s, nurses were the first individuals to attend 
new training schools for dietitians. In 1925, some hospitals in London, Glasgow and Edinburgh, 
established special diet kitchens (Levitt et al. 1996). These kitchens employed students with 
domestic or pure science qualifications. In 1933, King's College in London was the first British 
college to establish a special training course for dietitians. The work of the early dietitians 
principally involved the preparation and weighing of foods, but the effect of dietitians in treating 
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certain conditions was, subsequently, overtaken by advances in pharmaceuticals. In 1936, the 
British Dietetic Association was established, which later joined the voluntary registration 
scheme, before becoming legally required, to be state registered in 1954. After 1963, the 
regulating body for dietitians was the Dietitians Board of the Council for Professions 
Supplementary to Medicine. 
The dietetics profession was organised so that there were district dietitians, who were usually 
accountable to a general manager in each District Health Authority, and hospital-based dietitians, 
working to support doctors in their work. However, Working for Patients (DH 1989) changed 
this arrangement so that dietitians were, subsequently. employed by trusts. The dietitians follow­
up patients, through out-patient clinics in the main. However, some community trusts also 
employ dietitians to work in schools to advise children about nutrition for instance. 
3.6.3.3 Physiotherapy 
The origin and history of physiotherapy has received more attention than the dietetics profession. 
The professional organisation for physiotherapy arose in 1895 in the form of the Society of 
Trained Masseuses. Until 1920, this society was female only, when it became the Chartered 
Society of Massage and Medical Gymnastics, and in 1943 it was renamed the Chartered Society 
of Physiotherapy. By 1943, the Chartered Society had become the registering authority for 
physiotherapists, approving training schools and conducting examinations. In 1986, remedial 
gymnasts merged with the Chartered Society to form one Board. 
In his article 'Medical dominance and the development of professional autonomy in 
physiotherapy' 0vretveit (1985) described how the changes in the autonomy of the physiotherapy 
profession over the years had not occurred at the expense of medical dominance. 0Vretveit (op. 
cit.) explained that from 1936 physiotherapists registered with the BMA-established voluntary 
register, but, in 1960, the creation of the 'Council for the Professions Supplementary to 
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Medicine' changed this (0vretveit (1985: 83). Physiotherapists were now given majority 
membership of a Statutory Registration Board, which raised their independence. This Board 
admitted those people qualified to the register, detennined qualifications for State Registration, 
and disciplined those members who violated their professional code of conduct. The Board 
effectively gave physiotherapists control over qualification and training by accepting the 
qualification of the professional association, and by leaving the Chartered Society of 
Physiotherapists to monitor the quality of that training, and of qualification and clinical 
standards. However, the influence of the medical profession remained, as six of the seventeen 
members of the Board and seven of the twenty-one members of the Council (which administered 
the various Boards comprising the council) were doctors (0vretveit op.cit.). 
During the 1960s-70s, the physiotherapy profession gained more managerial independence. 
Physiotherapy departments expanded and medical consultants delegated more and more 
management and administrative work to 'superintendent physiotherapists'. This allowed 
physiotherapists, rather than doctors, to directly manage other physiotherapists, although most 
referrals continued to go through consultants to the superintendent physiotherapists, who then 
allocated the work. Physiotherapists continued to push for group autonomy during the 1960s and 
70s and for 'equal status' with nurses in decision-making processes which were of relevance to 
the profession. In fact, the development of the nursing profession was seen as a model for the 
physiotherapists to aim for (0vretveit op. cit.). However, the physiotherapists' dilemma, was that 
at the same time as wanting more managerial control, they did not want the most capable and 
experienced clinicians to move away from clinical into management work. They were, however, 
all agreed on their opposition to management by doctors. 
1974 saw a flurry of activity, as the profession sought to resist the medical management 
threatened on them by a series of refonns to the health service (0vretveit 1985: 85). Guidance 
from the Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS) proposed that 'remedial services'> 
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such as physiotherapy, should be organised on a district basis and that a senior physiotherapist 
should be designated by Area Health Authorities to ensure the maintenance of professional 
standards and advise the newly formed District Management Teams. This role was extended 
from 1979 to include the management of all NHS physiotherapy services in a district. This gave 
physiotherapists a significant amount of occupational independence and autonomy. This was 
extended with the right of direct representation, with physiotherapy managers no longer required 
to go through medical heads of physiotherapy departments to represent physiotherapists at Health 
Authority and District Management Team levels. Mercer (1980) found that doctors were more 
than willing for physiotherapists' to adopt this role because of their own considerable work 
pressures. However, the role of the district physiotherapist was abolished by the Conservative 
Government after their management reforms of the NBS. Some of the implications of this are 
explored in chapters five to eight of this thesis. 
Over the 1970s, physiotherapy services became increasingly specialised. The more skilled and 
knowledgeable clinical physiotherapists became more independent from their referring doctors 
and from their physiotherapist managers, notably the superintendent physiotherapist, who could 
also make referrals, but did not have authority over clinical decisions. In this way, 
clinicaVmanagement autonomy was reinforced, consolidating the process of professionalisation 
within the occupation. This was confirmed by Mercer's (1980) research. Mercer found that 
administrative, particularly departmental, autonomy was high for physiotherapists, mainly 
because there was very little control exercised over them by the medical profession: 
This is not so much an example of physiotherapists increasing their autonomy at the expense 
of doctors, as of physiotherapists increasing their autonomy because of new opportunities 
arising in the health service that doctors are unwilling to take or are too much in conflict 
among themselves to limit effectively (Mercer 1980: 181). 
Similarly, there was a recognition within the profession that when physiotherapists had reached a 
particular level in his/her career, their clinical decision-making would not be questioned by 
another physiotherapist (0Vretveit 1985: 87). This was because if physiotherapists could not 
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accept another's decision, then why should anyone else? - the professional status of physiotherapy 
would not be recognised by other professions. 0vretveit (op. cit.) claimed that 'practice 
autonomy' has also developed in the physiotherapy profession, by physiotherapists actively 
assessing patients' physiotherapy needs, then getting the doctor to refer them for physiotherapy. 
However, this is more common in areas where medicine has little to offer - single, experienced 
physiotherapists working in a mental handicap unit or mental health care trust, for example. 
This aspect of autonomy was not noted by Mercer (op. cit) in his analysis, although his article did 
not identify whether he had included a mental health care hospital in his research. Mercer's 
research indicated that professional autonomy for physiotherapists was evident in certain areas, 
that there were discrete areas of their work where contact with and dependence on medicine was 
low (Mercer 1980: 181). Nevertheless, he continued, even for experienced physiotherapists, 
there was a general tendency to assume that they had greater discretion than was really the case. 
They were, however, more autonomous than nurses, as they received patient diagnoses from 
doctors. and were subsequently left, unsupervised, to treat patients. 
The implications from 0vretveit and Mercer's analyses are that professional autonomy for 
physiotherapists has been allowed to develop, sometimes with a decline in some aspects of 
medical dominance over the profession but that important elements of control are still in the 
hands of the medical profession. The form these take are: 
• 	 doctors' membership on the Board and Council; 
• 	 the modelling of physiotherapy training syllabuses on the medical syllabus, despite 
physiotherapists developing new conceptions of physiotherapy, which differ from the medical 
view; 
• 	 despite physiotherapists being involved in resource allocation decisions, there was no 
evidence to suggest that this was at the expense of doctors' dominance over such issues; 
• 	 despite increasing clinical and practice autonomy, doctors have continued to exercise the right 
to authorise treatment or remove a patient from treatment; 
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• 	 the devolution of clinical decision-making by medical staff allowed doctors to free up some of 
their time, whilst retaining control. This allowed them to escape criticism for any mistakes a 
physiotherapist might make. 
Finally, it is important to note that physiotherapists are also able to practise privately. In this 
way, patients are able to refer themselves directly, which offers physiotherapists many 
opportunities, side-stepping the NHS referral system 
3.6.4 The challenge of New Public Management 
The evidence and arguments presented in this chapter will show that the domination of doctors is 
being challenged and their autonomy questioned. This may not have entirely undesirable effects. 
Indeed, as Power (1990) noted, value for money (VFM) may have benefits in that in upsetting 
closed professional cultures 'local forms of peer review may simply foster a tyranny of expertise. 
VFM may be genuinely democratising, opening up performance to wider scrutiny'. (Power 1994: 
35). In making a judgement about the benefits, or otherwise, of such claims, we must first 
compare the actual changes in the service itself, the benefits or otherwise to the producers and, 
above all, to the health gain of the population. The Griffiths Report (DHSS 1983) introduced a 
new kind of public management (general managers) to the NHS. Such New Public Management 
(NPM), as previously discussed, could be seen as representative of Aldford's 'corporate 
rationalisers' (Aldford 1975), a structural interest group presenting the main challenge to the 
medical profession (,professional monopo!isers'). Aldford identified a third structural interest 
group, that of repressed, community interests (e.g. health service pressure groups). Whether any 
of these groups have their interests served, Aldford argued, is dependent upon the degree to 
which those interests correspond to the dominant structural interests of society. Bureaucratic 
reformers (in the British case, the Conservative Governments of 1977-97), saw medical 
researchers and physicians as important workers, but as 'subordinated and differentiated parts of 
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a complex delivery system, co-ordinated by bureaucrats, notably hospital administrators' 
(Aldford 1975: 191). 
Aldford (1975) emphasised the point that bureaucratic control and government financing would 
not necessarily eradicate the power of the professions. He nevertheless believed that the 
structural interests of corporate rationalisers as represented by the top managers whose ideology 
emphasised a co-ordinated, rational, cost-conscious, efficient system of health care, posed a 
serious threat. The medical division of labour was seen by these managers as needless and iU- I 
suited to a modern health service and they attempted to change professionals, specifically 
physicians, into salaried employees and challenge their power in the hospital. 
North (1995) argued that the broad thrust of Aldford's thesis was difficult to apply. Corporate 
rationalists within purchaser and provider organisations may have the ultimate aim of increasing 
efficient use of resources, but have differing immediate objectives. Providers concentrate on 
winning contracts and, therefore, on improving performance, whereas purchasers take 
responsibility for establishing and prioritising need and deciding where contracts should be 
awarded. Consequently, it would be problematic to place these managers together in one 
structural group. However, between 1984 and 1997, purchaser and provider managers both 
shared with the Conservative Governments the objective of linking staff groups to their output 
and thus maximising efficiency. Although immediate objectives of managers .may vary, we 
cannot discount them as a professional group any more than we can discount doctors as 
professionals because the nature of work in each specialism varies. GP fundholders, however, 
also present a problem for the model, as they can be classified as both 'professional monopolists' I 
and 'corporate rationalisers'. When writers such as Hunter (1994) wrote about medicine and the I
issue of doctors in management, they concentrated upon hospital-based doctors and made 
generalisations drawn from this groups' experience. Hunter and other writers ignored the role of 
GPs and public health consultants, who acquired greater management responsibilites under the 
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Conservative Government's NHS refoms of the 1980s and 1990s. Nevertheless, the broad thmst 
of Aldford's work is still useful in this analysis, as it provides a plausible view of one element of 
government strategy. 
NPM introduced a management culture of command and obedience that increased the 
responsiveness of the NHS to political direction. It gave the managers new skills and powers in 
planning and managing clinical services, and a growing confidence in exercising them. In this 
way, they behave as Aldford's bureaucratic reformers believed they should, with medical 
researchers and physicians performing essential work, but as a subordinated and specific element 
in a complex delivery system co-ordinated by these bureaucrats. General managers are an 
increasingly sizeable and powerful force within the health service. Indeed, a frequent criticism 
made of the Conservative Government's health service reforms during the 1980s and 1990s was 
that they have vastly increased the number of general managers, senior managers and 
bureaucrats, whilst reducing the number of clinicians. In March 1994, Brian Mawhinney, the 
Health Minister from 1992-4, was quoted as saying that general and senior management posts in 
hospital and community health services rose from 510 in 1986 to 12, 420 in 1991 (Timmins 
1994a). Mawhinney claimed that this was mainly due to the reclassification of staff and that 
managers constituted 2% of the NHS workforce. Whilst this may be true to a certain extent, 
evidence from Jeremy Lee-Potter, the Chair of the BMA in June 1998, was revealing: he was 
quoted as stating that expenditure on these managers between 1990 and 1992 had increased by 
109% and administrative and clerical staff by 16%. In contrast, expenditure on medical staff 
increased by 10% and on nurses, by 2.5%. It should also be noted that the NHS spent between 
£50M and £lOOM on external management consultants (Brindle 1994d). 
Brindle (l994c) reported that in the period leading up to the imposition of an internal market in 
the NBS, 1989-90 and 1992-93, the number of managers rose from 4530 to 14,290 but fell from 
383,150 to 361,270 for nurses and midwives. There was also a considerable variation in the 
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number of hospital managers between regions. For instance, South West Thames had one 
manager for every 807 patients whereas North East Thames had one for every 400 (Brindle 
1994c). 
The rising number of managers and administrators in family doctor practices had also been the 
subject of much debate, rising by 41% between October 1990 and October 1993 (Wynn Davies 
1994a). This was in contrast to a 2.5% increase in the number of GPs and 5% in the number of 
receptionists and secretaries. In the same period, the number of managers elsewhere in the 
health service rose by 12, 000 and the number of administrative and clerical staff by 18, 000. 
Much of this increase was attributed to the growing amount of paperwork generated by the 
contractual NHS system. Staff employed by the Department of Health rose by 25%, to 4,829 
between 1988 and 1993. However, the abolition of the regional health authorities was expected 
to result in a loss of approximately 1500 jobs, along with about 1300 that had been lost over the 
first six months of 1994, through reorganisation, and the merging of DHAs and FHSAs. Also, 
the reduction of approximately 500 jobs was planned for the NBS ME headquarters and the rest 
of the health department (Wynn Davies, 1994b). This notwithstanding, such reductions in 
personnel were seen as only likely to have a modest effect upon the overall increase in 
management and administrative staff in the health service. It has to be counter-ballanced by the 
expansion of specialist audit and accountancy staff that accompanied the auditing process. 
Although medical audit had been in existence from the inception of the NHS, Working for 
Patients (DH 1989) really set the scene for its rapid expansion. A number of specialist audit 
posts and committees were formed, such as Regional Medical Audit Co-ordinators and Clinical 
Audit Co-ordinating Groups/Committees. 
At the same time as the number of qualified nurses employed in the NHS had been falling and 
the number of managers rising, the number of unqualified nursing auxiliaries had also been 
rising. The work of nurses is being 're-profiled' so that the more mundane elements are being 
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taken away from them and given to the nursing auxiliaries. At the same time, some of the more 
routine elements of doctors' work was being given to nurses. For instance, nurses now, have 
acquired limited drug prescribing powers. This frees doctors' time, time which is at a premium. 
Doctors, especially junior doctors, worked long hours, and this could effect the quality and 
outcome of the care that they provide. In response to this, and to the complaints of the 
profession, the junior doctors initiative was developed by the Conservative Government in 1991 
(Dowie 1990). The Department of Health promised to reduce the hours worked by junior doctors, 
and these have been falling, but remain high. The problem with this is that until more doctors 
are trained, the shortfall in hours has to be met by locums, who are expensive to employ. 
Nursing auxiliaries, however, were on low rates of pay, had comparatively less benefits and were 
largely employed on short-term contracts. This makes them cheaper to employ and easier for 
management to control. Concern has been expressed within the nursing occupation that an 
increasing amount of nursing work was being given to nursing auxiliaries, work that required 
nursing skills. Some have gone further and said that the steady increase in the number of nurses 
with degrees and post-graduate qualifications will result in a smaller, better qualified nursing 
'profession', supported by a large body of nursing auxiliaries. 
The growth of managers could be seen as a challenge to the dominance of the medical profession. 
The government, through the Griffiths Report, (DHSS 1983) attempted to get doctors to 
'manage' at regional and district level. However, this failed as doctors did not want to forsake 
clinical work in favour of administration for lower wages and on short-term contracts. Paton 
(1990) argued that doctors saw clinical directorates6 as a method of divide and rule, as a way of 
getting them to be directly responsible for making unjustifiable rationing decisions or 
implementing cuts. This would place clinical directors against colleagues, and doctors against 
doctors, rather than against management. Similarly, the separation of the functions of purchaser 
and provider placed GP fundholders and hospital consultants on either side of the purchasing 
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divide. This further raised the potential for division and conflict within the profession. Paddy 
Ross, ex-chairman of the Joint Consultants' Committee of the BMA and the Medical Royal 
Colleges was quoted (in 1994) as saying that the NBS changes had led to a movement in 
decision-making away from doctors in both purchasing and provider organisations (Timmins 
1994a). Ross added that in the purchasing organisations: II 
essentially decisions about what should be purchased are being made by managers not by 

health professionals ... The elevation of managerial judgements over medical ones.. .is, I 

suspect, a deliberate policy on the part of Government because the managers ...will accept 

balancing the books as their number one priority, whereas the doctor will always treat the 

individual patient (Timmins 1994a: 5). 

In a critical article on the effects of the NBS changes on health services in London, John Ireland, 
the former consultant orthopaedic surgeon at the King George Hospital, Ilford, Essex, argued 
that: 
There is an attempt by the government to deprofessionalise the consultant. Managers these 

days dictate what happens to patients, when it should be the providers of care, the 

consultants, who decide ... The ability of consultants to express themselves through clinical 

freedom is being eroded and they are demoralised and fed up with it (Evening Standard 

1994: 1). 

It appears, therefore, that the 'corporate rationalisers' may well be in the ascendant and 
challenging the power of the medical profession and other occupations within the NHS. As 
suggested previously, a major element of this challenge would be the subordination of medical 
labour to management, and this has led to claims of attempted de-skilling, de-professionalisation 
and proletarianisation. The following section will evaluate the value of these claims. 
3.6.5 De-skilling, de-professionalisation and proletarianisation 
The issue of de-skilling was first brought fully into the spotlight by Braverman (1974). 
Braverman argued that in the capitalist mode of production new technology was used to dissolve 
the labour process and reformulate it as a process conducted by management. In practice, 
according to Braverman, labour becomes displaced to other industries and occupations, but 
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becomes standardised. Increasing automation and mechanisation under capitalism increases 
production but also arrests the control of a worker over their own labour. The need for 
knowledge or training, according to Bravennan, was destroyed as a result of the management 
engineers control of these automated processes. Bravennan's position regarding de-skilling, was 
a Marxist one, and was, therefore, ultimately an economically deterministic argument. In 
addition, to decide upon the existence of de-skilling requires an adequate definition of what skill 
actually is, a difficult task which Braverman paid inadequate attention to. Being called 'skilled' 
is a valuable resource, but does not necessarily indicate the technical complexity of a job. For 
instance, few so-called skilled occupations are predominately filled by women. On the other 
hand, few of the dextrous jobs undertaken by women-for instance in the textiles trade-which are 
skilled and require a high degree of technical competance, are seen as 'skilled' by society and are 
consequently well paid. Skill, therefore, is a socially constructed term, making it impossible to 
evaluate adequately Braverman's thesis. Braverman also paid little attention to the political 
consciousness of workers themselves and their ability to actually resist deskilling. Consequently, 
to comprehend adequately the quality of the work experience, one must examine the forms of 
technology used, and how, the nature of the organisation under examination, the ability of the 
workforce to resist management and the fonns of managerial strategy actually used. This thesis 
attempts to address these points. 
The related issues of the proletarianisation7 and de-professionalisation8 of medicine in Britain 
have been given increasing attention recently, particularly regarding the changes in the NHS 
which are the subject of examination of this thesis. According to Elston (1993), one way of 
assessing whether or not there has been a shift in the power relationships in the health service 
could be signified by the increasingly overt provocation of, and challenge to, doctors. One clear 
indication is that doctors cannot now prevent some issues from reaching the political agendas. 
However, Elston argued that a call for change should not be confused with change itself. Her 
research suggested that changes in medical power were not easily discernible. Taking McKinley 
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and Archer's American study as a typical application of the de-professionalisation arguments, 
Elston evaluated their seven 'diminishing prerogatives' for doctors: control over entrance 
criteria, training content, the context and terms of their work, the objects of labour, labour tools, 
the means of labour (premises etc.) and pay. The main changes which they identified affecting 
the US physicians were alienation in the organisational, technical and economic aspects of 
doctors' work, combined with a loss of autonomy and dominance. This was seen as due to the 
bureaucratisation of US health care and the prevalent profit-maximisation ethos. Elston 
criticised those who claimed doctors had become proletarianised. As she pointed out, the 
concept of proletarianisation was contentious, even amongst Marxists.9 Class struggle for Marx, 
occurs between two principal classes - capitalist owners of the means of production and the 
working class. The existence of a clear, third (service) class complicates the model. The 
evidence in support of proletarianisation was also seen by Elston as weak. 
De-professionalisation bares a slightly closer resemblance to de-skilling than proletarianisation. 
This notion emphasises the change in the relationship between doctors and their patients. A 
decline in the cultural authority of medicine and in the level of monopoly over specific 
knowledge is seen as the result of the increased rationalisation of medical practice and knowledge 
(through computerisation, for instance). Such medical trends were seen as part of a more general 
social trend towards the rationalisation and codification of expert knowledge and growth in a 
more critical attitude towards paternalistic experts. Elston's (1993) criticisms of de­
professionalisation were similar to those she made of proletarianisation, most notably that there 
was a lack of specific examples and that supporting evidence was limited. The approach was also 
seen by Elston as too technologically deterministic and with no discernible end-point (Elston 
op.cit). 
Murphy (1990) conducted a comparative study of proletarianisation and argued that professionals 
and the proletariat are, and will, remain very different. However, in becoming salaried, the 
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medical profession-and others in the health service-have become 'ideologically' rather than 
'technically' proletarianised. By this, Murphy means that they have been subjected to an erosion 
of the social purposes and goals of their work. Professions, he argued, have simply become 
bureaucratised. The divide between professionals and most blue and white-collar workers are 
still profound. Rueschemeyer (1986) indicated that professionals still retained most of the 
features that elevated their position above others. Specialisation was not seen by doctors, for 
example, as a limitation, but a method to allow themselves to be good at what they do and 
achieve good results. Similarly, specialisation was seen not as an instrument of power or a cost-
cutting device, but as objective need for the solution ofcollective problems. Consequently: 
most professions are convinced-in fact they take for granted-that their specialised work is part 
of a whole that makes sense. Their self-respect is sustained by an identification with the 
larger social order, whether it is state socialism in the Soviet Union or advanced capitalism in 
the United States. Most expert practitioners in most industrialised countries, then, embrace 
the actual course of the division of labour as objectively necessary, as resulting neither in job 
fragmentation not in oppressive regimentation and control but rather as the welcome 
condition for individual accomplishment and success and as a development that is healthy 
and progressive for society as a whole (Rueschemeyer 1986: 138). 
During the period when the Conservatives were in office, they fostered the idea that professional 
monopoly limits public choice and that the restrictive practices of professionals in the health 
service should be limited. This challenge was continued by the Labour Government after they 
took office, in 1997. Elston (op. cit.) argued that consensual erosion and confrontational 
management were not necessarily the cause or direct outcome of the erosion of medical power. 
The changes to the health service, she argued, could be seen as constraining the political 
autonomy of medicine in relation to the state that has always existed. 
The importance placed upon leadership has increased in the NBS over the 1980s and 19905, as it 
has done in industry. The Conservative Governments adopted a partisan unitary approach to 
industrial relations theory. They essentially saw organisations such as health care providers as 
having common goals and interests, which all employees shared. The creation of NHS trusts, 
along with the implication of doctors in management through clinical directorates and the setting 
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of Patient's Charter standards (DH 1992b) for each unit, could be seen as an attempt to create a 
corporate image, and instil a notion in staff of belonging to that corporation and working for the 
benefit of it. This 'corporate identity' was thus intended to improve the efficiency of individual 
units, but may also have had the effect of weakening lateral cohesion within the occupational 
groups. 
The aim of the NHS reforms may have been to link staff groups to their output. This has raised 
issues in new, previously unthinkable ways; for example, could doctors' work be better done by 
others? Could the time thus 'freed' be used to increase doctors medical or clinical workload? 
This approach could be applied to nurses and has been used more generally, to assess how 
increased efficiency could be gained from the workforce through minimising inputs and 
maximising outputs. This approach could be seen to go one of two ways: either to increase 
specialisation between disciplines or create conflict between them. However, in conjunction with 
local pay bargaining, the reality is improved pay and conditions for professions and employees 
whose skills are scarce and worse pay for the others. 
Parry and Parry (1976) described how the medical profession operate to collectively defend and 
maintain their position in society. Murphy (1990) argued that the critique of bureaucratic control 
from professionals such as doctors could have been a 'knee-jerk' response to criticism of them 
from the proletariat. The doctors' critique was not an egalitarian one, but could have reflected a 
desire to improve or maintain their own position, not to eliminate inequality. When public 
service workers strike, Murphy argued, they always claim that it is for the benefit of the service, 
not for their own financial gain. This argument could, in many ways, be equally applied to the 
other occupational groups in the NHS, such as the nurses, physiotherapists and dietitians. 
Whereas individual professional autonomy over the 1980s and 1990s may have been eroded, 
there has been a strengthening of the medical profession's collective self-regulation. The 
General Medical Council for instance, has still retained its traditional control over complaints 
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and discipline, with an increasing amount of codes and guidance notes issued. However, as 
discussed above, the devolution of accountability to clinicians was expected to result in 
purchasers increasingly insisting that doctors adhere to clinical guidelines and audit their work 
when setting contracts. The attempt at quality control through audit has, however, given doctors 
an increased amount of control over their own work. The medical profeSSion itself defines 
quality in services and this is, allegedly, done to suit their own material purposes. Audit was 
intended as a method of bureaucratic regulation and nonnalisation. In the short term, the 
medical profession, however, has managed to adapt and control the audit agenda and concentrate 
it on medical, rather than managerial issues, organised by themselves. Attempts to control 
quality and effectiveness have been monopolised by the medical profession, largely, it must be 
said, without much opposition. The Conservative Government and managers themselves, during 
the period examined in this thesis, concentrated upon economy and efficiency issues and 
outcomes measures. This, as previously stated, has led to a concentration upon quantitative and 
financial infonnation which has come to dominate public discourse in this area. The changing 
research agenda reflected a desire to gain more data on effectiveness but the medical profession 
still managed to dominate research committees. As a consequence, the body of information in 
this area was still very limited. In this way, the protected inner 'core' of knowledge production is 
maintained (Larson 1990). Purchasing authorities are relatively weak and unwilling to challenge 
the professions, but need to be more assertive in dictating research agendas if they are to 
challenge the current orthodoxy. 
the R&D initiative should in theory provide ammunition, in the form of empirical evidence 
concerning medical treatments and their effectiveness, for managers to challenge doctors. 
Whether it will actually function in this way depends on whether managers attach sufficient 
importance to R&D and whether doctors are prepared to change their practice in accordance 
with the research evidence. If the R&D strategy becomes captured by a biomedical 
perspective, as some predict, then it will most likely fail to effect real or lasting change 
(Harrison 1994: 20). 
The 'higher' occupational groups, such as the doctors, nurses, physiotherapists, managers and 
dietitians were not affected by the changes to the NHS to the same extent as other groups. A 
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simple example of this would be the fact that the competitive tendering for services in the NHS 
has been applied to those areas such as cleaning and catering services. These were staffed by 
some of the lowest paid workers in the NBS anyhow. Consequently, the medical profession 
could be seen as less affected than others in terms of occupational control by management 
outsiders. The devolution of pay bargaining could also be seen as another attempt to give 
managers more power over the professions but was met with concerted opposition10• The threat 
of industrial action issued by GPs regarding night visits, and many hospital consultants, have 
engineered a challenge to the right of some managers to manage, and this challenge has 
continued into the late 1990s. The Averil Dongworth case at the Luton and Dunstable Hospital 
NHS Trust was a prime example of this (Katz 1994). In this case, the hospital consultants were 
able to oust the chief executive with a vote of no confidence for allegedly spying on one of their 
number. However, in the case of other professions, there is a certain amount of uncertainty over 
which tactics to employ: insider lobbying or more traditional trade union power. The threat of 
the latter appeared increasingly likely as professions attempted to exploit the weak Conservative 
Government of John Major. Nurses, midwives, therapists and later radiologists, all threatened 
strike action in the face or the annual pay awards. 
In addition to this activity, there has been an increasing number of law suits with regard to 
medical negligence and the effects of drugs over the 1990s. The number of complaints and civil 
actions increased after the Thatcher Government took office in 1979, as did the number of 
pressure groups fighting against medical negligence (Aldford's (1975) 'community' groups). 
However, Elston (op. cit.) noted that in the UK and USA, medical science and practice had been 
criticised by the public in specific areas, that is, areas where the client was not actually ill. These 
have included the management of reproduction or areas where medical science has little to 
actually give, such as disability or where fast developments in science cause concern in society 
(transplant surgery or genetics for example). This. it could be argued, indicated the continued 
weakness of consumers and their inability to significantly change medical practice. However. 
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these medical areas, both traditional and new, are becoming increasingly significant as the 
population ages. The health care agenda is moving into new fields (community health and 
scientific medical discovery), away from the traditional medical power bases and this gives the 
government the chance to take full control of most of the delivery of services, subordinating the 
labour and maintaining control through oversight and rule setting. However, the technological 
advances in medicine, characterised by heart surgery, genetics or transplantation, are in the 
rather fringe areas of medicine, but, nevertheless, areas which the medical profession clearly 
want to maintain control over. 
3.6.6 Conclusion 
Whereas there has been an attempt at the displacement and subordination of traditional experts 
in the health service, as Power (1994, 1997) contended, this has had only limited effects. The 
major professions, most notably the medical profession, have managed to maintain their 
privileged positions, with the largest impact of the NHS reforms of the 1980s-1990s hitting the 
lowest occupational groups the hardest. However, the health care agenda is changing, due to the 
changing nature of health and disease and this will have even more profound effects on the 
nature, organisation and delivery of health care in Britain. The Labour Government will be able 
to shift the emphasis of care away from the powerful and dominating hospital consultants into 
areas in which they have more knowledge and which will, consequently, be easier for them and 
their managers to control. The increased emphasis on primary care and health promotion is 
indicative of this approach. 
3.7 Theory Conclusion: Foucault Revisited 
So what do these changes imply and how does the work of Foucault help us to understand them? 
The following concluding section of this chapter will relate the evidence as discussed, to the work 
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of Foucault outlined earlier in this thesis. The thesis ",ill show that Foucault's notion of the 
panopticon and of regulation, individualisation, normalisation and hence power can be used as a 
model, as a metaphor to eX"plain change in the modem 'marketised' National Health Service. It 
is hoped that the reader will already have been able to make a number of connections with the 
evidence as s/he has read it. It remains the task of the author to highlight these and other 
connections. The preceding sections have analysed the major changes in the organisation and 
management of the English NHS, focusing upon and analysing several trends as identified by 
Michael Power (1994, 1997). The indication is that the Conservative Government's health 
initiatives in England had, through the implementation of new market-based reforms and 
creation of the so-called new public management, fonned a new panoptic network within the 
NHS. 
Section one indicated how there had been an attempt to separate government policy from politics, 
and from the organisation and management of the service. This can be seen as the formation of 
the structures necessary for such a panopticon to flourish. The centralisation of power through 
the reformulation of management structures; the replacement of RHAs with NHS E outposts; 
the imposition of health care trusts and the separation of purchaser and provider functions can be 
seen as the basis of the formation of an 'individualising pyramid'. The desire for the devolution 
of decision-making whilst concurrently retaining control of those devolved functions can be seen 
as the metaphorical 'mapping out' of management 'cells' and the individualisation of workers 
within them. However, at the same time the Conservative Government appeared to have been 
setting themselves up as the ultimate 'prison director' at the top of the pyramid, sitting in 
(relatively unobserved) solitude and watching and guarding the behaviour of workers in the 
health service in what they argued was an apolitical, unbiased way. 
Accountability in all its forms can also be seen as a further indication of the individualisation of 
managers and clinicians in the health service and the continued attempt of the Tory Government 
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to set themselves up as the seemingly neutral prison director. At the same time, the 
government's stipulation that the public should be involved in decision-making in health 
authorities, as· part of this desire, for accountability, can be seen as an attempt to illustrate the 
openness in some part, of this panoptic network. It is in line vvith the Foucauldian thesis, this 
allows public inspection at any time of a panoptican. However, this inspection is limited in scope 
and much debate has ensued over the openness of the government itself (the prison director) in 
policy development and management. 
GPs and purchasers increasingly insist that doctors adhere to clinical guidelines and audit their 
work. The purchaser-provider divide could also present a perverse incentive to hide and distort 
inforn1ation and provide a barrier to communication between units. The imposition of 'gagging' 
clauses in employment contracts, as previously discussed, is also significant. Together, these 
provide an illustration of lateral invisibility and separated individualities of workers within their 
pre-defined 'cells'. 
Within the health service, regional plans are formulated and managed according to national 
priorities. The rhetoric of devolution of operational responsibility masks a centralism which 
ensures local services match national expectations. This is somewhat akin to the further 
delineation of workers 'cells'. Control through normalisation to centrally-defined output 
measures rather than direct, interventionist management of the workforce, fits neatly with 
Foucault's approach. In effect, behaviour in the health service is eX'})ected to become self­
regulating. The roles of the NHSE outposts and purchaser and provider institutions had become 
tightly defined with workers in each expected to work to reach nationally set targets, such as 
those set out in the Health of the Nation (DH 1992a), league tables, performance indicators and 
charters. Workers are relatively autonomous within the space (cells) delineated by these targets. 
However, such management by oversight and rule setting, as described, could be seen as the 
metaphorical 'gaze' of managers over workers. As this power is invisible and automatic, the 
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behaviour of clinicians is expected to become self-regulating, thus ensuring the exercise of power 
at the lowest cost. Power and knowledge are, in this case therefore, mutually supportive, with 
power producfng what the state determines is the maximum health gain at the most economic 
cost. 
However, there is considerable resistance from workers; countervailing power does of course, 
exist. Centrally-collected statistics published in the form of league tables, and governrnent­
enforced sanctions, can be seen as further attempts to control non-confonnity. Such sanctions 
are usually applied to an institution, rather than an individual within that institution however, 
which has the effect of increasing competition between clinicians. They are all affected 
(punished) when there is non-confonnity, thus increasing division and conformity to corporate 
goals. If the performance of individual clinicians fails to match corporate goals, thus effecting 
the rating of their department and/or institution, then everybody in that department/institution is 
affected. Peer pressure is consequently high. The intention, therefore, is for behaviour of 
workers in the health service to become self-regulating under the watchful 'gaze' of the guards 
and attain these targets. Power is consequently both continuous and anonymous, with a circle of 
power operating through a process of individual normalisation, whereby the 'prisoners' become 
their own guard. 
Management by oversight and rule setting rather than direct management is a way of ensuring 
that power is exercised at the lowest cost. The emphasis on the three Es (economy efficiency and 
effectiveness) places a further emphasis on this. A concentration on these measures and upon the 
targets and measures noted earlier, promotes the compulsory visibility of clinicians, implicates 
them in a network of writing and promotes each person as a source of knowledge. The shifting 
of the focus of care away from doctors into areas where they are weaker also promotes an 
increase in individualisation, normalisation and regulation in the NBS. 
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The increased systematisation of medical knowledge has led to task fragmentation which may 
open up closed professional cultures to public scrutiny. Combined with the formation of clinical 
directorates aiid GP fundholders, this could be seen as a method of divide and rule, increasing 
lateral barriers between doctors and helping to promote a workfor.;e consisting of a series of 
separate individualities. The displacement and subordination of such experts is also an 
illustration of an attempt (at least) to differentiate individuals and divide the workforce. From 
the time it came to power in 1979 under Margaret Thatcher, the Conservative Government was 
determined to take on the power of the medical profession. The doctors, in particular, were, and 
continue to be, a very powerful force within health care. The rise of the New Public Management 
(NPM), therefore, could be seen as the delegation of power in areas of high resistance to chiefs, 
as Foucault noted would happen. The increased imposition of the audit process, outcomes 
measures and the like, could be seen as the increased mechanisation of the functions 
management were unable to control. There has already been a slimming-down of the RHAs in 
their number and manpower as they were replaced with NHSE outposts and, as highlighted in the 
previous section regarding accountability, the remaining staff were now civil servants and unable 
to voice their concerns publicly. Their role now was also limited to implementing government 
policy and consequently can be seen as increasingly mechanistic in nature. 
Changes in the nature of research and the research agenda are a reflection and an element of the 
development of this panoptic network in the health service. The development of health services 
research under the auspices of the Research for Health strategy DR 1991b, 1993a) is an 
illustration of the desire to gain more knowledge on clinicians (inmates). The panopticon is a 
laboratory for observation and experimentation; it has a quite literal application to the NHS in 
this sense. The results of much health services research is oriented towards the production of 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness, and outcomes measures. These results can then be used as 
yardsticks to measure and compare individual behaviour via the audit process. 
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The rise in the numbers of health services researchers provides an illustration of a new 
'disciplinary career', leading to increased power through the increased knowledge of the 
behaviour of clinicians. A new disciplinary career has arisen and a challenge to the traditional 
(medical) knowledge base of the health service has taken place. This challenge to the dominant 
mode of knowledge further weakens the power of the traditional dominant forces (doctors), 
placing it increasingly into the hands of a new magistracy-the managers-imposed by the 
government and leading, as Foucault suggested, to the increased centralisation of knowledge. 
The aim of the government, therefore, is to legitimise the power to punish and make it seem 
natural. The change in the nature of 'legitimate' knowledge, the associated displacement of 
ex.'Perts of the 'first order' and the fact that if people express reservations about audit. they are 
seen as trying to defend their secrecy and privileges, goes some way to substantiate Foucault's 
claim. 
To conclude, the purpose of this chapter was to highlight how Foucault's conception of the 
panoptic on can be used as a metaphor to explain change in the modem marketised health service 
and the role that research and development policy plays in this. The parallels drawn indicate that 
the panopticon is an apt model to use, but as the evidence from the literature highlights, does not 
exist in its idealised form as such. The panoptic model is an ideal typical representation of how 
power in the NHS is exercised and the role of R&D in this. The preceding discussion suggests 
that although there may be an attempt at the formation of what could be seen as a panoptic 
network, considerable resistance from below existed and political sensitivity is such that such a 
network may not be feasible. The panoptic model also provides the author with a framework for 
the thesis. The individualising pyramid, with power expressed downwards through the gaze can 
be viewed (in the NHS) as follows: 
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Figure 4. Individualising pyramid, as envisaged in the English NHS 
Research and development policy should be analysed within this framework, within the context 
of the changes discussed whilst seeing research as a discourse of power. To recapitulate: 
Foucault believed that resistance to power should be analysed through the observation of the 
positions occupied and action used by each competing force and at the strategies of counter-attack 
and resistance used. 
This theme of struggle only really becomes operative if one establishes concretely -in each 
particular case -who is engaged in struggle, what the struggle is about, and how, where, by 
what means and according to what rationality it evolves (Foucault 1980: 164). 
This remains consistent with the approach to policy analysis discussed previously. Here, the 
emphasis was upon focusing attention on different levels of analysis, at looking at the causes and 
consequences of action by the government and taking a holistic approach to this process. 
A paradox for Foucault's thesis was that increased equality was accompanied by increased social 
control throught the gaze. Ma;'(imum equality,therefore, is achieved through, maximum social 
control through the gaze. However, as social control increases, the mental and physical cost to 
the population increases. A medium has to be sought, which equates these positive and negative 
aspects of social control. In this context, the task of government is, therefore, to maximise the 
health gain of the population through normalisation to corporate goals, such as the Patient's 
Charter (DH 1992b), whilst minimising the negative pressures of power, such as the mounting 
121 
paperwork and bureaucracy (or network of writing, as Foucault would have it), sickness and 
absense rates. 
A major criticism of Foucault was that he failed to explain how par.opticons arose. This thesis 
goes some way to accounting for the rise of one such network. Is this network a good or a bad 
thing? Foucault was criticised as having no vision of what the alternative should be. He argued 
that the whole network should be replaced but didn't (or couldn't) say with what. However, there 
are positive benefits to the present system of managing and organising the NBS. Indeed, in 
terms of systems of health care, the NHS is one of the most efficient and effective in the world. 
In Britain, in 1991, for example, 6.6% of GDP was spent on health care and every citizen has 
equal access to health care on demand. In France and Germany, the figure was 9.1 % and 8.5% 
respectively, and in the US, 13.4% (with a far less equitable service provided) (Abel Smith 1994: 
152). 
Similarly, the rise of New Public Management as it is applied to the NHS, and its associated 
trends such as the increasing prominence of health services research and the Research for Health 
agenda should not be dismissed entirely. In any case, it may not be possible to dismiss these 
initiatives. Statutes are very difficult to abrogate, and the introduction of new measures usually 
takes longer than the 'life' of anyone government. Similarly, further service reforms at a time 
when the NHS has already undergone a multitude of substantial changes will not be welcomed by 
existing managers and clinicians. However, it is clear that certain factors and changes do need to 
be made. Over the preceding chapter, the nature and implications of New Public Management 
have been discussed and a number of difficulties highlighted. Indeed, certain aspects of 
marketisation and New Public Management appear to owe more to political dogma than a 
genuine concern to improve health care provision. Reports have indicated that some 
fundamental aspects of the Tory Government's changes, . such as GP fundholding, were, indeed 
less effective than previous systems (Robinson and Le Grand 1993, Ranade 1997). 
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I Merquior (1990) called the French philosophical tradition 'litero-philosphic', meaning it was characterised by a superb literal 
ability and theorising, but was purposively absent ofanalytic discipline. 
2 Police for Foucault did not simply mean the modern police force but the 'ensemble ofmechanisms serving to ensure order, the 
properly channellea growth ofwealth and the conditions ofpreservation of health "in general'" (Rabinow (ed.) 1991: 277) 
l For further e)"-planation of the neo-Marxist perspective, see chapter two. 
• See section 3.2. 
, A core region is the defmite, protected social location where the truest discourse is uttered, defending dominant codes of 
practice (codes of practice adopted by social agents with the influence and power to make them accepted). 
6 The system ofdevolving budgets, pre-defined by central NHS trust managers, to specific clinical directorates (normally 
medical special isms, such as obstetrics and gynaecology). These directorates are managed, on the whole, by doctor-managers, 
who are charged with the organisation and management oftheir services to meet their contractual obligations, but within the 
financial constraints imposed. 
7 The mechanism by which the control over certain prerogatives concerning the content, location and essentially of an 
occupational group are taken away so that the group is subordinated to the wider demands ofcapitalist production. 
8 A similar notion to proletarianisation, although it does not specifically depend upon a general theory ofsocial change. The 
changes in medicine are, however, seen as an element ofwider social trends (rationalisation, the codification of expert 
knowledge and the growth ofa more critical attitude to the paternalism ofthe experts). 
9 For further discussion ofthe Marxist viewpoint, see chapter 2. 
10 TIus was the same case for other occupations, such as teachers. 
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CHAPTER 4 

METHODOLOGY APPROACHES 
4.1 Introduction 
The following chapter is an evaluation of the various methodologi~al approaches open to the 
social scientist and their suitablility for this thesis. This part follows the theory chapter, because 
sociological methodology and methods are intrinsically linked to theoretical approaches. Indeed, 
the choice of methodology is not only about chosing an appropriate technique and tools, but an 
investment in, and commitment to, a theoretical approach. The actual conduct and practical 
realities of data collection and analysis will then be discussed. The chapter will describe the 
methods chosen for this analysis and explain why and how they were chosen. It will also 
examine the methodological problems and issues encountered and solutions to them during the 
process of developing, designing, conducting and writing up the research. 
As a result of the size of the task in hand, the time available, and, most importantly, the 
theoretical focus of the thesis, viz, the relationship between professional groups in the NBS and 
their attempts to monopolise knowledge in order to enhance their position, it was decided at the 
outset to concentrate attention upon the following five groups: the medical profession (the most 
powerful group in the health service); nurses (numerically the largest occupational group); 
'managers' in purchaser, provider, regional and academic institutions (as an increasingly sizable, 
powerful and important group); and physiotherapists and dietitians, as representative of other 
professions in the health service (the Professions Allied to Medicine-P AMS). These two groups 
are relatively sizeable but comparatively under-researched. The groups are believed to be 
representative of the NBS in general and provide a wide range of views and perspectives for the 
analysis. In addition, the thesis mainly focuses upon acute and community trusts. Data 
collection did not take place in the primary care sector, although the boundaries between primary 
and secondary care are blurred, particularly those between primary and community care. For 
instance, a health visitor interviewed was also a locality manager and was employed by a 
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community trust. However, the health visitor was based in a GP practice. Nevertheless, as most 
of the theoretical literature related to the secondary care sector, and this was where the vast 
majority ofNHS research funds went, the thesis again focuses primarly on this sector of the NBS. 
4.2 The case studies approach 
To characterise using Yin's definition (Yin 1990), a case study is an empirical analysis that: 
• 'investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when 
• the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which 
• mUltiple sources of evidence are used' (Yin 1990: 23). 
Multiple case studies are particularly suited to questions which require generalisation and 
accounts made of the complexity of the subject matter through comparison of individual cases. 
This is a complex task, and requires clear aims and objectives. Of course, by expanding this 
analysis, the nature of the thesis has altered to a certain extent, but the aims and objectives have 
remained consistent. A case study approach was adopted because, as Yin (1990) noted: 
In general, case studies are the preferred strategy when how or "why" questions are being 
passed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context ... The case study allows an 
investigation to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events. (Yin 
1990: 13). 
Traditionally, case studies were only seen as useful in the exploratory phase of an examination. 
However, case studies can in reality be exploratory, descriptive or explanatory and, to a certain 
extent, overlap all three (Yin 1990). In essence, a case study is a general term given to a variety 
of research methods all focused upon a single occurrence, and the interaction of events and 
factors around that occurrence, but when behaviour cannot be manipulated. As opposed to a 
large-scale survey, case studies allow the researcher to analyse the various interactive processes at 
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work whilst concentrating on a specific situation or instance. Such processes may well remain 
hidden in a large-scale survey. Yin (1990) identified at least four applications for case studies: 
• 	 e:\."plaining causal links in real-life situations too complex for experimental or survey 
strategies; 
• 	 describing the actual context of the research situation; 
• 	 evaluations can benefit from a descriptive, illustrative study of the intervention; 
• 	 exploring the situations where the subject being evaluated has no precise single set of 
outcomes. 
The case study approach, therefore, is the ideal one to take when examining complex issues of 
policy, as it enables the researcher to capture the rich diversity of sources necessary to provide a 
truly holistic picture and explanation of the development and implementation of policy. Case 
studies within this definition can be both single and multiple, qualitative and/or quantitative. 
They provide the strength of experimental research in a natural setting and are both 
multidimensional and multi-method, in order to provide a more rounded and balanced picture. 
Following Yin's approach (Yin 1990), case studies were conducted once a sufficient amount of 
research evidence had built up on a topic (Yin 1990). The cases were refined by focusing upon 
specific aspects or issues. However, the major problem with this is that it may create a bias in the 
work, through focussing upon issues the researcher hlmlherself, rather than what the respondents 
see as important. This made it more important to remain reflective and open in the analysis, so 
that the reader was able to trace the progression of the work and form their own opinion on the 
justifications made. This illustrates how the analysis of the cases continued into the writing-up of 
the thesis, by allowing the evidence and arguments from the analysis to be tested by the reader. 
The emphasis, as with qualitative research is on the validity, rather than statistical 
generalisability of the work. Yin (1990) further advanced this notion of analytic generalisation, 
using it to describe the comparison of a pre-existing theory with the empirical results of a case 
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study; if two studies support a theory, then replication has occurred and if they do not support 
another theory, then the theory is even more plausible. However, such analytic generalisation 
presents certai"n problems when one is using qualitative research methodologies. 
The case study method in health policy is characterised by Paton and Bach's book Case Studies in 
Health Policy and Management (paton and Bach 1990). The authors argued that they wanted the 
reader to be aware of the many perspectives, but avoid making abstract choices. Questions should 
be, for example, who has central power in the NHS?, how pluralistic, centrifugal or diffuse is 
policy making, how coherent, pluralistic or fragmented is district policy implementation?, for 
debates, what methodologies or concepts can one supply? They argued that the major role for a 
case study is to promote discussion, asking how the past shapes the future, and consequently 
organised their research, to discover: 
• what had happened to date?; 
• who was influential and why?; 
• which decision-making mechanism was important and why?; 
• what were the predictions? 
Paton and Bach (ibid) used the political structures, ideologies and forces defining the policy 
debate and influencing policy as a backdrop to their analysis. They subsequently looked at the 
forces influencing policy implementation, such as individuals, structures, economic constraints 
and social forces. Successes and failures were then analysed, along with managerial incentives 
and constraints and policy evolution affecting the chances of local influence. For them, the 
researcher must note the processes ofNHS policy-making in an evolving context and evaluate the 
factors contributing to change. Like Yin (1990) in his formulation of selective case studies, 
Paton and Bach argued that they were deliberately selective in taking out extraneous detail from 
their case studies to provide a clearer picture. The case studies could then be used to inform 
managers about decision-making, allowing them to reflect on existing practice. Case studies, 
128 
therefore, are fully compatible with the sociological approach to policy analysis adopted by this 
author, capturing the historical development and implications of policy, as well as the other 
essential elements outlined in the previous chapter. 
A choice is also required of the researcher as to whether shelhe wants to place more of an 
emphasis upon the validity or generalisability of research findings. That said, it should be the 
task of the competent researcher to be fully aware of the limitations of herlhis methodological 
approach and try to make amends or compensate for these. The choice of method ultimately 
depends upon the general purpose of the research' project itself and the general beliefs of the 
researcher. The following section will subsequently explore this issue further to provide a full 
critique of possible methods of data collection. Firstly, however, the issue of whether to use 
qualitative and/or quantitative techniques will be addressed. 
4.3 Quantitative and qualitative research 
There are five principal forms of methods by which data can be collected in the social sciences ­
observation, analysing te:x.1.s and documents, interviews, questionnaires, and experimentation. 
Each of these methods may be quantitative or qualitative in nature~ the former emphasising 
reliability and the latter authenticity. The research techniques required for this analysis needed to 
be flexible and sensitive to the needs of the respondents and the form of subject matter. 
Typically qualitative methods yield large volumes of exceedingly rich data obtained from a 
limited number of individuals and whereas the quantitative approach necessitates 
standardised data collection, qualitative researchers exploit the context of data gathering to 
enhance the value of the data. Analysis of qualitative material is more explicitly interpretive, 
creative and personal than in quantitative analysis, which is not to say that it should not be 
equally systematic and careful. (Walker 1985: 3) 
In essence, the strength of qualitative research methods lies in their emphasis upon the notion of 
the validity of the data. Such validity is dependent upon demonstrating that the 'features' being 
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portrayed reflect the researcher's general theory, rather than a (statistical) population. Silverman 
(1985) argued that only through the use of theory or logic can the researcher apply causal 
relationships l:5etween variables. Statistics do not reveal causal relationships between variables 
but correlations. The aim of conducting qualitative case studies, ther:!fore, is to achieve faultless 
logic, emanating from logical inferences based upon the strength of the theory developed. The 
paucity of any previous literature in the field of R&D policy in the English NBS meant that the 
use of qualitative methodologies was inevitable, as quantitative methodologies require pre­
existing theory and scientific evidence as a foundation on which to develop a null hypothesis. As 
such, they are theory-derived, rather than theory generating, with the emphasis upon that of 
reliability of results. As with all research methods, neither qualitative, not quantitative 
approaches are necessarily right or wrong, just more appropriate for particular instances. A 
distinct advantage of qualitative methods is that they permit the researcher to get 'closer' to the 
data, thus allowing him/her to gain insight into mental and social processes and the shared 
meaning and interpretations given to objects. Insight has been identified as the heart of social 
knowledge. This insight necessitates the researcher to move from their position of neutrality to 
one of fully engaging with the subjects. 
It is inevitable that the researcher will have some effect on the setting being studied and such 
effects vary according to a number of factors, such as length of observation and the research 
setting itself Whether these factors do actually effect conclusions is debatable, but the researcher 
and reader of the report should be able to make an informed judgement about such matters. Of 
course, this issue is by no means specific to qualitative research, although the emphasis on 
quantitative methods is to minimise such effects by strongly controlling the environmental setting 
of the research. 
What the researcher learns from his research depends on the quality of his interaction with his 
subjects, his ability to interpret what he observes and is told, and his O'WTI ethical and social 
values. The qualitative researcher considers these influences explicitly in his analysis in a 
way that a positivist rarely does. (Walker 1985: 13) 
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For this reason, the theory was developed methodologically and systematically from the data 
gathered, in a way which enabled decisions and actions to be more accurately assessed. This was 
through giving the study visibility and weight, and restoring the legitimacy of subjectivity. 
However, the debate so far has concentrated upon the difference between quantitative and 
qualitative research. The difference in the overall process of research may not be so divergent. 
Kvale (1996) argued that the dichotomy between quantitative and qualitative research was not as 
pronounced as is so often assumed and that the first stage of any research study (the literature 
search) was a qualitative analysis, the data collection stage was either quantitative or qualitative 
and the final stage of reporting was essentially a qualitative procedure. In the light of this 
discussion, the following section will examine and critique each of the methods of social analysis 
discussed earlier. The uses and limitations of each will be assessed and their suitability for the 
purposes of this case study analysis explored. As previously stated, each of the major methods 
can be either quantitative or qualitative in nature, and as such, the specific advantages and 
disadvantages of each will also be briefly noted. 
4.4 Methods of data collection 
The following section will provide a brief overview of the principle research methods open to the 
social scientist. It will go on to describe and critique the methods used in this anlysis (semi­
structured interviews and document analysis) and explain the reasons for their use. It will 
subsequently explain in finer detail, the methodological processes, issues and strategies used in 
the thesis to gather, analyse and write up the data. 
4.4.1 Observation 
The principal advantages of observational methods, be they participant or non-participant, lies in 
their ability to study action and interaction on individuals and groups in their natural setting for 
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longer and in more depth than other strategies. A classic example of the use of this methodology 
was William Foot Whyte's Street Corner Society (1943). In this study, Foot Whyte played the 
role of non-participant observer of a Chicago street gang. This form of analysis does allow the 
researcher to get 'close' to data and, arguably, the character and subject matter of the research are 
less affected by the actual researcher than by other methods. It was decided, however, that 
observation was not an appropriate methodology to use for this thesis, principally because the 
amount of time required to forge relationships, negotiate access, gain the confidence of subjects 
and gain a significant amount of data, would exceed time limits set for doctoral study. Of 
particular significance was the fact that as the author was known through previous work to some 
of the organisations, his role could not be a covert one. The evidence-based medicine agenda and 
Research/or Health (DH 1991b, 1993a) strategy were new to the NHS and, as such, the author's 
position as 'expert' in these areas would have placed him in the intolerable position of having 
(potentially) far too much influence over the observed situation. 
4.4.2 Questionnaires 
Questionnaires are developed, then administered to a sample population in order to determine the 
distribution of attitudes, beliefs and characteristics of the total population. The over-riding 
assumption is that such self-report can measure or describe these attitudes, beliefs and 
characteristics. A questionnaire survey is a preferred method to obtain a relatively small amount 
of information from a relatively large number of subjects. Correlations are established, relating 
to specific groups identified from the data and inferences made from those and applied to the 
general population. As previously noted, the emphasis in quantitative methods such a 
questionnaires is upon the reliability, rather than validity of the data. Correlations between two 
or more variables are established from questionnaire data, rather than causal relationships 
established. The statistical description and explanation of the variability of specific features of 
the population is ~e basic aim of questionnaire-based research. 
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Although questionnaires are relatively easy to organise, administer and analyse, they are of little 
use for the analysis of complicated patterns of interaction and social relationships • 
. 
Questionnaires are of particular use when the aim of the research is to gain quantitative data on a 
specific population. Of course open-ended questionnaires may be administered, where 
respondents are free to answer questions in their own words, but the same criticisms, by and 
large, still apply. The aim of this thesis was to analyse policy implementation in a number of 
geographical areas and establish how policy was developed and implemented in those areas. The 
obvious complexity of these processes, therefore, and the lack of previous studies from which 
specific questions could be developed and theories evaluated, militated against the use of 
questionnaires for this thesis. Similarly, given the exploratory nature of the thesis, a structured 
questionnaire might focus respondents attention on issues which were irrelevant to them. For 
these reasons, it was decided not to use a questionnaire. 
4.4.3 Experimentation 
Psychological testing and projective techniques have often been used by psychologists to obtain 
personality data. The intention of the researchers using these techniques is to gain an accurate 
portrait of an individual through assessing the methods they project their personality onto an 
ambiguous, but standard stimuli. Such ambiguity and standardisation are common features of 
these tests, although the principal interpretation of results is expressed in the form of a clinical 
judgement. Despite much criticism, these tests are still used by psychologists quite frequently in 
a clinical context. Contemporary aspects analysed include styles of interpersonal behaviour and 
self-esteem and are consequently more concrete and contain less vague generalisations than 
previous studies. Other measurements and tests have been developed to be used in 
anthropological and qualitative research, such as games played by people as a source of 
information about social and community behaviour. The principal criticisms directed at these 
methods of investigation are that as they operate at an individual level, such techniques are of 
little use in examining wider social and political issues and behaviour. In addition, the validity of 
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these tests and measurements are still suspect, their reliability is still questionable, and 
environmental and cultural factors may affect results. The approach, therefore, was not believed 
suitable for this research and was not adopted. 
4.4.4 Randomised controlled trials 
Randomised controlled trials (RCTs) have traditionally been the preferred method of evaluation 
for biomedical researchers, in for example, the clinical evaluation of new drugs. To characterise, 
RCTs are used to evaluate two or more 'treatments'. Patients are randomly allocated to one or 
other of the treatments, and measurements taken sometimes before, but always after the treatment 
is administered. Results are statistically analysed and compared (Newell 1992). They can also be 
(and are) applied to multi-faceted regimes of treatment. The population to be studied are 
carefully defined, usually in terms of medical diagnosis and of specified exclusions (social, 
medical, administrative or legal). Patients informed consent should always be be sought before 
entering them into a trial. Exclusions are kept to a minimum if possible, as strictly speaking, the 
results are only generalisable to the type of people selected in the study. There has been some 
attempt to make RCTs of more relevance to policy, as the NHS changes have emphasised cost 
effectiveness and efficiency. For policy-related RCTs, service considerations are often used to 
define the 'diagnosis'. RCTs are also used to look at the process of care, as opposed to the 
structure, and may cover topics such as patterns of general practitioner prescribing. This requires 
more of an input in the study from social scientists and others with specialist knowledge, such as 
nurses. 
Trials are usually evaluated in terms of a single major criterion of success, such as a reduction in 
mortality. This may well be undesirable in policy-related trials and, indeed. unlikely to be 
achievable. Instead, there is likely to be a number of criteria relating to each of the disciplines 
involved (sociaL clinical and economic, for instance). Defining acceptable outcomes is always 
difficult and is still a topic for debate (Newell 1992). Ethical consideration are also paramount; 
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investigators need to make sure beforehand, that none of the treatments offered is better than 
another. If a doctor is sure that one form of treatment is better for a patient than another, then 
the patient should not be entered into the trial. 
Sample sizes nearly always have to be large in order to identify a difference between treatments. 
A noticable difference in a small trial will only be found if the treatment is much more effective, 
or very much poorer in comparison to the control group. This raises distinct scientific issues 
regarding whether the treatment was so important, or so dangerous that it shouldn't have been 
missed. Ethical issues also arise, in that if a sample size is too small to detect a better treatment 
for patients, it can not be ethical to include patients in a trial. Other problems and issues arising 
from RCTs include the following: 
• 	 the conduct and administration of a trial is very difficult and time consuming, particularly 
patient recruitment and randomisation; 
• 	 results are hypothesis testing, rather than hypothesis forming; 
• 	 results are expressed statistically and all the usual quantitative criticisms apply; 
significance levels become problematic if a special sub-group is sought, who may benefit 
particularly from one fann of treatment; 
• 	 when combining qualitative data into a clinical trial, the large number of data sources may 
make it difficult to 'control' for all possible influencing factors in the study; 
• 	 the generalisability of RCTs is made difficult by the restrictions placed on the identification of 
the study population and the control of variables, which are made to maximise reliability 
(Newell 1992, Jelinek 1992, McDonald and Daly 1992). 
The large number of groups and influencing factors, combined with the relatively heterogenous 
nature of these groups, make the RCT inappropriate as a methodology for this thesis. Trials are 
of little use for addressing broad questions and issues, such as those encompassed by this thesis. 
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404.5 Document analysis 
This is an unobtrusive method involving accumulating and analysing documents produced during 
everyday life.' It is a popular technique, often used in conjunction with another, such as 
interviews or observation. There has been a large increase in the amount of data and sources of 
data in the post-Second World War period. Ackroyd and Hughes (1992) argued that this increase 
resulted from the introduction and mass development of computer technology. Social data are 
kept on computer files almost everywhere nowadays, from government organisations, to 
personnel offices, allowing an input from social data into systems not originally designed with it 
in mind. To some extent, social science techniques and objectives, have been internalised and 
institutionalised by other organisations. No where has this been more pronounced, than in the 
state itself. Indeed, the NHS, as the discussions in the previous chapter indicated, has itself been 
witness to a large increase in the amount of bureaucracy, paperwork and official documents. 
Indeed, as Foucault (1977b) indicated, the individual has become embroiled within a whole 
network of writing that are amenable to analysis. Somewhat ironically, this PhD report itself will 
also contribute to part of that network of documents itself. 
The analysis of documents was deemed a necessary and important element of this study as they 
provided an essential insight into the operation of an organisation, yielding important 
information. Budgets and progress reports, for example, were invaluable in this respect. In 
analysing the implementation of a government strategy such as Research for Health (DH 1991b, 
1993a), important associated documents are produced at all levels from the central government 
department to the surgeries and hospitals. Other documents, in addition, may be equally 
important, such as newspaper reports and government speeches. These all provide a rich source 
of data and can provide a valuable insight into the social life and processes under investigation. 
Accessing this information was a task in itself, particularly the 'grey' literature, but was achieved 
through careful and methodical searching. I 
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-Content analysis is often used to systematically analyse data and to objectively document patterns. 
The approach adopts a quantitative approach to the analysis of the communicative material in 
question, categorising and counting the occurrence of certain phenomena or references, for 
instance. However, this approach was not adopted here, as it was felt undesirable to reduce the 
data to a series of categories; the subtlety and depth of understanding, it was felt, would have 
been lost by reducing the data to a series of rather abstract quantitative factors. The following 
factors were seen as the principal strengths of document analysis: 
it is unobtrusive; 
it is non-reactive; 
it is conducted without disturbing the research setting; 
the researcher decides, after the data is collected, where the greatest emphasis should be; 
procedures are explained, so facts and analysis are easy to check. 
The principal weakness of document analysis relates to hermeneutics, that is, it is difficult to 
understand the meaning attached to documents by the producer. It is, therefore, very important to 
use as many sources of evidence as possible. Despite this, the researcher always runs the risk of 
interpreting documentary evidence in the light of his/her present historial situation and, 
consequently, suppositions and analysis may be completely unwarranted. Reliability and validity, 
therefore, are as important to this methodology as they are with others. 
4.4.6 Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were the second method of data collection chosen for this analysis. 
They are one of three principal forms of interviews: structured (closed), semi-structured and 
unstructured interviews. Structured interviews follow a positivist approach to the theory and 
conduct of the interview, whereas semi and unstructured interviews are more akin to 
interactionist approaches. The following section will analyse both these interactionist and 
positivist perspectives and their approaches to the conduct and analysis of interviews. 
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4.4.6.1 Structured interviews 
Structured interviews, produce data in the form of 'facts', that is facts about attitudes and 
behaviour. They are in effect, orally presented closed questionnaires, with a fixed list of 
questions which the researcher asks in exactly the same way for all respondents and in exactly the 
order in which they are printed. The main attempt, as with all positivistic research, is to produce 
valid and reliable data which is independent of the research setting. As a result, most of the 
advantages and disadvantages of questionnaires and quantitative methods in general, equally 
apply to structured interviewing. The way in which meaning is derived from structured 
interviews ensures they have a 'factual reality'. If accounts do not totally reflect that reality, 
remedies and checks are made to increase the accuracy of the complete picture. The reliability of 
the technique is of paramount importance for the positivist, and one way of achieving this is to 
ensure that the interview takes place in a neutral setting. As a result, the positivist research 
design incorporates reliability tests, and remedies. Interviews are standardised, so that data is 
generated which stands independent of the interviewer, interviewee and interview setting. 
Standard protocols are followed, such as asking questions as they are printed and in the same 
order. Reactions and interaction between the interviewer and interviewee is also minimised, all 
in order to maximise the reliability and (external) validity of data. 
4.4.6.2 Unstructured interviews 
To reiterate, interactionists view interviews as a relativistic interpretation of the interview 
process. In-depth interviews are favoured over structured interviews, because they emphasise the 
interactive and social nature of the encounter. Both interviewer and interviewee are seen as of 
equal status and understanding is the basis of the validity of the analysis and the type of 
knowledge gained. The attempt is to obtain data which gives an authentic insight into the 
experiences of people. Interviewees are consequently encouraged to freely express their own 
personal views. Questions are not asked in any specific order and according to any set list, and 
respondents can discuss topics and issues not defined by the interviewer. 
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The problems inherent in this approach are numerous. The open-ended nature of the interviews 
is problematic'in that to not view such an encounter as a form of social control, moulding what 
people actually say, is somewhat naive. The non-assertive nature of the interviewer can cause 
problems for the interviewee in knowing what is relevant to say and can indeed stifle talk. The 
flexibility of unstructured interviews often results in problems with the comparison of results 
between interviews. They are also more time consuming and analysis is more difficult than 
standardised interviews. In addition, interactionists themselves are unsure of where they stand 
regarding an internalist (positivist) or externalist (ethnomethodological) position on interviews. 
The former stance treats interviews as reports of external realities, so long as predefined protocols 
are adhered to. The latter treats interviews themselves as a topic for analysis where researcher 
and researched actively construct their social world together. Both positivist and interactionst 
perspectives, however share a concern over the way that informants may distort social reality 
(Silverman 1985, 1993). 
It is argued here that in-depth interviews are never totally unstructured. Researchers should be 
able to define the relevance of the data they collect; if interviewees find it uninteresting and 
insignificant, then the quality of the data should be questioned by the researcher (Jones 1985). 
Indeed, what Silverman appears to neglect is that ifone wants to interview health service workers 
and others whose time is limited, then one has to show how the research being conducted relates 
to, and will benefit, them, Only then are they likely to be willing to be interviewed. This was the 
approach taken for this thesis. Consequently, the researcher has already made some decisions on 
the structure of the interview to be conducted and if the respondent has agreed to be interviewed, 
then this structure has been agreed in advance of the encounter. Researchers have issues in mind 
before interviews; the more data gathered, the more trends and patterns the researcher is likely to 
notice and the more likely the researcher is to want to explore these further. In the research 
encounter, the researcher is reflective on past knowledge and interests and will. in the light of 
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this, decide on which issues and topics s/he does or does not want to explore further. Some 
structure is consequently imposed on the interview encounter. In addition, an interview can 
never be solely seen as a conversation started and controlled by the researcher for a specific 
purpose, as they are of course, two-way interactions and intervievl"ees can and sometimes do 
refuse to answer questions or ask their own. No research, therefore, is pre-suppositionless and 
there can only be structured and semi-structured interviews (Walker 1985). 
4.4.6.3 Semi-structured interviews 
Just as Kvale (1996) sawall research as being both quantitative and qualitative, Silverman (1993) 
also argued that both positivist and interactionist approaches can be bridged in research. 
Silverman (1993) noted that sometimes it made sense to focus on the situational or local nature of 
talk, whereas at other times it might be necessary to treat what people say as 'true' reports, 
depending upon the purpose in hand. Indeed, sometimes both issues could be followed up, and 
this occurs both in the interview itself, analysis and writing-up. Semi-structured interviews were 
chosen as a methodology for this thesis as they provide a rich source of information on how 
people account for their actions, based upon the reality of their everyday experience. Over their 
lives, people develop a complex framework of values and beliefs which they use to predict, 
categorise and e)\."}Jlain events in their worlds. Elements of these frameworks may be shared by 
different people, but what elements. cannot be assumed (although a certain degree of 
conunonality must surely be fairly predictable on certain topics between, for example people in 
the same occupational group or class). Each account, however, was taken from a distinct, 
individual perspective, and was treated accordingly. The in-depth interview is accepted as a good 
method to use when trying to understand why people act as they do as it enables one to discover 
the meaning and significance people give to their actions. This was achieved by asking people 
and not just by observing and assuming they know. Furthermore, questions were asked and 
answers received in interviewees' own terms and in sufficient depth to uncover the context and 
substance of their meanings. 
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The advantages of semi-structured interviews were such that they were adopted as a principal 
form of data collection for this thesis. The attempt was to analyse power relationships within the 
health service "as a central element to the study of R&D policy. Interviews of this nature provide 
the necessary depth and reflection required and a range of outcomes, needs and requirements 
specified by health care workers themselves, not ones that are assumed and imposed on the study 
by the researcher. In addition, as this analysis was the study of different organisations who were 
at different points of development when the research was initiated, a historical perspective was 
required, not simply a 'real time' study. Interviews provided the reflective data which helped 
build this historical perspective. 
4.5 The choice of case studies 
As stated previously, a case study approach was adopted for this analysis of NBS Research and 
Development policy. The origins of this thesis goes back to work undertaken in 1991 at the 
University of Luton as a case study of the implementation of the Research for Health strategy 
(DH 1991b) in Bedfordshire. The study was to be a qualitative, exploratory case study; not 
theory-driven but rather more exploratory. The author was recruited by the university to develop 
and conduct the research, having previously worked there as a research assistant. The whole 
process of doing this research proved to be much more complex than anticipated because the 
organisational framework of the NBS, in which the strategy was launched, had been subject to 
many changes. Following the reorganisation of Regional Health Authorities (DH 1993h), it was 
felt that the experience of R&D in Bedfordshire during these changes was probably unlike 
anywhere else, but in order to justify this assumption further research should be undertaken. 
Consequently, it was decided to spread the base of the study and conduct more case studies in 
order to be able to make comparisons and distinctions, and in this way, increase the external 
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validity of the research study. It was intended that by adopting this approach the validity (both 
internal and external), reliability and analytic generalisability of the analysis would be improved 
(Yin 1990). Validity refers to whether the methodological tools measure what one is trying to 
explain. Reliability refers to the ability to obtain the same result on repeated occasions (de Vaus 
1990: 54-57). Had this thesis been undertaken in earlier years, when the NBS was much more 
stable, it would have been difficult, but perhaps not impossible to measure the effects in an 
environment where other factors are constant. Trying to measure the outcomes of the strategy 
when the NHS organisation is in flux is immeasurably more challenging. 
The effect of the reorganisation of the Regional Health Authorities on Bedfordshire (DH 1993h) 
meant that Bedfordshire was a unique case. This was because Bedfordshire (which was in North 
West Thames) was moved out into the new Anglia and Oxford region when North East and 
North West Thames regional health authorities were merged under the new NHS arrangements 
(DH 1993h). The choice and number of the two additional case studies were chosen largely for 
logistical reasons. The cases were conducted within the boundaries covered by Suffolk Health 
Authority (HA) and Cambridge and Huntingdon HA. They were reasonably (geographically) 
close and there was knowledge in the PhD supervisory team of the areas. It was felt important 
that an area containing a teaching hospital should be included, in order to provide a more 
comparative analysis. As both these areas were within the boundaries of East Anglia, 
(subsequently Anglia and Oxford) Regional Health Authority, ideally, should time have allowed, 
the selection of an additional case study in another area containing a teaching hospital would 
have been selected. However, time and financial limitations ruled this out. It was not felt, 
however, that the final choice would have had any significant detrimental effects on the validity, 
representativeness, nor generalisability of the thesis. Indeed, the accounts one reads in textbooks 
often take a theoretical approach to the gathering of data, without necessarily considering the 
real-life situations and position that the fieldworker faces. The practical reality of fieldwork is 
such that the process is far from the mechanistic notions often espoused. The changing structure 
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of the NBS described illustrates the need to be adaptive in one's approach. As Buchanan et aJ 
stated, 'Fieldwork is permeated with the conflict between what is theoreticaly desirable on the 
one hand and' what is practcally possible on the other' (Buchanan et af 1988: 53). What is 
possible always wins. We may hold an idealised view of the data collection process, but this is 
always compromised by the opportunities, constraints and practical realities organisational 
research presents. This should not, however, be read as a licence to do as one likes (protocols 
should always be adhered to), but to readily admit that certain unforseen factors do confront the 
field worker and have to be addressed. For this analysis, each case study followed the same basic 
protocof 
4.5.1 Access 
In the case of the Cambridge and Huntingdon, and Suffolk case studies, the Regional Manager of 
R&D (RMRD) was contacted for information about the districts and about key personnel to 
interview3. As part of a panoptic network (Foucault 1977b), a new disciplinary career, the health 
services researcher, can be seen as the' metaphorical eyes of the 'guards' overlooking the 
behaviour of health care workers and, as such, may arouse their considerable suspicion. 
However, it is clear to most workers in the health service, through the increased emphasis upon 
evidence-based medicine, that certain changes in clinical behaviour were desirable. The 
additional political, economic, social and cultural factors previously discussed in the theory 
section, also meant that occupational groups, almost by definition, wanted to have access to, and 
control, the knowledge generated through the research and development on themselves and 
others, if possible. This was a necessary prerequisite to maintaining or acquiring professional 
status. The practical task of the researcher was, consequently, considerably problematic as the 
researchers themselves want some professional autonomy, in order to maintain and enhance their 
own position of power. 
Researchers, consequently, have a difficult task in attaining this autonomy against a demanding 
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paymaster and a suspicious but interested workforce. The task of the author, therefore, was to 
produce a thesis which was of interest and sufficiently focussed on the needs and requirements of 
managers and clinicians; demonstrated the benefits of the research to both; did not appear too 
judgemental and 'big brother' like; implicated everybody in the research to at least question what 
they did, acknowledge that there was a problem, and encourage participation in the solution of 
that problem; was impartial; and ensured that identities remained protected if required; and 
ensured that the intrusion of the researcher was minimised. As Benyon (1988) has pointed out. 
research in organisations is 'understood as a political process; it involves the researcher in 
mediating power relationships' (Benyon 1988: 21). The research, researcher, and researched are 
all part of the same political network, and the process of data collection and analysis were viewed 
as part of this network. 
Entry to an organisation can also be made difficult because organisations and researchers have 
different goals. If individuals in an organisation do not like the research and/or its outcomes, 
there may be attempts to discredit it. This, Benyon (op.cit.) noted, is just one aspect of corporate 
defence. Less public is the refusal of an organisation to allow access to certain people, groups or 
documents. In many ways, however, the researcher is at the mercy of an organisation and the 
people within it, to inform them of the very existence of some data, let alone access to it. It is, 
therefore, very much up to the skill and experience of the researcher to ensure that access and 
cooperation is achieved, bearing in mind the above points. A constant process of negotiation is 
required throughout the course of a research project. in order to obtain and maintain access and 
co-operation to organisations, groups and individuals within them. As such, the research process 
itself is a creative act which links the sociologist to the organisations being studied. 
With these concerns very much in mind, a summary paper of the research was prepared, 
emphasising the value of the project to the service. This, together with a copy of an article by the 
author Research for Health: Background and Immediate Implications (Twelvetree 1994), was 
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sent with a covering letter to those individuals selected for interview. Letters were sent to the 
chief executives of all trusts and health authorities in the three case study areas requesting 
permission to' conduct the research in their respective organisations. Where permission was 
granted by the chief executive, letters requesting interviews were then sent to relevant individuals 
in the organisation. Chief executives were also asked if they themselves would be prepared to be 
interviewed, and mutually convenient times were arranged for those who agreed to this request. 
This strategy proved to be relatively successful. Fourteen chief executives out of a total of 
seventeen agreed to participate. The three organisations which were not covered in the study 
were: Mid Anglia Community Health NBS Trust (which declined due to heavy workload), West 
Suffolk Hospitals Trust (which was assessing its approach to research at the time and feIt that it 
would be premature for them to be involved), and South Bedfordshire Community Care NHS 
Trust (which did not respond to the initial and follow-up letters). While the author would have 
liked all the organisations to have participated, the fact was that most did and it was not felt that 
the results would have been significantly different had all the organisations participated. 
4.5.2 Conducting interviews 
In general, interviews lasted for approximately sixty minutes and were all based upon the same 
protocol (Appendix 4). They were all conducted at interviewees' places of work, in rooms that 
they themselves decided upon. Thus, the setting of the research was comfortable and familiar to 
them, in order to maximise the quality and validity of data. Interviews were all tape recorded and 
transcribed. Interviewees were all asked for permission prior to interview; they were clearly 
informed of the nature of the research, the value of their contribution should they decide to 
participate, and their confidentiality, assured. The approach was succesful as no interviewees 
refused permission to record the encounter. The tape recorder used was small and unobtrusive 
and interviewees quickly forgot about it. The only time when the tape recorder did interrupt the 
flow of the interview was when tapes had to be turned over, after forty-five minutes. However, 
145 
interviewees were not unduly affected. They generally waited for a few seconds whilst the tape 
was turned, then carried on, or continued after being prompted. 
As Bresnen (1988) noted, many issues, such as conflict. arise relatively sporadically and in 
relation to certain events. This is particularly true of policy-related research, where national 
(central) policy may be relaunched or adapted (the Culyer Report (1994), for instance). The new 
emphasis placed upon evidence-based medicine has also been a significant theme to emerge in 
the NBS. The researcher needs to be responsive to emergent themes in the field such as this. 
The choice of interviewees may also expand as one follows up newly emergent leads (the 
'snowball' technique) to obtain as comprehensive an account of a situation as possible. This 
'opportunism' is a relatively common feature of social research. Indeed, this is a feature of 
multiple case studies, as discussed, where knowledge gained is used to develop and refine future 
cases. However, it was important to be wary of deviating too far from the aims of the research 
and, consequently, being biased. As such, protocols for each case were consistent. 
Opportunism is also an essential element of an interview, in that the questions one asks are 
dependent to a certain extent, upon the answers offered by an interviewee. As new themes 
emerge, they may need to be further explored. Certain judgements have to be made during the 
course of an interview regarding what to follow up in order to control aspects of the interview, 
and consequently a certain amount of analysis is required at the time. Of course, some 
interviewees had particular expertise or interests in certain areas, such as audit, or creating a 
research culture, so more time would be spent on these topics than on the others (or at the 
expense of others) but such key interviewees provided essential insight and depth of 
understanding essential to the production of research. Judgements made in the field have a 
considerable onus placed upon them, therefore, and mean that interviews can, and did vary quite 
widely in terms of time and content. These issues have led to criticism concerning the reliability 
of the methods used. Yin's notion of analytic reliability is problematic in this instant as it 
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depends upon the same results being repeated by following the same operation (Yin 1990). Being 
able to fully assert reliability becomes impossible as the operations required are all relative on 
circumstance and events. Data were also cross-checked and verified (triangulated) with other 
interviewees comments and documents, to ensure the reliability demanded of the method. 
Relationships with respondents in organisations must...foster Blum's "permissive 
atmosphere". An opportunistic approach which identifies and uses particularly cooperative 
informants, and which uses self-disclosure and interview feedback where appropriate, is 
consistent with this atmosphere, as long as the resarcher is sensitive to the potential bias in 
single-sources information and the need to cross-check (Buchanan et al. 1988: 63). 
It is accepted that the researcher is not totally bound by these frameworks and should be flexible 
and reactive to the situation, listening to the interviewee, probing and questioning respondents 
further on issues they mention and abandoning others. A balance was, therefore, achieved by 
keeping as closely as possible to the interview protocol, whilst allowing interviewees to comment 
on other issues that were of concern to them. The process of conducting this research 
necessitated constant reflection in order to avoid any question of interview bias. When trying to 
pursue a topic further, for instance, strong disagreements with the interviewees opinions were 
avoided, as this could have stifled their responses. If asked for an opinion however, the author 
did offer one where appropriate and necessary, dependent upon the context of the interviewee and 
the interview. Constant reflection of actions and the interaction was essential, therefore, in order 
to maximise the validity of research results. As part of this process of action and interaction, it 
was important to gain the trust of the interviewees, and guarantee interviewee confidentiality in 
order to obtain free and genuine responses. Non-verbal communication was also seen as 
important, and notes were taken during interviews of anything believed significant, in order to 
maximise validity. Brief notes of the interviews were also taken as a back-up should tape 
recorders break down, or where it was believed that the interviewee's voice might not have been 
audible. 
Of course, as well as demonstrating the relevance of a research project to potential interviewees 
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in order to get their co-operation, it was also important to demonstrate it during the actual 
interview itself. This was especially true when dealing with sensitive or difficult issues. The aim 
was to gain and maintain the respondents committment to the research. Another way to do this 
was to show how the respondents could be involved and contribute to the research, to address 
topics they defined as important and to give them some feedback at the end of the project, for 
example a summary of findings of relevance to them. This was the intention and consequently it 
gave the intervie\vees an incentive for participating in, and expressing their thoughts and feelings 
in the interview. 
The reality is the tension between the pragmatic requirements of completing a research study and 
the dry, sanitised accounts and recommendations often made in methodological textbooks. 
Although the protocol appears quite comprehensive, it can be seen to be divided into a series of 
themes to be covered, in addition to suggested questions. Interviews began at the same point, 
with the author explaining who he was and why he was there, and what the interview involved. 
A general question concerning the interviewee's position and role in their organisation, then one 
concerning their research background (if any) was then asked. This provided useful background 
information. but they were also simple questions all interviewees' could comfortably respond to 
and were a good way to ease interviewees' into the interview, and gain their confidence. From 
this point onwards, however, the interviews were open and could follow any sequence or form of 
question, dependent upon interviewee responses. The questions listed were prompts and were 
intended as guides, not questions to be asked verbatum. 
The general problem is one of control: in gaining a more in-depth view and clearer insights 
into the working of the organisation, the path your research takes becomes dependent upon 
what you find. This lack of control over the situation means that in the field you have to work 
a good deal harder to keep the research on an even keel (Bresnen 1988: 52). 
Ethnomethodologists, such as Dingwall (1992) have argued that methods such as interviews are 
not valid as the researcher is engaged in a social process and, as such, intervie\vs only form topics 
for analysis, where the researcher and researched both actively constructed their social world. 
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The consequence for such research, it is said, is a relativistic interpretation of knowledge. 
However, as Silverman (1985) has argued, the cultural realities implied in all data are real, 
neither biased nor unbiased, and can lead us, therefore, to reject the claims of 
ethnomethodologists. This is not to say that bias and inaccuracy are 110t problems, but they arise 
in the analysis only. They do not arise in the content and form of data, unless they trouble the 
participants. Interviews are personal opinions but remain, nevertheless, expressions of reality 
and should be treated as such in this thesis. 
What qualitative research can offer the policy-maker is a theory of social action grounded on 
the experiences -the world view -of those likely to be affected by a policy decision or thought 
to be part of the problem (Walker 1985: 19). 
4.5.3 Analysis of the data 
In total, 61 interviews with 58 individuals were conducted in the fieldwork for this thesis. All 
tapes were fully transcribed. A small selection were transcribed by the author, but the majority 
were transcribed by a secretary. Buchanan (1988) argued that researchers should always 
transcribe tapes themself, as they could fiU many of the gaps in the tape from memory if sound 
quality was poor. They understand the acronyms and jargon used and can 'clean up' the 
interviews. In other words they can translate the full conversations into a readable form without 
compromising the accuracy of statements. However, had the author transcribed the tapes himself, 
this would have taken an inordinate amount of his time. In answer to Buchanan's points, a 
selection of interviews transcribed by the author were compared with the other interview 
schedules to check for consistency. Completed transcripts were also checked against what was 
recorded in the interview. This process allowed 'cleaned' data to be checked. In this way, 
Buchanan's points have all been satisfactorily addressed, without compromising the data. 
As with all qualitative research, the level of complexity of qualitative data was extremely high 
and presented a particular problem with analysis. Kvale (1996) listed five principle approaches 
to the analysis of interviews~ condensation, categorisation, narrative, interpretation and ad hoc 
approaches. However, it should be remembered that analysis takes place throughout the research 
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process, from beginning to end, not just in one discreet section of it For this thesis, both 
documents and interviews were analysed in essentially the same way, with an ad hoc approach 
adopted (generally the most common form of analysis). 
Techniques have to be devised which make it possible for the researcher to generate the new 
empirical or theoretical sequences which will be presented to others as a result of the research. 
Any novel patterns will need to be scrutinised in order to draw out those general or theoretical 
conclusions which the investigation will support, and, finally, at those points where aspects of 
the outcomes are to be passed on to other members of the social scientific community, the 
researcher's new understandings must be set out in written form for discussion and evaluation 
(Turner 1988: 113). 
A free interplay of techniques was used; documents and interview scripts were read, and tapes 
listened to. Themes emanating from the literature review were examined, then themes and issues 
'naturally' occuring from the data were analysed. Turner (1988) used the metaphor of the degree 
of magnification of a microscope to explain his response to this problem. He explained that the 
researcher should shift the focus up and down until a sufficient number of major elements are 
identified in order to yield an interesting outcome for each theoretical sub-system under analysis. 
In one or two instances, statements were counted, such as in the Bedforshire case, where the 
number of interviewees who had read the Research for Health strategy (DH 1991b, 1993a) were 
counted. In other instances, interpretations of particular statements were made. The internal 
validity of cases was assured through conducting pattern-matching, explanation building and 
time-series analysis, whilst the construct validity was assured through the use of mUltiple sources 
of evidence and establishment of chains of evidence (Yin 1990). 
The researcher intending to develop a grounded theory of organisational culture or 
organisational behaviour needs ... to acknowledge the importance of seeking out, acquiring and 
interpreting data through a unique personal perspective in which the subjective and the 
objective are in constant interplay. The researcher needs also to become accustomed to this 
idea, that a competent researcher puts meaning into the field (Turner 1988: 116). 
4.504 Triangulation 
The multi-method nature of case studies relates closely to the notion of triangulation, that is, the 
idea that the location of an unknown point can be fixed in relation to two known points. In this 
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way, through combining methods, data sources, theories and multiple observers, any alleged bias 
in one theory, method, or observer studies, could be overcome. Although this approach has much 
to supp~rt it,' it is expensive, and, furthermore, can be problematic in that the different 
approaches used may have their roots in different theoretical concerns, which perceive the social 
world differently. Such concerns may well conflict and make for incompatibility. 
Triangulation assumes that there are commonly agreed criteria which can be used to evaluate 
different theories, inconsistencies and methods. However, different methods provide different 
results, making it impossible to decide which one is correct. This can only be resolved through 
negotiation between the different parties involved, but the likelihood is that the disagreement will 
remain. However, more contemporary social science has placed more emphasis upon flexibility 
and inventiveness and the use of different sources of data to build clearer pictures. Methods are 
now used in conjunction with others, due in many respects to a recognition of the problems with 
traditional methods. 
Triangulation may well elucidate different accounts from a single perspective, so that the 
different methods produce realities which are valid in their own right, but not comparable 
(Silverman 1985). However, certain 'facts' - dates, times etc. - may be cross-correlated or 
compared and contrasted. The differing 'realities' produced are not an attempt to produce one 
'super-reality' but certain commonalties may emerge. These may relate to accounts given by 
people working for the same organisation, in the same occupational group, geographical district 
etc. Such commonalties may not produce a more 'valid' version of reality than one person's 
account, but, nevertheless, may produce a common feature or characteristic to which policy 
recommendations, may be more easily accepted, may be able to be fed back and a dialogue be 
instigated to resolve, or highlight the issue further. If, in terms of policy, a particular problem is 
noted in a number of people's accounts of reality, then the common and uncommon increases the 
internal and external validity (Silverman 1985), It is for this reason that it was felt that the case 
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study approach to policy analysis would provide the depth, validity and coherence of approach 
that was both necessary and demanded by interviewees and policy makers. 
4.5.5 The research report 
Writing-up the research, that is, the step towards communicating results, is as much an integral 
part of the research process as any other. The 'richness' of the data makes it interesting to read. 
The research report needs to tell a story, but should be adequately 'signposted' throughout. 
Priorities are chosen in analysis to determine which portions of data are used and the selection 
conducted in a way which produces propositional statements. It is hoped that the reader will 
have recognised these features within this thesis. There is no eotypic format for case studies to be 
presented, but the wider audience that case studies receive than many other forms of research, 
means that special care has to be taken in assembling them. For this thesis, the reader would 
have noticed from the protocol that the thesis is of a standard linear - analytic structure. This is a 
standard format for theses and is applicable to explanatory, descriptive or exploratory case 
studies. In order to elicit comprehensive and detailed information, some of which was sensitive, 
anonymity of interviewees was assured and as such comments are not directly attributed. This 
could be seen as problematic by some, as background information could arguably have been lost 
and the composition of cases made more difficult. However, these issues were believed to have 
been a necessary concession in order to obtain the quality of data collected. The supervisory team 
made comments on early drafts of the case studies, to check for consistency and quality of reports 
and increase the construct validity of the thesis. The analysis offered here is believed to match 
Yin's principal characteristics of an exemplary case study. It develops existing theory and 
provides new knowledge. The case studies have been replicated and contextualised. Evidence 
has been obtained from a range of sources and the data have been analysed from a variety of 
perspectives. 
1 Indexes and sources used included Medline. Psychlit, Sociofile, Index oftheses and dissertations. CINARL. library listings, 
bibliographies. Intemet discussion lists, conference procedings, committee meeting minutes, annual reports. etc. 
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, Study Protocol: 
'Problem' identified. 

Literature search initiated. 

Project proposal developed. 

Literature (and documents) searched and interviewees identified. 

Documents and literature analysed. 

• 	 Project proposal further developed and refmed. 
• 	 1l1eoretical framework developed and refined. 
Case studies developed. 
Letter sent to Chief Executives asking permission to conduct the research in his organisation and to interview himself. One 
page sunullary ofthe research project included with letter. 

Interview conducted with Chief Executives. 

Organisational charts obtained. 

• 	 Names ofinterviewees identified. 
Letters sent, asking permission for an interview, along with one page summary of research project. 
Intervi ews conducted. 
• 	 Names offurther interviewees identified. 
• 	 Interviewees contacted as above. 
Interviews transcribed. 
Data analysed. 
Individual cases analysed. 
Individual cases written up. 
Cross - case analysis. 
• 	 Thesis written. 
Full report published. 
• 	 Executive summary written for feedback to interviewees. 
) The RlvlRD was approached as a first step in identifYing important interviewees in the areas and for checking whether the 
intended method ofapproaching organisations and interviewees was appropriate and likely to be successful. 
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CHAPTERS 
CASE STUDY NUMBER 1 

BEDFORDSHIRE 

5.1 Introduction 
Power and control over Research and Development (R&D), that is, over the production of 
knowledge (research) and the dissemination and utilisation (development) of that knowledge, 
were central to the themes emanating from the analysis. Such R&D was a support to a more 
general desire to control the NHS. How and to what extent did the Research for Health strategy 
(DH 1991b, 1993a) support these changes and how successful was it in establishing government 
control over R&D? The following case study will attempt to answer some of these questions and 
evaluate the strategy's success in achieving such aims. The fact that it was intended to support 
government health policy, meant that any subsequent changes to government policy had profound 
implications on reactions to the strategy and its implementation. It was essential, therefore, to 
e;;.:plore all these issues with interviewees (for further information, see below). 
The following case study is an analysis of NHS R&D policy in Bedfordshire, a small county 
approximately thirty miles north of London. The county contained a new single purchasing 
agency and four NHS trusts. There was an acute and community trust in the north of the county 
(Bedford Hospital NBS Trust and Bedford and Shires Healthcare NHS Trust) and an acute and 
community trust in the south (Luton and Dunstable Hospital NHS Trust and South Bedfordshire 
Community and Health Care NHS Trust). The study involved the analysis of local, regional and 
national committee meeting minutes, agendas, documents and reports and semi-structured 
interviews with a variety of professionals and managers at all levels of the service and in 
academie. Interviews were conducted between 1994 and 1995. A list of the interviewees can be 
found in Appendix 5. 
The case study will briefly look at NHS policy changes leading up to, and beyond. the creation of 
a single purchasing agency for Bedfordshire -Bedfordshire Health Authority. It will subsequently 
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describe and analyse the nature, role and implications of research and development policy in the 
various purchaser and provider agencies in the county. The results will show that there was a 
clear separation between 'research' policy and 'development' policy and that each was seen to 
address specific sectors of the NHS. The case study will go on to consider how each element of 
policy related to the management and control of the production of 'valid' NHS knowledge and 
over the dissemination and utilisation of that knowledge. The role of audit, training, and 
economics in this struggle for control will also be assessed. What is eminent from the case study, 
however, is that the underlying theme is that from 1979-95, consecutive Conservative 
Governments attempted to exercise power and control over health professionals and NBS 
services. Research, development and audit played a major role in these developments. 
5.2 Background 
Bedfordshire Health Authority was a relatively new health care purchasing agency at the time 
that interviews were conducted. The formation of the health authority (HA) had created some 
tension and debate and it is essential that the context surrounding its development is examined. 
The health authority was formed through the merger of the three previous purchasing agencies in 
Bedfordshire; North and South Bedfordshire District Health Authorities and Bedfordshire 
Family Health Services Authority (the agency which concentrated on primary care). This merger 
reflected the Conservative Government's desire to see larger, more integrated health authorities. 
The HA was situated within the boundaries of North West Thames RHA, which was later merged 
with North East Thames RHA, to become North Thames NHS Executive Regional office. 
Appendix 6 illustrates the national structure for R&D in the NHS and Appendix 7 shows the 
management and committee structures of North West Thames REA at the time interviews were 
conducted. 
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In 1990 a new chief executive of South Bedfordshire District Health Authority was appointed. 
His remit in taking up the position was to establish a health care purchasing organisation as 
directed by the government in Working for Patient's (DH 1989) and support the health care 
providers in Bedfordshire to become NHS trusts. In doing this, the chief executive stated in his 
interview that he and the other NHS chief executives and chairmen in Bedfordshire were aware 
that there was an increasing amount of overlap in their functions. As a result, they recognised a 
need to act together on a Bedfordshire-wide basis. The chief executive noted that North West 
Thames Regional Health Authority (NWT RHA) then suggested they then look at ways to form a 
single health care purchasing agency for Bedfordshire. This was to have one chief executive, a 
post for which he was later appointed. The chief executive subsequently set up a management 
team of six directors to work under him (Appendix 8) to manage the three separate authorities 
comprising Bedfordshire Health Authority. The actual organisational merger of the two district 
health authority's finally took place in 1994, despite an objection from the Community Health 
Council (CHC) on the grounds that it would decrease competition. The Bedfordshire Family 
Health Service Authority (FHSA) was not fully merged with the rest of the health authority at the 
time, as it had its own Chief Executive. However the chief executive of the health authority 
stated in interview, that he would like the FHSA to fully integrate with his organisation. 
Appendix 8 indicates how Bedfordshire FHSA remained as a distinct entity within the new health 
authority, with its own director. The director of the FHSA was expected by interviewees in the 
health authority and the FHSA to remain in post for a while. Committees and strategy groups 
within the new health authority, however, were amalgamated to avoid duplication and confusion. 
As well as objections from the community health council, there were objections from the north of 
the county. Traditionally, Bedford and Luton had been rivals in terms of obtaining resources and 
fighting for priority. The chief executive of the health authority explained that four of the six 
directors for the HA came from the south of the county. This decision had generated a certain 
amount of criticism, which was reported in the local newspapers as the south of the county taking 
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over the north. It was claimed, for example, that Bedford Hospital would close, because of the 
favourable status afforded to the Luton and Dunstable hospital, located in the south. The director 
of public health and strategic planning was seen as a key role in the new health authority (HA), 
with the Working for Patient's White Paper (DH 1989) seen as establishing a leading role for 
public health to assess population needs and purchase appropriate services. thus, the director 
would playa key role in determining the fate of the hospitals and provision of clinical services in 
Bedfordshire. 
5.3 Marketisation, centralisation, devolution and accountability 
Analysis revealed that the Research for Health strategy (DH 1991b, 1993a) was seen to 
specifically address national research policy issues, whereas development policy (which was seen 
to be of more relevance to locally-based interviewees) was formulated locally, taking influence 
from a variety of sources. The following section will indicate how national, 'official' government 
research policy was developed and responsibility for its implementation was devolved to regional 
health authorities. Such regional health authorities were then each charged with formulating a 
regional strategy to meet national expectations. Responsibility for implementation of regional 
strategies was, in turn, devolved to a local level, overseen by regional directors (or managers) of 
R&D. 
'Official' research and development policy was generated nationally by the government and 
regional policy was developed in the contex1 of this. Regional directors of R&D (RDRD) had an 
input into these national agendas as they were in direct contact with the national director, the 
NHS Executive (NHS E) and sat on national R&D committees. Such national and regional R&D 
policy related to the organisation and management of the conduct of research. Nationally and 
regionally formulated 'official' research policy was, consequently, principally directed at and 
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perceived to be aimed at addressing issues of concern to the high profile research centres, 
specifically, the medical schools. This was reflected in local attitudes towards research identified 
in the case study. R&D had, and was, firstly, seen as the domain of the teaching hospitals, where 
analysis revealed. most of it was carried out; and, secondly, the r~sponsibility of the medical 
profession within those centres. 'Official' policy relating to research and development was 
formulated at a national and regional level, with responsibility for organisational and 
management of development issues devolved to purchasers. As an interviewee from the HA 
stated: "We met the [purchaser} contacts yesterday and we were talking [about} how we can get 
the purchasers to help ... to achieve the objectives" (health authority-based interviewee). 
Following a traditional linear model of implementation, therefore, the purchasers were expected 
by the regional health authority to develop local policy and management to fit in with the 
regional policy objectives. As such, there was a clear demarkation between national policy, 
regional policy and the organisation and management of local services to meet these policy 
objectives. Similarly, of course, the political consequences of the implementation or othenvise of 
that policy was avoided by the government. The analysis of data from the case study revealed the 
following key points: 
" the changes to the NBS (regional structures) meant that the health authority was unsure of 
the future power of the regional health authority and as a result, it was felt by the local, 
knowledgeable interviewees, that research "had come off the front burner", following an 
initial flurry of activity to form regional R&D committees; 
" many interviewees in Bedfordshire felt that the policy was not being 'driven' by anyone, 
including the regional health authority; 
" that what was relevant to local services was not the same as those relevant to regional policy-
makers; 
" local professional groups (including some trust managers) did not see the benefits of research; 
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• 	 similarly, it was clear that the health authority had been sorting out its own structures and had 
given little thought to linking with the regional R&D directorate (but was beginning to 
express a desire to do so). 
The emphasis for the health authority, interviewees argued, was increasingly upon the effective 
investment of their funds in services, on efficient and economic purchasing decision-making. 
This, it was claimed, "based on inJormation and research which I don 'f think looking at the way 
we used to do things in the health service was necessarily the case (health authority-based 
interviewee) ". As such, research, or rather the results of research, were seen as a basis for 
holding providers accountable to the purchasers for the services they provided, although the 
evidence was not always available. Within the health authority, it was the Department of Public 
Health and, hence, medically-trained public health physicians, who were specifically charged 
with this role. This issue will be explored in depth later in this chapter. However, it is sufficient 
for the present debate to note the important role R&D played for health authorities, in holding 
providers accountable for the services they provided. This was intrinsically linked to audit, as the 
following analysis will illustrate. 
5.4 Audit 
Audit, as discussed in chapter 3 had gained an increasing profile in the NHS. Indeed, analysis of 
interviews indicated that there had been an increase in the amount of audit conducted, including 
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multi-professional audit and that a primary reason for this was the availability of funding and the 
willingness of purchasers to hold providers accountable for doing it. As one interviewee 
commented: "one of the reasons they're a/l doing audit is there's money for it but another 
reason is the purchasers are making them accountable Jor that which is the driving Jorce and 
therefore there is activity" (university-based interviewee). Interviewees in general, saw an 
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intrinsic link between research and audit. However, as might be expected, the interviewees from 
an academic and research background were much more clear and intent on making a distinction 
between the t\\(o. Audit was the principal method identified to evaluate clinical practice, with 
some interviewees arguing that it was a development vein within research. This was recognised 
by the regional health authority, although there was a clear desire to keep them separate, as an 
interviewee from the regional health authority commented: "there is quite a strong link between 
audit and research. Ofcourse audit is one of the best ways ofimplementing research, so there's 
very much a link between them. J'm not convinced of the necessity to have another say, head, or 
the same funding" (regionally-based interviewee). 
The definition of the term 'audit' was not clear to the clinicians and managers in the county and 
was intrinsically linked to the term 'research' as both concerned evaluating practice. Within 
Bedfordshire, audit was reported by interviewees as becoming more multi-disciplinary, helping 
clinicians work across occupational boundaries. For instance, it was explained that the 
physiotherapists at one acute unit were doing an audit of inhaler techniques of asthma patients, in 
conjunction with the pharmacists. However, there was no evidence that this involved an equal 
relationship in the process between doctors and other occupational groups. Indeed, the medical 
profession were more inclined to conduct audit, probably because they were given time for 
professional development which other occupations did not have. 
Similarly, although the purchasers held the providers accountable for audit, there was no 
evidence that the purchasers did any themselves. Although intellectually, audit and research 
were separate, they were closely associated, both in their historical development (in concrete and 
cognitive terms), in their close association in forming an 'evaluative culture', and in relation to 
the implementation of research results, "it interfaces with research". There was no regional 
director of audit but a regional committee awarded audit monies for bids and the regional 
manager of R&b sat on this panel. As such, the links between audit, research, development and 
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accountability were clear and direct at a local and regional-level. The intention, of course, was to 
purchase and provide the most efficient and effective clinical services. And these classes of 
knowledge, otefficiency and effectiveness, were increasingly prominant factors in the NHS. As a 
result, the following section will focus upon the nature of knowledge in the NBS. 
5.5 Knowledge, economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
The different occupational groups were still seen as working individually, although more multi­
disciplinary auditing was occurring. Indeed, the directorate system of organisation in trusts was 
seen by the purchasers as working against collaborative, inter-disciplinary working. 
"And really in a way we want them to come together, to come up with their one business plan 
which we can identify with. At the moment they're tending to bypass their own internal 
management structure because they haven '[ worked it out yet" (health authority-based 
interviewee). 
Indeed, inter-professional working was still being discussed by the therapy occupations at the time 
interviews were conducted. Nationally, the occupational therapists at the time, were in the 
process of devising a strategy outlining what each discipline did. This was in order to avoid 
overlap between therapists, and to co-ordinate their work better. Physiotherapists interviewed saw 
their profession as gradually building up its own research base, but argued that the doctors would 
not accept the qualitative methodologies which they often used. The same was true for nursing 
research of course, although, as previously stated, the poor quality of the research proposals they 
submitted did not help their cause!. Nevertheless, doctors were able to maintain their domination 
over research funds. As one interviewee pertinently noted: 
"the medics are so secure in their grasp oj research funding that even without understanding 
R&D they can happily move their network sort ofacross marginally as long as somebody knows 
how to do the forms. It doesn't matter if the rest ofthem know in detail it'll get sorted Whereas 
because for nurSing they weren 'f locked in there anyway, the fact that they don't understand it 
162 

means that they can't access it at all, whereas for the medics 1 don 'f think it's a big deal" 
(university-based interviewee). 
Doctors, therefore, had at their core a body of specialists with the right knowledge, experience and 
technical and strategic know how to access funds and adapt that to new agendas. This is not to 
say that doctors necessarily wanted to do research, as clearly most of them did not. Nevertheless, 
this 'core' did not posess, nor control, the social research skills, which the changing research 
agenda was increasingly demanding. Additionally, the fact that health services research was 
supposed to be multi-disciplinary, meant that one of the biggest gainers out of the research process 
was going to be the social scientists and management researchers 'you see once you say 
multidiSCiplinary it means even medical projects have to have a sociologist attached or 
management specialist attached" (university-based interviewee). 
The medical professions' dominant position in the NBS, it appears, was unshakeable. Indeed, the 
responsibility for implementing the Research for Health strategy (DH 1991b, 1993a) in the 
district was seen by the RHA as the responsibility of the health authority. Within the health 
authority, responsibility, it has already been noted, was delegated to the public health department 
and the consultants within it. Public health, therefore, played a surveillance role in monitoring 
and legislating for/against individual health. Similarly, analysis revealed that this surveillance 
role was extended to observing the behaviour of clinicians: 
"lfthere's a particular demand coming out ofa particular service ... You need to know something 
about what the effectiveness ofthose procedures are in order to challenge them. Andyou need to 
have 1 think, public health skills; you need to have a clinical know/edge but also an 
epidemiological know/edge" (health authority-based interviewee). 
In this way, doctors were used to control doctors, and this job could only be performed by doctors, 
as they possessed the specialist medical knowledge required and demanded. Illustrating this 
surveillance and normative role further, the public health department of the health authority 
employed a health information research officer. The role of this officer was described as: 
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"actually building up a purchasing intelligence base. Which means that we can access ... world­
wide the databases for research, particularly into current health care evaluation" (health 
authority-based interviewee). As such, purchasers were accessing the most up to date 
information in order to be able to increasingly challenge clinical practice. 
Knowledge was a central issue to emerge from the analysis, or rather, control over the production 
of knowledge, control over the dissemination of knowledge and control over the utilisation and 
uptake of knowledge, illustrating the separation of research from development policy. The 
Project Register, the management (bureaucratisation) of the conduct of research, strict financial 
control and, later, the Culyer recommendations (Cutyer 1994) were distinct elements to control 
over the production of knowledge. The development of the Cochrane Collaboration, and the 
York Centre and their subsequent series of reviews entitled Effectiveness Matters and other 
clinical outcomes reviews were central to control over the dissemination of knowledge. Finally, 
EL (centrally-defined practice) guidelines, the purchasers and audit mechanisms were seen as 
fundamental to maintaining control over the utlisation and uptake of knowledge. The utilisation 
and uptake of knowledge in particular, was seen by central and regional R&D officials as a 
particularly weak link in the R&D chain. The utilisation of research results was traditionally 
(and continued to be) seen to 'naturally' occur after their dissemination. Implementation studies 
were, subsequently, identified as priority areas for future research funding, but not until a 
significant amount of time had passed. The analysis below will, subsequently, examine the 
various issues surrounding the specific implementation of research results; on audit and on the 
politics, power, control and resistance involved in the management of change, focusing upon 
Bedfordshire. 
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5.6 Research policy and politics 
The following section will discuss efforts to manage and control research and development 
agendas and researcher workers themselves. Most of these researchers were based in the teaching 
hospitals. Research evidence for this section of the thesis specifically derives from a detailed 
analysis of regional committee meeting minutes and reports and a small number of interviews 
with regionally-based individuals. What will become apparent is that rather than direct control 
over researchers and the medical core, the reforms marked what can be seen as the 
bureaucratisation and monitoring (surveillance) ofthe research process and knowledge producers. 
Interviews revealed some feeling that the R&D Directorate was running parallel to other 
departments in the NBS Executive (NHS E), rather than being an integrated part of it. There was 
also some concern expressed from within the Regional R&D Directorate (RRDD) that the 
national R&D strategy presented the regions with "onerous" responsibilities, and there was 
scepticism about whether they had the management resources to deliver it. Nevertheless, work 
proceeded on developing organisational structures and processes necessary for implementation. 
This case study will proceed with an assessment of the nature, impact and implication of research 
and development policy on Bedfordshire Health Authority and the NBS trusts in Bedfordshire. 
In line with government policy, the first annual Regional R&D plan was published in September 
1992, detailing the structures developed and being developed, to manage and organise research 
(Bates 1992). A Regional R&D Committee (RRDC) was set up to advise the RRDD how to 
develop and implement the Regional R&D strategy. A series of working groups were later 
formed, including a mental health and an organisation and management working group 
(Appendix 7). A Strategic Working Group (SWG) was also formed to replace the Locally 
Organised Research Scheme. This continued to fund research proposals on a reactive basis. All 
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working groups (except the SWG, of course) decided on areas they saw as priorities for funding 
research (sometimes using external consultants) and advertisements were placed in the press 
inviting applications. Each group was to last approximately three to four years and have a total 
budget of approximately one million pounds. The RRDD initially proceeded to allocate 5% of the 
R&D budget to operating costs but this was later changed to a stated aim to keep the management 
costs to between 5-10%, eliciting concern from some members of the CRDC. 
The pressures of managing and providing local health services was recognised by members of the 
regional health authority. However, the RRDD were looking to local purchasers to lead on 
developing research and development activity "because they are the people who decide health 
policy" (regionally-based interviewee). It was surprising, therefore, to learn from interviewees 
from Bedfordshire, that there had been no consultation with any of the purchasers or trusts in the 
county regarding the regional R&D plans until two years after the Research for Health strategy 
was launched and after two regional R&D plans had been published (Bates 1992, NWT RHA 
1993a). 
Chief executives of HAs in the region were asked to approve regional budget plans for R&D in 
June 1993, which had been approved by the Central Research and Development Committee 
(CRDC) the previous April. Analysis of Regional R&D Committee minutes indicated that chief 
executives based in the region agreed the spending plan pending a review of existing spending 
patterns, but noted the following points: 
• 	 there should be a concentration upon development; 
• 	 the budget should be indentified as soon as possible; 
• 	 linking the R&D and audit budgets should be investigated: 
• 	 the RRDC should ensure that the results of R&D were taken into purchasing contracts 
whenever appropriate; 
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• health agencies did not and should not have the infrastructure to review research proposals. 
This should be the responsibility of the regional health authority; 
• 	 health agencies would find it difficult to fund research proposals themselves (NWf RHA 
1993ze). 
Research and development policy, therefore, was established at a regional level. The groups and 
committees were established, then contact made with purchasers to approve budgets before local 
purchasers outside of the London area were consulted. This consultation was to establish how 
"the District can get into the regional thing". There was, therefore, also an increasing control by 
managers over the production of knowledge. This was particularly evident in their demand to see 
an emphasis on development, rather than research. The perceived impact of the Research for 
Health (DH 1991b, 1993a) strategy on the teaching hospitals only, indicated a clear distinction 
between 'research' policy and 'development' policy. Such research policy principally addressed 
the management and control of research and researchers. The then Conservative Government, 
through the Research forHeaith strategy (ibid), therefore, was attempting to make the research 
that was funded by it more relevant to its own policy and political direction and beliefs. It was, 
therefore, more applied and management oriented, rather than biomedical, theoretical, 
knowledge-driven. This was broadly welcomed by the managers in the study. 
Analysis of interviews revealed that locally, in Bedfordshire, little monitoring ofR&D activity was 
taking place by trust management and, consequently, knowledge was scant. Similarly, although 
the situation in the teaching hospitals was slightly better, research activity there was, on the 
whole, not monitored by management. To rectifY this situation a regional research database was 
developed in 1991192. A national one, the Project Register System, was also created, which came 
into operation in November 1993. Trusts were required to register all funded research activity on 
the regional databases and this information was transferred to the Project Register System by the 
R&D office at the regional health authority. Information was also collected from ethics 
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committees by regional employees to supplement the database. Analysis of regional committee 
minutes revealed that the system had raised concerns amongst researchers regarding the 
confidentiality of commercially sensitive research. It had also led to a debate concerning the 
actual definition of the terms 'research' and 'development'. The cunfusion was felt throughout 
the NHS, in teaching hospitals and elsewhere. This led to distinct problems in the calculation of 
base-line figures for NHS R&D. However, the RDRD worked on the assumption that research, by 
definition, should be peer reviewed, protocol-based, publishable and generalisable. There was 
some confusion and debate at all levels of the service about whether audit should be included in 
the definition, but this was decided against by the RRDD (audit is not generaiisable)2. 
Nevertheless, the distinction was not seen as so clear cut by managers and clinicians, who saw an 
overlap between the two, through the process of evaluation. Perhaps it was not so surprising to 
learn that the project register system was not as successful as it might have been in capturing 
information. This was a situation the Culyer Report (1994) later picked up on and attempted to 
redress. However, a need to conduct an audit of research activity and establish a database to 
record this information in the trusts in Bedfordshire was expressed from some quarters. One 
acute trust was making some effort towards this, as well as keeping records of publications 
produced by its workers. However, even here there was no power invested in the people wishing 
to conduct this audit, even though they were board-level members of the organisation. 
"Because, ifyou start doing it you really need to start doing it properly and have a system which 
makes it possible to record what's [going on) and keep up with people. Now that of course 
would be qUite interesting because it would show up who was doing research and who wasn't 
which J think might be a faSCinating exercise in its own right. But you see there'd be no push 
here" (trust-based interviewee). 
A network of R&D contacts had recently been established in the region by the regional health 
authority, with one person in each health authority and trust named as the spokesperson and 
conduit for passing information regarding R&D to and from the RRDD. The RRDD would then 
be able to mohitor local research activity. 
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"The R&D contacts in the provider units will let us know who wants to do what, who can do what, 
what their strengths are etc. They also help us to collect information (for the) register. That's an 
obligation they have. The general practice contacts we hm'e, all the FHSA contacts we haven't 
set up" (regio~ally-based interviewee). 
In essence, the framework to monitor research activity had been set up, but this had little, if any, 
impact on behaviour in Bedfordshire. At the same time, however, it should be noted that only 
one of the trusts in the county had formed a research committee by the time interviews for this 
thesis were conducted, although most were expressing a desire to form one. This indicated the 
limited impact of the official policy upon service provision. 
Although there was activity and moves in Bedfordshire to develop some fonn of 'research 
culture', this appeared to be occurring on an individual (institutional) and piecemeal fashion and 
largely independently of the Regional R&D Directorate (RRDD) and committees. The 
developments that had occurred revolved around the formation of mechanisms to develop 
individual, independent organisational profiles and frameworks. There were interested 
individuals scattered around the county but very few with any in-depth knowledge or experience 
of conducting research. Those who did have some knowledge were invariably doctors, with one 
or two notable exceptions: The Dean of a newly-established university, who was a researcher in 
the health field, with a background in nursing; and another similar researcher, working in one of 
the acute trusts, charged with developing an evaluative culture in that trust. The reasons for this 
lack of research activity were numerous. Interviews revealed that they included the following: 
• 	 there was no perceived incentive for professionals from any of the disciplines to conduct 
research; 
• 	 it was not seen as beneficial, or immediately relevant to local clinicians' and managers' jobs; 
• 	 post-graduate education was too expensive for managers to fund out of their budgets; 
• 	 clinicians and managers did not have the time or opportunity to study due to the pressures of 
their everyday work commitments; 
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• the professional associations of the non-medical groups, particularly the Chartered Society of 
Physiotherapists played little role in developing a knowledge-based profession; 
• 	 any research activity, such as there was, was led by doctors; it was, unsurprisingly, less 
developed (if at all) in the community trusts "It just isn't there on the ground whereas at 
least in hospitals you've got some consultants who know roughly how to do it" (trust-based 
interviewee); 
• 	 what localised activity there was, was principally related to drug trials, such as the RU486 
medical induction of abortions (later withdrawn after severe side effects were found with it). 
As a hospital consultant noted ... "The research programme is (a) voluntary and (b) done in non­
working time for the most part so it's a very minor part ofthe average district general hospital" 
(trust-based interviewee). The issue of doctors conducting drug trials aroused some debate 
amongst interviewees, with some arguing that it could be seen as a PR exercise by the drugs 
companies. However, one interviewee involved in such work, argued that the pharmaceutical 
companies had realised that district general hospitals (DGHs) treated the majority of NBS 
patients and were consequently conducting and financing more research in those centres. The 
researcher in question had received some criticism for doing this work, but was defended by a 
colleague; "we did it all the time at the Brompton and nobody criticised it. But then again I 
don't suppose [the hospital} is thought of as a first choice for early stage trials" (trust-based 
interviewee). Analysis of interviews indicated that the doctors within the teaching hospitals were 
seen as separate from those in the case study by some interviewees, with a 'them and us' 
mentality expressed. These complaints were mainly expressed by interviewees who were more 
knowledgable about research and research processes. Nevertheless, the teaching hospitals were 
generally regarded as a separate entity from the rest of the service. As such, research policy, 
specifically, the Research for Health strategy (DH 1991b, 1993a) was of little concern to the 
county-based interviewees in this case study. The vast majority had neither seen nor read the 
strategy, with one or two notable exceptions. However, rather more had comments to make on it, 
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reflecting how nationally-defined R&D policy was read about and interpreted in the context of 
local e:"'llerience, rather than read and understood first hand. 
The senior managers in the Bedfordshire trusts and the health authority all had distinct views and 
opinions on Research for Health (DH 1991b, 1993a), which they broadly welcomed, but without 
having any in-depth knowledge of it. Indeed, the strategy was seen by some regional R&D 
policy-makers as a bit detached from other work within the NBS Executive and the wider 
Department of Health. It appeared that the increased call for evidence-based clinical practice and 
the provision of an efficient and effective service had had an impact on local thinking and 
priorities, but this had not been due to the Research for Health strategy (DH 1991b, 1993a): "It's 
percolating rather than actually being fostered. developed and grown as a particular target" 
(health authority-based interviewee). Indeed, it was argued by one regional R&D source that 
shire hospitals and DGHs were, in fact, more 'change minded' than the teaching hospitals, who 
were "very comfortable the way they are". 
This case study will further examine the reasons for these views and explore their impact as part 
of the overall analysis of R&D policy. The interviewees who were familiar with the strategy were 
all supportive of it, but had several reservations, notably: 
• 	 the power of Professor Peckham (the national director of R&D at the time) to change 
practices of established medical researchers in the teaching hospitals was doubted; 
• 	 the strategy was one of many documents to arrive on desks each week and, like any other, 
would only appeal to those with a special, personal interest in the subject; 
• 	 the level of bureaucracy it created was large; 
• 	 changing the organisational set-up at region would not change local cultures away from 
being the domination of biomedical research. 
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Interviewees from the purchasers indicated that there was a changing cultural climate in the 
NBS. They noted a shift of power away from providers towards themselves, with the demand for 
evidence-based clinical practice seen as central to this. Analysis indicated that the success, or 
otherwise, of the Research Jar Health (DH 1991 b, 1993a) strategy in the county was intrinsically 
linked with the exercise of power and control, through the devolution of accountability for service 
provision and local responsibility for the local organisation and management of clinical services, 
as characterised by Power (1994). The issue was analysed earlier in this chapter, but what is 
noticable, is, as the previous section explained, the attempt by the then conservative government 
to more directly manage and control the research knowledge agenda in the NHS and the 
(research) knowledge producers, so that it supported more general government NHS policy. 
Who was driving the policy was clearly an issue of concern and it appeared that the purchasers 
saw this as a responsibility that they needed to take on board to increase their own power over 
providers. Interviewes from the university and regional health authority also saw this purchaser 
role as important. The priority that the issue played in the minds of the purchasers and their 
ability to hold providers accountable for the services that they provided, was seen as the major 
determinant of the success of the strategy, or at least of establishing an evidence-based culture in 
the county. However, the strategy was seen as "not driven" at a local level by the regional or 
local health authorities. The health authority's efforts centred upon accessing research evidence 
to inform its purchasing decisions, that is, to hold providers to account so that they provided the 
most efficient and effective clinical services. The focus of the health authority was to find 
solutions to locally-derived issues. 
"There is no doubt whatsoever [that] we were very much driven by the service providers ... now 
I've noticed quite a remarkable shift. Everything now in terms oj where we award contracts, 
where we are going to invest our money, all comes down to, shall we say we'll need to know what 
benefits we're gonna get; what the needs oj the market place are, (what's) been done" (health 
authority -based interviewee). 
"You know when the purchaser provider divide went on first oj all there was a great investment 
in the units, [the] Jormation oj trusts, and the purchasers were relative£v weak. Then they [the 
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government] realised that if purchasers don't lead this process it won't work, it 'Il become 
provider dominated. So we're very! concerned to beef up the purchaser process [and} the 
purchaser skills" (health authority-based interviewee). 
Although tlle region and regional R&D groups saw purchasers as the drivers of change, the 
purchasers had assumed this role regardless of the RRDD, with whom they had had no direct 
contact until (coincidentally) the time of the interviews for this thesis. What the above interview 
extracts indicated, was the changing nature of health policy locally, and the shifting nature of 
power in the health service, with HAs seeking to increase their authority over service providers. 
This was being achieved particularly through asking more questions regarding the efficiency and 
effectiveness of service provision, and, perhaps most important of aU, increasing power through a 
more stringent surveillance of clinical activity. The so-called 'marketisation' of the NHS and the 
devolution of management and organisational resposibilities to purchasers had facilitated this 
policy shift rather than the Research for Health strategy itself. The development of regional 
R&D policy related to local services could, therefore, arguably be seen as reflecting (or 
supporting) what was already happening, although some senior regionally-based sources 
attributed development more directly to the Research for Health strategy: 
"It's now not at all uncommon to hear managers talking about evidence-based health care and 
clinicians actually talking about critical reviews, so in a sense I think it has shifted people quite 
significantly" (trust-based interviewee). 
Nevertheless, the challenge to the power of the professions in the NHS from managers was clearly 
evident, and R&D policy was an important factor in this challenge. The following section will 
further explore the nature of this attempt to 'displace' traditional experts in the NHS. 
'I 
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5.7 Professions, experts, knowledge and control 
Locally in the NHS, as interviewees in Bedfordshire explained, the challenge to the clinicians 
providing services was led by the public health consultants in the health authority. 
"In my view if you don't have a strong public health department ... you will be led by the 
providers because ifyou do not go along to providers with a rigorous challenge to the status quo 
then things will not change, I think in Bedfordshire we're fairly lucky that we do have a strong 
public health department which is central to the purchaSing organisation" (health authority­
based interviewee). 
"1 certainly think [the purchasers] are promoting research aren't they because of this you're 
not supposed to spend any money until you can actually justify spending it'. So there is this need 
to actually research what we do, but everybody seems to be in the same boat, that the research 
hasn '( been done, so nobody knows" (trust-based interviewee). 
Public health consultants had links through their registrar training to the London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine; the lead R&D Officer (LRDO)3 was a consultant. A senior 
public health manager saw the preceding ten years as marking a distinct shift, whereby the inner 
London districts had become relatively small and less attractive to district general managers and 
directors of public health, in comparison to the shire counties and outer London districts. Such 
areas now had larger populations and budgets, so that "1 would now say that some of our most 
talented people are actually based in the shires, or outer London" (regionally-based interviewee). 
This, it appeared, had led to a challenge to the traditional research power bases, to the managers 
and academics in the inner-London teaching hospitals, who "had it stitched up" and resulted in 
many of the non-London districts being more change minded. Indeed, this was evidenced by 
Bedfordshire health authority initiatives. The health authority had decided to work with the local 
university's new Health Care and Social Studies Faculty, to form an Institute of Health Services 
Research (of which the author of this thesis was previously a member) to help answer their 
locally-defined questions, thus fully embroiling university researchers into new disciplinary 
careers (Foucault 1977a). However, some doubts were expressed by other interviewees regarding 
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how much power the purchasers did actually posses, given that there were only two acute and two 
community provider trusts in the whole of the county and that the majority of patients would 
probably wanno be treated close to their own homes anyhow. Additionally, the reorganisation of 
the regional health authorities (RHAs) had resulted in HAs feeling "a bit besieged ... we're small 
organisations but we've got big tasks" (health authority-based interviewee). 
Given the above evidence, it was no surprise, therefore, that interviewees saw little power in the 
Researchfor Health strategy (DH 1991b, 1993a) and, similarly, it was not seen as being driven by 
the regional health authority. The impact was seen by those familiar with the strategy as being 
more directed at a regional, organisational level and still largely focused upon the teaching 
hospitals. At the same time, however, the power of regions was seen to be waning in the light of 
the government announcement to replace them with NHS E Outposts (DH 1993h). Several 
interviewees described the situation at the local and regional level as "up in the air". This 
uncertainty was compounded in Bediordshire, as the county was, uniquely, being moved from one 
regional health authority into another in 1994. This led to further questioning of whether the 
present regional manager of R&D would bother to fund any research activity in the county 
(although they said they would), given that the health authority's top-sliced money would go to 
the new region's account the following year anyhow. 
Of course, as chapter 3 indicated, one of the major concerns of the NHS, if not the overriding one, 
was economics and finance. The whole audit explosion was a response to financial pressures in 
the NBS and a desire by government to curb the increasing cost of new medicine and providing 
services for an increasingly elderly population. Audit and R&D, as previously discussed had 
focused upon value for money, and upon efficiency and effectiveness. With R&D, this has 
translated itself into a focus upon health services research. However, it was front-line services 
where the tension between the desire to change clinical practice and the stresses of managing the 
increasing pressures of everyday clinical workloads translated into action. And the dedication of 
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the staff to their patients always won. After all, interviewees argued, it was better to treat 
somebody (and impossible not to) with less effective methods, than to stop work, step back and 
reflect on practice. The time, many argued, was simply not available. As for research and 
development activity itself, although there was some requirement for purchasers to demand 
research strategies from providers, they usually did not do so. Instead, they were more concerned 
with identifying specific areas of local service interest themself. They would then assess the 
available evidence and challenge clinical practice on the basis of this evidence. The skills and 
techniques required of the public health physicians to conduct these tasks, such as meta analysis, 
were described as in a "very primitive stage" to the extent that they were only "a quarter way 
along the path to be able to do it" (HA-based interviewee). The following section will examine 
this form of control. Although national R&D policy was not seen to be of much relevance to 
interviewees in Bedfordshire, it did have many implications on future activity in the county and 
upon professional organisations. 
Analysis of regional R&D committee minutes also revealed a clear attempt to apply business and 
management principles to the conduct of research. Strict financial control of research and health 
service budgets was a feature of the government reforms and over regional attempts to control and 
manage researchers. A number of funding options were looked at by the government and regional 
offices, but top-slicing was felt to be the option most likely to drive change. This was because it 
was open for all managers and clinicians to see and, therefore, would elicit demands from them to 
identify the benefits from the money that would otherwise have supplemented their own budgets 
without top-slicing. This was what happened and an adequate rationale to identify areas of R&D 
financed from top-slicing was demanded. The RRDD decided that all projects funded by them 
should be able to demonstrate their benefit to the NHS and contain clear business objectives 
against which success could be measured. Also demanded were: 
• project plans agreed with the RRDD; 
• progress summaries; 
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• annual reports from project leaders. 
The. changes iliustrate what could be seen as the bureaucratisation of the research process and over 
the production of medical knowledge and management of research, rather than direct 
management control. In other words, there was increased bureaucracy over the processes of work. 
Having said this, the fomlation of new research committees was a distinct attempt to control 
research agendas and define what was 'valid' knowledge. However, R&D policy was defined 
largely by those who were based in the clinical schools in teaching hospitals. Indeed, regional 
R&D committees were dominated by individuals from a biomedical background and/or from 
London (NWT RHA 1993j). Of the 16 members with voting rights on the RRDC who advised the 
regional manager of R&D (RMRD) on developing and implementing R&D policy, nine were 
either trust managers or biomedically trained individuals based in London (NWT RHA 1993 m). 
One of the Bedfordshire trust chief executives had written to the regional manager of R&D about 
this and was told that the RRDD were trying to get a better balance to the membership. However, 
even if, as may be argued, most of the people with the research experience were from the 
biomedical stable, this should not preclude a chief executive from a district outside of London 
from being a member. The chief executive on the committee was not from an organisation outside 
of London. However, two individuals from Bedfordshire were on Regional R&D committees, but 
were nominated as academic representatives, rather than NHS employees (although one was also 
the non-executive director of Bedfordshire FHSA). Research committees, therefore, and the 
medical profession itself, remained largely unthreatened by the changes. Perhaps of more 
significance was the issue of service support for research. This service support was significant 
because it reflected the government's attempt to increase control over R&D, over the production of 
new knowledge, and over 'experts' in the NHS. 
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5.8 Service support for research 

The issue of service support was of particular concern nationally and was flagged up for 
discussion by the RRDD at the inaugural meeting of the RRDC and working groups in April 
1993 (NWT RHA 1993za). By this time a national review of the Service Increment for Teaching 
and Research (SIFT-R) was in progress4. Regional health authorities were being approached by 
the NBS Executive to distribute and monitor SIFT -R funds, but there was no consensus on how to 
administer its. Service costs for research were particularly important because the then 
Conservative Government wanted to be able to fully cost and monitor research. Research 
workers, therefore, would be held more accountable for the work that they produced. As a result, 
the Tomlinson (1992) review recommended that SIFf-R be applied to all hospitals and it was 
hoped by the RRDD that the Thompson review of research in the Special Health Authorities 
(Thompson et a/1993) would resolve the matter (NWT RHA 1993r). It did not, but the issue was 
later directly addressed by the Culyer report and change instigated (Culyer 1994). 
There was also a stated desire in the Research for Health strategy (DH 1991 b, 1993a) to create a 
proper research market, with SIFT -R broken down for individual projects. The matter was brought 
to a head by two particular incidents. Firstly, a deal was struck between the NHS Executive and 
the Medical Research Council (MRC) was made, without outside consultation, in which the NHS 
E agreed to pay the MRC's service costs from NHS research funds. This brought a strong 
response from RRDDs and researchers as it would have led to all NHS research funds being used 
up. It indicated again, a lack of co-ordination in central departments of the NHS Executive, with 
decisions being made without adequate consultation with other bodies. As a result of this 
response, the issue was deferred until the review of SIFT -R was complete. However by April 1993 
the RRDD had decided that service costs should be included in all future research contracts. 
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Secondly, in May 1993, the Regional Director of R&D for Yorkshire wrote to the North Thames 
RRDD requesting a contribution towards service costs for a nationally (NHS)-funded mental 
health project: to be partly conducted in the region. The request was refused for the same reasons 
by the Rlv1RD who stated that he would seek the views of other regional directors of R&D. The 
intention, therefore, was to disassemble the existing block-funding of service support, which 
benefitted the clinical schools in the teaching teaching hospitals but nobody else, make the system 
more open to public scrutiny, and the bidding for NBS research funds more open to competition. 
There was, therefore, clearly an initial desire to control the medical profession, particularly those 
working in the teaching hospitals. Control over the professions, therefore, could be increased by 
controlling the nature of their production of knowledge. Similarly, by fixing research agendas 
onto supporting government objectives for the NHS, as set out in the Health of the Nation (DR 
1992a) there was clearly some attempt to redefine what was 'relevant' knowledge to the NHS. 
However, the devolution of management responsibility to regional offices to achieve such aims 
was also clearly limited by central NBS offices reluctance to relinquish their control. The NHS 
Executive's deal could be seen as a rear-guard action by the MRC, a body representing those at 
the medical core, to maintain their existing privileged position. This was, initially, unsuccessful 
at this level but a deal was later agreed and implemented. The result was that there was less NHS 
money available to fund other research and development activity, and that the research 'market' 
envisaged by Culyer (1994) was not really a market. For the NBS in Bedfordshire, this meant that 
gaining funds to conduct research and development activity there was made even harder. 
Evidence from regional and Bedfordshire interviewees suggested that a key issue for the R&D 
agenda was the extent that Michael Peckham could impose a new (health services) research 
agenda on the teaching hospitals and there was some scepticism about his ability to achieve this 
goal: 
"The biggest problem's going to be that you've got a separate strategy but it's still got to fit into 
the overall Peckham one ...lt depends to what extent Mike Peckham manages to impose a much 
more health service sort oforientation to his research. But having sat on various [committees] 
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and being involved with various groups at the [London teaching hospital] where they were 
talking about that, where a whole lot ofthings had come in when they surveyed the regions, they 
just tossed them all out basically and said 'oh we 'U write our own because we don't believe any 
ofthese are important" (trust-based interviewee). 
However, the Health Authority in Bedfordshire were content to let the region develop policy in 
this way, expressing no sentiments to the contrary. Their intention was to wait until the regional 
implementation group had decided on their role and form of action before doing anything 
themselves. In the meantime, however, they continued to establish a local challenge to service 
provision, indicating a clear distinction between research policy and development policy. That is, 
the demand for evidence-based clinical practice. Central and regional 'research' policy, therefore, 
concerned power over researchers, specifically biomedical researchers in the teaching hospitals, 
power over the production of medical knowledge and therefore, control of the medical 'core'. 
Local 'development' policy on the other hand, concerned the power to control the doctors and 
other clinicians in the wider NBS, through power and control over the dissemination and 
utilisation of that evidence-based knowledge in the NBS. 
The exclusivity of research to a few centres was in part due to the considerable amount of time, 
money and effort required to write research proposals. Even the academics interviewed stated 
their difficulty with this process, which was exceedingly bureaucratic and embroiled workers in 
another network of writing. It was also proving to be very difficult for individuals in all 
occupations outside of the medical schools to gain experience in preparing research proposals. 
This was the case in Bedfordshire. Nurses were particularly flagged up as not possessing the 
knowledge or ability to write proposals by some interviewees. A 'short' and 'long-form', two 
stage process was established for applications to the Responsive Funding Group, to speed up the 
a.pplication process. A Project Development Group was also formed to check the quality of long-
form proposals from those invited to submit, prior to peer-review. The group was intended to 
encourage activity and bids from non-medical professions but the necessary expertise was just not 
there, "the embarrassment was, the level of quality of the nursing proposals put forward" 
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(university-based interviewee). The regional support, therefore, was misdirected, because support 
was needed earlier in the process. However, none of the Bedfordshire-based interviewees in the 
case study ex-pressed knowledge of the Project Development Group's existence. In this way, it 
appears that the funds were kept amongst the individuals with the specialist knowledge and 
experience required, i.e. the biomedical researchers in the medical schools, by a lack of knowledge 
about the group. However, the situation also highlighted the underdevelopment of research 
amongst the nursing, midwifery, dietetics professions and amongst the P AMS in general. Clearly, 
research activity amongst these groups was just as underdeveloped in the teaching hospitals and 
universities as elsewhere in the NBS. The situation allowed the medical profession to retain 
power over knowledge production and resist control from outside, without seeming to make any 
overt effort to do so. Is such medical dominance likely to be challenged? Not on the evidence 
gathered here. Regional research committees were dominated by biomedically-trained 
individuals, largely based in or around the teaching hospitals. However, analysis of the minutes of 
regional R&D committees revealed that the training of individuals in health services research 
skills was identified at an early stage by the RRDD as a priority for funding (NWT RHA 1993a). 
The following section will examine the many issues involved in such training. 
5.9 Training 
The RRDD did make an effort to fund research and development activity amongst the less 
research active professions, but funding for training, including studying Masters degrees was 
problematic for some. Indeed, it was a particular concern of the physiotherapists interviewed, 
whose departments were comparatively small, so that staff cover was particularly difficult when 
clinicians were away. Nursing research was a specific topic of interest amongst interviewees in 
the case study, as there were two quite high profile nurse-trained individuals based there. Both of 
these individuals had comparatively high research profiles, although were directly managing few 
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research projects themselves at the time. Views ex "pressed at regional level indicated that nursing, 
and other non-medical occupations, should become 'desirable' degree-based professions, with 
well-defined career structures and competitive entry. This was seen as necessary in order to 
attract high calibre trainees, some of whom would follow the research path after graduating. The 
remaining trainees, although not able (or willing) to conduct research, would be able to 
understand and appraise it. Consequently, the RRDD identified at an early stage, the importance 
of training. An R&D training strategy was tabled at the first meeting of the initial regional 
research groups and this was finalised by October 1993 (NWT RHA 1993 zc). Over this time a 
national strategy was being developed, but the RRDD did not anticipate that it would seriously 
affect their own. The regional paper emphasised the development of a postgraduate infrastructure 
and concentrated, therefore, on two principal elements: 
• 	 the training of more health services researchers through studentships and fellowships; 
• 	 increased information on the R&D programme and research awareness for the broader 
spectrum of staff. 
Both of these elements would have been welcomed by NBS workers in Bedfordshire, but by this 
time the implications of the changes in the structures of regions on Bedfordshire was clear. There 
was no evidence to suggest that information and awareness of the regional schemes had 
increased. The training strategy revealed a desire to increase the management over training. This 
it aimed to achieve through the rationalisation of library and information services at post-graduate 
training centres, the formation of an education and training working group, the delivery of the 
strategy through purchasing contracts, and the centring of medical schools around Imperial 
College, London. The climate for non-medical education and training was seen to be changing, 
with all education contracts being moved into higher education institutions. Indeed, dietetics and 
physiotherapy had become degree-based occupations, the former since the 1950s and the latter 
much more recently. The evidence was that physiotherapy courses, in particular, were getting 
much higher grade applicants. It was, however, still underdeveloped in terms of R&D. Indeed, 
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the Chartered Society of Physiotherapists, noted some interviewees, still had no research 
department itself and did not have a discernible role in any postgraduate training in general. 
However, the Research Jor Health (DH 1991b, 1993a) strategy was seen as an opportunity by by 
most universities to secure new funds and become leading centres for health services research in 
the region. Imperial College, in particular, was alleged to be seen in a more favourable light by 
the RRDD, with a senior regional nursing manager allegedly talking about "throwing" nursing 
research at them, thus following the centring of medical education there. However, certain 
difficulties were expressed, relating to the inherent problem in implementing a strategy to train 
individuals in (health services research) skills that were new to most academics and higher 
education institutions themselves. These were characterised by a senior regionally-based 
interviewee: 
"More generally 1 think it may be that it's something that sounds fine in principle but when you 
actually think about trying to do it, we are so short of strong health service research - type 
organisation, that you're potentially devising an educational training strategy that's not 
possible" (regionally-based interviewee) . 
Nevertheless, the creation of a 'research culture' and 'change mindedness' in practitioners was of 
clear concern at all management levels of the service. This was to ensure a normalisation of 
clinical practice to guidelines, ensuring the consistent provision of effective clinical services. The 
York Centre for Review and Dissemination and the Cochrane Centre were developed to help with 
this process, to bridge the gap between research and practice. As such, they could be seen as 
attempts to manage, or control the dissemination and utilisation of knowledge. Systematic 
reviews were conducted on specific subjects, with the attempt to produce succinct, accessible 
guidelines on clinical practice. Indeed, it was argued by some interviewees that if there was a 
total concentration upon development rather than research, they would not mind, because so much 
research was yet to be utilised. By challenging doctors ability to correctly treat a patient, or, 
rather, treat them more effectively, the purchasers were challenging a fundamental relationship at 
the heart of medical practice, that is, the one between the patient and doctor. However, such 
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challenges rarely reached the public domain~ instead they were made by the medically-trained 
public health consultants using knowledge and language that were most acceptable to the doctors. 
The culture ofchallenge was not developed in the county. For instance, as previously discussed, 
the knowledge and skills of public health departments to conduct meta analyses of research 
evidence was underdeveloped. There was also resistance to these attempts to manage the 
development of research results (knowledge). 
"1 have read these Effective Health Care Bulletins supported by management but as they weren't 
produced by [clinician] for [clinician} other than the one on fertility they are not really 
relevant. Because it was so, so obviously put together by somebody analysing as many papers as 
they could put their hands on with no emphasis on what is really important and what is 
irrelevant, there were just as many irrelevant papers. And [these were] put all together and 
analysed by a robot. They were not analysed by somebody looking after patients, so 1found that 
intensely annoying. ..Maybe that's a problem with the NHS, that we're all in our own little 
specialty corners and it's very hard for people outside those speCialties to analyse the relevance 
ofwhat 's going on" (trust-based interviewee). 
There was little research activity locally in Becifordshire, but on a general level, what research 
activity there was, was biomedical in nature, with none of the other professions represented in the 
case study doing any. This also appeared to be the case at the teaching hospitals elsewhere in the 
region. However, this raises an interesting question regarding medicine. It was a widely accepted 
fact that medicine was an evidence-based profession. If, as the evidence for this case study 
suggested, most consultants never do research, and as the Research for Health strategy suggested 
(DH 1991b), most research was ignored, then to what extent could medicine be termed an 
evidence-based profession? The reality indicated, rather, that medicine was simply more 
evidence-based than other professions. Research evidence was not used in a systematic way by 
doctors to inform all aspects of their work, merely the elements they found interesting and 
relevant. The professional self-perception was of medicine as a blend of art and science; that 
medicine is interpretivistic and not systematisable (Turner 1988). A consultant interviewee 
explained that doctors read researchjoumals in their own specialism all the time. but although the 
articles might be technically correct, there were variations in case selection (the type of patients 
recruited into clinical trials), which meant they had to use their own experience in assessing them. 
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Experiences were also shared in meetings with colleagues, and audit results were shared at 
lunchtime meetings. It appeared, however, that although there was some recognition that clinical 
activity, in general, needed to change, the connection with needing to change their own individual 
behaviour was not made. 
"Perhaps one ofour problems as a breed is we are all better than the next man. J know that I do 
things better than anybody else, so there is no problem with me, but other people should read the 
research journals" (trust-based interviewee). 
"We are ffif/are hopefully, of the most important research and development in our specialty and 
implement it; but that's done mainly by consultant initiative but occaSionally a broad issue like 
day case surgery might be subject to management initiative" (trust-based interviewee). 
Consultants worked in their own specialisms, largely free of, or ignoring, management agendas. 
They largely kept up-to-date in their own specialty and implemented new services on their own 
initiative. The management (control) of development, therefore, was additionally problematic. 
Education and training was seen as an important element to facilitate development, but clinicians 
needed to have the time to develop themselves and be reflective. This social reflexivity (Giddens 
1994: 6) had to be a constant process in an environment which was 'change minded', as "the last 
thing you want is to introduce something new which then just becomes tablets of stone again" 
(trust-based interviewee). The requirement, therefore, was for clinicians to continually reflect 
and normalise their behaviour accordingly. However, this all had resource implications. 
Normalisation was not just about individuals stepping back and reflecting on their practice, as 
changing practice involved a whole set of other factors, issues and people. It was normally not in 
an individual's ability to change on hislher own. Trusts, purchasers, GPs, the NHS Executive and 
governments also had to be change oriented. 
Clinicians, various interviewees argued, had no time to be able to reflect as they were so busy 
meeting their clinical workloads, and there was no discernible incentive or threat, either personal 
or organisational to force them to do so. Neither were people taught to manage the change 
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process. "They're often not in control of it and it usually has implications beyond the individual 
person". The process was, therefore, not seen as a normal and natural aspect of the individual's 
day-to-day life, which had implications beyond hislher experience. The region did fund a nursing 
post at one of the local acute trusts. The post holder was a respected researcher, whose task was to 
manage nurses and to act as a • signpost', to read, understand and communicate the findings of 
relevant research and change practice. This was done in an attempt to establish an evaluative 
nursing culture in the trust. However, despite trying, it was not evident that the individual in 
question has had much of an effect and left a few months after interviews were conducted. 
Of course, economics was seen as a major factor in the ability to conduct and implement research. 
Financial reward or penalties were and are powerful controls on trusts and upon the behaviour of 
professionals, particularly because a principle statutory obligation of trusts was to break even. The 
pressures of conducting their everyday work was paramount for the various occupations in the 
NHS, over and above anything else. Attempts to form research interest groups in trusts had failed 
because "the climate was not right as the staffing levels had been cut back to bare bones". The 
implementation of research, that is, the development of services, similarly involved resource costs. 
"If1 was to say let's look at how to implement this strategy, then one ofthe Ihings I would need is 
more bloody nurses in the unit. Where's that money going to come from? Development moneys 
aren'l going to pay for that but they'// [purchasers} say that's [the} provider units 
[responsibility}, nothing to do with us" (university-based interviewee). 
Some interviewee's were still confused about how the Research for Health strategy (DR 1991b, 
1993a) would be financed. In fact, as noted earlier, the money was going to come from the top-
slicing of purchasing budgets, which did give it some power and attention. Nevertheless, the 
relevance of this to non-teaching trusts, such as those in Bedfordshire, led to some questioning of 
the whether trust budgets should be cut for this purpose. 
"ifpush comes. to shove and their backs are against the wall they'll say you've lop-sliced us for 
research, we don 'f want research. We want the money back... You look at what you can do 
without and R&D is one ofthe things you can do without" (university-based interviewee). 
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However, the interviewee's fears did not appear to materialise. The possibility was always there, 
however, and the interview extract does illustrate the ultimate level at which R&D featured in 
priorities for service provision. From the evidence cited above, it was generally a low priority. 
The pressure of meeting output target, and managing clinical workloads were far more important 
for the trusts. 
1 This was acknowledged by a senior academic who was interviewed and was not simply a reflection ofbias and lack of 

understanding in funding committees. 

2 Audit was included in the research remit for North East Thames, however. 

1 Each purchaser and provider organisation had a nominated RDLO who acted as the official link to the RRDD. 

4 but would not be complete until 1995196. 
~ Three teaching hospitals in the region were in receipt of an estimated £9.5 million in 1991/92 and two trusts were in receipt of 
non- SIIT-R funding amounting to £659 000 in 1992/93. 
,I I 
187 
CHAPTER 6 
CASE STUDY NUMBER 2 

CAMBRIDGE AND HUNTINGDON 

6.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports on the findings of the second case study; research and development policy in the 
area covered by Cambridge and Huntingdon Health Authority, in the East of England. It follows the 
same format as that used for Bedfordshire. The Cambridge and Huntingdon area is dominated by a 
large teaching hospital-Addenbrooke's and includes the medical school for the University of 
Cambridge, which is an international centre for biomedical research l . The university also had links 
with the Cambridge community trust, Lifespan Healthcare, which was also a teaching trust. There are 
two other major trusts in the area: Papworth is a speCialist cardiothoracic centre for the East of 
England, based just outside Cambridge,2 and Hinchingbrook, which is a non-teaching, combined acute 
and community trust, based in Huntingdon. Interviews for this case study were conducted in 1995. 
Appendix 9 lists the individuals interviewed for this case study. The analysis also incorporates minutes 
of relevant regional R&D committee meetings from the East Anglian Regional Health Authority and 
later, from the newly combined Anglia and Oxford Regional Health Authority. 
Analysis of the data revealed a very complex picture. What was clear was the extremely intricate 
nature of decision-making and the role that research policy and development policy played in this. The 
themes identified in the theory chapter, such as devolution, were confirmed by the research findings 
from the case studies. In addition, in Cambridge and Huntingdon, other related themes, such as the 
politics of R&D in community trusts were to emerge. This made writing up difficult, but interesting. 
It took time for roles and responsibilities to define themselves. A period of uncertainty followed the 
NHS eCA (1990) and other policy developments, such as the concentration on waiting lists contributed 
to a rather adversarial environment in the NBS. The marketisation of the NBS had shifted the balance 
of power, principally towards purchasers of health services (the health authority and GP fundholders) 
after an initial concentration on the providers. Relations between health authority (HA) purchasers and 
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trusts in particular, were singled out for attention by interviewees as strained, but were beginning to 
settle down as individuals and institutions became more confident in their roles and responsibilities. 
"It's very macho kind of, competitive behaviour. rather than working in partnership. which 1 think 1 
would describe as a mature client contractor split, which you see in maturer organisations where they 
have a long term relationship" (trust-based interviewee). 
There were some conflicting views e;\:pressed concerning the coherence of the services provided, with 
some (doctors) arguing that they had come to realise that trusts involved in poaching business from 
each other simply meant "everybody loses out"; one pound gained by one trust is a pound lost by 
another and vise versa. However, views from other quarters were that the servive for physiotherapy was 
characterised by a series of separate competing businesses. There was little stated change in dietetic 
services resulting from the internal market, although some was anticipated by dietitians in the future. 
6.2 Marketisation, centralisation, devolution and accountability 
It was clear from the analysis that the purchaser/provider divide had made clinicians and managers 
more evaluative, or reflective in their work and approach to service provision. The marketisation of 
the health service was characterised here too by a desire for the devolution of decision-making, in 
response to government demands. What will become clear to the reader, however, is the intensely 
political nature of decision-making and how such devolution was severely limited by central 
government legislation and financial restrictions. There was no true NHS market as such, as 
purchasers had limited resources, powerful structural forces were in operation and politics played a very 
prominant role in decision-making. However, 'marketisation' did have an impact upon the nature of 
service provision. It had the effect of making purchasing and to a lesser extent, clinical decision-
making processes more open to the public gaze and introduced some notion of accountability into these 
processes. 
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The NBS CCA (1990) had devolved to health authorities the task of purchasing health services for 
local communities. Health authorities were given a predefined budget and, in theory, were free to 
spend that money how they saw fit. However, the reality, as evidence indicated, was that the 
government were unwilling to relinquish control to purchasers and, as a result, the purchasers were 
restricted in their ability to make purchasing decision even if they were based on sound scientific 
evidence. Not only did this illustrate centralisation, rather than devolution but it also illustrated the 
government's (and drug company's) control over the application of knowledge. A public health 
consultant used the example of evidence-based medicine to illustrate the political interference of the 
government, notably regarding Beta Interferon. 
"We are very clear, having looked at the evidence very carefully in consultation with our neurological 
co/leagues ... the evidence of effectiveness is poor. and even if we took evidence at face value the 
clinical effect is also slight. Therefore the opportunity cost ofspending £10 000 per patient to get a 
very minimal clinical gain is in our view too high. If we believe government rhetoric the decision 
should be ours and ours alone because that is what they keep on saying and not the governments. Yet 
they are actualZv going to come out with guidance that says we must purchase it. And what's all this 
rhetoric about evidence-based medicine; with the evidence-based medicine stujJwe have been very 
assiduous about reviewing this, we 've taken the judgement, reviewed it, and we don't want to spend a 
penny on it, but we are going to be required to. Now it drives a coach and horses through the whole of 
the Peckham initiative" (health authority-based interviewee). 
Decision-making, therefore, was not wholly devolved to managers. This was because of government 
sensitivity to public (media) pressure and to political pressure from various interest groups, particularly 
drugs companies. Policy was not apolitical, nor separated from politics, nor were organisation and 
management issues immune from government, as rhetoric dictated. 
"In the case ofBeta Interferon, there is the political agenda about drug companies. there is a political 
agenda about the medicines side of the Department ofHealth. On the homeopathy issue no doubt 
there is a general practitioner lobby that will use it. the Royal Family is very keen on homeopathy. 
Everything has got a political agenda, and I don't think it's just this government, I think it is in the 
nature ofpublic services that there is a large political agenda ... On the whole relationships are good 
and we all understand that we are living in a political world, but there is nevertheless a reasonably 
large what I would call a rhetoric-reality gap" (health authority-based interviewee). 
It was generally recognised by interviewees that as the internal market was cash limited it wasn't really 
a market. All trusts were expected by the government to reach annual efficiency indexes, and 
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reductions in waiting lists and Patient's Charter standards DH 1992b). This took precedence over most 
other considerations. A major task devolved to purchasers was to implement these indexes and they 
were left to do these on their own. "at the end of the day they've got to concentrate on those prime 
objectives and then the options" (trust-based interviewee). Clear measures and standards of 
performance were created, although these, such as the reduction of hospital waiting lists were crude and 
problematic. The government's desire was to shift care into the community and avoid hospital inpatient 
stay which was expensive. However, high numbers of inpatient day case episodes counted as highly 
efficient whereas community services counted for very little in the efficiency index. Consequently, 
there was arguably an inbuilt disincentive to reduce or stop daycase episodes. However, a 
physiotherapy manager argued that the Patient's Charter (DH1992b) had made them try harder to meet 
the requirements of patients and GPs and provide a good service. This interviewee claimed that such 
pressure from the centre was necessary and the physiotherapists were now going to come round to this 
way of thinking. Nobody wanted to corne bottom of the league tables, the interviewee argued, even if 
they thought the system was flawed. 
There was some recognition of the dilemma facing the health authority amongst trust-based 
interviewees, who recognised that the HA were not saying that 'this is ineffective' but something else 
was more important or equitable. It was known that the behaviour and decision-making of the 
purchasers was dictated by the Government and cash limits "if you tried to deal with things like 
operations, hospital admission, there's ail these standards now around which constrain their [health 
authority's} ability to actually make some sensible decisions" (trust-based interviewee). The nature of 
the health care reforms was such that there was no incentive for providers to reduce expensive 
procedures, as money was simply taken away. 
"The reward is actually ifany thing, to slightly overspend and under perform. You see you tend to get 
money thrown at you to solve the problem ... The other perversity is the way we measure activity, you 
know, one ofmy colleagues in another District Trust [was} saying that ifyou come up with ways of 
keeping people out ofhospital it's very difficult because actualZv you lose the income against to FCE3 
without necessarily getting any income for what you're doing. So the perversity is then not to change 
anything the way you run as services because you lose out" (trust-based interviewee). 
;! 
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The government's desire for efficiency gains from the health service, as part of these reforms meant 
that the health authority, according to many interviewees, were becoming more prescriptive towards 
them, in order" to gain these efficiency targets and this affected their own (trust) autonomy, the level of 
services they were able to provide and by implication, the clinical autonomy of the doctors 
"One of the problems we've had, I have to say, it stilI is our problem integrally, locally it still feels a 
bit adversarial and that's a pity but I think we're beginning to work out way through that. When as 
they develop their own policy framework and their strategies, and we are involved often at the earlier 
stages, so we end up with a number of building blocks, that it would help to provide a degree of 
stability and a sense ofdirection; but too often it's a bit adversarial here and it feels we are having to 
do a lot afwork and we are having to carry most ofthe risks" (trust-based interviewee). 
The health authority's interpretation and implementation of this issue was criticised by trust-based 
interviewees, as the health authority wanted the efficiency gains in cash, arguing that they would 
reinvest some of that money back into services. The issue reached a climax when the Chief Executives 
of Addenbrooke's and Hinchingbrook trusts together wrote a letter to the purchasers, which was leaked 
to the press, stating that the 'elastic had been stretched as far as it could go '. This was due to the 
pressures to meet the annual efficiency demands. The result was little opportunity for reflection, or 
normalisation of clinical activity, in terms of thinking about how jobs could be better performed and 
health gain improved, but corporate normalisation to centrally-defined output goals. 
Similarly, a perceived focus on numbers and output, rather than outcomes, characterised purchaser and 
provider relations. This had an effect upon clinical practice in that the clinicians were "more aware of 
who's buying what and what they need to deliver for particular purchasers to get the money to come in 
to enable them to carry on working"(trust-based interviewee). It was clear that it had introduced a 
business-mindedness into many specialties in all of the trusts, with fixed budgets allotted to clinical 
directorates. Services would not be provided if there was no money from purchasers to pay for them 
(excepting urgent and emergency cases). As a result, therefore, the issue of funding (or underfunding) 
had become much more explicit. Indeed, there has always been a certain amount of rationing in the 
health service but this was largely performed by doctors away behind the scenes (Klein 1989). Some 
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interviewees contended that the long waiting lists of the past were probably the fairest form of 
rationing, in that the people who waited longest were mainly the ones waiting for cosmetic surgery, 
such as that for varicose veins. Rationing, however, was increasingly performed in the open, by the 
purchasers, rather than doctors and through waiting lists. For instance, the director of public health 
had met with local ENT surgeons and discussed how they would ration services "and it was decided in 
the end that the referrals would come through to the ENT surgeons and they would decide what would 
pass through from that" (health authority-based interviewee). The doctors continued to make the 
decisions and remained accountable to their patients, but the purchaser would carry public 
responsibility and accountability for the decisions. 
The fact that Cambridge and Huntingdon had one major purchaser and four providers who provided 
care for specific populations, also meant that there was little capacity for the market, in the form of 
competition to have a major impact on trusts. However, a doctor argued that he did see himself in 
competition with the other district general hospitals, as contracts had to be secured at the right price 
and quality. It appears, however, that this manifested itself in the form of the efficiency gains referred 
to earlier. Nurses, physiotherapists and most certainly, dietetics services were less affected, probably 
reflecting the profile and financial prominance of those services, compared to medicine. "/ think that 
there are some fundamental, major issues [that] I'm sure that they need to sort out and it doesn 'f 
particularly worry them that they haven't got round to addressing nutrition" (trust-based interviewee). 
The clinicians, according to another interviewee, were beginning to realise the implications of 
insufficient funding, and were becoming more aware of having to think about what they did and why 
they were doing it, and were getting more business minded. 
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6.3 The devolution of pay bargaining 
The devolution of pay bargaining elicited a mixed response from the interviewees, but several common 
issues emerged from the analysis. The issue has been an important one. widely reported in the media 
and has been the source of much unrest amidst the threat of industrial action from health care workers. 
In 1995 when interviews were conducted, the government stated that it would offer trusts 1% extra 
money to fund pay rises for clinicians, against the 3% recommended by the pay review bodies, The 
extra money was to be found by trust management out of existing resources; in effect, through savings, 
cuts and increases in efficiency, effectiveness and economy measures. However, there were differences 
amongst trust managers regarding the money available to fund such rises. The majority of them 
appeared to be of the opinion that the extra cash was not there. The result was that in some cases the 
pay rises that were offered were accompanied by the requirement for a change in job descriptions, terms 
or conditions of service. Like all trusts that year (1995), the ones in this case study all offered their 
clinical staff the 3% pay increase recommended by the national pay review bodies. This was after 
much unrest and talk of industrial action. The government sensitivity to such unrest, most notably to 
nurses protests was such that it was unwilling to fully relinquish responsibility for pay bargaining. This 
elicited uncertainty, frustration and cynicism from managers and clinicians alike. 
"It's got to be one ofthe most outrageous failures ofthe last couple ofyears really hasn't it? .. There is 
effectively no local pay bargaining. The constraints came out effectively telling you at the end of the 
day pay 3% and the national review bodies have effectively set the scene for another year and the 
flexibility for local pay really disappeared out of the window. It's been a major frustration 1 think" 
(trust-based interviewee) 
"] think it was potentially such a big problem it's been watered down to such a degree now that it's 
going through the motions J think" (trust-based interviewee) 
Although the government attempted to devolve pay bargaining, this appeared to be more rhetoric than 
reality. The issue, initially, was seen as an attempt by the Conservative Government to devolve 
responsibility for cost-cutting to local managers. However, the vociferous reaction of the clinicians 
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affected,caused some concern amongst government ministers and officials, to the extent that national 
directions regarding pay were issued. This illustrated that the rhetoric of devolution masked a 
centrally-directed pay policy. 
6.3.1 Local Responses 
Localised pay bargaining was generally seen as something that would have more of an effect in the 
future. Relations between management and clinicians were seen as relatively good by all the 
interviewees. However, the issue had been as contentious in Cambridge and Huntingdon as anywhere 
else. Although staff-management relations were quite good, it was clear that the die had been cast and 
relations would never be quite the same. Indeed, one trust ended up imposing a 3% pay rise, as the 
staff were instructed by their national officers not to participate in pay negotiations, which "caused a 
rift for a while and that's not going to go away really" (trust-based interviewee). The trust 
management had quite good relations with staff around the development of trust contracts but the last 
round of pay bargaining in 1994-95 undid that, and created quite a lot of tension. Similarly, staff at 
another trust, were offered 3% from the outset "and the only thing we said we wanted staffto do was to 
be prepared to talk about issues next year really"(trust-based interviewee}. Paradoxically, the 
response by the clinicians was both hostile and relaxed. This perhaps indicated that there had been 
some relaxation of the lateral cohesion within occupational groups between different trusts and local 
and national negotiators. 
"What they've said to us privately is they're quite relaxed about it, but they do have national 
instructions, so it's not the most enormously big deal. The main problem is that people are anxious, 
and a lot of that anxiety comes through their professional bodies and what they read in the media" 
(trust-based interviewee). 
Although nationally, everybody concerned received their 3% in the end, not all trusts offered it at first. 
This caused some divisions within occupational groups. The call for strike action received a varying 
amount of support and/or caused frustration amongst those workers offered 3%, but unable to accept it, 
and those for whom the offer was lower or conditional. There was evidence that the devolution of pay 
196 
bargaining also increased divisions between staff in acute and community trusts. An interviewee from 
a community trust explained that it had been a bigger issue in acute trusts, where they were more 
powerful. There had been some tension in community units, but "to a great extent I think our local 
reps were toeing the union line rather than necessarily themselves being table thumpers" (trust-based 
interviewee). The interviewee argued that the staff in her trust were stirred up by 'table thumpers' at 
the acute trust, who had traditionally been the reps for the community staff as well. However, although 
they were no longer the union representatives since the trust had obtained trust status, they did continue 
to have quite a strong influence. 
There was some feeling amongst managers that the new system was a method of making the pay 
structure more simple as opposed to the "complex and archaic" Whitley Council system. 
"You don't have all these sort ofstrange allowances and duty payments and enhancements which will 
actually make a simpler pay structure...maybe also we reward them in a rather more logical way, so 
there's more clarity between reward and input, whereas at the moment you pay people for doing things 
when there's no particular reason ofpaying them extra for it"(trust-based interviewee}. 
However, despite this, the Whitley Council system was largely seen as benefician by clinicians, with 
some exceptions. Although the devolution of pay bargaining might well have led 10 the simplification 
of the pay system itself, it also increased the amount of bureaucracy involved, and meant that more 
individuals spent more time negotiating similar (if not identical) pay deals in each and every NBS trust 
throughout the country. This, unsurprisingly, caused some worry amongst many people, who would 
rather be, or would rather their staff spent more time actually treating patients. 
"People have got better things to do. You know, we're here to care for patients [rather} than have all 
these people from all these professional bodies sitting around talking about how much we're all going 
to get paid. .. it means it takes one of my staff out to more staff-management meetings, to more 
documents that she has to read. .. it takes up more time in staffmeetings, because people want to know 
what's happening. It means you get more circulars coming round from the BDA, more questionnaires 
that we all have to fill in" (trust-based intervie'tvee). 
I 
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In addition, of course, as dietetics departments were comparatively very small, taking one person away 
for meetings etc. had a much more profound effect on the workload of the department and other 
dietitians than·it would on nursing, for instance, where the individuals work could be spread between a 
larger number of people. The result was an increasingly complex bureaucratic system. However, 
despite this, there were some criticisms of the Whitley Council system from clinicians: "[The Whitley 
System] is protecting some pretty awful physiotherapists who dont deserve to be protected" (trust­
based interviewee). Nevertheless, the Whitley system was held dear by clinicians, to the extent that 
physiotherapists calling to enquire about job vacancies would ask whether trusts paid Whitley Council 
rates before considering applying. Indeed, the pay system did appear to have been an issue of particular 
concern to physiotherapists and nurses especially. A clinical manager interviewed, on return from a 
seminar, reported that Ken Jarrold, the then NBS Head ofHuman Resources, noted that only the nurses 
were ofconcern to the government. Jarrold was arguing that P AMS felt that they had lost status. This 
was because they didn't think that they had got a career structure now that the days of district 
physiotherapists and district occupational therapists were gone, and were, subsequently, yearning for 
the days of old. 
A trust general manager argued that the therapists had picked up on local pay bargaining more than 
other professions because there were fewer of them than nurses, so they felt more exposed. There were 
also fewer therapy managers and consequently, fewer managers who understood the needs of therapists. 
The interviewees' trust, for instance, now had only one manager for all the therapy groups, instead of 
the four they had in the past (chiropody, speech, physiotherapy and occupational therapy). However, 
the physiotherapists have some power and leverage at a more localised level. The shortage in their 
numbers, and subsequent high demand for their services is something they are able to (and did) exploit 
I to their advantage, perhaps indicating that the government had underestimated the situation before 
them. 
I 
"J may be naive, but I don't think they'll necessarily push physios too hard, because we could leave, 
and go and get a job somewhere else tomorrow, and they know that, and then they will have the GP, 
the fundholder screaming because the waiting list has gone up, or you'll have the orthopaedic ward 
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stuffed up with people that they can't get out ofbed. ..so I think it's a very awkward situation" (trust­
based interviewee). 
Indeed, it was "felt by some that both nurses and physiotherapists felt let down by the NBS and would 
'vote with their feet'. A trust manager noted the irony of the whole situation" We can't get qualified 
nurses and that will get worse as we come out ofthe recession and the last thing we're going to do is 
cut pay anyway" (trust-based interviewee). The problem for some, was compounded by the failure of 
practitioners to return to work after having families. The issue of recruiting physiotherapists had 
reached such a state that Lifespan Community Trust was attempting to recruit them from South Africa. 
In fact, it appeared to be more severe for community trusts, as the work was not seen as so attractive to 
practitioners as acute-based work. The problem was that if one practitioner was paid more, then all the 
others would demand similar amounts. Costs would consequently rise dramatically. According to an 
interviewee, one solution, which an acute hospital in Essex had come up with, was to offer new staff 
'golden handshakes'. However, finances were very scarce. In theory, trusts could pay more to attract 
the best staff, to solve their recruitment problems, but as a dietitian observed, "something has to give, 
and there isn't the money, there isn't the extra money there" (trust-based interviewee). A solution to 
this problem looked at by the community trusts was explore the possibility of making the actual jobs 
themself more attractive. "That's about thinking about why [it] is that people don '[ want these jobs, is 
it something to do with the skill, the experience they get, or the other side ofit. And that's the way, not 
money, but actually the fringe benefits ifyou like, how we actually make people feel welcome when we 
recruit them" (trust-based interviewee). The expansion ofR&D activity within the trust was one way it 
was thought this could be achieved; by offering clinicians the training and experience that may not 
have been available elsewhere, thus making them a more attractive employer. 
Analysis of the interview material revealed that dietitians were in a slightly different situation in 
comparison to the other clinicians interviewed. They are a relatively small occupational group, 
I historically politically inactive, and generally non union-based. "1 suppose the BDA were quite a 
I quaint little professional body that ambled along talking nutrition and dietetics and training and 
I 
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research and journals and whatever else" (trust-based interviewee). Pay for dietitians was dealt with 
elsewhere and wasn't really an issue for them, locally, until 1995. A dietetics manager noted that since 
that time, the aietitians as a profe~sion had probably been the most militant it had ever been. In 1995, 
they had also voted to strike, but the matter was resolved before the deadline for starting industrial 
action was reached. As an occupational group, however, dietitians were seen by some in the NHS as a 
1u,'\.1.lry service and were consequently in a much less stable position than others. 
"as somebody quite tartly said, ' well make sure that ifyou actually do go on strike anybody would miss 
you', so you have to think about those sorts of things because we are very much a luxury service. We 
need physio 's and we need OTs we do need dietitians to a certain extent, but people can usually fudge 
over the cracks with dietetics and that can be a problem" (trust-based interviewee). 
Localised pay bargaining focused attention much more onto clinicians themselves, upon what they 
actually did, and upon the efficiency of service provision. This had a destabilising effect; although 
dietitians had a very necessary role to play in the health service, this was not deemed an essential role. 
Indeed, one of the hospitals in the case study had no dietitians at all, preferring instead, to use those at 
another trust. This, when combined with their small numbers and traditional lack of political 
militancy, placed dietitians in a very precarious position when constraints were tight; a position of 
which they were very conscious. 
In conclusion, the devolution of pay bargaining was a very contentious issue for the NHS and one 
, clinicians felt very strongly about. However, the evidence was that devolution was more a fiction than a 
reality. Essentially the government was using a politically-sensitive, centrally-directed (and reactive) I 
employment strategy to devolve operational responsibility to local managers who, in tum, would have I 
to meet nationally-defined efficiency targets. It was clear that the power of managers was not 
significantly extended-doctors were unaffected; government sensitivity to the threat of industrial action 
by nurses and midwives (who had much public support) meant that mangers were discouraged from 
confronting them and, although the government was less (not) concerned about the P AMS, the scarcity 
of trained physiotherapists placed the latter in a strong position, which managers were unwilling to 
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challenge. However, the other P AMS, notably dietitians were in a relatively weak position, which they 
were very conscious of but their small numbers meant that they were a relatively small cost to trusts and 
had largely escaped the attention of managers. 
There was evidence that new job contracts were being more tightly defined, thus possibly increasing the 
power of trust managers in the longer term. The devolution of pay bargaining had caused considerable 
unrest amongst clinicians and managers. Managers saw the national (Whitley Council) system as over 
complicated and protective of aU clinicians, regardless of ability. It was not surprising then, that 
clinicians held the system very close to their hearts. There was evidence that it had lessened the 
cohesion within occupational groups, such as nurses, most notably between those in community and 
those in acute trusts, thus, possibly causing some fragmentation and lessening of power. In addition, 
although the Whitley system may indeed have needed simplifying, local pay bargaining increased 
bureaucracy by involving more clinicians in the bargaining process and enveloping them in an 
increasing network of Writing. It therefore, contributed to a bureaucratisation of health care clinicians. 
Finally, the lack of money available to pay higher wages to attract trained and scarce clinicians to work 
for a trust meant that other methods of attraction had to be found. The expansion of R&D within trusts, 
notably the community trust, was seen as one such method, offering the training and opportunity for 
development other trusts might not offer. 
6.4 The impact of audit on clinical practice 
The following section will assess the impact of audit on the provision of health care. The overall 
sentiments expressed by the interviewees was that audit was beginning to have some impact, but that 
this was in specific areas that were not threatening to clinicians and was still essentially medical audit. 
A number of common themes and perspectives emerged from the data and these will be systematically 
examined to evaluate whether the medical profession shaped and controlled audit; whether they 
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controlled quality specifications; whether managers had access to agendas and results; and whether 
management commissioned their own audit. 
Generally, audit and the audit process, was beginning to have some impact upon clinical practice, albeit 
a rather limited impact. Although audit itself was not a new concept, it had been on agendas for a 
relatively short time (6-7 years before the interviews were conducted) and as such, was yet to enter in 
any significant way, into professional cultures. All provider units produced audit reports, which were 
disseminated to the relevant departments, internal boards and to the purchaser. Such reports were 
expected and contracted by the purchasers on a regular basis, to the extent that audit was increasingly 
entering into the contracting process itself. Clinical audit was seen by managers in all aspects of the 
service as beginning to address clinical performance issues, and their relationship to effectiveness. 
However, despite this change in climate, it was clear that audit was still not having that much of an 
impact upon clinical practice, despite having "money thrown at it". Indeed, it was seen as something 
that had to be done, rather than something that clinicians necessarily wanted to do, or saw the benefits 
of doing. 
It was clear from the analysis of interview data, that, compared to community trusts, the audit agenda 
was more 'advanced' in acute trusts and that the audit that was conducted was principally medical, 
rather than clinical. This was largely a reflection of the criterion for funding audit, which had been 
calculated on the basis of the whole time equivalent number of consultants employed in a trust. As 
community trusts employed fewer consultants than acute trusts, it followed that the amount of audit 
funding they had received was much less, and there was, consequently, less of an audit (or evaluative) 
culture. This continued, despite a recognised need to conduct multi-professional audit, the redefinition 
of the medical audit to the clinical audit programme, and the funding of audit on the basis of resident 
popUlation share (NBS ME 1993e). Geography was also seen as a barrier to the development of audit: 
"how do you actually do that [audit leg ulcer treatment] when you've got twenty odd district 
nurses.. .spread across a forty square mile area, you know, it isn't easy (trust-based interviewee). This 
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is in addition to the actual difficulty of divising or applying audit methods (which had been developed 
to evaluate medical practice after all) to non-medical settings or occupational practices: "We've talked 
very recently about audit ofnursing care, as it were, and I've said to the general managers, 'can you 
put your hand on your heart and say to me that you can actually audit nursing care in some reasonable 
fashion?' and they say 'well, not really'" (trust-based interviewee). However, the fact remained that 
clinical audit was still largely medical audit and there were still a great many aspects of important 
medical practice, which were not audited. The other professions, generally, did not act proactively to 
develop audit themself. A dietitian characterised the situation for dietitians; they know they should 
audit, but nobody has asked them to, or threatened them with penalties so they don't do any. The audit 
department in her trust were reactive, rather than proactive towards them, but she knew that they would 
be required to conduct audit soon: 
I 
"Ifyou haven't grown up with audit then it's something that can quite easily slip to the bottom of the 
pile and that's the position I'm in. J know I should do it and I know roughly what it is, but how to I 
c. actually implement it in dietetics is quite difficult" (trust-based interviewee). 
Another dietitian noted that they have a representative on the trust-wide audit group, but due to the 
difficulties of actually conducting multidisciplinary audit, they have only audited simple things such as 
record keeping. Audit, she continued, was something that the British Dietetics Association (BOA) 
were looking at at the time. This, the interviewee continued, was where research came in, researching 
where and how audit could be introduced. Together, these factors indicated how audit was still more 
oriented towards assessing medical outcomes, rather than, for instance, nursing, dietetic or for that 
matter primary care, or community-based outcomes. This was in large part, due to the difficulty of 
actually applying audit methodology to the work of these occupational groups. Doctors were also 
given time in their contracts to spend on conducting audit, or for professional development, time 
which other professions were not awarded. A physiotherapy manager noted the consequence of this 
lack of time to conduct audit, whilst recognising its positive benefits: 
"It would probably, in most cases, save us time in the long run, but it's making that decision to take 
that chunk of time out in the first place, when you've got, you know, a hundred or whatever patients 
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waiting on the waiting list, all with problems that they want to be treated right now. and that's the 
difficulty" (trust-based interviewee). 
Additionally, there were so many important aspects of (medical) care which required auditing, other 
aspects of care had largely escaped the gaze of managers, at least for the time being, illustrating the 
importance awarded to acute-based medical care over other forms of care. A hospital consultant 
interviewed, noted that clinical audit was discussed with junior medical staff during their induction 
period so there was an early awareness instilled in them of what audit was and meant. He reiterated the 
sentiments of other interviewees, that audit was not universal throughout his trust, that there were 
pockets of enthusiasm and disinterest. Indeed, interestingly, the interviewee noted that "surprisingly 
some of the least interested people - the least supportive are the very strong academic departments of 
~ medicine" (trust-based interviewee). thus indicating that the least accountable members of the 
profession were the ones at its core. Similarly, none of the interviewees of the health authority audited 
or had their work audited and were only held accountable through annual review and performance 
related pay (pRP). And this also appeared, on the whole, to be the case for trust managers. As such, 
accountability for managers was based almost entirely on their ability to ensure that their organisation 
confomled to corporate goals and targets. 
A locality manager from a community trust argued that the staff saw audit as a top-down imposition. 
This was felt to be the case in all provider units in the case study. Both community and acute-based 
staff felt that "audit is something that's done to you, not what you do" (trust-based interviewee). There 
was clearly a 'them and us' culture, noted an audit manager. A locality manager saw the solution as 
educating staff to recognise a problem and the fact that there was room for improvement in their 
clinical practice. A solution attempted by the community trust was to work with the Medical Audit 
Advisory Group (MAAG). If the trust could introduce such an audit via GPs, it was believed, then it 
would be more acceptable to staff. Thus, there was a clear attempt at legitimising knowledge by 
association with the (creditable) medical profession, rather than with the (less creditable) managers and 
government. 
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It was clear that doctors had the power and confidence in their own roles, which other professions 
lacked. They had captured the audit agenda and made it their own, thus retaining their clinical power 
and autonomy and resisting the 'gaze' (Harrison Hunter and Pollitt 1990). Although, efforts had been 
made, there was no evidence in Cambridgeshire and Huntingdon to suggest that this situation had 
changed. However, what the drive to evidence-based medicine and the establishment of an evaluative 
culture in the NHS indicated, was that one of the first question professions should ask themselves when 
beginning research; is my role relevant here, was not a question most practitioners, including doctors 
had consistently asked themselves. 
An audit manager's strategy for work was to try to speak to and reassure clinicians, informing them of 
what the audit department were doing, improving the poor level of communication within the hospital 
and trying to co-ordinate and centralise the workers in her department. In the past the audit clerks had 
worked with individual consultants, rather than a group of clinicians. The trust had abolished that 
system so that the clerks worked to service whole specialties and all the professions. The audit 
manager was, in addition, taking a much more proactive role with the purchaser in deciding what 
projects to contract. To sum up: audit and quality, therefore, were gaining in profile within the service 
as a whole, with managers playing an increasing (albeit still minor) role in defining audit agendas. 
These, however, were in non-threatening areas, such as communication. 
It was generally hoped that trust audit programmes would 'look after' clinical effectiveness to some 
extent. Certain quality standards were identified in contracts, and these standards were monitored and 
developed through clinical audit. To characterise using one trust as an example, an audit manager 
noted that audit was playing an increasing role in the contracting process. The director of nursing 
noted that they were setting up a strategy for quality, which was agreed with the health authority. Six 
targets had been agreed with the health authority, in topics such as trust-wide communication to 
patients. However, the interviewee also noted that in the past the people with a quality remit couldn't 
make an impact, as they were not high enough in the trust "They could advise and they could put into 
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place structures, but they couldn't actually influence it" (trust-based interviewee). Nobody knew how 
to deal with non-compliance, the interviewee noted, supporting the comments previously e\.-pressed in 
this section, that consultants will "tell the person to take a running jump ". However, the director of 
nursing's position gave her access to all the clinical boards sitting in the hospital, including the medical 
school, which gave her the opportunity and power to actually make the changes required. The attempt, 
therefore, was to legitimise audit in the eyes and minds of clinicians, to instil a notion of confidence in 
them and to make audit appear normal and natural and in their control (although really it was not). 
"What I was trying to get away from was the fact that it was the Health Commission dictating, because 
then you get the clinicians saying 'who the hell are they to tell us what to do' whereas, if we put the 
same list forward, they'll do it...l think when we first came it was almost like 'time and motions' and 
financial audit, because everybody assumes that an audit is an accountant coming in to check up on 
what you're doing with your petty cash and things, so I think the tern 'audit' didn't do us a lot of 
favours in the very beginning and it's been a case of selling them 'we're here to help you do what 
you 've got to do and to see what you're doing to the patients • .. .it·s almost a personality thing. You 
know, you've gone in and you've spoken to them and proved that you're not a frightening individual 
and things like that, and that you're here to help" (trust-based interviewee). 
There was a general awareness throughout all the organisations visited of the link between research, 
quality and audit, as discussed previously in this and chapter four. This was not without its problems, 
as one doctor/researcher commented; people who were interested in audit distance themselves from 
research because ... "they saw research as people playing with their new toys, or disappearing offto the 
lab, whereas they saw audit as practical, improving patient care. So there's a difference in culture. 
(trust-based interviewee). However, there was a general acknowledgement of the need to relate 
research more to practice, as the actual Researchfor Health (DH 1991b, 1993a) strategy testified. This 
was recognised on the 'coal face', as an R&D manager acknowledged. There was still a need to work 
on getting changes in practice, the R&D manager conceded, arguing that research should be designed 
with one aim-the production of standards for audit. Research provided the outcome measures, which 
could be audited against practice to establish the level of quality and effectiveness of service provision. 
There was no evidence from minutes of regional R&D committees that this was occurring or requested, 
however. Indeed, the evidence was that audit results, like research results, were largely ignored by 
clinicians: 
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"people present it at a meeting or put it into journals, and everybody ignores it ... People tend to take 
part in it and then say 'well, I don't agree, I won't do it; on the appraisal, all it suggests is this is the 
better [method a/practice], I'll still do what I think because it's my clinical practice" (trust-based 
interviewee). 
In conclusion, what auditing there was, was largely of the medical variety, which used methodologies 
which were seen as unsuitable for auditing non-medical areas. Criteria for funding, although changed 
in 1993, had for some time been weighted towards the medical profession and, as such, audit was and 
continued to be, largely controlled and shaped by the medical profession. It also remained in control of 
quality specification. Although quality standards were increasingly identified in contracts, contracts 
were still primarily based on past habit-on what had always been purchased. Managers in both the 
health authority and trusts did not audit or have their own work audited. General results were, on the 
whole, available to managers if they wanted them, but evidence suggested that on the whole, nobody, 
including managers, took much notice of results that were published. Finally, as part of the contracting 
process and the MAAG, commissioning managers could and did commission some audits. However, 
these was limited and essentially in non-threatening areas to the medical profession. 
6.5 Accountability to the centre 
The issue of accountability was an especially significant one to emerge from the analysis. The 
devolution of responsibility for the organisation and management of services had resulted in the health 
authority becoming accountable for purchasing services for the local community (they represented). 
Indeed, accountability was one of six principle values the health authority had made a public 
comrnittment to (the others being efficiency, effectiveness, equity, clinical appropriateness and 
responsiveness). Together, these largely addressed the quality standards demanded of the health 
authority by the government through the Patient's Charter (DH 1992b) and other standards. An 
adherence to budgets, efficiency indexes national practice guidelines and the Patient's Charter (ibid) 
were widely recognised by interviewees as principal influences on service provision, along with the 
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reduction of waiting lists. As stated earlier, there had also been an increase in the amount of defined 
quality standards and in the amount of audit conducted in trusts, which was the principal method of 
ensuring clinical effectiveness. The role of purchasers in ensuring adherence to these nationally-
defined standards was universally recognised, although these standards were in specific areas, notably 
around reducing waiting lists and times: 
"Nurses out there in the field, or wherever, now, for the first time are seeing how much they cost and 
their staff costs and what their activity looks like and they know that they're constantly being 
compared, and we have a certain amount that we have to achieve, so I think that's quite different, and 
I have to say 1 think it's one ofthe great benefits ofthe reforms actually" (trust-based interviewee). 
The internal market had made clinicians more aware of what their own accountability was and opened 
up the decision-making processes to them so that they were more aware of who was buying what and 
what they needed to deliver to meet demands. Consequently, there was a noticable attempt to shift 
professional accountability away from their patients towards accountability to the purchasers on behalf 
of the population. Purchasers and doctors were making the government's rationing decisions for them, 
with the purchasers made accountable for those decisions, in consultation with doctors. The result, 
along with the effect of efficiency indexes, quality and audit measures, were that clinicians, as an audit 
manager put it, were beginning to realise the implications of insufficient funding. They were becoming 
more aware of having to think about what they did and why they were doing it, and were getting more 
business minded. However, there were some dissenting voices, and the areas concentrated on were 
largely in areas that were not threatening to doctors. 
"It's been very good on what I called driving up the quality in 'hotel services' if you like, and the 
standards for waiting lists, reducing waiting lists, waiting times in 'C/inicaling' so some of those 
quality standards there" (trust-based interviewee). 
The government were not openly accountable; they devolved responsibility for difficult decisions in 
theory, but in practice, were highly sensitive to politics and, consequently, retained control over those 
decisions, although the directors of public health were still responsible for implementing them, as the 
Beta Inteferon example illustrated above. The extremely limited nature of quality factors which 
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clinicians were held accountable for, meant that there was a lot of scepticism concerning them. 
However, as a physiotherapist pertinently remarked, even if the system was flawed, nobody wanted to 
come at the bottom of a league table, so they made a concerted effort not to. And this appeared to be 
the case for everybody. An increased notion of accountability was clearly noticeable amongst 
interviewees. Indeed, the purchasers and GP fund-holders had begun to question practice, most 
notably new services, so that providers had to prove their effectiveness before the purchaser would 
consider buying them. 
"GPs will do the same thing as weI!. because they might say well. this procedure is done differently in 
a different trust. and it's cheaper. why is that? So there is more of that sort of challenging and also 
because it's obvious [that when} money's finite. they have to make chOices. and they need that 
information to help them make those choices. " (trust-based interviewee). 
The healthcare market had made purchasing decisions more explicit. Evidence from interviews 
suggested that purchasing decisions in the past, had largely been made on the basis of past habit, and 
historical precedent. However, questions were increasingly being asked, and research was required to 
formulate and answer those questions which had led to an opening up of the process to public scrutiny. 
In line with this trend, the reforms to NHS research had also made the work of those in the teaching 
hospitals more open and accountable. Researchers style and methods of working had become 
increasingly bureaucratic, as a result of the Culyer declarations and more stringent management 
control4. 
Public accountability for purchasing services was, ultimately, the responsibility of the director of public 
health, who made his decisions in consultation with doctors. However a considerable amount of 
tension was noted by interviewees from the health authority, regarding their ability to make such 
decision; decisions which were, ultimately, restricted by economics and the political (public) 
sensitivities of the government. However, clinicians were responsible for implementing those decisions 
as a specific number of finished consultant episodes (FCEs). This created some discord at Trust level, 
as it was believed that this meant that trusts carried all the risks. Nevertheless, the notion of public 
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accountability had clearly entered the minds of most of the interviewees in both purchaser and provider 
organisations, but was particularly in the minds of senior managers. 
"[we have got to] listen like we've not listened before, we have to offer better arguments, better cases 
than we have before. We need to understand costs better. Our quality has to be better, the resuits that 
we are actually offering [have to be] better than they were before. But often in the past, ofcourse. we 
hadn't invested in areas that allowed us to answer those elements ofour work .... ] do think actually that 
the notion of the managed market, the mixed market, the uncertainty ... that this brings in, the need to 
listen, to be much more responsive than we have in the past, ] think are all benefits of the process 
(trust-based interviewee). " 
There was a clear distinction between the acute and community trusts regarding their perceived 
autonomy from the purchasers, that is, their ability to answer the questions put to them and 
demonstrate their value and accountability as a provider. A lack of available research studies in the 
community care sector, the reluctance of the purchasers to invest in the necessary information systems 
or support the community trust in developing their own research studies, clearly made the individuals 
in the community trust rather paranoid and frustrated. 
The internal market and resultant efficiency indexes had increased the pressures to treat patients more 
quickly. This affected clinical practice, in that the clinicians were "more aware afwho 's buying what 
and what they need to deliver for particular purchasers". The establishment of trust status had 
introduced business principles into service provision, to the extent that services would not be available 
on demand if there was no money to pay for them (excepting urgent and emergency cases). The 
situation was further exacerbated by the purchasers in the case study demanding efficiency savings in 
cash, rather than on paper. Although the purchasers argued that they wanted to reinvest the money in 
services, the providers in the area could not achieve such savings as the "elastic had been stretched as 
far as it could go ". A letter from the Chief Executives of Hinchingbrook and Addenbrooke' s hospitals 
to the director of public health explaining this predicament, was leaked to the press, probably in an 
attempt to put extra pressure on the purchasers and/or government to invest more public money in 
them. 
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The increased openness of decision-making processes led to a lack of flexibility, therefore and made the 
issue of funding or under-funding (rationing) much more explicit. And there was a recognition and 
sense of frustration from both purchasers and providers that efficiency gains really meant cuts. Waiting 
lists were seen, to an extent, as the fairest fonn of rationing by some, as the individuals waiting longest 
were principally waiting for cosmetic surgery, such as that for varicose veins. Nevertheless, an 
openness of rationing decision-making processes was becoming apparent, with purchasers carrying 
public responsibility for such decisions, although doctors were ultimately responsible for implementing 
those decisions and explaining them to individual patients. As the health authority was acutely aware of 
the political nature of decision-making (as indeed were most people) they were concerned that the 
process should be correct and in the open. The actual health authority decisions themself were almost 
secondary considerations, so long as they were justified by the process. This was a brave move by the 
health authority, but one which brought the inherently economic and political implications of decision-
making and rationing debate into the public arena. The emphasis was on the process of decision-
making rather than the actual decisions thernself. 
"if you explicitly ask yourself how this value infringes on the decision you take, you can actually 
justify this type of action and in priority setting and rationing there is no right answer, it's all about 
value judgements and the issue is about having a process that is legitimate that one has gone through 
and taken all the relevant factors into account and not taken irrelevant factors into account when 
decision-making; but the content ofthe decision whatever answer you come to, that is neither right or 
wrong, rightness or wrongness doesn't come into it, the legitimacy lies in the process" (health 
authority-based interviewee). 
What was clear, however, was the strong inter-relationship between the factors of economy, efficiency, 
effectiveness, adherence to national guidelines, accountability, evidence-based medicine and ultimately, 
of course, the quality of services provided by the NHS. They all fanned part of the Conservative 
Government's political agenda, but were potentially contradictory. As the above example illustrated, 
accountability, and hence. the devolution of decision-making, was limited by the government's own 
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political and perceived economic situation. The health authority, therefore, were in many ways, simply 
charged with implementing government policy, but had (limited) autonomy concerning the fonn of that 
implementation. 
"we all understand that we are living in a political world, but there is nevertheless a reasonably large, 
what 1 would call, rhetoric-reality gap" (health authority-based interviewee). 
Decisions concerning what was effective were largely related to evidence-based medicine. As the above 
example shows, however, ultimately the decisions made were irrelevant if they contradicted 
government policy. Additionally, the strict emphasis placed upon cost-containment by the government, 
restricted the ability of managers and practitioners to supply many of the most effective services, as 
these services were very often the most expensive ones. As a result, the purchasers often concentrated 
upon ineffectiveness instead; that is, the elimination of ineffective clnical practice. This could, in fact, 
be seen as rationing, as the Child B case illustrated, a point which will be returned to later in this 
thesis. 
There were many problems noted in how quality was defined and it was clear that there were no 
universally accepted standards available. The Patient's Charter (DR 1992b) and waiting lists were the 
principal (but widely criticised) standards, but evidence-based clinical practice was gaining an 
increased profile, with providers asked to provide the evidence to support the introduction of all new 
services before they would agree to buy them, causing some concern; "control's one thing, but it's 
gone a bit jar, the NHS, is just bureaucracy gone mad". Existing service provision was also 
increasingly being questioned, although this was still relatively rare. And audit, as previously 
discussed, was the principal method of ensuring standards had been acted on and put into place. 
Quality, therefore, was recognised as a contentious and difficult issue to measure, particularly in a 
community setting: "The outcomes are so wool/y, it's very hard to know quite when things are bad or 
good". At the very least, acute services had information on numbers of operations, in-patient's stay, 
mortality and morbidity etc. which community services did not have. 
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Dr Brian Mawhinney, the Conservative Minister for Health at the time, was singled out as particularly 
emphasising the need for clinicians and managers to be accountable. Mawhinney was said by a health 
authority manager to have met with senior managers from around the country and stated in plain 
language "you have got to listen to your local people, and it's not bloody optional". This had caused 
a flurry of activity, which calmed down once Mawhinney had taken up a new office. From then on, it 
was said to be slipping off of some purchasers agendas: 
"and the nature ofinstitutions is that they will turn in on themselves and protect themselves unless the 
pressure's kept on them ... The whole business about health authorities being externally focused needs 
more pressure from the top than it has got at present, because it's actually about the future" (HA­
based interviewee). 
There was evidence that the purchasers in the case study were involving the public in decision-making; 
indeed, one senior manager health authority had a specific interest and remit in public participation, 
arguing that it was the one area of health authority work which they were left to develop themselves. 
Research on the subject was noted as particularly lacking at the time, although there has been some 
(limited) attempt by the Department of Health to redress this matter (Blaxter, 1995). Nevertheless, the 
health authority had made a concerted attempt to raise the public debate regarding rationing. A pack 
was being tested with local groups and indeed, the health authority had conducted an exercise to 
involve the public in decision-making concerning sub-fertility services. Two groups of local people 
were assembled "like kind ofjuries really". The groups were told that they had a budget of £1.8 
million to spend on cystic conception services. This meant not everybody who wanted the treatment 
could get it, and a waiting list was created as a result. The groups were given the task of deciding on 
the criteria to define waiting lists, with the health authority acting as facilitators. The 
recommendations of the group were taken to the health authority and approved by senior management 
for implementation. The above example, can be viewed in two ways: firstly, as the purchasers 
enabling local citizens, who pay for the service, to have a right to say how that service should be 
delivered; and secondly, as shifting accountability for rationing away from the purchasers and out to 
the public. Devolution of decision-making, therefore, was devolved to the farthest level; that of the 
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individual member of the public. It also meant that the work of health authorities was more open to the 
public gaze. 
6.6 Professional accountability and bureaucratisation 
Evidence suggested that doctors were still more accountable to each other (peer accountability) than to 
the purchasers or the centre. However, a trust chief executive claimed that there was now a more 
diffuse accountability process than in the past. He argued that there was no longer only peer 
accountability, but clinicians, particularly GPs, were made accountable through more questioning 
patients and their families. And this was true to a certain extent, as the Child B case highlighted. 
However, evidence from the study was that the accountability and power of the medical profession was 
still unchallenged, although the processes of decision-making were becoming more visible to the 
public. 
The director of medicine in the same trust added that accountability had become more important. He 
added that in some circumstances, professionals would claim that they couldn't act, as it was not 
appropriate in terms of their professional accountability. Management accountability he continued, still 
had not had much of an impact on many services as the tools were not available for managers to 
understand and question what clinicians did. Managers tended to be too simplistic and concentrated 
upon quantitative evidence, such as numbers of patients treated. However, there was little (if any) focus 
by managers on quality. 
Government demands for accountability had not had much impact on dietetic services. Indeed, one 
dietitia.n manager argued that her department was not even doing any auditing of their services and, 
further, nobody had asked them to, although she recognised that they should. An audit manager noted 
that despite the demands for accountability, non-medical clinicians had not participated in the audit 
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and research agendas. A physiotherapy manager argued that to a certain extent, physiotherapists did 
not feel or recognise their accountability, although they had become much more aware of the legal 
implications of writing careful records. And the indications were that an increase in the amount of 
paperwork required of clinicians was a major result of clinicians accountability to managers and 
insurers. This was particularly the case for nurses, whose role was changing to a limited degree as they 
took on some of the minor work previously only conducted by doctors, and whose managers 
consequently ensured that clear accountability mechanisms were in place. 
"I think that for me, what it's meant is the importance ofhaving very very clear protocols because, I'm 
not everywhere at once, I'm one person, I'm sitting up in an ivory tower ifyou like. I'm not out there 
watching what that person's doing all the time. And J think that whilst in many ways the new UKCC 
scope ofpractice has actually unlocked the door for many nurses, potentially, it can also place them at 
risk ifyou don't ensure that the appropriate safeguards are in place. Andfor somebody like me, that 
means 1 must ensure the agreement of all the appropriate people. which may be doctors, nurses, 
managers, even the insurers these days ... So 1 have to say, I am on the 'phone perhaps more than J have 
been {before}, to either the UKCC professional body or to our local lawyers. to check out the situation 
with them, because J am conscious that nurses are potentially much more exposed" (trust-based 
interviewee). 
The community trust had had a management reorganisation and replaced ten community nursing 
managers, employing locality (general) managers instead. According to interviewees, this 
reorganisation, however, had worked and made district nurses take more responsibility than ever. 
Managers were now saying to nurses "look, you've got to decide that. you're the one who's got to 
make that decision (trust-based interviewee)." The reduction in the number of hours junior doctors 
were required to work and in the number of qualified nurses, had also contributed to the fact that nurses 
were being given more responsibility than ever before. There was some anxiety noted amongst nurses 
of what accountability actually meant; nurses were unclear about the scope of their professional 
practice. This had made them concerned about the care they provided. The expanded role of the nurse 
had meant that they had moved away from the strict confines of their previous role, something which 
they were reluctant to do. Indeed, the manoeuvrability and flexibility of their new role was reportedly 
rather frightening to them. 
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"You still have the naivete in some respects of 'well if J do this, am J covered, will the trust cover me?' 
and there's this anxiety about job loss and professional barriers, and people still get very uptight 
about that, so 1 suppose in a restricted way, yes they do analyse [their role and responsibilities}, but to 
the point that t~ey ought to be a bit more flexible with it and not be so rigid" (trust-based intell'iewee). 
One of the locality managers in question, argued that professional accountability was not an issue until 
they started working on issues occurring in the interface between NHS and social services, discussing 
how their respective services could be better organised and co-ordinated. Social services, the 
interviewee noted, wanted them to formally delegate health care tasks to their staff and gave the trust 
some documents to sign, which they refused to do: 
"To all intents and purposes it was making them responsible for what the social care staff did and it's 
been quite useful, that debate, because it's now leading to some county-wide work with the county and 
three community trusts and we're going to collectively look at all those interface issues together and 
define precisely where the lines ofaccountability are and what the limits ofresponsibility are" (trust­
based intell'ieweej. 
The result was that medical accountability was still a matter of individual accountability between 
doctors and their patients. The director of public health at the health authority was responsible for 
ensuring that correct processes of decision-making were evident. The other health care occupations 
had little awareness of their own professional accountability. But the issue was gaining an increased 
profile and they were increasingly having to reflect on the implications of their actions and complete an 
increasing amount of paperwork. In other words, an increased bureaucratisation of health care work 
was a feature of their increased accountability. 
6.7 Knowledge, economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
The following section will analyse the role of knowledge and the state in the running and order of 
health services in the Cambridge and Huntingdon area. The order and control of knowledge has been 
discussed sevenil times throughout the course of this chapter, but will now be systematically brought 
together and discussed along with more evidence from interviews and regional committee meeting 
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minutes and papers. The section will indicate that there has been an increase in the regulation and 
bureaucracy involved in the production of knowledge, but the domination of the medical profession and 
medical knowledge remains uppennost in the NHS. At the same time, the application of new 
knowledge was clearly severely restricted by central government fiscal policy restraints and indirectly 
by the tighter controls which these imposed. 
It was clear from regional committee minutes and documents that since the 1990 reforms and the 
subsequent emphasis on evidence-based medicine, the two Conservative Governments had attempted to 
play an increasing role in, and exercise more control over, the production of knowledge (research) in 
the health service. The attempt to employ a Regional Director of R&D (RDRD) for East Anglia in the 
autumn of 1991 was initially unsuccesful and a suitable candidate, not found. The job specification 
was, subsequently, re-drafted and the result was a new, post of RDRD, combined with a Professorship 
in Health Research and Development at Cambridge University. The new post-holder's duties were to 
work within the national R&D framework, to develop, organise, manage and co-ordinate a programme 
for R&D within the region. The importance of this role in managing the production and use of 
knowledge and helping to attain Health of the Nation targets (DH 1992a) was highlighted by the 
region's decision to place ·the post-holder at the centre of the organisation. The post holder was to be 
directly accountable to the regional general manager and was to be a member of the regional executive 
to contribute to and share in the overall corporate management structure (East Anglian Regional Health 
Authority, 1992). A RDRD was 'elected' in October 1992 and took up his post in March 1993. The 
RDRD was also given an honorary professorship in health services research at the University of East 
Anglia (UEA), reflecting the enhanced role of the discipline in the 'new' NBS. And the Centre at the 
UEA was where Cambridge and Huntingdon Health Authority and the Regional Health Authority 
specifically went to for advice on social science and particularly qualitative research, reflecting an 
increased role for social scientists in the organisation of the health service and services. 
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However, the continued domination of the medical profession and medical discourse in the research 
agenda meant that the randomised clinical trial and associated systematic review were dominant on 
health service' research agendas. The result, along with the need to demonstrate the efficiency and 
effectiveness of services, about which research had been undertaken, meant that the biggest winners 
were likely to be statisticians and health economists. This was illustrated by the RHA's subsequent 
stated desire to see more researchers in these disciplines and, indeed, in their funding of a Centre for 
Statistics in Medicine at Cambridge University. 
There were no criticisms from purchasers or from the public about treating patients in large general 
hospitals, which, as chapter three described, are seen as expensive. Rather, criticism came from the 
other trusts because, conversely, they strongly believed that the purchasers wanted to centralise services 
at Addenbrooke's. However, there was more of a willingness to criticise the use of high technology 
medicine, such as Beta Interferon; their costs were often prohibitive and their effectiveness often seen 
as dubious, as discussed above. And this was again reflected in the purchasers' insistence that new 
technology and medicines be of systematically-proven benefit before they would purchase them. 
The evidence from the case study interviews and document analysis, was that although the use of high 
technology medicine was increasingly being criticised, medical knowledge was, to a certain extent, 
being rationalised, although the way it was interpreted and applied in the everyday work of clinicians 
was not. No attempt had been made to directly dictate how such knowledge was applied in practice, 
and the ability of doctors to apply knowledge interpretively and autonomously was unchanged. 
However, what was changed was the nature of the knowledge doctors were able to draw on, for clinical 
decisions. This was increasingly being organised and controlled by health authority managers who 
demanded that new developments be fully evaluated before being used and that there should be 
systematic reviews and evaluation of existing studies. Such developments did mark a certain 
rationalisation of 'valid' medical knowledge. Similarly, it was acknowledged that there was room for 
218 
greater input from managers over clinical training with the publication of Working Paper 10, thus 
aIlo'wing a greater input in the knowledge values of the future clinicians themself. 
'The moves recently introduced to allow the NBS to specify more clearly the type of skills that it looks 
for in the professionals they train using NBS finance, through postgraduate medical education and 
other arrangements covered by "Working Paper Ten", now offer the NHS a much greater say in the 
type of professionals that are produced by Universities and postgraduate medical education 
programmes' (Gray and Sackett, 1995). 
Similarly, the RHA devised two programmes, the 'Library ofthe 21st Cenrury' (Gray, 1995) projectS 
and the 'CLINIK' project (Gray, 1996). The intention was to provide quick and efficient access to 
information for clinicians. Indeed, the aim of CLINIK was to get the knowledge clinicians needed 
within fifteen seconds. through the 'better marketing of knowledge', through encouraging primary care 
teams and trusts to use 'Chief Knowledge Officers' as conduits for information, and through new 
developments in telecommunication and computing. 
The response by some trusts to purchaser demands was to try to develop the IT systems and a research 
culture themselves, in the hope that this would help them answer the questions being posed by 
purchasers. Neither the providers nor purchasers, however, had the funds to pay for such 
developments. and the purchasers were unwilling to contribute to such investment anyway. The 
academic links of smaller trusts were also comparatively underdeveloped. The result was that the trusts 
without a medical school felt at a distinct disadvantage in the 'market' and quite aggrieved that they 
were being held back by the disinclination of the purchasers to invest in them. 
Control was, therefore. being increasingly exercised through controlling the information and 
knowledge available to clinicians, but clinicians were autonomous regarding what and how they 
applied such knowledge. Similarly, the development ofIT systems was seen as a method of cerating an 
alternative power base by some trust managers, and a means of demonstrating the value of their 
services. But such moves were strongly resisted by the health authority, who wanted to ensure that 
knowledge on services was standardised and controlled. It should be emphasised, however, that the 
'CLINIK' project was yet to be implemented at the time and that the knowledge (evidence) available on 
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which to base clinical decisions, particularly in primary and community care, was lacking. So although 
there was some evidence to suggest there was some rationalisation of medical knowledge, it could not 
actually be said to be rationalised. 
The limited resources available for health care has created a good deal of tension and friction. This has 
created quite a competitive atmosphere in the district, which, at first may appear to be what the 
government had desired of their market-based reforms of the health service. However, as previously 
stated, a 'leaked' letter had been sent by the chief executives of both major acute units in the district 
claiming that the annual efficiency gains imposed on them had stretched them and the services they 
provide as far as they could go. This created additional tensions locally, and "a great deal of time 
spent by management on both sides in this rather exhausting annual [contractual} row. (trust-based 
interviewee). Rather than this 'creative' tension manifesting itself in more competition between trusts 
to provide the same services, it appeared to have caused greater friction between the acute and 
community trusts. A senior researcher in one acute Trust commented: 
"The only bone ofcontention is a belief, ] think accepted by the purchaser, that they spend less here 
on acute care than they should. Cambridge and Huntingdon Health Authority, ] think spends less on 
acute care than any other health authority ...] think we consider ourselves to be actually running that 
much harder than a lot of other trusts because Cambridge and Huntingdon Health Authority are 
spending more on community care" (trust-based interviewee). 
However, this was strongly contested by interviewees in the community trust, who along with managers 
and clinicians from Hinchingbrook, believed it was the intention of the health authority to centralise 
services at Addenbrooke's. There was clearly an increasing amount of knowledge being produced on 
the provision of health services, as the expansion in the amount of health services research conducted 
testified. It was clear that over the years a considerable body of research evidence had built up, but had 
not been acted upon in the NHS, although this still probably related to a fraction of what clinicians 
actually did. This prompted the Director of Public Health at the health authority to state that he would 
not be especially concerned if researchers concentrated their attention wholly upon secondary research, 
and made use of the knowledge there was, before embarking upon more primary research. 
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"The contracts themselves are very general at the moment, and this comes back to my own comment 
about the fact that there has to be a question about whether they know what they're buying anyway. I 
mean, they're "buying what they've always bought, plus and minus a bit, and perhaps they are now 
becoming more interested in what it is they're buying" (trust-based interviewee). 
Comparatively little research had been conducted into services in the primary and community care 
sectors, so even less was known about service provision in these. The issue was being addressed by 
R&D committees, who allocated £15 000 to each health authority in the region to set up an R&D 
network to develop research in primary care, directed at GPs. 
6.7.1 Economy, efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness 
The evidence presented throughout this case study has indicated that research and audit agendas were 
dominated by the medical profession, with little outside input. Indeed, professional self-interest was 
identified as very influential in the development of national guidelines concerning medical 
effectiveness. 
"[The health authority] tend to use more of the things from either the government or professional 
services, such as best practice gUidelines ... They're not necessarily based on anything other than 
professional opinion ...J mean to say a good example in my own speciality, is a group report for the 
British Paediatric Association called the 'Health care in the School Age Child', which is based on 
nothing other than professional interest and compromise within the groups about what's acceptable" 
(trust-based interviewee). 
Likewise, the limits of measures of resonsiveness, such as the Patient's Charter (DH 1992b) and 
publication of waiting lists have been comprehensively discussed, as have purchaser attempts to 
respond to public demands by including them in some decision-making processes" Ultimately such 
measures were superficial in nature, but at the same time could not be ignored by clinicians or 
managers alike. Areas where public consultation had been sought were in areas involving the actual 
managment of care, which did not threaten doctors. Although this may be seen as a weak attempt, it is 
also true to say that the power of the medical profession is such that any attempt to insist on other 
agendas would meet with strong opposition. This occurred in the late eighties, prompting the 
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publication of Working for Patients (DH 1989). Measures of responsiveness to the public in the district 
were, therefore, limited and peripheral, and as discussed above, were quick to slip off health authority 
a~endas when there was no pressure exherted from the centre. Similarly, health performance 
indicators and the Patient's Charter (DH 1992b) were not really 'empowering' citizens as they may 
have appeared. The non-medical occupations were more affected by performance measures, feeling 
rather more overtly pressured but were not significantly affected by measures of reponsiveness to the 
public. There was no evidence to suggest that direct management control had significantly increased, 
but financial and resource control was the main method control and clinicians largely worked without 
direct interference from managers. The creation of clinical directorates and locality managers lessened 
professional cohesion, (although this did not relate to doctors) through changing traditional career 
structures. There was not the career structure for district nurses, for instance as unidisciplinary 
managers were replaced by general, clinical managers, managing multidisciplinary groups. Whereas 
an emphasis upon multidisciplinary working has distinct advantages, it also meant that departmental 
meetings no longer consisted ofunidisciplinary fora for discussion. Such meetings were one of the only 
times in the past that clinicians such as district nurses could get the time to meet as a professional 
group in a trust. Managers themselves were principally evaluated by their ability to attain corporate 
goals and keep within their department or units spending limits and meet the objectives set out in their 
business plan. Their work, by contrast with clinicians was not audited (only their finacial dealings, of 
course). 
The RHAs reponse to the government reforms of the NHS and to the Research for Health strategy (DH 
1991b, 1993a), was to 'increase our understanding of health and disease, and stimulate enquiry and 
innovation' (East Anglian Regional Health Authority 1992: 23) This was to be a carefully managed by 
the region, with a focus upon ensuring the 'value for money directed into research and development 
innovation' (East Anglian Regional Health Authority ibid). The purchasers locally, by contrast, were 
trying to contain and control what there was and were very reluctant to encourage trusts from taking 
the initiative, as they were worried that the quality of the research would not be assured (although if the 
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work was ex1emally funded, this would be part of the funding bodies criteria for assessment). However, 
this met with defiance by some providers who asserted their independence to spend their budget as they 
saw fit, illustniting the tension manifest in the creation of a purchaser/provider divide. The problem 
appeared to be, a trust executive stated, that many areas of primary and community care demanded 
research and this had become apparent with the demand for evidence-based services from the 
purchasers. The purchasers, the executive argued, stated that there was no evidence to support the 
utility of certain services but as the whole primary community area was under-researched, there would 
be no evidence, which creates some paranoia. A consultant in an acute/community provider 
summarised the situation, in the following terms: "the problem with evidence-based medicine is it's 
only as good as the evidence". It was believed by many people in the community trust, that the health 
authority were preventing the trust from answering the questions that they (the purchasers) were 
putting to it and, consequently, creating a vicious circle. The same story was repeated by another 
senior manager in the trust, who added that the purchasers response to them when they pointed this out 
was that they were "always winging". The manager continued to argue that the lack of research-based 
evidence to support clinical practice was used as ammunition for not investing money in developing 
services in the community. At the time, the interviewee argued, the purchasers were saying that they 
were inefficient and they wanted to respond, saying "no we're not, it's because of thiS, this and this". 
However, the lack of adequate research evidence and infonnation systems meant that the process was 
still rather unsophisticated. In response, the trust took an innovative move and decided to form a 
research and development department, employing a full-time research manager to lead it. Similarly, 
Hinchingbrook had taken on researchers, one of whom who had obtained a number of grants and 
employed a research assistant. There was no research department within the trust, although there was 
talk of developing one. Initiative and innovation were of course, seen as defining factors and central to 
the heart of Addenbrooke's as an internationally-reknown centre for research. 
The research department at Lifespan was seen by senior trust managers there as central to the 
formation of an R&D culture in the trust. However, opposition to this development came from 
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managers at the health authority, where the director of public health saw it effectively as an amateur 
operation, which could prematurely introduce inappropriate services. Opposition also came from 
senior managers at Addenbrooke's, who according to interviewees i~ the community trust saw it as a 
IU:xury service and an indication of the trust's relative over-funding. However, the formation of the 
group was regarded as a matter for Lifespan "46% of our income comes from Cambridge and 
Huntingdon Health Commission and they like to approve things, whereas we were saying, well we are 
an autonomous organisation, if we want to spend money on that we will" (trust-based interviewee). 
Innovation was shown in all trusts in the case study, although reaction to it varied, depending on the 
degree to which purchasers discouraged or encouraged such initiatives. 
Evidence suggested that the concentration on economy and efficiency measures was total. Effectiveness 
played little role in decision-making. Rather, the concentration was on ineffectiveness, that is, the 
elimination of ineffective working practices, rather than the promotion of effective ones. Such a 
concentration on efficiency, as stated earlier, did cause some problems, to the extent that one 
physiotherapy manager complained that she was getting more (re) referrals, because patients were 
being sent home too early. Nevertheless, there was some anticipation amongst providers that 
effectiveness was going to become an increasingly important issue. Indeed, senior managers in one 
trust were considering forming a clinical effectiveness unit, drawing research, audit, and quality 
together in order to deliver the knowledge about the services they were lacking at the time. Related, 
integrated clinical pathways were being introduced, drawing together different clinicians to work more 
effectively together and provide a more coherent, consistent and effective service for patients. And 
research evidence was clearly seen as central to effectiveness of clinical activity as might be expected. 
However, some suspicions were raised concerning evidence-based medicine; that it was "not as useful 
as perhaps the politicians would lead everyone to think" (trust-based interviewee). Indeed, the 
Cochrane database once analysed, argued one director of medicine, illustrated that in practice, there 
were only a few studies which formed the "nuggets that make a dramatic difference "; that for every 
question answered there were at least a dozen sub questions arising from it. Answers to these could 
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reveal greater savings. Evidence from interviewees also suggested that surgical techniques were not 
evaluated with quite the same rigour as drugs, a situation which was regarded as suspect. The result 
was that the evidence on effectiveness in all sectors of the service and all disciplines was still not 
comprehensive, nor satisfactory. 
The feeling was expressed by most interviewees, was that as the internal market was cash limited, it 
was not really a market, that there was always pressure from the centre to deliver efficiency gains over 
and above anything else. The Conservative Government wanted to shift care into the community and 
avoid hospital inpatient stay whenever possible. On the other hand, large numbers of inpatient day-
case episodes counted as highly efficient in government performance tables, whereas community 
services did not. Consequently, there was an in-built disincentive to eliminate or reduce day-case 
episodes. Efficiency was, therefore, very crudely measured and completely unconnected to the 
complexity of tasks in hand. 
"in a system which counts the surgical removal of ingrown toenails done on a day-case ward, not in 
theatres, the same as a revisional hip replacement, there's got to be ajlaw in this and that's the system 
we've got. " (trust-based interviewee). 
The result was a system that was inherently ineffective, because of over concentration upon poorly 
devised indicators. It also resulted in much cynicism and frustration amongst health care workers and 
managers interviewed. Within a community trust ('Lifespan'), a quality facilitator took the lead and 
co-ordinated the Patient's Charter (op.cit.) monitoring, which was built into contracts with other 
quality indicators. The task was co-ordinated by the heads of nursing at the other trusts. However, 
measures of quality elicited some note of scorn from interviewees: 
"1 think there's an awful lot talked about audit and quality and not a lot happens, and I think that the 
Patient's Charter is typical ofthat actually"(trust-based interviewee). 
The frustration of some individuals at Lifespan was that when the productivity index was examined, 
their organisation came out as one of the least efficient trusts in the country. This, they argued, was 
probably because of the high number of continuing care beds the trust had (the highest number in the 
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country) and the way that infonnation was counted (as finished consultant episodes). The patients in 
the community trust, a senior trust manager argued, were never discharged: "they just die, so you can 
imagine that ifsomeone 's in hospital for two years, that doesn't look like very much activity" (trust­
based interviewee). As a result, Lifespan were seeking to find out what the problem was and introduce 
some form of performance management into the primary care teams. However, this was expected to 
take quite some time as the individuals in the trust were at the start of the research process when this 
research was completed, would enable them to go back to the purchasers and say "no, we're not 
inefficient and have the evidence to prove it". However, monitoring systems for community services 
were allegedly so poor, purchasers had very little input regarding their effectiveness as there were not 
the data available. 
A dietitian manager in an acute trust claimed that she had noticed little impact from effectiveness 
measures, although in line with the trust, her department was having to become much more efficiency 
and cost-conscious, and was consequently being restructured. The interviewee added that the formation 
of trusts had hindered the exchange of information amongst the profession; people were more 
competitive and kept information to themselves to keep a market edge, resulting in dietitians 
unnecessarily repeating work. Despite these frustrations, there was some recognition of the reasons 
behind priority setting by the health authority; an appreciation that the behaviour and decision-making 
of the purchasers was largely dictated by the government and by financial limitations. The perceived 
emphasis of the government was to get hospital waiting lists down "ifyou tried to deal with things like 
operations, hospital admission, there are all these standards now around which constrain their ability 
to actually make some sensible decisions" (trust-based interviewee). Again, this was frustrating to the 
community-based workers who believed that they were a 'soft' target, as there were no waiting lists and 
no comparative standards as such in the community. As such, community-based interviewees often felt 
that their services were being squeezed to make money available to reduce hospital waiting lists. 
Consequently, the nature of the health care reforms was seen to legislate against efficient working 
practices, as there was no incentive for providers to reduce expenditure, as it brought their units no 
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reward and money was taken away, as discussed above. What was made clear by interviewees, was that 
the NHS was not an apolitical organisation where individuals were free to make rational, evidence-
based decisions and improve the effectiveness of NHS services, even if the evidence was available. 
Politics, both locally and nationally, interfered with this process: 
"the political drive from the centre is what makes people do things, and politics completely overturns, 
overcomes effectiveness and efficiency. . .In a purer system you should say do nothing without evidence 
ofeffectiveness and efficiency. Ofcourse, we can 'f do that, because halfof the things we do, haven " 
got any evidence [to demonstrate their effectiveness] at all. But new developments should have (a 
block) ofclear evidence ofefficacy and effictiveness and efficiency and cost benefit ... You can be very 
efficient but it might be horrendously expensive. What does it cost per case or cost per life saved is an 
important question to ask. So I'm afraid 1 don 'f think effectiveness plays a vast part in [decision­
making]. I think often people use these arguments to stop things, rather than to start things. That's 
part of the NHS prob/em, we're not very good at stopping things; we're very good at starting things 
but very bad at stopping them" (health authority-based interviewee). 
There was no evidence to suggest that medical superiority had been, or would be threatened by 
the shifting emphasis towards primary and community services, away from acute-based care. 
Indeed, GPs, who dominated primary care services, were all medically trained, of course, and 
according to some interviewees were too busy as they were, to take on any more work: 
"About 18 months ago, two years ago, everybody was saying that we could 'down-bed' because there 
was a large tranche ofwork going on in hospitals that could be moved out to general practice. That 
turns out to be the funniest thing out. First of all we're heading towards probably the biggest 
manpower crisis in medicine the country has ever seen, which ministers 1 don't think want to hear. 
And the Department [of Health} is just scared o/it all. The second thing is that in general practice, if 
you ask a GP if he wants to do any more work, you're lucky to escape with your life" (trust-based 
interviewee). 
It would be expected, therefore, that the health authority would be looking to invest more in primary 
and community care services. However, such investment in community care, as previously discussed, 
was not the case as they believed that care in the community was more expensive than acute-based care, 
and were reluctant to invest more money into it. 
Age and individual personality were significant factors identified by interviewees regarding attitude 
towards research and change across all occupations in the NBS. Younger clinicians were widely 
reported as being more responsive than others, to the extent that it appeared that improvements to the 
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service did seem to have been obstructed, to a certain ex1ent, by medical 'arrogance' but the changes in 
the training of doctors and culture of the NHS had began to change the situation: 
"1 think the group ofconsultants who are still finding this very difficult, they're on their way out now 
(they're at the top 10% of the hospital). In another ten years they '1/ all be gone" (health authority­
based interviewee). 
"1 think consultant doctors have been in charge oftheir own skills and everything for so long that they 
don't like it being questioned. The younger ones are better" (trust-based interviewee). 
The domination of economy and efficiency measures meant that there was an increased emphasis 
placed upon rather abstract quantitative and financial factors in the running of the NHS in the case 
study. A call for more health economists and statisticians was evident throughout discussions at 
regional committees, reflecting these changes. However, there was no evidence to suggest that these 
factors had surpassed or replaced the service-specific values held by clinicians. Indeed, medical 
knowledge was largely defined as quantitative in nature, as evidenced by the continued dominance of 
randomised controlled trials and systematic reviews in research agendas and medical publications. 
Waiting lists and efficiency indexes were published, however, and considerable amounts of time spent 
discussing them in the media and Parliament, and for this reason they played a fundamental aspect in 
the organisation of clinical services. In this respect, therefore, managers could be seen as increasingly 
controlling the terms of public discourse. The public were also increasingly questioning purchasing 
judgements, as an interviewee from the health authority noted: 
"We live in a post-modern world where there are no more icons, no more heroes anymore. The heroes 
of twenty years ago have gone, the doctor now, the good paternal caring doctor says 'I'm ever so 
sorry, I don't believe you mate, sad your pleasant manner, I don't believe you" (health authority­
based interviewee). 
The questioning of purchasing decisions by members of the public was a situation in Cambridge and 
Huntingdon which hit the national headlines in the notorious case of Child B. The result was that 
public discourse'was by no means under the total control of managers either. 
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6.8 Research policy and politics 
The following section will describe and explain the increasing importance of health services research in 
the East Anglian Regional Health Authority, and particularly the Cambridge and Huntingdon area; the 
changing nature of research and development; and the reasons for, and consequences of, these changes 
on the NBS and NHS workers. The reforms of NHS funded research, instigated by the Priorities in 
Medical Research (House of Lords Select Committee 1988, 1990) and Research for Health (DH1991b, 
1993a) reports have had a profound impact upon the research community and been seen as an 
opportunity by researchers, academics, and clinicians outside of the medical schools to play an 
increasing role in the NHS research process, gain additional funds and answer the questions put to 
them by NHS purchasers. What the section will show is that there has been an increase in the amount 
of research and research centres funded from NHS resources, to develop activity and knowledge in 
primary care settings in particular; that there has been an increasing demand for certain social science 
skills, but that the traditional centres of medical domination (the medical 'core') have remained firmly 
in command and the medical domination of agendas and committees little altered. The section will 
begin with a brief overview of the changing research committee structures for the region and the 
inclusion of health services research within them, which reflected the changing needs and requirements 
of the NBS, but also the structural changes caused by the reorganisation of the regions. 
There were six research-related groups in the region by 19926 . These were subsequently reorganised or 
replaced with a more health services research focus, but membership was still rather dominated by 
biomedically-trained individuals. In June 1993 a new Regional R&D Advisory Committee was 
established, superseding the Locally Organised Research Scheme (LORS) Committee and Public Health 
Operation and Research Advisory Committee (PHORAC). Membership was still rather dominated by 
biomedical staff (10 of the 18 members were identified as from a biomedical background and two were 
identified as social scientists). Additionally, a management group, (the Regional R&D Steering Group) 
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was established to link R&D with regional policy. Finally, a Regional Network of R&D Co-ordinators 
was formed, consisting of representatives from each purchaser and provider organisation in the region 
, 	to firstly, 'disseminate knowledge about the R&D programme especially opportunities for participation 
and results; secondly, to gather information about research taking place in their units; and thirdly to 
help those who wanted to do research to make contact with the Regional R&D Directorate' (East 
Anglian Regional Health Authority 1993). In response to Managing the New NHS ( DH 1993h) and 
following the creation of the new Anglia and Oxford Regional Health Authority, in September 1994, 
letters were sent from the RORD inviting people to be members of a new Regional Liaison Group for 
R&D. This was to replace the previous funding bodies. However, it was quickly superseded in October 
1994 by a Regional R&D Committee (a difference in name only). The first meeting of the Group was 
on 23 November 1994 at Hinchingbrook Hospital, Huntingdon. 
The group was to be strategic and advisory and members were "appointed in a personal capacity" for 
up to three years and were not intended to be representational. Again, biomedically-trained individuals 
dominated the committee (nine out of sixteen members). However, there was only one person 
representing nurses and P AMS on the committee. This was acknowledged in regional documents and 
it was agreed that 'if this proved to be a practical deficiency it might be addressed in the second wave of 
appointments' (East Anglia Regional Health Authority 1994a: 2). This is somewhat surprising, as 
suitable representation was available. The response of the regional committees perhaps represented the 
hierarchical view of the health service and the tendency to denigrate non-medical knowledge. The lack 
of a representative for P AMS was seen only as a potential deficiency in terms of practical aspects, not 
for any conceptual (knowledge gap) ones. However, overall, given the lack of experienced researchers 
in other clinical disciplines, the domination of the committee by biomedical staff was not entirely 
surprising, nor avoidable. 
The organisation for R&D in the region following the regional changes was discussed at the first 
meeting of the RRDC, with the regional manager formulating initial Regional R&D plans, but these 
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could only be provisional until a director was appointed. Administration was to be split between two 
sites, at Oxford and Cambridge (but not duplicated). The RRDC agreed to form biomedical and health 
services research sub-committees to administer respective funds. The health services research 
committee was given twice the budget of the biomedical committee, the intention being that this would 
allow the strategic balance of the research portfolio to be maintained by adjustment to the budgets of 
the two committees on the advice of the R&D Advisory Committee. At the same time assessment of 
research grant applications would follow the same procedures. Separation of the two broad categories 
of research was intended to permit different operational policies: biomedical pump-priming (short­
term small scale) and health services research, which was longer term and with the possibility of larger 
grants (East Anglian Regional Health Authority 1994b: 3). Health services research was clearly 
playing an increasing profile, therefore, with each change in organisation of the health service and 
committee structures. 
Training in health services research and research methods meant, of course, that universities were 
employing lecturers to teach them. The existing university departments, such as the health services 
research unit at Cambridge, were expanding and employing more health services researchers. And 
there was an expansion of these centres nationally, not just in the region (the National Primary Care 
R&D Centre at Manchester, for example). The health services research discipline, although not 
especially a new idea in itself, was a new discipline to the majority of people and was as new to the old 
universities as the new. Indeed, the regional manager of R&D complained that he had great difficulty 
in convincing academics at Cambridge that health services research was a valid discipline. The result 
of this expansion, however, was an opportunity for social scientists to utilise and apply their skills and 
training. There was, however, no defined career structure for them (as was the case for all researchers). 
The issue featured on regional and national R&D agendas, but has not been resolved to this day. The 
case for establishing a training strategy for research was also very similar and this will be discussed in 
length later on. Nevertheless, the regional health authority expanded their investment in training in 
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health services research skills, through their bursary and fellowship scheme, but training was for NBS 
employees, so in this respect, the university-trained social scientists did not benefit directly, 
Similarly, the Clinical Research Sub-Committee, which assessed applications for clinical research and 
fellowships, awarding grants for up to two years and up to £50,000 per year, was closely associated 
with the Health and Sciences Panel (1995), There was, consequently, a clear biomedical bias in the 
working of the committee, to the extent that the group sought to establish a Biomedical Steering Group, 
target funds to promote work and allocate funds in areas proposed by the foresight group, and distribute 
and manage funds to develop R&D centres acting as "technology incubators" (Gray 1993), The 
analogy illustrates the e~"Pansion of health services research as a recognised academic discipline but the 
continued strength ofbio-medical research and research centres, The RHA invested money to develop 
research at the Institute of Public Health at Cambridge and the University of East Anglia, As such, 
more research was being conducted outside of the clinical school and universities, This said, more 
research was not the same thing as much research, Two thirds of applications for LORS funds 
generally came from Addenbrooke's Hospital, principally from the clinical school to do clinical or 
biomedical research (East Anglian Regional Health Authority 1992: 32, 1993), Furthermore, just over 
one quarter of the active projects funded through PHORAC were also awarded to individuals at 
Addenbrooke's, As such, the setting in which research was conducted remained largely the same, i.e, 
in the teaching hospitals, but there was more being conducted elsewhere, 
The increased amount of NBS funds available for health services research was seen as an opportunity 
for the universities and colleges not traditionally associated with health research directly, to gain 
business, The district general hospitals and community trusts now became new sites for competition, 
with the universities increasingly attempting to conduct research in them, However, the trusts 
themselves had become more research aware and managers of these organisations were becoming more 
vociferous about stating their own needs and requirements. Trusts were being much more proactive in 
the education and research process and were no longer content to merely be passive sites for academics 
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to conduct their work and assert their own agendas. The evidence was that trusts were developing their 
own agendas and taking these to universities as well. The result was that universities were being forced 
to tailor their agendas to those of trusts, i.e. conduct more focused (applied) research and work in a 
language more understandable to trust-based workers. 
The rise of health services research inevitably created more opportunities and demands for new 
research skills. Most notable, however, was a desire to see more epidemiologists and statisticians. This 
was probably a reflection of an increased role for research in public health and purchasing and of a 
perceived superiority of the randomised controlled trial as a health services research methodology, as 
witnessed by the eminence of the Cochrane Centre in particular. There was a recognition of the need 
for social science and qualitative research skills to answer health questions raised by interviewees, and 
the University of East Anglia was approached by the health authority to provide these skills. The result 
was a certain change in the 'nature' of the research community, but this involved the periphery rather 
than the 'core'; the teaching hospitals and biomedical researchers maintained their privileged position. 
What was significant was the increased focus placed upon the implementation of research findings, 
which was closely linked to the rise of evidence-based medicine. 
The following section will, subsequently, assess the various developments to the nature and organisation 
of health research that have occured, and explain their nature, consequences and effects on the NHS 
and NBS workers. What will become apparent is that there was a clear distinction made between 
research policy and development policy at all levels of the service, but views on how to develop and 
implement research varied and were often at odds with each other. The result was the creation of much 
tension within the service, notably between the HA and the community trust. 
6.8.1 Research, development and implementation 
There was an increasing emphasis in regional R&D committees placed upon the need to promote the 
development and implementation of research findings7. One of the principal methods proposed, was to 
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form Regional Research Development Centres, to act as central points to a number of networks, linking 
expertise, skills and knowledge at purchaser and provider level. The Regional Centres were part of a 
'systematic programme of development planned and coordinated with the NHS E' (Anglia and Oxford 
Regional Health Authority, R&D Directorate 1993). These centres were to receive at least £200,000 for 
three years to carry out work to implement evidence-based practices and help clinical staff gain 
eXl'erience in clinical evaluation. Following the changes to regional boundaries, regional health 
authorities were explicitly given responsibility for the dissemination and implementation of the results 
of R&D. On the recommendations of an R&D Information Systems Strategy study, a 
dissemination/enquiry centre for R&D-based information was established at the University of York 
(the Centre for Reviews and Dissemination) (Anglia and Oxford Regional Health Authority 1994a). 
This was opened in December 1993. The formation of the centre was marked by a clear policy 
statement to differentiate dissemination, that is getting knowledge to clinicians and managers, from 
implementation, which was seen as requiring 'wider classes of information and the lead participation of 
other groups' (Anglia and Oxford Regional Health Authority 1994a). This emphasis on dissemination, 
was also reflected in the development of the 'CLINlK' and Library of the 21st Century projects, 
referred to earlier. In January 1994, at a meeting of Regional Directors of R&D (RORD) the national 
Director of R&D, Professor Peckham asked Professor Andy Haines (Regional Director of R&D for 
North Thames RHA) to complile a short paper on clinical effectiveness and R&D. By this time, two 
projects, in particular, were seen as important in providing accessible research information to 
clinicians-the Bandolier, and implementation-the GRiPP (Getting Research into Practice and Policy) 
initiative. Bandolier8was singled out in particular by interviewees as an example of good practice. 
However, scepticism was expressed by some interviewees regarding the effectiveness of the GRiPP 
initiative, with some arguing that they could find no instances of where it had actually changed 
practice. Haines recommended that the R&D Directorate and RDRD's should take reponsibility for 
each of the following: 
• 	 Commissioning research on methods of implementation in conjunction with the York Centre for 
reviews and dissemination; 
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• encouraging purchasers to use the findings of research; 
• using audit; 
• commissioning research in national priority areas; 
• ensuring the York and Cochrane Centres were linked properly; 
• and coordinating implemenatation work (Haines 1994). 
Haines's paper was discussed at the second RDRD meeting in February 1994 (Anglia and Oxford 
Regional Health Authority 1994b). The RDRD also emphasised the need to use existing information 
where systematic reviews had been done, and the need for close work with public health workers, and 
for research on methods of implementation, which was recommended to be a top priority in the NHS 
R&D programme. As a result, another working group was established, again chaired by Professor 
Haines, to take forward research in implementation (Anglia and Oxford Regional Health Authority 
1994c). The group was to report in 1995, after data collection for this thesis was completed. 
Nevertheless, what these developments illustrate is that a clear distinction was consistently placed 
between research, dissemination and implementation policy. The three elements were treated as 
separate items on research agendas, although this distinction may well have created more problems 
than it solved. The views in the NBS in general were similar, although the distinction was much more 
blurred and the process from research to the incorporation of results into clinical practice-more 
sequential. 
All trusts were looking towards making a greater attempt at linking research, quality, audit and 
effectiveness in some way, but some were much more proactive than others. Interestingly, 
Addenbrooke's appeared to be behind the other two in this respect. The possibility of forming a 
clinical effectiveness unit was being mooted at Hinchingbrook, along with the increasing use of 
integrated clinical pathways and managed care, which would "interpret into some form ofcollaborative 
care plan. rye want to employ someone of degree calibre, with committee experience to take this 
forward and they will have research at the forefront of their job" (trust-based interviewee). The 
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community trust (Lifespan) had formed a research unit, which was rather more concerned than others 
at making the link between research and development, notably by establishing small-scale, managed 
research projects as development. The group had been in existence for two years, at the time when 
interviews for this thesis were conducted, and trust managers believed it too soon to have had a really 
profound impact on the trust, but there was an increase in the number of clinicians doing and 
understanding research, This was seen as important by the senior trust managers as it promoted the 
ownership of research, leading to the desired change in behaviour. Guidelines and protocols for best 
practice could be developed but would be and are ignored; the people who have the problem, or who 
may be the problem, or who practice the problem have to be involved in a process of analysing what 
they do and devising a solution. Practitioners have to be included, and the way to start that process, to 
get people to want to be involved in this process was to develop an organisation where questioning was 
the norm: 
"it's about developing an organisation in which you expect practitioners to question what you do and 
don't slap them down when they kind of say to their manager 'why do you do this?' they say 'well 
we've always done it that way' or 'it's the managers decision' or you know you shouldn't be asking 
those sort ofquestions', so it's about the cultural side ofit and you say yes, good idea, go away and 
find a bit more about it', and even saying, if it's a big issue 'here's some time to do it' or well, 'we '/I 
find some way ofgiving you a bit ofhelp with your work" (trust-based interviewee). 
In practice, the purchasers and the trusts had the same aim; to promote the development of research. 
although the purchasers were more keen to concentrate upon eliminating ineffective practice. 
However, their means of achieving this aim differed and caused particular friction. It became clear 
during the course of interviews that the terms 'research' and 'development' were not used in the same 
sense by interviewees and, indeed, 'research' policy was clearly separated from 'development' policy. 
Instead, interviewees were more likely to use these two terms to explain an understanding of the 
research process, on understanding and being able to appraise the results of research, and in 
understanding and being responsive to change (being 'changeminded'). "[Research] just sounds like a 
formal thing involVing applications and grants and people doing research projects. It's about a 
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culture. acquiring a culture" (trust-based interviewee). This, perhaps, indicates the different 
requirements and knowledge (at the time) of staff in the acute teaching trust and the others. 
The issue of development and making use of the results of research that had already been conducted 
was a particular concern expressed in the original Research for Health strategy (DH 1991b, 1993a). 
Equally of importance was the relation of NHS research to achieving the objectives of the Health ofthe 
Nation (DH 1992a). The following section will, consequently, assess whether, and the extent to which 
R&D contributed to achieving these objectives. It will then proceed to explore the level and nature of 
primary and community care that was conducted, to establish whether the research and development 
agenda was reflecting government agendas to provide more care in these sectors. 
The 1992 Regional R&D plan identified that nearly half of the research projects in the region were 
related to Health of the Nation areas (East Anglian Regional Health Authority 1992). Following a 
consultation process begun at the beginning of 1991, six key regional priority areas were established 
against which targets could be set and the health of East Anglian people could be improved. 'It was 
concluded by the RHA that this approach was consistent both with that of the then Green Paper 'The 
Health of the Nation' and with the RHA's 1992/93 objectives for achieving strategic goal one, 
'measurable improvements in health in selected priority areas', which would be negotiated as part of 
the RHA's contract with the NHS:M.E.' (East Anglian Regional Health Authority 1992: 20). The 
research priorities were, therefore, closely related to the Health ofthe Nation (DR 1992a) and to setting 
quantifiable health targets. 1993's R&D plan echoed these sentiments, noting that the CRDC had 
established a Priorities Working Group to define NBS research priorities. However, the link to the 
Health ofthe Nation (ibid) was important but not paramount, such that 'research should be focussed on 
major problems especially but not exclusively the Key Areas identified in the Health of the Nation.' 
(East Anglian Regional Health Authority 1993: 5). 
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Primary care was acknowledged as an especially underdeveloped area of research and development in 
the region and this was seen in part because the clinical school did not have a chair in General Practice. 
Although the matter illustrated the impact of the clinical school on research, it also illustrated a bias 
which was to persist through regional committees and activity-that primary care meant general 
practice. Nevertheless, approximately 15% of all GPs in the region stated that they would like to be 
involved in research, half of whom were already involved (East Anglian Regional Health Authority 
1993: 16). However, GPs were believed to be so busy that it was thought by some interviewees that 
they simply did not have any time to take on any more responsibilities. The issue was noted and a 
particular emphasis on developing research in primary care was subsequently made in regional R&D 
committees. This was entirely directed at developing GPs skills. Fellowships were made available and 
each health authority was allocated £15 000 pump priming funding to set up appropriate R&D 
networks. An emphasis upon GPs and other doctors in research was a consistent theme to emerge from 
the analysis. The following section will assess whether this was justified, how and why. It will also 
analyse the role and affect of research and development upon the non-medical occupations. 
6.8.2 The role of the non-medical professions in research 
What research there was conducted, was principally done by doctors and psychiatrists, especially those 
working in departments attached to universities. The result, therefore, was that those doctors working 
outside the teaching trust were, generally speaking, not involved in actually conducting research. 
However, the nature of medical training meant that medical personnel did have a better grounding and 
understanding of some research than other occupational groups, if not health services research. 
Interestingly, however, only GPs and public health trainees developed skills in critically appraising the 
results of research as a central theme in training and examinations (Gray and Sackett 1995). As a 
result, it can be assumed that doctors on the whole, were not as skilled or consistent in their 
understanding or approach to research as might be assumed by their elevated status. And this, of 
course, may go s'ome way to explaining the mountain of research results published and ignored over the 
years, leading to the Research for Health strategy (DH 1991b, 1993a). Overall, whilst the medical 
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profession could not be described as research-minded, but it could be claimed to be more research-
minded than other professions in the NHS. 
The number of nurses, therapists and dietitians involved in any research projects was negligible across 
all sectors of the service and those who were involved, concentrated on projects initiated and led by 
doctors: "the doctors got the money and it involved something to do with the performance of 
physiotherapists (trust-based interviewee)". In the five years to 1993, 70% of the 82 LORS grants 
awarded went to medically-trained staff, 18% went to non-medical NHS staff, such as psychologists 
and physiotherapists and 3% were awarded to nurses or midwives (East Anglian Regional Health 
Authority 1993: 32). Similarly, PHORAC only awarded grants to three nurses out of a total of 42 
grants. Unfortunately, this data were not available from subsequent regional reports or documents 
obtained, but there was no evidence to suggest that the situation had changed. However, the problem 
was at least acknowledged and the need for remedial action noted (East Anglian Regional Health 
Authority 1992: 16). Within the acute teaching hospital, R&D was seen as the province of the medical 
staff, and the clinical school programme was entirely medically driven. Consequently, in general, the 
multi-professional research that there was, invariably involved doctors and another occupation, rather 
than, for instance dietitians and nurses working together. This was so, despite the fact that the very 
work of these clinicians involved them working together as a team. However, this teamwork was not 
recognised elsewhere, where the PAMS were seen as "more vulnerable". The doctors and nurses in 
contrast, were seen as strong, coherent groups and team players. 
The thing J 'd say is that ofcourse both physios, speech therapists, dietitians and so on do not have the 
strong profeSSional corporate feeling. They work very much as individuals within the system and so 
they are rather different in fact from nurses and doctors who have, ifyou like, professional support 
around them' (trust-based interviewee). 
In addition, multi-professional research invariably involved workers such as nurses acting as assistants 
to doctors, rather than as equal partners, and, consequently, contributed to maintaining the traditional 
hierarchical hospital order. However, there was a noted change in the attitude of new recruits to the 
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nursing and therapy professions towards research and development. This change was a reflection of 
the socialisation of the newer recruits to the NBS, into this changing culture. Certainly, a major factor 
championed by many interviewees in the analysis was the education the newer recruits received. In 
particular, the nurses and P AMS who had undertaken degrees were seen as the seed-bed for future 
development of research. "J think that the newer generation [a/nurses and therapists] who are coming 
out, who are being educated now, da have that research awareness, but there's a big wadge in the 
middle who don't" (trust-based interviewee). However, in community trusts, a distinction was made 
between the district nurses on the one hand, and health visitors and physiotherapists on the other. The 
district nurses were singled out as being less interested in R&D as they allegedly did the job because 
they wanted to be bed nurses. However, some RGNs were beginning to understand that as the 
traditional career ladders were changing, they needed to develop their skills in order to progress. 
Research awareness training and the 'demystification' of research was, consequently, widely seen as 
very important in both the development of professions and the development of health service provision. 
And this would be expected to be reflected in training initiatives, but regional training initiatives 
appeared to be more directed at doctors than anybody else.9 
The actual NHS mechanism for funding research was seen to work against the promotion of 
research outside of the traditional centres and medical domain, much to the frustration of 
managers and clinicians in these centres, who saw the Culyer report in particular, as a new 
opportunity. The situation was described as a 'Catch 22': take nursing, for instance, funding 
was needed to put a nursing research infrastructure in place before a body of nursing research and 
expertise could be generated. But without support for a research infrastructure, a body of 
expertise could not exist in the first place. In fact, this was true for the development of research 
expertise anywhere outside of the traditional centres, and was a problem which, whilst widely 
recognised, was not overcome. Additionally, teaching hospitals had the advantage of an existing 
research management infrastructure, which could and was utilised to help secure funding. 
Writing bids for research funds was a special skill and one which required much technical 
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knowledge and experience. The poor quality of proposals was flagged up for concern by the 
regional sub-committees and funds offered to develop centres top provide advice, but there was no 
evidence to suggest that these had had any significant impact. In effect, therefore, the traditional 
centres (notably doctors within those centres) were able to continue their dominance over the 
allocation of research funds, even if those funds were being targetted at new arenas of research. 
This they did through the following factors: 
• They had the personnel with the specialised skills required to write funding applications; 
• they were well known centres of research excellence (albeit if not health services research); 
• they contained the personnel who dominated the research funding and advisory bodies; 
• they were plugged into the established research networks. 
The monopoly of the biomedical researchers was such that the power appeared 'normal' and 'natural', 
and it was self-perpetuating. The returns from the Culyer declarations, however, as a research manager 
pointed out, have highlighted these issues and identify "who's doing what, where, why and jar how 
much that we will be able to see where research isn't taking place where maybe it should be, and we 
can actually begin to jacilitate that" (trust-based interviewee). To generalise, therefore, there was, if 
not an attempt to break up the hierarchical dominance of doctors in the medical schools, an attempt to 
bring the situation into the open, through increasing the bureaucracy in the service, so that the 
processes were more visible to the outside world. Significantly, the issue illustrates how the teaching 
hospitals could not be accurately termed 'learning organisations' as such, as this label could not be 
universally applied accross the teaching trusts. The biomedical researchers there, fonned their medical 
'core' (Larson 1990). but in other respects, the workers in the rest of the organisations; the nurses, 
dietitians and therapists, were no different from those in an average district general hospital. Research 
was still concentrated in the same areas where expertise had traditionally been found. The following 
section will examine what effects the Research jar Health strategy (DH 1991b, 1993a) actually had 
upon these areas and the researchers working in them. 
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One of the most striking impacts of the Research for Health strategy, and subsequent NBS research 
policy developments, was that rather than there being an increase in management control as such, they 
marked an increasing bureaucratisation and control over resources, especially through SIFf-R and the 
Culyer declaration. The regional health authority had a particular difficulty in establishing the exact 
level of R&D activity in the region, indicating the level of autonomy of trusts, but notably consultants 
within trusts (East Anglian Regional Health Authority 1992: 15). The amount of consultant time spent 
on R&D or support services could not be identified by trusts; there was no established systematic tool 
for collecting this information, and clinicians were unwilling to provide information on their research 
activities, as they believed it would lead to a loss of control of their research funds. (East Anglian 
Regional Health Authority 1992: 15). A National Research Register was subsequently formed, which 
was based upon the fourteen regional registers. Through a variety of sources, this gathered information 
on the activity of clinicians previously unaccounted for. Unexpectedly, this proved to be a difficult and 
complicated task and one which met with concern from the research community. This was expected as 
in the case of the clinical school. !information was required on the "uncosted" NHS support costs for 
research, such as staff time or outpatient visits for pharmaceutical trials (E;ast Anglian Regional Health 
Authority 1993: 13). There was some anxiety that research funds would be lost because these extra 
costs would not be met by the principle funders. The issue continued to be a contentious one through 
the following years. An agreement with the MRC and the Department of Health regarding service 
costs was reached and budgets agreed. However, agreement for service support was not reached with 
other agencies, a situation the Culyer Report (1994) addressed and attempted to change (East Anglian 
Regional Health Authority 1993: 5) The timetable for implementing Culyer's recommendations started 
at the beginning of April 1995 and declarations had to be submitted to regional offices by May 1996. 
The chief executive of the health authority played a prominant role in the establishment of the 
(national) reforms to the research networks and was vocal on several national committees, calling for 
the system to be open and visible. It was believed that the system as it was, concealed individuals 
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running independent, large profit-making businesses from the premises of teaching hospitals and that 
individuals within medical academie were working to keep it this way. 
"suddenly it's a market place that's appeared and nobody 's managiNg it and {the chief executive, is] 
talking a lot ofsense about how that ought to be made more explicit. The trouble with making things 
explicit is that it undermines vested interests" (health authority-based interviewee). 
The expectation would be that this would cause relations between the health authority and the medical 
school to be strained. In fact, this was not so, with interviewees from Lifespan and Hinchingbrook 
trusts complaining of the opposite. The post graduate dean of the medical school was said to be 
"intrigued" by the chief executive of the health authority and consequently kept close to him. The 
clinical school also had direct links to the highest committees and bodies. The regis professor of 
medicine was a member of a relevant House of Lords advisory committee and as a result, there was, 
what was described as an "informed" dialogue between the medical school and the House of Lords. 
Consequently, it could be seen that the links and work of the clinical school enabled it to operate 
defensively and maintain its advantageous position, or at least limit any changes it saw as adversarial to 
its position. 
A research manager noted that Addenbrooke's received approximately £4m from the research element 
of SIFT -R and employed a research finance manager and a contracts manager, who were managed 
themselves, by the R&D manager. These individuals were employed to establish where research money 
was going in the trust, and to disassemble the old 'knock for knock' arrangement between medical 
academics and NBS doctors. The boundary between academic and NBS staff in medicine was 
described as "blurred", with much "free interchange". The aim of the research department, in which 
the research managers worked, was to establish where these boundaries were and, working from the 
bottom-up establish how the money was being spent. An interviewee explained that the trusts' past 
experience of costing had resulted in them losing some money, so they were determined to ensure that 
this did not happen again and protect the £4m they received. 
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Collection of the data for the Project Register System (PRS) and Culyer declarations was difficult and 
the criteria used were not systematic. The Infonnation Manager in the regional R&D office was a 
member of a national PRS working party on data ddinitions. However, as the Department of Health 
were so slow to act, the staff at Addenbrooke' s proactively developed cheir own costing, accounting and 
activity criteria. As explained above, their motive was to maintain their trust's existing level of 
funding. However, the lack of an alternative model, meant that the system they developed was 
communicated to the RDRD and taken to national commitees. Local systems, designed to maintain 
existing medical research funds and superiority, therefore, were incorporated into national research 
policy: "/ think there were times when we felt that we were actually developing the criteria ourselves 
and passing them on to Richard Himsworth who then passed them on to Michael Peckham" (trust­
based interviewee). In this way, the elevated position of the medical schools was maintained, although 
in a more bureaucratised fonn. Professor Himsworth, the research and development manager for 
Anglia and Oxford Regional Health Authority (East) was later seconded part-time to the national 
Culyer implementation team (Anglia and Oxford Regional Health Authority 1995) so that a direct link 
could be seen between th.e university and the central research policy-making bodies. Analysis of 
committee meeting minutes also revealed further indications of the increasing bureaucratisation of 
research workers (Anglia and Oxford Regional Health Authority 1995). Cost-based R&D contracts 
were introduced from March 1997 and a move to an agreed system for quality and value assessment 
was started in April 1997. Management and perfonnance criteria were also introduced into research 
contracts, which had the overall effect of increasing bureaucracy. 
6.8.3 Training strategies 
The need for more training for clinicians in research and development skills was recongised at an early 
stage in the NHS in the Anglia and Oxford region. The continued absence of a promised national R&D 
training strategy elicited some concern, which was expressed in regional R&D committee meeting 
minutes. A regional R&D training strategy was pursued, regardless, as it was not believed by regional 
R&D managers that it would significantly vary from a national strategy anyhow. The regional training 
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schemes subsequently developed, appeared to be weighted towards doctors in particular, with a strong 
emphasis on promoting evidence-based medicine, defined as 'The ability to track down, critically 
appraise (for its validity and usefulness), and incorporate this rapidly growing body of evidence into 
one's clinical practice' (Sackett and Rosenberg 1995). A Regional R&D Education and Training Task 
Force was established, which met for the first time in September 1995. The task force addressed the 
problems of developing appropriate research skills in the NHS. The result was a fellowship scheme 
and a program of training to improve research skills. The program and scheme were allocated a budget 
of £380 000, which was available from 1996/7 (Anglia and Oxford Regional Health Authority 1996: 
3). However, a capacity and funding problem was identified, due to an increased demand for one year 
research-related training as part of the Royal College's new training programme for doctors (Anglia 
and Oxford Regional Health Authority 1996 ibid). The implications of this were that the regional R&D 
training funds could be quickly used up by a relatively small number of (expensive) doctors. 
Doctors have always organised their own professional training, principally through what used to be 
known as the postgraduate medical centres in acute trusts. The NHS trusts in Cambridge and 
Huntingdon did have their own training and staff development strategies, but these were directed at 
achieving their own needs and goals. They tended to be focused in contrast to doctors, upon the non­
medical staff, for example, to train staff to conduct small-scale research projects as part of a 
development programme to create a questioning organisation and to promote the implementation of the 
results of research. This placed the organisations at odds with the purchasers who wanted to keep a 
tight control upon what and how research was conducted and implemented. In conclusion, therefore, 
health services research was gaining an inceased profile, although not at the expense of NHS-funded 
biomedical research and researchers, who maintained their privileged position and protected the 
boundaries of their medical 'core' (the clinical school). However, researchers and research processes 
were increasingly bureaucratised. 
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6.9 Professions, experts and control 
The previous chapter has documented the changing nature of the NHS in the Cambridge and 
Huntingdon area, to illustrate, explain and analyse the nature of policy development and 
implementation; the issues surrounding the accountability of NHS workers to the public and state; the 
role and effect of these changes upon knowledge, upon the production and utilisation of different forms 
of knowledge; and the rise, effect and increasing the eminence of health services research as an 
academic discipline on the NHS. The chapter will conclude with an examination of Power's (1994) 
contention that there has been a displacement and subordination of experts of the first order, such as 
doctors and nurses, with experts of the second order, such as managers and accountants in the context 
of the Cambridge and Huntingdon area. What it will show is that although there has been an 
increasing amount of criticism directed at health care professionals (notably doctors) from within and 
outside of the service, this has not resulted in their displacement or subordination. Rather, the 
professions-and processes of their work-have become steadily more bureaucratised, but not controlled. 
This has implications for the NHS and research, as it indicates that policy implementation in the 
English National Health Service, notably the implementation of research policy as a conduit to 
achieving a more effective NHS, is not co-ordinated or controlled by the government. This is because 
the medical profession controls research audit and effectiveness agendas, protects its right to practise 
autonomously and sees itself as accountable to patients, not to the government or managers. 
What was clear throughout the analysis, was that medical superiority was maintained through a 
combination of the profession's own power and ability to dominate NHS agendas and government 
unwilling or inability to challenge it themselves. Instead, responsibility for controlling medical and 
other prefessions was devolved to regional and local health authorities, on behalf of the government. 
The principal method of control the government (through managers) were able to exhert was financial 
control. Budgets were strictly limited, wages tightly controlled and efficiency indexes enforced in the 
provision ofNES services and the work of health care managers and professionals was largely oriented 
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in order to meet these government targets (see above). The analysis, therefore, supported Larson's 
(1990) and Friedson's (1970) contention that the power of the medical profession lie in its ability to 
control education processes and what was 'relevant' knowledge. And there was no evidence to suggest 
that this power was seriously threatened in any way. 
To sum up: the evidence presented during the course of this chapter eX'"Plained how the government, 
through purchasers, were becomming more prescriptive towards service provision through its demands 
for efficiency gains and that this exacerbated by the health authority's demands for such efficiency 
gains to be made in cash. This resulted in little opportunity for reflection, but a corporate 
normalisation to centrally defined output goals. Clinicians were getting more business minded and 
aware of the implications of insufficient funding. Rationing was effectively performed by doctors, in 
consultation with the director of public health at the health authority. There was a noticable attempt to 
shift the professional accountability of doctors away from one of accountability to patient towards 
accountability to the purchasers on behalf of the population in general. However, doctors remained 
accountable to their patients but the purchaser took public responsibility for rationing decisions. There 
was also more questioning from the public, but this was towards the director of public health, not the 
doctors themselves. Medical decisions were being increasingly questioned and waiting lists and 
efficiency indexes were featuring prominantly in the media which had led to managers being 
increasingly more vocal. Public discourse subsequently focused upon waiting lists, performance tables 
etc.; what Power (1994) termed 'abstract financial and quantitative categories'. The evidence 
suggested that in the Cambridge and Huntingdon area managers were rather sensitive to this 
discussion. In this way, value for money issues did open up the performance of the NBS and NHS 
workers to a wider scrutiny, but the domination of the medical profession based in the clinical school at 
Addenbrooke's was never seriously challenged. What dissenting voices there were, were on the 
'periphery' of the profession, notably from public health consultants and those working in community 
trusts. There was also criticism, to a lesser extent from doctors at Hinchingbrook of their professional 
colleagues at Addenbrooke's, ifnot to openly. 
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The dominant mode of discourse of the NHS was, and continued to be that of the medical profession 
and the randomised controlled trial (RCT). The 'language' of medicine remained dominant; the 
randomised controlled trial was the standard accepted methodology for evaluation and through their 
domination of knowledge production and service provision, the authority of the medical profession was 
still strong and dominant. The Cochrane and York Centres took steps to control, organise and 
systematise the results of medical knowledge and to distribute the findings of 'validated' studies in the 
fonn of systematic reviews, which encouraged, at least! some standardisation and normalisation in 
clinical behaviour. However, the continuation of the autonomous methods of clinical practice and 
accountability meant that methods of changing medical practice and implementating the findings of 
audit and research were at best limited. Control was exercised over the implementation of new service 
developments but control over existing clinical practice was not exercised, nor was it possible (see 
above). As such, the medical profession were able to control and dictate agendas, working to prevent 
certain issues from being discussed and promoting others, and 'deciding what to decide' (Lukes 1981). 
The result was that the individuality of doctors to practise as they wanted to (within reason) was, by 
definition, central to their professional identity, and remained so. Any external attempt to dictate their 
behaviour, would and did fail. And, indeed, the health authority and government were ambivalent 
about introducing changes because these were often seen as more expensive, whereas existing practice 
was not necessarily ineffective. It had the advantage of leaving rationing decisions to doctors. Instead, 
the regional health authority, health authority and government were content to concentrate their 
attention on eliminating ineffective practices and setting strict efficiency targets, devolving the 
attainment of these targets through the system and ensuring a corporate normalisation to output and 
budgetary goals. 
The matter was brought to a head when the health authority director of public health refused to fund 
further treatment for a child suffering from leukaemia and was challenged by the child's father-the 
Child B case (Weale 1995:1). The refusal to fund treatment was based on the decision that the 
treatment of the child was so distressing and her chances of survival so slight, that the HA's limited 
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resources would be better spent elsewhere. The matter was taken to the High Court, then Court of 
Appeal, before the HA's decision was vindicated. Sir Thomas Bingham, Master of the Rolls, and one 
of the Appeal Court judges was quoted as saying that 'while I have every possible sympathy with B, I 
feel bound to regard this as an attempt - wholly understandable but nevertheless misguided-to involve 
the court in a field of activity where it is not fitted to make any decision favourable to the patient' 
(Weale 1995: 1). Virginia Bottomley, the then Health Secretary, similarly supported the decision, 
stating that 'all treatments involved an "opportunity cost"-money spent on one patient meant another 
person going without-but that it was for doctors to make such choices on financial grounds' (Mihill 
1995a: 5). 
The increasing level of bureaucracy and bureaucratisation of health care professions has been a 
consistent feature to occur throughout the course of this case study and has been a defining feature in 
debates featuring in the NHS in the Cambridge and Huntingdon area. It had been increased through 
the following measures: 
• 	 government attempts at devolving pay bargaining resulted in more clinicians negotiating deals and 
filling in forms; 
• 	 an increased call from the government, for clinicians and managers to be held accountable for the 
services they provided, leading to the need for increasingly detailed records to be kept, and, in turn, 
more negotiations with lawyers being conducted; 
• 	 all new service developments had to be evaluated before they would be purchased; 
• 	 more guidelines being produced and clinicians being required to adhere to them; 
• 	 an increased amount of audit forms, performance criteria, standards to meet and completion of 
forms and compilation of reports to prove NHS efficiency, such as Patient's Charter standards; 
• 	 increased financial accountability and performance monitoring of research workers and the 
production of research. 
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In consequence, therefore, there has been an increasing bureaucratisation over the processes, ouputs 
and outcomes of the work of NHS clinicians, rather than control over the exact nature of the work 
itself. There was little evidence to suggest that any of the professions in the NBS were becomming 
deskilled, proletarianised, or deprofessionalised. On the evidence presented in this case study, Elston's 
(1993) critique of these notions in the USA are equally applicable, to the English NBS. The reforms of 
the nature of NHS education and research funding illustrated an increased (although still very limited) 
input into medical training, through Working Paper 10; the bureaucratisation of the processes of 
knowledge production and of the research workforce (the 'knowledge producers'), in the establishment 
of research priorities, in the number of papers produced for and by regional research committees and in 
the inclusion of clear management protocols within research contracts. Most significant was the 
requirement for trusts to account for direct or indirectly NHS-funded research conducted in the service, 
through the completion of project register forms and, later, Culyer declarations, which involved a 
complex programme of surveillance and fonn filling. The situation was that the clinical school was left. 
to develop the criteria and systems for monitoring themselves, which they did, but with the intention of 
maintaining their existing position. Such methods were subsequently taken to be incorporated into 
national policy. There was no direct control of 'those who know' (Larson 1990) because the 
government were unable, or unwilling to control the devolution of organisation and management of 
research functions, and nor were managers. 
The medical profession controlled research and audit agendas. The evidence presented in the course of 
this chapter indicated that they themselves defined issues of quality and effectiveness. If audit marks 
the beginning and the end of the research cycle as is assumed-that is, it identifies gaps in knowledge 
and tests to see whether knowledge has been put into practice-control of audit agendas means control 
over the production and implementation ofknowledge. Similarly, the evidence presented indicated that 
audit managers were gaining in power to some extent, but from a very low base, and the power, such as 
it was, was over the nursing profession. Doctors were, by and large, unaffected and unconcerned with 
audit (other than for their own benefit) and other occupational groups, on the whole, were similarly 
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untouched. Purchasers did demand that new services be evaluated before implementation, and a 
concentration upon the elimination of ineffective working practices was evident. The development of 
initiatives sucli as the Cochrane and York Centres and the 'CLINIK' and Library of the 21st Century 
indicated an increased systematisation and regulation of 'valid' knowledge available to purchasers and 
providers. There was control, therefore, over what information and knowledge was available to doctors, 
but no control over what they already knew and how they used that knowledge, unless it had been 
recognised as dangerous. In such cases the Royal Colleges and government bodies produced guidelines 
for clinical practice. If the work of any doctor was shown to be poor or dangerous, then the matter 
remained an issue dealt with by the GMC, not by the government or managers. 
The control of research agendas, and the production and utilisation of this knowledge was not seriously 
challenged by managers. Research committees were dominated by doctors and evidence which 
emerged in this case study indicated that although research agendas were more oriented to issues 
addressed in the Health of the Nation, (DH 1992a) they were still largely defined according to 
professional self-interest. Similarly, biomedical researchers in the clinical school (the medical 'core') 
consistently captured most 'responsive' research funds (funds which do not have pre-defined priorities). 
The reality was that as stated above, the researchers working within the clinical school and elsewhere, 
were simply more bureaucratised, rather than controlled. Although the Culyer declarations were 
probably the most significant move in opening up the work of these researchers, the lack of knowledge 
concerning how to actually do it meant that the very few people it was meant to control were making 
the decisions; decisions which were based upon the intention of maintaining their existing elevated 
position, and which were incorporated into national policy. 
The situation was similar for the other professions, although there was rather more control from 
managers and the government over them. Nevertheless, Working Paper 10 similarly increased 
government input into professional training. Control over the pay, terms and conditions of the work of 
nurses and PAMS was rather more overt and reactions to it more acute, as the section on the devolution 
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of pay bargaining detailed (see above). However, political sensitivity and the shortage of skilled labour 
were such that the existing system was, in reality, little changed. In fact, the shortage of labour had led 
to some trusts actively thinking about ways to improve conditions to attract suitable staff. The nature of 
the work of the professionals was also little changed, although nurses, were given some responsibilities 
previously done by doctors, such as limited prescribing powers. These were tasks the doctors were not 
really concerned about losing anyhow. As such, the nature of the work and how it was conducted had 
not really changed over the course of the reorganisation of the NBS. In conclusion, therefore, it can be 
assumed that the NHS professions in the Cambridge and Huntingdon area were neither proletarianised 
nor de-professionalised. 
The mangers in the purchaser and provider organisations did have the same aim of linking staff to 
output, although the latter were attempting to prove themselves and the benefits of their products to 
health authority managers. Such knowledge, therefore, was used as a counter-power, but on the whole, 
contracts were such that budgets were fixed and a specific number of finished consultant episodes, 
contracted. Each clinical directorate, or equivalen4 was allocated a budget by central trust management 
and expected to organise services to meet those budgets. The management structures of most of the 
purchasers had been reorganised, to the extent that there was a clear division between central trust 
managers and clinical managers working on the wards or in the community. Clinical managers were 
primarily clinicians who managed their department (such managers at Lifespan, for instance) spent 
80% of their time working as clinicians). The creation of clinical directorates did not create inter­
professional conflict, but did make some of the (non-medical) professions slightly less coherent as a 
wholelO. Nevertheless, the distinction between central and clinical managers was important, as it 
illustrated how the managers were not as coherent a group as suggested; clinical managers were 
differentiated from the health authority and central trust managers. However, as well as the aim of 
linking staff to outputs, there was some consistancy between managers in terms of the links between 
some of the trusts, the clinical school, the university, the health authority and the regional health 
authority. 
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The impact of audit upon clinical practice in the Cambridge and Huntingdon area was discussed in 
some detail earlier. Although managers did attempt to link staff with outputs, there was no evidence to 
suggest that audit was yet being used as a form of control, although it ~as increasingly entering into the 
contracting process. As such, power over health care professionals was still relatively weak, particularly 
over the medical profession. Clinical audit was still relatively underdeveloped as a discipline and the 
standards developed were principally developed and controlled by the medical profession. 
6.10 Conclusion 
The previous section has discussed the notion proposed by Power (1994) that there has been as 
displacement of experts of the first order, such as doctors and nurses, with experts of the second order, 
such as managers and accountants. The evidence from the Cambridge and Huntingdon area, was that 
although the professions were coming under increasing pressure from the government, from the 
I purchasers and from the public, they were not being displaced by managers or accountants. Similarly, there was no evidence to suggest that NHS professionals were becomming deskiUed, deprofessionalised 
or proietarianised. The reality was that they, or rather, the processes of their work was becoming 
increasingly bureaucratised. 
I This link was described by a senior biomedical researcher in the trust as very formal and structured through staff 
appointments, with collaborative work also with the physiology and bio-chemistry departments ofthe university. 
"We 're also offoring honorary consultative contracts to senior academics I think without exception and we have joint 
objectives ofstrategy in terms ofR&D. I think that we would see ourselves as working in parallel. so there are very strong 
links there" (trust-based interviewee). 
The university medical school and the trust are seen as one and were talked about as one entity by all the interviewees. A:; such, 
When the acute teaching trust was mentioned, what was generally meant was the medical school (often referred to as the clinical 
school by interviewees). Indeed, whgen many ofthe interviewees referred to clinicians, what they meant was doctors, indicating 
the level of dominance achieved bu the medical profession (especially the hospital-based medical profession). However, the 
major community trust and the acute teaching trust were attached to the same university. A senior manager in the community 
trust explained. 
"We don '[ have a formal relationship with the university. but we have a lot of joint appointments ...about half our 
consultants are employed by the university. but work within the trust. so that's really the nature ofthe relationship. so we 
have formal contracts with the dean. the clinical dean, and we olso have regular meetings with the regis professor" (trust­
based interviewee) .. 
The relationship of the purchasing commission to Addenbrooke's was seen as very strong by interviewees from both 
institutions. The Regis Professor ofMedicine was a Non-Executive Director ofthe Health Authority and the Director ofPublic 
Health was a member ofthe Planning Resources Committee ofthe clinical school. 
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"we have a very very close informal working relatIOnship with the Regis and his team. Our relationship with the academic 
staff at Addenbrooke's is such that [ can pick up the telephone and talk to any professor that [ want to in the clinical 
sciences to discuss whatever needs to be discussed so they are very close" (health authority-based interviewee). 
Addenbrooke's, as well as having close links to the purchasing commission. also had clinical links to Hinchinbrook, with 
several linked (medical) appointments. Some minor specialties, wuch as neurology were also covered by Addenbrooke's. In 
addition. there were some ad hoc links, such as the medical school library, which practitioners could use. 
1 Papworth also had close links to the clinical school, to the extent that whilst not being a university department, did have a 
section in the University of Cambridge School of Clinical Medicine's Annual Report dedicated to research reports and 
publications produced by it Papworth employed a Director of Research and Development, who had an honorary appointment 
with the health services research group at Cambridge University. 
3 Finished consultant episode - the measure ofhospital performance used by the government. 
• See 'researcy policy and politics', below. 
, The aim and significant elements ofthe library were as follows: 
• 	 to link all libraries together into one network, through networking (electronic) skills development and primary care library 
and librarians project; 
• 	 to note that most information used at the time was numerical, but there would be an increased emphasis in the future on 
textual information for decision-making for evidence-based medicine; 
• 	 to aid decision-makers access 'all' the relevant information as 'the average clinician will find only about one fifth of the 
evidence available within the literature'; 
• 	 an award of£200,000 to the development of the library; 
• 	 a proposal to develop the library was passed by the RRDD in February 1995. 
6 These consisted of: 
• 	 The Clinical School Liaison Committee, an advisory group consisting of individuals from the Cambridge Clinical School 
and the Health Authorities, later replaced by the Universities' Liaison Committee, with a larger, broader membership; 
• 	 the Locally Organised Research Scheme (LORS) Committee, charged with administering responsive research funds and 
with a very biomedically-dominated membership (10 out of 13 members were medically trained ); 
• 	 The Public Health and Operational Research Advisory Committee (PHORAC), fOll11ed in response to the House of Lords 
'Priorities in Medical Research' report (House ofLords Select Conunittee 1990a) and charged with funding public health 
and operational (health services) research. Membership was much broader than the LORS Committee, with two public 
health consultants, three managers, a director ofnursing, two social scientist and the director of general practice studies at 
Addenbrooke's clinical school; 
• 	 The Institute ofPublic Health Management Board, formed in 1990 to oversee the work ofthe Institute of Public Health on 
behalf of its funders - the University of Cambridge Clinical School, the Regional Health Authority and the Medical 
Research Council. 
• 	 The Health Services Research Advisory Group, formed to oversee the regionally-funded Health Services Research Group 
at the University ofCambridge Department ofCommunity Medicine; 
• 	 The Outcomes Development Group, which was in the process of winding down. 
7 Dissemination was officially defined as 'making information available' and implementation as 'the adoption of health 
interventions which are shown by research to be beneficial and the discontinuation of those shown to be harmful' (Anglia and 
Oxford Regional Health Authority 1994a). 
8 Bandolier was a newsletter produced for Anglia and Oxford RHA, edited by Dr Andrew Moore, Dr Henry McQuay and DR 
JA Muir Gray at the Pain Relief Unit, Oxford 
9 This point is discussed later in this chapter. 
10 This was most marked in the community trusts, where the creation oflocality management restricted the chance for district 
nurses, for instance, to meet as a group. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CASE STUDY NUMBER 3 

SUFFOLK 

, ~,&.,' 
7.1 Introduction 
This case study, was conducted in Suffolk, a district covering a fairly wide geographical area in 
the East of England. There were no medical schools situated within the district. However, there 
were five provider trusts: two acute (Ipswich Hospital NHS Trust and West Suffolk Hospitals 
NHS Trust) and and three community (Allington NHS Trust, East Suffolk Local Health Services 
NHS Trust and Mid Anglia Community Health NBS Trust). Letters and accompanying 
documents were sent to chief executives of all the trusts and Suffolk health authority (HA) 
inviting participation in the research, as outlined in the methodology chapter!. In total, fifteen 
interviewees were questioned: Five from Allington trust, seven from Ipswich hospital, two from 
Suffolk HA and one from the regional research and development (R&D) office2• Interviewees are 
listed in Appendix 10. Due to timetabling difficulties, one of the interviews with an employee of 
the HA was conducted over the telephone (and recorded) but followed the same format in all 
other respects. All trust interviewees were either clinical or central trust managers. The findings 
of the following case study, differs slightly from the other two. Although the subjects covered in 
the interview protocols were all clearly of interest and importance, some issues were grouped 
together or subsumed under others to fit the circumstances of the interviewee's more closely. 
Nevertheless, many of the themes will be familiar to the reader. The district covered by this 
analysis was located within the same regional boundary as Cambridge and Huntingdon (Anglia 
and Oxford RHA). As such, much of the meso-level analysis in the previous case is equally 
applicable to this one and will not be repeated. Instead, the case study will primarily concentrate 
upon micro-level activity in Suffolk. 
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7.2 Marketisation, centralisation, devolution and accountability 
The analysis of interviews indicated that the creation of an internal market in the health service, 
has driven the issue of reflective practice and helped create a climate of opinion whereby self-
reflection (or evaluation) against desirable outcomes (evidence) was highly regarded, although 
not altogether possible. 
"people don " have at their fingertips the justification for what they're dOing, so in that sense it's 
driven people to begin to think much more about evidence (than they did) in a defenSive sense 
perhaps originally, but I think increasingly with the development ofbusiness patterns as part ofa 
contractual process, as a tool to reinforce arguments about changing practice" (trust-based 
interviewee). 
Interviewees agreed that the internal market had impacted on both the process and practice of 
the delivery of health care, with the emphasis on process following on from changes in practice. 
Concern with numbers and through-put was initially high and continued to be so, with the health 
authority and GP fundholders demanding a certain number of patients treated for a certain 
amount of money. This resulted in individual professionals feeling very pressured to try and meet 
demands and this appeared to be particularly true for the nurses and Professions Allied to 
Medicine (pAMS) interviewed. This pressure, some interviewees claimed, was having an 
adverse, stressful effect upon the workforce, making them ill. This was reflected in rising 
sickness rates, problems in recruitment and retention and high levels of stress in the workforce. 
Whilst one consultant accepted that there was an efficiency target to meet and inefficiency to 
eliminate, there were limits, he argued, and these were being reached. Another problem with the 
internal market related to competition. One interviewee referred to the 'research mafia', which, 
in some acute trusts, was driving through new developments (in this case, injected 
contraceptives). These involved risks being taken without proper evaluation, in order to obtain a 
competitive edge on rivals. 3 As such, the competition the NHS market and resultant separation 
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of purchaser and provider roles created some health problems and was the antithesis of what was 
intended. 
Both the formation of clinical directorates in the acute sector and locality management4 in the 
community were seen as the means to devolve decision-making and achieve an evaluative culture 
by local managers. Appendix 11 illustrates the management structure for Allington Trust. 
Similar documents were not available from the other trusts at the time. Management structures 
consisted of a core of central managers, accountants, directors and associated administrative staff 
housed in a trust headquarters or management block and a series of clinical managers based with 
other clinicians in service. Within this context, the role and control of information in the form of 
evidence-based medicine, quality and audit information, were paramount and a central element to 
the reforms and the concept of the internal market. 
"[The internal market has] changed practice a lot and it's made us have to sharpen up on what 
we deliver...] don't think it's actually made us write down or formulate that into why we've done 
it, we've just done it in response to the need. ] think the research and development that goes on 
here is... reactive" (trust-based interviewee). 
"] think over the last, probably ten years, the feeling is that we can't just rely anymore on what 
we have done, even though there may be clinical practice to show that it works, if it's not 
evaluated in a way that is credible, then perhaps there is still room for doubt" (trust-based 
interviewee). 
Overall, there was wide agreement amongst interviewees that the purchaser/provider divide, 
which helped create the internal market, had begun to create an evaluative culture. However, 
some reservations were expressed about changing too much, particularly at the health authority, 
where a public health consultant stated that "ifyou want to keep your job you don't upset too 
many people". A trust chief executive explained how he believed the internal market "creates 
the dynamic that creates the motivation, that makes people think", 
"] actually think the reforms, the purchaser/provider split, this element ofcompetition, this spot 
ofreal market, mis-managed market, managing market, or an internal market, was an absolute 
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necessity to create desirable change. and I'm sure we would not be here talking like this if that 
had not happened. We would still be closing ranks, defending ourselves. telling everybody we 
knew best, and you had got it all wrong -the world. the politicians, the public" (trust-based 
interviewee). 
Relations between purchasers and providers had undergone change over the year preceding data 
collection, as the health authority had merged to form one county-wide purchasing organisation. 
Staff had changed with the appointment of a new chief executive and director of public health 
and the atmosphere there was described as "very competitive". Similarly, there was the feeling 
in the district that senior staff at the health authority believed that there was one provider 
organisation too many and were looking to rectify the situation. This had caused some tension, 
particularly bet\veen community trusts.s A chief executive commented that there had been stress 
in the NHS during the preceding three to four years but that this had been engineered by 
politicians. The chief executive claimed that the government had told the purchaser to "find the 
levers and pull them on the trusts" and told the trusts to "screw the purchasers ". However, the 
relations between trusts and the health authority were described as "maturing", in line with the 
devolution of power from the centre to the locality. As such, the Conservative Government 
reforms had created a rather combative environment between purchasers and providers, as 
functions had been devolved. Nevertheless, the desire to maintain a separation between 
government policy and politics and the organisation and management of local health services was 
clear. The government clearly encouraged trusts and purchasers to battle it out, whilst 
remaining, or trying to be seen to remain, distant from the battle. 
An evaluative culture had, as previously discussed, also created a climate which allowed 
politicians, managers and the public to make judgements about clinicians. Such questioning 
helped open-up the previously closed working practices of the NBS and contributed to a 
'democratisation' of health care through an increased public input in decision-making processes. 
A more 'open' environment, where decision-making was more transparent, could be created in 
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this way. Indeed, the need to be open was recognised amongst the consultants interviewed, as a 
necessary element in the provision of a truly public service. 
Hi/we cannot put things to our constituents, whether they happen to be voters or patients, in an 
honest and intelligent way, which takes account ofdifferent levels of understanding, then we're 
failing in our jobs whether we're politicians or doctors" (trust-based interviewee). 
Although there has always been some form of 'rationing' in the health service, this was only just 
becoming explicit and the professional organisations were uncomfortable with it. Doctors and 
public health consultants interviewed complained that as the government had limited the 
resources available, they were forced into making rationing decisions for them, thus jeopardising 
their own professional activity and demoralising staff. But the public health consultants and 
doctors were in the spotlight when such decisions were made (as highlighted by the Child B 
case), and were held responsible and chastised by the public and media for doing so. It is not 
unreasonable to claim that devolved management and organisation was an attempt by the then 
government to force public attention onto health professionals and managers and make them 
responsible for rationing decisions. It could thus distract attention from the wider public debate 
concerning the funding of the NHS. However, there were clearly some advantages in devolving 
management and organisational responsibilities, and in principle the trend was welcomed by 
managers and clinicians. A particular issue in Suffolk which had been highlighted in the 
national newspapers, concerned the devolution of pay bargaining. The issue epitomised the 
conflicting desires of government over the running and operation of the NHS and was an 
interesting example of health policy implementation. The following section will, therefore, 
examine the devolution of pay bargaining in Suffolk. 
7.2.1 The devolution of pay bargaining 
The devolution of pay bargaining was seen as part of the government's efforts to devolve 
accountability for resource management to a local level. As such, it was also closely linked to the 
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issue of information, in which LT. was to feature heavily. The benefits, such as pay according to 
merit, were welcomed by many managers. However, the government's sensitivity to the public 
(media) gaze and the apparent regular rule changes which it introduced annoyed and confused 
managers. The issue at the acute unit had received much media attention, and placed the hospital 
management in the spotlight. 
"the trouble is that ifyou get it wrong ofcourse, they [unions and the government] jump on your 
backs at the same time; but that's our job, that is public service, it's part ofnational politics, 
it's high on the agenda. We are going to be kicked around in the next couple ofyears... We 
work in }ish bowls, the public glare. media glare. and the politicians just keep changing their 
minds, moving the goal posts" (trust-based interviewee). 
Although such managers were not the subject of such overt monitoring as clinicians were, they 
were still very much in the public eye. They were subsequently under pressure on the one hand, 
to adhere to government employment norms and, on the other, to submit to pressure from others 
to stick to existing standards, supported by the public and professionals. The site of conflict, 
therefore, was at the periphery, away from the government, who subsequently largely managed to 
avoid the public gaze and accountability for their own policy. However, messages corning from 
the government were reported as confusing, to the extent that it was difficult for anybody to know 
what was going to happen that year. With an election fast approaching in 1997, commitment to 
controlling local pay bargaining by trust management was waning, given that a new (Labour) 
government was expected to be elected and that it would scrap local pay bargaining anyway. 
There was no doubt that resistance to the NHS pay reforms from clinicians was strong. The 
traditional Whitley pay council system was viewed by the government and managers as complex 
and inflexible. However, a localised system was viewed as simple, responsive and based on merit 
by the government and trust managers. Wage costs were seen by the government as an area, if 
not one of the major ways through which expenditure in the NBS could be reduced. But control 
over wage costs was also a major way that local managers could control health care workers and 
ensure their adherence to employment norms. Awarding staff pay increases according to merit 
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was one succesful way of achieving control. The issue was a contentious one for the government 
and resistance from workers of all kinds was high. Resistance was strong, particularly from 
physiotherapists. The Chartered Society of Physiotherapists was, according to interviewees, very 
outspoken on this subject, but this was seen as an attempt by some interviewee's to protect their 
own waning power. The interviewee's saw the union as hanging on to something it could fight 
for, at a time when it had allowed the nature of the service around it to change, without playing 
any significant role in that change. 
7.2.2 Audit in the NBS 
Michael Power (1994, 1997) argued that audit was increasingly used by managers to monitor and 
retain control over the functions they had devolved. There was no doubt from the evidence 
gained from the case study that audit had rapidly expanded in the NHS. Outside of the 
traditional centres of research (the medical schools), audit in particular was high on the agenda. 
"now audit is in the hearts and minds ojevery member ojstaff. And audit means evaluation, it 
means as well, that we can then prove to our purchasers what we are really doing and what the 
world is about, whether it's auditing standards oj patient satisfaction through to the obvious 
clinical audit" (trust-based interviewee). 
However, there were some dissenting voices, for example, a medical director described audit 
arrangements with the purchaser as 'stylised', with the purchaser expressing little interest in his 
trust. This sentiment was expressed because the health authority had recently undergone a 
substantial amount of change and reorganisation, gaining a new director of public health. As 
such, it was yet to establish a fully proactive role in the audit agenda within the interviewee's 
trust. Nevertheless, other audit arrangements were strong. The need to audit was contained both 
within health authority contracts with region and those between trusts and the health authority, 
with a public health consultant sitting on each trust audit committee. Audit agendas were agreed 
between the two agencies, starting with the government agendas. Health authority staff and 
central trust managers themselves did not generally audit their own work. A performance review 
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mechanism with the regional health authority was the principal fonn of monitoring health 
authorities and Independent Perfonnance Reviews (IPR) for individual staff. 
Analysis revealed that audit, as well as research, was clearly more 'advanced' in the acute than 
community sector of the health service, probably reflecting the historical precedence given to the 
more 'glamorous' hospital-based services. There was also a clear distinction made between 
medical and multi-professional (clinical) audit within the district, despite government moves to 
the contrary. Medical staff both chaired the audit committees in the acute and community trusts. 
A nurse adviser with a responsibility for quality had an audit remit at the acute unit but this did 
not appear to have any jurisdiction over medical audit. The impact of medical audit has been 
documented elsewhere (Kerrison et al. 1994), and the situation in Suffolk shared many 
similarities. Nevertheless, several important features emerge from the data that warrant further 
attention and analysis. Audit has focused attention on the process of care as much as, if not more 
than, on the actual clinical outcomes. This is perhaps not so surprising given the increased 
emphasis upon multi-professional audit. However, audit was the principal method to normalise 
clinical practice, or at least foster a reflective (evaluative) ethos amongst clinicians: "and I think 
that process has started people to think about, should I be doing this or should somebody else be 
doing it, or should I be talking to somebody else before I consider doing it, and 1 think that's 
been the driving force for that type of assessment of what we do" (trust-based interviewee). 
Senior managers did not conduct research and audit, they just ensured the mechanisms were in 
place, that it was being done to meet the demands of purchasers and the government. They had 
some, but not much input on agendas themselves; their work principally focused upon process. 
Purchasers did not audit what they did, although they should, argued one health authority-based 
interviewee. The situation supports Power's (1994, 1997) notion regarding audit; that what was 
more important was that the processes were in place to conduct audit, rather than there 
necessarily being more actual audit conducted. Of course, processes had to be in place before 
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audit could be conducted anyhow, but this was more important than carrying out the audit itself. 
Nevertheless, an increase in the amount of audit had occured and it was clear from senior trust 
managers interviewed that the attempt was to create a more 'evaluative' culture and, therefore, in 
many ways foster a more normative environment6• Such attempts to normalise clinical practice 
involved overcoming considerable forces of inertia, and making the structures and system of 
power appear 'normal'. The amount oflegitimisation awarded to the system of power, however, 
was dependent upon the power, cultural and political position of the individual on whom it was 
exercised. The nurses and P AMS appeared to be more amenable to accepting audit and change, 
or at least prepared to work with it than the doctors, possibly because it offered them some 
freedom from medical dominance. 
"staff are more comfortable with the process, it doesn't feel like 'Big Brother' looking at you 
and criticiSing you whatever aspects come up and we have lots of audits of our clinical 
environment that again are very useful" (trust-based interviewee). 
The interview extract is an interesting one as it acknowledges a notion of panopticism inherent 
within the audit framework. It also recognises that they have moved beyond it, so that the 
process appears normal and natural. Audit was generally seen as the main form of monitoring 
and evaluation. The change in culture needed for audit and evaluation was developing and 
people were slowly adopting that 'evaluative' attitude. Audit had particularly increased in profile 
over the five years preceding the interviews, as it received more investment; medical trainees 
were reported as having a more robust attitude to what should be audited and how. Indeed, a 
medical director argued that it was mostly the powerful people in the trust who didn't know how 
to get into the audit and R&D process. However, for non-medical staff, quality, documentation 
and Patient's Charter standards (DR 1992b) were the principal targets of audit. Doctors were, 
consequently, regarded as posessing more advanced knowledge and skills in conducting audit and 
evaluation than other professional groups. This can be attributed in large part to the specialised 
training doctors receive, and the time they are allocated for professional development activities; 
time that other occupational groups do not have the 'luxury' of having. 
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Audit was cited by many clinicians as the means to prospectively prove to purchasers the value of 
what they were doing. However, as Kerrison et al (op.cit.) demonstrated, the medical profession 
have largely controlled what they audit and how it was audited and presented, and the evidence in 
this case study supports this view. Audit was used to prove the value of services, as well as 
offering managers a means of questioning existing practice. However, only the medical 
profession really had the technical ability to conduct service evaluations. New services should 
only be introduced if they can be properly evaluated beforehand and this approach was 
increasingly becoming the norm. A doctor explained how they introduced a pacemaker 
implantation service. He asked the in-coming cardiologist to be involved in an audit of the 
introduction of that service. The interviewee described the way he managed to convince staff to 
conduct the audit: 
"sold it to him along the lines that the health authority, as purchaser. would be looking very 
carefully at quality issues as well as quantity issues, and it would be a good opportunity to bring 
that kind ofservice to Ipswich to show that it was possible to provide a good service to reqUired 
standards" (trust-based interviewee). 
According to the interviewee appropriate standards of practice were worked out~ that were then 
built into the audit cycle. This then gave them good information for 'sensible' discussion with 
the purchasers. Indeed, the quality lead at the trust stated that all audit results were 'shared' with 
the purchaser, both clinical and organisational. The other occupation groups in this analysis, as 
might be expected, were more inclined to audit on a responsive basis according to central and 
local management dictates. However, a lack of adequate outcomes indicators against which 
practice could be evaluated meant that there was little else that they could do. The lack of such 
indicators, in turn, was a reflection of the comparative lack of research conducted in the non­
medical fields and a subject that will be returned to later in the chapter. 
The government emphasis upon multi-professional audit was being felt locally, but little of 
substance appeared to have occurred. The multi-professional audit group at the acute trust was 
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described as limited in scope, with everybody in it doing their own thing, then meeting in the 
group to discuss it. The medical staff were also seen as not wanting to be shown up in front of 
the other stafr; who themselves, were being frightened off because the doctors were seen to be so 
good at audit and research. However, insufficient time to reflect upon their practice in general 
was a feature common to all health care practitioners. There was a conflict between the need to 
work flat out to get through their workload, on the one hand, and the requirement to take a step 
back and reflect and normalise behaviour in terms of effectiveness and evidence-based clinical 
practice on the other. "It's not about what people should be doing, it's about what they feel able 
to do, both in terms ofwhat they can put on their own staff. and what they have time to actually 
do" (trust~based interviewee). This is also indicative of the concentration upon economy and 
efficiency measures, to increase output, rather than upon effectiveness to improve clinical 
outcomes. Such a concentration was inevitable when finances were tight and confirmed the 
priority of meeting financial norms, rather than to those maximising health gain. 
In summary, therefore, it can be concluded that audit was gaining in profile in the NHS in 
Suffolk, but that the medical profession still dominated the audit process. Audit was more 
'advanced' in acute services, and was the principle source of evaluation for all clinicians, 
although not everyone ageed: some saw it as 'stylised'. Central trust and health authority staff 
did not audit their own work (apart from financial audit). For clinicians, however, audit in 
general often focused llpon the process, rather than the outcome of their work. Nevertheless, 
audit was being used as a form of power, to normalise and regulate clinical practice. However, 
the panoptic nature of this audit, whilst initially overtly in the minds of non-medical clinicians, 
was becomming a normal, accepted and invisible aspect of daily life in the NHS. Doctors, in 
contrast to other clinicians, however, proactively and independently conducted their own audit, 
indicating their control of the audit agenda. However, the doctors interviewed, acknowledged 
that they did have to join in the 'game' with managers, to some extent, in order to maintain their 
control. 
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All NBS professions had professional codes of accountability, of course, but the new demands 
emanating from government were widely recognised and approved of by interviewees. However, 
the reactions 'to these demands varied. The Griffiths Report (DHSS 1983) introduced line 
management into the hospital service. From a time when doctors could not say who their boss 
waSt now accountability was "pushed in their face ". However, it was widely recognised that most 
doctors when asked were still likely to state that they were accountable to their patients and those 
doctors interviewed confirmed this fact. Evidence from the study indicated that consultants saw 
their line manager as the medical director, rather than the chief executive or chairperson, a point 
recognised by chief executives. The point also indicates the failure of the reforms to subsume 
doctors within the management structures and make them directly accountable to (non-medically 
trained) trust managers. This was highlighted by the failure of managers to gain easy access to 
the results of audit and research conducted by doctors. The solution was to involve doctors in 
management and in that way they would come to appreciate the idea of resource management: 
"and they really begin to take into their minds the idea ofresource management and spending 
tax payers money" (trust-based interviewee). A chief executive estimated it would take until 
about the year 2000-2002 before audit would playa part in resource use and provision. However, 
it was also acknowledged by others that the CaIman Review (1995) would result in medical 
training producing specialists, rather than consultants, resulting in doctors with a different 
attitude that would present managers with less of a problem regarding accountability. 
Demands for greater accountability appeared to have more impact upon nurses in the acute 
sector. All Project 2000 nurses, it was recognised, were trained with rules and regulations of 
accountability in mind, so that it was "entrenched in staff'. Such demands had reportedly 
improved documentation, which nationally, were described as "dreadful". For example, there 
was a requirement for nurse managers to rewrite job descriptions, review procedures and policies, 
support staff in decision-making, and look at who does what and amend their skill mix 
accordingly. However, the time taken to draw up such documentation meant that there was still a 
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long way to go before this would fully be implemented. The importance of accurate 
documentation was echoed several times, probably reflecting a heightened sensitivity to public 
attention and 'legal responsibility at a time when the public were increasingly inclined to 
challenge professional decision-making. It also reflected, above all else, a heightened 
susceptibility to government control. Some confusion amongst staff regarding the extent and 
need for accountability was reported, but this was being rectified, through, for example, having 
external speakers address staff in meetings on the subject. Nevertheless, responses to the need to 
be more accountable amongst some of the non-medical occupations interviewed could almost be 
seen as one of paranoia and exposure to 'higher' powers, through embroiling workers in a 
network of bureaucracy, which ensured the systematisation of procedures of work and clinical 
knowledge. There were some worries that the demands for greater accountability centred upon 
meeting output demands, with an emphasis upon quantity rather than quality. However, evidence 
suggested that treatment protocols were being developed based upon best outcomes: 
"!fit was something that was a bit more Wishy washy like for instance some ofthe inflammatory 
bowel disease management protocols, what we've done with that, we do a literature review and 
look at what's been done, what had the best outcomes, what our needs are here and then draw up 
our own protocol based on that. So if things weren't cut and dried we would look at what's 
ava; lable and decide 'well this is what we'l/ do '. So we at least have a consistent approach 
based on the best o/what was available" (trust-based interviewee). 
The statement illustrates how clinicians were not necessarily opposed to the concept of clinical 
accountability to managers, so long as the issues addressed did focus upon effectiveness. Indeed, 
the situation could be, and was, used to their advantage~ such information could be used to try to 
gain more money from purchasers. A problem that this presented, however, was that it might 
simply replace one 'tablet of stone' with another. For this reason, the notion of an 'evaluative 
culture', or 'change-mindedness' was important in ensuring a continuous expression of power 
through normalisation. However, information systems in the community sector in particular, 
needed to be developed so that managers could identify what people were doing and issues of 
effectiveness covered as well as efficiency. In practice, this was an issue called for from all 
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sectors of the service· purchasers and providers alike. It illustrated, however, the priority which 
efficiency received over and above effectiveness issues in the NBS.7 Although individual 
autonomy was' reduced by the reforms (see above) the directorate structure of local services did at 
least offer clinical managers control over budgets and left them with the autonomy to control 
staffing to use resources as they saw fit and to have responsibility for them. The problems 
devolution presented were discussed in chapter three. Budgets were established for directorates 
and then for departments within these directorates. In theory, this could be a way to force clinical 
managers to normalise behaviour and stick to centrally~efined budgets. As directorates, if one 
manager overspent, the others would have to underspend to balance the directorate's books. 
However, it appears that staff who had overspent, saw it as placing the directorate's and 
therefore, central trust budgets under pressure, rather than other departments within the 
directorate. 
(~my intention for this year is to fill the posts so that next April I'm actually in an overspend 
position and 1 can use them as cost pressures, [1 can say] here's the work I've done, and this is 
what you've for your money ... cough up for the next year" (trust-based interviewee). 
Power was therefore expressed back up through the hierarchy. However. the ability to express 
power in this way assumes a professional confidence and power, in this case, power through a 
limited resource: trained and skilled staff. Managers in purchaser and provider organisations 
were personally monitored through individual performance reviews (PRP) and peer review. 
Monitoring of departments and directorates, however, was principally through monthly returns 
and audit related to output figures. The monitoring was autornised, with the returns simply being 
fed into the computers at the service end and aggregated and interpreted by central management 
in trust headquarters and purchasers in their offices. 
In conclusion, therefore, analysis revealed that accountability was becoming increasingly 
significant in the Suffolk case study. The central issue was to draw doctors into management and 
make them accept a fundamental role in making and being responsible for resource management. 
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Similarly, for the nurses, midwives and PAMS, accountability was gaining in profile and 
importance. What characterised this demand for accountability amongst all clinicians was the 
desire from managers to homogenise practice to pre-defined nonns of behaviour. However, these 
norms, more often than not, related to meeting resource demands, rather than upon providing the 
most effective treatment, Such management efforts were viewed cynically by clinicians, who saw 
effectiveness of treatment as much closer to their own hearts (even if, as the evidence indicates, a 
significant amount of clinical practice is not effective). And such issues could be, and were, 
taken on board by trust managers, and used as bargaining tools to use against the health 
authority. In order to obtain such information, audit played an important role, as did Infonnation 
Technology (1. T.). However, I.T. systems in all sectors of the service were underdeveloped and 
investment in them from central government, minimal, much to the frustration of purchasers and 
providers alike. As such, information on performance of clinicians could only largely relate to 
quite crude financial and quantitative factors. In light of this discussion~ the following section 
will analyse the role of LT. in the context of such accountability demands, and the control of 
knowledge production. 
7.3 Knowledge, economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
The following section will examine the issue of knowledges and the state. The section will focus 
upon five elements in particular, which analysis revealed as significant in the debate about 
research and development in the NHS: information technology (LT.), educatio~ health services 
research~ developing an evaluative culture and the implementation of the results of research. All 
five elements together form a larger debate regarding the control of the production, dissemination 
and utilisation of knowledge in the NHS. Each element will be examined individually and in 
relation to the others to gain a wider understanding of research and development policy and its 
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implementation in the NHS in Suffolk. The section will conclude with a summary of the overall 
contribution of these factors and others discussed, to the role and control ofknowledge. 
7.3.1 Information technology 
Information technology (LT.) was identified by many interviewees as of particular importance, in 
terms of generating, using and controlling knowledge about service provision and matters 
concerning management. The poor quality of the existing information systems was frequently 
mentioned and an area highlighted by a number of interviewees as requiring attention, 
particularly in the community sector. Such systems were described as of limited use to central 
management teams for trend analysis, planning, and in formulating future policy. Information 
technology was also the means that enabled services to be decentralised and target setting and 
contracting to develop, and therefore, it was essential that they should operate efficiently. A trust 
chief executive explained: 
"in this place now you will find people sitting on the ends of terminals, accessing data bases, 
setting up their standard reports, setting up their own ad hoc reports, looking at life through 
knowledge rather than opinion. hunch, background" (trust~based interviewee). 
The monitoring and service evaluation mechanisms were seen by central trust management as 
slowing down decision-making, but minimising mistakes, thus increasing viability and raising 
the quality: "ofnot just deCision-making but the services themselves, because having established 
a regime where the Board goes through that level of scrutiny, it's automatically cascading 
fonvard within the rest of the organisation and obviously that's the level ofscreening I will put 
on things" (trust-based interviewee). Systems were used to 'observe' clinicians and gain 
knowledge about them, but only in certain areas. The nature of the data required by managers, 
purchasers and the government has been previously discussed in this chapter, and in chapter four, 
with the principal focus being upon workload. Although clinical outcomes data were entered on 
to the system, the information was, allegedly, never used much, to the dismay of some clinicians. 
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Instead, knowledge focused almost entirely upon what clinicians did, and how, rather than of the 
effects of the clinicians' advice and treatment: 
«what does the physios do every minute ofthe day, how much is she ~pending driving, how much 
is she spending with patients, right, she's got some slack. Cut down on the driving, cut down on 
the admin and clerical" (trust-based interviewee). 
This focus on output was criticised by all interviewees, from all aspects of the service, including 
purchasers, who complained of inadequate coding systems: "Routine data systems do not easily 
lend themselves to forming a view on much at all" (HA-based interviewee). I.T. systems, 
therefore, were set up to collect inadequate input/output information. What interviewees 
demanded, was further development and capitol investment in hospital and trust information 
systems, which could provide meaningful data with which to measure the effectiveness of clinical 
practice. The situation, therefore, highlighted that control of knowledge and the means 
(technology) of producing that knowledge was a key to exercising power in the NHS. Purchasers 
and providers expressed a desire to collect more 'meaningful' data, based not just on what 
clinicians did, but how, in what way and what were the outcomes. Politics and economics 
litigated against this. The government's decision to limit public expenditure and concentrate on 
issues of economy, efficiency and eliminating ineffectiveness have ensured that these issues are 
paramount. Money was not offered to local services to develop the I.T. systems which would 
allow them to collect the data on effectiveness and outcomes which health care workers would 
have liked. This could in some large part be because the knowledge gained would be used to 
exhert a challenge to the governrnent~ effective, evidence-based medicine is not necessarily 
cheaper. New drugs, new machines, new procedures are often more expensive, and consequently, 
if existing methods of treatment worked, albeit less effectively, there was a reluctance to change 
them. However, I.T. had been recognised as a priority by the Central Research and Development 
Directorate at a relatively early stage and a Health Technology Assessment Priority Research 
Group established in part to address this issue. However, this had not had much of an impact on 
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the local services examined and none of the interviewees expressed knowledge of the group's 
existence. 
7.3.2 Education and training 
The provision of education and training for NBS clinicians was discussed at some length in the 
second case study. The issues discussed remained equally applicable to Suffolk, which of course, 
was based within the boundaries of the same Regional Health Authority. Nevertheless, analysis 
of interviews revealed that for public health, continuing medical education for the region was said 
to be reasonable for registrars, but very poor for consultants. However, a considerable 
commitment to staff development and education was stressed by senior managers in trusts. The 
intention was to empower staff and make clinical managers take some responsibility for 
developing an evaluative culture and consequently establishing a commitment to change. A 
learning environment within this context, was intended to encourage employees to take an 
interest beyond their jobs so that they could help shape organisational structures and values. This 
was to enable clinicians to learn on their own initiative, without the need for traditional teaching 
techniques such as lectures, so long as what the clinicians wanted to learn was commensurate 
with corporate goals. 
Through such moves, the links to professional 'cores' (Larson 1990) may also be weakened 
through drawing the clinicians away from their traditional centres of learning. However, the 
nurses, midwives and PAMS did not have a 'core' in the same way that the medical profession 
did. Education for them had only relatively recently entered the higher education arena. As 
such, it is probably more appropriate to see these measures as helping to prevent such cores 
developing. Nevertheless, professional education and development, therefore, was oriented and 
funded to increase the utility of clinicians to achieving corporate, management, rather than 
professional goals, on an individualised, rather than professionally-organised basis. By 
implication, it also enabled management to begin to break down professional cohesion, making 
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clinicians more amenable to management control. In the community, for instance, locality 
management was seen as restricting the ability of some clinicians to learn from each other or 
communicate new ideas learned from elsewhere. This was because meetings were organised on a 
\ 
locality, multi-disciplinary team basis, rather than as individual professional (departmental) 
meetings. For physiotherapy, this was resisted and departmental meetings organised regardless. 
Nevertheless, clinical managers did express enthusiasm for the educational opportunities 
available, but lamented the fact that workload and finances were such that it was extremely 
difficult for clinicians to take time off to take advantage of them. This, despite trust 
management's stated attempts to free such time. 
7.4 Research policy and politics 
The following section will examine the issue of the impact of the changing nature of research and 
development policy on the NBS in Suffolk. Suffolk was in the same Regional Health Authority 
as Cambridge and Huntingdon (the previous case study) and inteviews were conducted shortly 
after those in Cambridge and Huntingdon. As a result, the account of R&D activity at a regional 
(meso) level and in the teaching hospitals is equally applicable to this case. However, the 
following discussion will focus on how R&D shaped up in a non-teaching district and how the 
regional and national R&D initiatives impacted there. 
It was clear from analysis that an evaluative culture had been growing out of the reforms, with 
the drive coming from the central NHS bureaucracy and from some of the professions themselves, 
rather than through the Research for Health strategy (op.cit.). It was only when the Culyer 
recommendations were made (Culyer 1994) and the Government gave R&D a political boost 
through their espousal of evidence-based medicine that R&D began to be looked at seriously by 
local hospitals and trusts. The teaching hospitals were generally seen by interviewees as at the 
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centre of evaluative activity, through their historical association with research, and because many 
of the resources were allocated to them. It was evident from the interviews, however, that the 
Culyer reforms (ibid) were having some effect in encouraging the adoption of this culture all 
round. Adding emphasis to this expansion was the development of more degree-based 
occupations. such as physiotherapy, and other paramedical groups, such as nurses, whose 
members were increasingly gaining degrees. However, Project 2000 was also seen by 
interviewees as being one of the biggest boosts to nursing research, as it also contained a research 
element within its training programme (although in reality, this could not really be termed 
research training, as it was so limited). However) non-medical clinical education was moving 
into the higher education institutions, linking clinical and academic skills together and driving 
research (or the ability to appraise research) further forwards in the non-medical professions. 
The ability of clinicians in these centres to understand, critique and reflect upon research 
evidence, therefore, had increased.8 However, as the time to actually conduct research was limited 
by service demands, managers were increasingly happy to match academic staff who had the 
skills and access to research resources, with clinical staff who had access to raw clinical data. 
Additionally, as many of the non-medical courses were conducted in higher education institutions 
outside of the teaching hospitals, these institutions' utility to the government was also increased. 
Indeed, the contractual basis on which research was funded, forced these institutions to compete 
for funds, and consequently may have further ensured this utility to the government. As a result, 
knowledge and knowledge production was increasingly under the governmenfs control. 
In 1994, the Culyer Report (Culyer 1994) explained the need to conduct research outside the 
main teaching centres (which were concentrated in the major cities) and to spread the base of 
research, particularly into the primary and community care sectors. This occurred at a time when 
the government had really started to take up the mantle of evidence-based medicine. The issue of 
research, therefore, began to be placed on the agendas of managers and clinicians in non­
teaching hospitals and community trusts and was increasing in profile on the back of the rise of 
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audit and quality initiatives. So this proved to be in the case of Suffolk. However, more senior 
managers and doctors were, as might be expected, informed earlier and more comprehensively, 
than others. The doctors were informed earlier because research and development played more of 
a role in their profession and because the lead research and development officers (LRDOS)9 were 
the medical directors. Central trust and health authority managers were informed earlier 
principally because the information was targetted at their networks and because they were more 
responsive to government policy, being accountable via NBS regional health authorities for its 
implementation. 
Legislation arising from the Culyer Report required all NBS organisations to conduct an 
inventory of research activity and publish it in the form of a 'declaration' (Culyer 1994). The 
intention was to ensure that all research activity was accounted for, properly costed and not 
unofficially subsidised by the state. It was to be of a rigorous academic standard and not a 
replication of work already covered. In effect, the main way was to create a 'level playing field', 
whereby all research in the first instance, was visible, regulated and standardised; open to the 
public gaze or, in this case, to the gaze of the public regulators (the NBS E regional R&D office). 
The regional manager of R&D reported that he spent ~all his waking hours' implementing the 
Culyer recommendations, which had created a considerable amount of work and bureaucracy 
through all levels of the service. Research and development, through the Research for Health 
strategy (DR 1991b, 1993a) had become much more centrally directed through the development 
of changing structures and funding mechanisms. Interviewees accepted that the principles were 
good so long as issues of effectiveness were the key focus of attention. However, the process of 
changing people's beliefs and attitudes regarding clinical practice was expected to take several 
years, by which time "it will be easier and a part ofpeople's life to assemble evidence about 
what they do" (trust-based interviewee). Information technology was enabling the 
decentralisation of decision-making through target-setting and the contracting process and it was 
hoped that through this means, more outcomes data could be collected. As such, R&D, LT. and 
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audit were linked together in an attempt to create what could be termed an 'evaluative' or 
'normative' culture' (which will be discussed later in this chapter). The health authority did not 
ask trusts to substantiate service provision with the results of research but did agree some audit 
topics and set a common agenda in terms of outcomes and resources. However, if there was no 
personal interest in practice guidelines coming out from the central NBS bureaucracy (such as 
Effectiveness Bulletins) they were, by and large, ignored by clinicians. Although doctors, for 
instance, were regarded as a research-based profession, they resisted agendas set by politicians, 
prefering peer group pressurelO• However, they were becoming more amenable to such issues, 
some interviewees' argued, facilitated by changes in the nature of their education and training. 
Doctors were attracted to health services research now because although, strictly speaking, the 
agendas were not seemingly their own, the money was there. However, committee meeting 
minutes indicated that some social scientists were also having an increased profile on research 
committees, particularly health economists. 
The medical profession continued to be the most dominant profession, and continued to dominate 
research committees at all levels locally, regionally and nationally. Issues of effectiveness, 
therefore, were still largely determined by doctors themselves. Although it may be simple to 
dismiss this as professional conspiracy, this was not necessarily so. Rather, the situation was a 
self-perpetuating one. The medical profession had the history, techniques and strength of 
(research worker) numbers the other professions simply did not have. Analysis indicated that the 
vast majority of research funded by the region was conducted by doctors from the teaching 
hospitals in bio-medical subjects. The researcher networks were close and the major researchers 
were well known to each other and sat on different local and regional committees. As a 
consequence, they were also well known to the regional research office. This was reinforced 
through the regional manager of R&D, who was also a professor at the Cambridge University 
(Addenbrooke's) medical school. 
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The common, dominant, 'proper' mode of address for all doctors (the randomised control trial­
RCT) remained dominant. Several interviewees complained that doctors, by dominating research 
committees, ensured that the research techniques specific to their profession, i.e. the RCT, were 
looked at much more favourably than other methodologies and thelefore, received preferential 
funding. It was being used to a much greater extent than other methodologies. to the extent that 
researchers using other methodologies were de-authorised or exc1udedll . Despite the rhetoric of 
Research for Health (DH 1991b, 1993a) and the Culyer Report (1994) to shift the focus of 
research into the community and primary care sectors, this had not been realised and activity had 
largely remained in the traditional medical centres. Furthermore, what research was conducted 
outside the teaching hospitals was principally confined to the acute sector, where consultant 
doctors predominated. Given that health services research was as new to most of the research 
'establishment' in the region as it was to others~ it might have been expected that a significantly 
larger proportion of funded projects be conducted elsewhere. This was not the casel2. There was 
no evidence to suggest a conspiracy between these individuals. However, interviewees in Suffolk 
did express a dissatisfaction with the distribution of research funds and complained of bias. The 
process of applying for funds was described as extremely time consuming, with little return and 
poor feedback upon rejection. However, an interviewee from the Regional R&D office argued 
that the quality of all proposals had risen under the new system and that funds were, in fact, not 
being used up. Health services research, he argued, was seen as a non-discipline by academics at 
the medical schools in the region and it was not until the reforms that the desire for quality 
information, on which to design and base the NBS, took root. 
The regional R&D office were working to change this attitude and make clinicians question 
practice and spend limited resources effectively. Although this had usually happened, it was now 
more transparent and the professional organisations were very uncomfortable with it. Some 
managers and clinicians saw the changes described above as an opportunity to compete on an 
equal footing with the larger centres for health service research funds (or practice ..based research 
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as it was tenued) to develop their own organisation and practice. However, Culyer (1994) also 
recommended that the bulk of research activity should remain in the major centres of research 
excellence. There appeared to be something of a contradiction, therefore, between moves to 
, 
create a more evaluative NHS and the recommendations of Culyer. However, as previously 
stated, managers and clinicians in Suffolk were, by and large, actually looking for development 
funds. Nevertheless, the increased competition posed a considerable threat to the medical 
schools' income. 
7.4.1 Developing an evaluative culture 
The following discussion will explore further the development of a 50-called 'evaluative' culture 
in the NHS in Suffolk. The issue was a recurring theme in the interviewees' comments and was 
especially important to trust managers. The issue is one which links many of those previously 
discussed. Most notably, the discussion illustrates the relationship of research, development, 
audit and I.T. in providing knowledge which is more in line with NHS management agendas. 
The latter requires that knowledge is systematically collected on the volume, nature and outcomes 
of service provision, that managers have access to all results and contribute to agendas, and that 
clinicians come to think in tenus more akin to the values held by the central trust and health 
authority managers. Hence, the issue also had clear implications for clinical accountability. 
Developing an evaluative culture was really a central element to facilitating the implementation 
of research results into clinical practice (a subject which the following analysis will assess). As 
such, it was an attempt at providing a more cost effective service. However, although R&D was 
increasing its profile in Suffolk, an increasing profile was not the same as a high profile. 
There was some history of assembling research bids for funding and actually conducting research 
at the acute trust, ifonly as part of medical training. 13 Consequently, it might have been expected 
that it was above-average for its type, in tenus of research and evaluation. This, to a certain 
extent, appeared to be the case. Research activity, however, in its strict sense, appeared to be 
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confined to the medical profession, and largely restricted to conducting clinical trials and 
registrars undertaking their university research projects. That notwithstanding, some consultants 
were conductirig research linked to a nearby telecommunications research centre and a northern 
university. The only research activity raised by the other professionals interviewed related to 
undergraduate projects and 'extended' audit work. One interviewee claimed, however, that the 
audit that was conducted was primarily related to surgery; audit meant surgeons auditing what 
they did in the theatre, which, according to the interviewee was a view shared by the audit 
commission. 
The community trust itself, it appeared, like most community trusts, had less research and audit 
activity than its acute counterpart, and had nothing in the way of a research culture. However, 
both trust chief executives of the major trusts in the case study expressed a desire to expand their 
research activity as part of a wish to develop an evaluative culture in their respective 
organisations. The health authority had little involvement in research and development work 
itself, except in the case of one public health consultant who was involved in developing 
community care packages. A certain amount of frustration was detected in the public health area. 
Public health consultants interviewed regarded the issue as one for both their organisation and 
the regional R&D office; they felt that the latter had excluded them from their discussions, or 
had failed to give them much support. The public health consultants believed that they had made 
attempts to raise the profile of R&D as they were conscious that public health: "represented the 
R&D element of the purchasing organisation. Not least because most ofus here are medically 
qualified people"(HA-based interviewee}. 
R&D and forming an evaluative culture in Suffolk was seen as gaining in profile less by the 
doctors in the trusts than by the other professional groups. Like audit, however, the medical 
profession was seen to be ahead of the nurses, contracts staff, paramedics and P AMS so far as 
conducting, appraising and developing research was concerned. Outcome indicators that had 
280 

been and were being developed were almost exclusively acute, medically-based, reflecting the 
dominance of research committees and funding by the medical profession. The chief executives in 
both the acute and community trusts were taking active steps to develop this culture~ in the acute 
trust, an associate medical director was appointed to do just this. 
"We are about to appoint a very senior consultant in this place as an associate trust medical 
director. and he is going to have a leading brief called Research and Development and Audit 
and his first job ofall. is to get an inventory ofwhat's going on in this place. Who is doing what, 
why they are doing it, where is the money coming from, and to give us a base ifyou like, from 
which we can begin to make bids for funds that are clearly going to be available now, for the 
centre and the regions to do research here, but we are very interested not in academic research, 
we are very interested in practice-based research, which helps us to improve as an organisation, 
helps the doctors to learn, and that knowledge gets transferred into the management ofthis place 
and ... the plan is [to make] resource decisions based on that research JJ (trust-based 
interviewee). 
The above statement illustrates the role research was to play in the strategic development of trusts 
but also shows how strategic development, research and audit were all interlinked. Another 
specialist post was created to monitor research and gain more detailed knowledge of workers, 
their work and behaviour. Such information was required by managers who used it to meet the 
demands of the government (via the NHSE Regional Offices) regarding the Culyer declarations. 
The community trust itself, had recently employed an audit and R&D co-ordinator, but the post 
was not at such a high high academic level within the organisation. Similarly, both trusts, like 
all the others visited whilst undertaking the fieldwork for this thesis, had a board member (again, 
the medical director) with an R&D role (their lead research and development officer). The trusts 
were clearly making a commitment to manage and co-ordinate the production and utilisation of 
knowledge. Such control was being led by central trust managers, so that what was deemed 
'relevant' knowledge, could be seen to be increasingly controlled by managers. 
The role of R&D and audit were key features of the formation of an evaluative (nonnative) NHS. 
However, it was envisaged by managers that the culture was likely to take several years to 
develop as traditional attitudes were gradually replaced by newer ideas. Such a culture does not 
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necessarily require clinicians to actually conduct research themselves, but they should know how 
to access and evaluate existing information. This was aided by the increasing number of 
clinicians with degrees, but also by the critical appraisal workshops organised by the regional 
R&D office. However, as discussed throughout the course of this chapter, district general 
hospitals and community trusts were looking to conduct some form of research along with audit 
In practice, however, it appeared that what they were intending to conduct was development 
work, rather than research. They were, consequently, looking for the R&D funds to be able to do 
that. The issue highlights a concern which arose throughout the course of this study; that is, 
what is the distinction between research, audit and development14• Separated funding streams for 
each reinforced the idea that they were distinctively different. The fact that the personnel taken 
on to lead research in these trusts also had an audit function indicated the link as they saw it. In 
fact, although the difference between research and audit had been debated and defined by 
academics and has continued to do so (Black 1992), it was still of concern to managers and 
clinicians, who often talked of 'extended audit' or 'mini-trials' as research and would look for 
funding it. It would appear that development funds would be of more relevance to them in 
helping to form a localised 'evaluative culture'. 
The need to build auditable outcomes into research as a method to facilitate their development 
and implementation into clinical practice was also requested by interviewees, but appeared to be 
an unresolved issue and not one given precedence by researchers. This is an important issue, of 
course, as research is of less use if it is ignored by practitioners. As such, the implementation of 
the results of research was a significant feature affecting the NHS in Suffolk. However, this was 
intrinsically related to the role and control of knowledge and of the working practices of health 
care professionals. In the light of this discussion, the following section will evaluate on the basis 
of the evidence gathered in Suffolk the notion that there has been a displacement of experts such 
as doctors and physiotherapists with experts such as managers and accountants. 
282 

7.5 Professions, experts, knowledge and control 
The following section will draw together many of the features discussed during the course of this 
chapter to illustrate that there has been an attempt by NHS managers in Suffolk to increase 
control over health care provision and health professionals. The section will initially look at how 
GPs have contributed to the increased specialisation of the NHS workforce. It will also establish 
how managers have increasingly sought to control the terms of public discourse, placing 
economy, efficiency and the elimination of ineffective clinical practice increasingly into the 
public profile and into the minds of clinicians in an attempt to introduce a notion of resource 
usage into clinical decision-making. 
The issues raised in this thesis indicate that implementation cannot be looked at in isolation. 
Rather a variety of factors must be examined to establish their relationship to one another and to 
the implementation process. Implementing the findings of research has remained a problem but 
analysis suggested that there was still a culture of 'doing' to patients largely without evaluating 
what was being 'done'. Interviewees described a service where professionals and service 
providers had traditionally worked in a rather fragmented way. Each profession and each 
specialty worked rather individualistically and specific services were split between providers, 
each of whom was working to tightly controlled budgets. However, interviewees commented on 
an increased focus on the process of providing NHS care. This focus, it was agreed. was 
facilitated to some extent by audit, and was important because it enabled providers and clinicians 
from the different disciplines to work together and reflect upon their new working relationships. 
A dietitian commented that this made them feel more professionally competent; it enabled the 
individual to hold a dialogue and co-operate with GP fundholders and to provide a more 
professional, improved and "seamless" service for patients. Indeed, a nurse manager described 
how her trust was now being presented as a specialist (secondary care) provider. The indications 
were that it was the GP fundholders (practicing doctors), rather than the health authority or 
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universities, who were the driving force behind such innovative practice. Through such 
initiatives, the necessary specialist practitioners required to break down the barriers between 
primary and community services were able to develop. As such, GPs were contributing to the 
further development of specialist practitioners in the health service, not just specialist medical 
services. However, that notwithstanding, there was no indication that these local changes in 
practice were being evaluated to assess their actual effectiveness, and it was, consequently, 
difficult to assess their true impact. But the indications were favourable. 
Analysis revealed discontent with medical training from some outside the profession, indicating 
the failure of the reforms to open up the profession and make it more responsive to change and 
management agendas: 
"1 think the other real diffiCUlty we have with research, which isn't so much about the writing up 
afresearch but more to do with the way we train junior doctors, is that they [doctors} are not 
trained in this country in my view, to be individualistic in any sense shape or form. They're not 
trained to look at research and make their own decisions about what protocols they use. It is 
more a case ofthe consultant trained you, you've got to do as they do" (trust-based interviewee). 
I:. 	 There was clearly a desire on the part of central trust managers to see the nature of knowledge 
production for doctors change and a frustration with the inflexibility of existing systems, which 
they felt were a barrier, to provide an efficient and effective NHS. As the previous section on 
education indicated, an investment in continuing education for clinicians was made, particularly 
in the acute trust. However, again, this was under strict guidance of central trust managers. 
Continuing professional education always has been part and parcel of being a doctor but not so 
for nurses, midwives and P AMS. The investment, therefore, represented an attempt to rectify 
this situation to some extent, but also to try to instil in these clinicians a more sympathetic 
attitude towards corporate, management goals and values; central trust managers were very 
prescriptive in what they would fund. In this way, managers were playing an increasingly 
prescriptive part in defining knowledge agendas, but also in defining the terms of public 
discourse in the health service. 
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However, the previous section on research indicated that doctors were becoming more amenable 
towards health services research as a legitimate discipline, but were still not wholly convinced of 
its academic merits. Nevertheless, research committees and agendas were still dominated by 
doctors, as were audit committees in trusts. Consequently, effectiveness was still largely defined 
by the medical profession. The randomised controlled trial was still the dominant methodology 
and the dominant mode of discourse for the medical profession. Similarly, most research that 
was conducted and funded by the regional R&D moneys was conducted in acute settings. 
Although the government may have attempted to control the knowledge 'creators', that is, the 
academics in the teaching hospitals, the doctors had remained dominant and their position, 
protected by most of their colleagues. 
Managers in the trusts in Suffolk saw the Culyer reforms as an attempt to create a level playing 
field for accessing research funds and, therefore, took this as an opportunity to gain funds for 
their own trusts. However, analysis revealed that what they were really interested in was funds 
for development activity and researching development. The intention was that this activity, along 
with audit, research implementation and the development of I.T. and education systems would 
create a more efficient and effective service. In effect, central trust managers were trying, 
through linking these elements, to instil in clinicians a more overt notion of resource usage. As 
part of this process, new senior posts were being created, staffed by biomedically-trained 
individuals to help gain knowledge on clinicians and clinical performance and co-ordinate 
research, development and audit activity. Knowledge production and utilisation in trusts, 
therefore, was increasingly being oriented to match management agendas. However, the 
knowledge that was sought by managers and purchasers centred upon economy, efficiency and 
eliminating ineffective clinical (not management) practice. This was in preference to the 
research and promotion of effective clinical practice (a factor which clinicians saw as closer to 
their own professional values). As such, clinicians were still rather uninterested in management 
agendas, but nevertheless, were drawn in to a certain extent, to conform. Doctors, for instance, 
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were still resistant to management demands, although the more newly trained ones were seen as 
more sympathetic. 
However, the principal power base (the doctors-particularly those in the medical schools) have 
continued to resist government control and have so far managed to retain their power and 
dominate health and research agendas. In trusts, doctors still saw their line manager as the 
medical director, rather than a general manager. However, medical directors were board 
members and although this could be seen as the medical profession retaining a hold on the 
strategic direction and operation of trusts, it also meant that they were also directly implicated in 
management. It appeared that the government reforms had tried to introduce the notion of 
resource usage overtly into the work of doctors, by using health service managers (Aldford's 
(1975) so-called 'corporate rationalisers') as intermediaries. The government would not then 
have the responsibility for making rationing decisions themselves. Public health consultants were 
expected to think in terms of a cost-benefit approach and make purchasing decisions in 
negotiation with trust-based doctors, taking this into account in preference to most other 
considerations. The view was expressed that there was a concentration upon efficiency at the 
expense of effectiveness. Similarly, central trust managers were interested, first in cost-benefit, 
economy and efficiency, and second, in effectiveness. Managers were reasonably consistent in 
their working values and approaches accross both purchasers and provider organisations, though 
aims were rather different. Trust managers saw the money saved as their own, to invest in their 
services, whereas purchaser managers saw it as their own, to invest in services which they 
defined as necessary and worthwhile. 
Analysis revealed that the results of research and best clinical practice were principally accessed 
by clinicians from professional journals, conferences and the publication Bandolier. The 
implementation of the results of research was an important issue for most managers interviewed, 
who felt it contributed towards developing a research culture and providing an efficient and 
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-effective service. Implementation was the link between many of the factors outlined in the case 
study and a principal outcome intended for an evaluative culture, as the section will illustrate. 
Although medicine was seen as a research-based occupation, the doctors resisted the agendas set 
by politicians and managers, preferring peer-group pressure instead. The increased amount of 
information regarding evidence-based decision-making emanating from the central offices of the 
Department of Health, such as Effectiveness Bulletins, were reportedly ignored by most clinicians 
unless they had a particular interest in the subject. This is not to say, however, that clinicians did 
not take a personal interest in the latest information and keep up-to-date in their own specialist 
areas. However, a senior manager argued that only by getting more doctors in management could 
the issue be resolved. Clinical directors were allowed to keep the results of research and audit in 
the directorates, but clinicians were encouraged to voluntarily share findings. Estimates provided 
by managers interviewed were that it would take between 2000 to 2002 for the culture to change 
before audit, and hence evidence-based practice, would playa part in resource use and provision 
of care. Although the autonomy of doctors was not immediately at stake, the longer-term gains of 
managers was to bring doctors into the management fold, so that they would have to make their 
decisions on a more rationalised and routinised basis. The Cochrane database was seen as an 
important development by both senior management, doctors and public health consultants 
because its: 
• 	 Assessors were well regarded by clinicians; 
• 	 presentation was good (but needed getting used to); it 
• 	 drew attention to the most 'important' studies quickly: and 
• 	 for senior managers, the system "communicated how the material should be used so it was 
conSistently evaluated and compared'. It therefore helped homogenise clinical practice. 
However, interviewees' argued that there were still comparatively few topiCS covered by the 
database and it was restricted to RCTs and, therefore, medical outcomes. Upon closer 
examination, it became clear how few studies conducted actually meet the strict criteria given 
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most weight by the assessors. As such, recommendations for good practice were based upon 
comparatively few studies. Nevertheless, the Cochrane Centre, the Centre for Review and 
Evaluation and others, could be seen as 'buffers' between the medical practitioners and the 
government, filtering and distilling infonnation in line with government strategic policy and 
establishing norms for clinical practice that could be consistently applied throughout the NHS. 
Although, therefore, there was no challenge to the production, or nature of medical knowledge, 
there was a direct attempt to manage what was produced. But for some interviewees, the 
constantly changing social and political environment of the NHS, meant that when research 
results were published, they were not applicable. Most research projects, interviewees 
complained, did not produce outcomes which contained auditable standards. This reflects the 
academic distinction made between research and audit and allegedly hindered successful 
implementation. Research was seen by interviewees as written up to impress sponsors, 
professional (academic) colleagues and/or for professional development, not for decision-makers. 
Indeed, a lack of outcomes was lamented, especially for non-medical professionals and in 
community care in general, indicating how the implementation of evidence-based clinical 
practice was even more problematic beyond the acute-based medical profession. This provides 
further indication of the distinction between the knowledge creators in the universities and 
teaching hospitals and the wider NHS community, both in tenns of the nature of their work and 
its intended outcome and relevance to clinicians. 
To help combat this problem for those who managed local services, the implementation of the 
results of research was intended to occur through establishing the 'evaluative culture', described 
previously. This evaluative culture consisted of a combination of audit, development and 
researching development issues, supported by the creation of a 'learning environment'. The 
evaluative culture that managers were attempting to establish, however, appeared to be initially 
focussed at nurses, midwives and P AMS; doctors for the time being, were left to continue as they 
were. There was a general awareness amongst interviewees that the rising eminence of an 
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evaluative NHS culture was an inevitability when financial constraints were tight. However, a 
heightened awareness should not be confused with an existence. Developing an evaluative 
culture takes time; it develops at different rates across different sectors, areas, disciplines etc and 
was rather more complicated than initially envisaged. 
Stipulations regarding research-based practice were not generally made in trust contracts. 
Contracts between trusts and HAs were vast, complicated documents which most clinicians did 
not see and public health consultants rarely did. To make such changes was very time 
consuming, as a public health consultant explained: 
"It's always been the case that to get decisions made about planning. where requirements 
require contractual shifts, it's been a/most such a tortuous path to get anything to change. For 
every hour or two you spend outside the authority agreeing something, you might have to spend 
another ten within the authority steering it through. So that's a really hig thing. It's very very 
inefficient in tenns ofresources and ... we muddle through" (HA-based interviewee). 
Limited time and resources were issues to which interviewees constantly referred and arguably 
held back the implementation of research results. However, the concentration upon evidence-
based medicine drew research and researchers much more overtly into the political arena. The 
amount of time given to conduct or evaluate research was dependent upon the position research 
held on organisational agendas and as such was seen as an organisational, management issue. 
The Research for Health strategy (DR 1991b, 1993a) arose and was oriented to support 
government policy. Medical researchers and academics oriented to keep issues under their 
control but within the confines of such government policy. The focus on evidence-based 
medicine was seen by many interviewees as an attempt in part to instil in doctors, clinicians and 
local managers the notion of resource usage. Public health consultants were being asked by the 
Department of Health to ask doctors to take into account total resource issues and raise the cost 
profile in their consciousness. Beta Interferon was cited as an example, with many health 
authority's evaluating its cost effectiveness and deciding against buying it. "But if you're a 
patient with MS you say blow that, I want to try it, it's better than not having it" (HA-based 
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interviewee}. The result was a dilemma for all those working for the NHS, but was a major 
frustration for public health consultants, as the follo\ving quote illustrates: 
"So there's a fundamental population verses individual problem which the effectiveness agenda 
hasn't actually addressed... And that's at the core ofpublic health. That's a big thing which we 
just don't know what to do about, as well as the organisational relations with the centre through 
the region and how it's put on the agenda ofauthorities, and the information systems that have 
been developed" (HA-based interviewee). 
The health authority, notably the public health consultants (who were the principle individuals at 
the health authority who actually met the clinicians), were caught between the demands of the 
government and those of the patients and service itself. They were the individuals who worked at 
the purchaser/provider interface and who took responsibility (accountability), in consultation with 
doctors for rationing decisions, when it was clear that they as much as any other clinician would 
rather purchase according to effectiveness criteria. 
"J think the organisation doesn't quite see what R&D has to contribute. And J wouldn't blame 
the (executive) for this entirely. Because the health authorities over the last fifteen years have 
worked in a paradigm where they largely implement government policy and have had very little 
opportunity to innovate or change things locally" (HA-based interviewee). 
"We would like to show to the Department ofHealth that if they want efficiency they can't have 
effectiveness. What we're trying to do is run effectiveness alongside and demonstrate that it's in 
the interests of everyone to buy more effectiveness at the expense of efficiency" (HA-based 
interviewee). 
The need for the support required to make these decisions was evident, but the paradox talked of 
was fundamental. It was clear that the role and control of knowledge in the NHS was 
fundamental to how it operated and to controlling its future operation. This case study has paid 
particular attention to the issue as a central element and factor in the changing nature of the NHS 
and NBS research and development policy, and in the implementation of the Research for Health 
strategy Cop.cit.). The sections in this chapter illustrate how the control over the production and 
utilisation of knowledge was clearly a significant factor and feature of the reforms to the NBS in 
Suffolk and over the control of health care professionals by managers. This centred upon the role 
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of information technology, control over continuing professional development (education), 
research and development, developing an evaluative culture and implementing the findings of 
research. Again, what was clear from the analysis was that the overriding concern of the 
government and notably managers in all trusts, was upon economy, efficiency and the elimination 
of ineffective practice, rather than the promotion of effective practice. Information systems were 
oriented almost exclusively towards collecting information upon output, rather than upon the 
outcomes of what clinicians did. All those interviewed during the course of this case study 
expressed a strong desire to collect this information. Having said this, the data that was collected 
on effectiveness was not all utilised. Although managers and clinicians in both purchaser and 
provider organisations expressed a desire to collect and use more data on effectiveness and 
outcomes, it was evident that trust managers were trying to gain more control over what data was 
collected and how. This, as might be expected, did result in some disquiet, which was expressed 
by clinicians. The feeling of the community physiotherapists, was that community services were 
becoming more centralised and more like a hospital-based service. Local managers were viewed 
in the same way as they themselves were reported as viewing the government's management. 
"They feel that they're taking control [with) their statistics ... They're talking about things like 
central referral, and various other things [and} they feel that their autonomy is being eroded" 
(trust-based interviewee). Management control over clinicians was increasing and the evidence 
was that service specific values were, therefore, being displaced to some extent by the more 
abstract financial and statistical values. 
Interviewees singled out GP fundholders in particular as pushing them to raise their efficiency 
levels. Despite this, there were no complaints expressed about them by interviewees. This is an 
interesting point, as it illustrates the similarities in intention of GP fundholders and NHS 
managers, but the varying attutude and legitimisation health care professionals awarded their 
actions. This difference in attitude was probably a result of the increased respect and 
legitimisation a medical training bestowed on the GPs in the eyes of others. Managers appeared, 
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on the other hand, to be seen as rather more like intruders, interfering in the delivery of health 
care and causing what was seen to be unnecessary bureaucracy. 
7.6 Conclusion 
The NBS reforms, including those to research and development, aimed to take more control over 
clinical work and introduce a notion of resource use into clinical decision-making. The new 
research agenda was introduced to support this objective. Linking staff groups to their output 
leads to a questioning of whether roles are necessary in a given situation, as does an emphasis 
upon the health process, which audit and the health services research agendas themselves focused 
on. By using this strategy, the government challenged the very heart of professional identity, 
notably that of the medical profession, and exerted some control over the knowledge 'creators' in 
order to achieve greater compliance. The latter, however, managed to retain control of research 
agendas for themselves, and thus the professional authority of the medical profession has 
remained intact. Divisions in ranks have been highlighted and dissatisfaction expressed. 
In Suffolk, of particular note was an attempt by trust managers to increase their control, of what 
was done with the results of research, and hence, over the implementation process. This was 
important, as it represented an attempt to bring the notions of economy, efficiency and the 
elimination of ineffective practice into the forefront of clinical decision-making, in preference to 
a concentration upon promoting effectiveness. Service specific values were being replaced, to 
some extent, by more abstract quantitative and financial categories of knowledge, as Power 
(1994) contended. However, although managers had increased their control, they could not be 
seen to have displaced experts of the first order, such as doctors. For other experts, such as 
nurses and physiotherapists, managerial control was rather more overt, as managers increasingly 
controlled aspects of education and training, and used LT. systems to collect, monitor and 
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evaluate clinical perfonnance, principally in tenns of output, rather than effectiveness of 
treatment. In effect, therefore, clinicians have become bureaucratised, rather than displaced. 
There was no evidence to suggest that this had led to their becoming deskilled or proletarianised. 
In this sense, therefore, service specific values were being replaced to some extent by more 
abstract management and financial categories of knowledge. 
1 Replies were received from all but one institution ( a small community trust), which, despite follow up letters being sent, still 
did not reply and was consequently excluded from the analysis. In addition, the chief executive of one acute trust declined to be 
involved in the research., claiming that the organisation was going through a period of change and that the staff would be too 
busy to participate. Whilst it was obviously disappointing not to have included all institutions in the analysis, it was felt that the 
results would not have been significantly different if they had, as the trusts which did participate were generally deemed 
'typical'. 
1 The district under analysis fell within the same regional boundary as the second case study and, consequently, comments and 
documents from regional sources were used in both case studies. 
3 Serious side-effects discovered with injected contraceptives later led to them being withdrawn. 
4 The management of community trust services, organised on the basis of mUltidisciplinary teams, working in specific 
geographical localities. 
, Subsequently, a community trusts (not the one in this study) became the frrst in the country to go out of business, after the 
health authority withdrew it's contract with it 
6 This is explored in more detail later in this chapter. 
7 The issue of information technology (IT) is covered in depth later in the chapter. 
8 For physiotherapy, however, there was a clear distinction between the graduate and non-graduate clinicians. Graduates were 
noticeably more academically proficient, in terms of evaluating research evidence and making accurate diagnoses. However, 
they were less clinically proficient than those without degrees. This led one interviewee to remark that in her opinion, skilled 
physiotherapists would in future manage treatment. They would be directing multi-professionals or assistants, while the latter 
would undertake the 'hands on' work. 
9 The official research and development link to the Regional research and development office. 
10 This is an interesting point. The medical profession is usually regarded by most people as a research-based profession, but in 
practice, most doctors do not conduct research, or, as the Research for Health (DH 1991b, 1993a) and evidence-based 
medicine agenda implies, use the results of up-to-date research to inform their clinical practice. They do carry out a research 
project as part of their medical training, which is supervised by their consultant 'trainer', but this is not, in itself, research 
training. The medical profession in the main, therefore, is more research-based than other professions, but the work of most 
doctors could not really be described as 'research-based'. 
11 The membership profile ofthe R&D groups in East Anglia were outlined in Chapter six. 
11 See chapter 3 'The rise ofhealth services research'. 
13 The trust in this case study, had a good clinical reputation. Senior registrars spent time on rotation at the trust, whilst 
receiving tuition at Addenbrooke's medical school. It also had a reputation for attracting high calibre consultants, several of 
whom regularly lectured at the medical school. 
14 Research is the gaining of new, generalisable knowledge, while development is the dissemination, utilisation and uptake of 
that knowledge, audit tests whether that knowledge has been put into operation. 
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CHAPTERS 
CROSS-CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
8.1 Introduction; defining research and development policy 
Analysis revealed that macro, meso and micro-level R&D activity were very distinct, reflecting 
the fact that the NHS and the professions within it were not necessarily the coherent units 
commentators frequently spoke of. This distinction in micro, meso and macro-level activity was 
also reflected in conceptions of R&D policy. So what was research and development policy? The 
evidence in the case studies was that there was no such thing as research and development policy. 
What there was, was 'research' policy and 'development' policy; the two were distinct and 
separate from each other. Of course, the Research for Health strategy (DR 1991b, 1993a) 
represented 'official', national (macro) policy and this policy was essentially focused upon 
research, despite an initial recognition of the importance of development. Such official policy 
was formulated by government representatives, such as the NHS Director of Research and 
Development (DRD), or via government-appointed committees and was recommended for 
publication and implementation to government ministers before general release. A Department 
of Health policy unit supported government policy-making, and this operated as a separate entity 
to the other elements of the R&D strategy. In chapter three the nature of the Research for Health 
strategy (op.cit.) and its implications were explored. The national strategy was established to 
support government policy itself, specifically, the objectives in the Health of the Nation (DH 
1992a). Specific groups were established to lead in priority areas and establish and manage 
research programmes in those areas. Similarly, regions were expected to publish regional R&D 
plans and establish their own research programmes to support national NHS R&D policy 
objectives. This represented meso-level policy and activity. 
It was no surprise to discover from the case studies that research policy was seen in the local 
(non-teaching) trusts as national (central) policy aimed at teaching hospitals and not at 
themselves. Instead, at this micro-level there was more concern with development policy and the 
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establishment of a so-called 'evaluative' as opposed to 'research' culture. Development relates to 
the dissemination, utilisation and take up of knowledge, and managers, particularly in case 
studies two and three had picked up this issue. Development policy was established on a much 
more individual (trust) level and did not have an 'official' central strategy in the same way as 
research did. The case studies outlined managers' strategies to create these evaluative cultures 
and reactions to them. In the light of this discussion, the following chapter will focus on 
'research' and 'development' policy at these three macro, meso and micro-levels. The case 
studies, which fonn the empirical basis for this thesis have all supported the notion that research 
policy and development policy should not, and were not, seen as distinct stand-alone entities, but 
were firmly tied into the wider changes and features characterising the modem NBS. This 
chapter will, therefore, offer a cross-case analysis, which will draw out the main points to emerge 
from the empirical material, in order to throw some light on the development and characteristics 
of research and of development policy in the English National Health Service. 
8.2 Marketisation, centralisation, devolution and accountability 
It was clear from the three case studies that changes to the service following the NHS and 
Community Care Act (1990) were very profound and had created quite a degree of uncertainty 
and an;xiety in the health service. An initial focus by the government on NHS trusts when they 
were formed, was followed by a focus upon purchasers, as district health authorities and family 
health service authorities merged to form single health authorities. The uncertainty faced by 
managers centred upon their new roles and responsibilities within these new organisations, and 
how purchasers and providers should relate to each other. The intended 'competitive market' in 
the NHS, was not expressed in the form of competition between NHS providers in any of the 
districts in the analysis. Instead, competition was between health authorities and trusts, and 
between managers and clinicians, as health authorities and managers sought to assert their 
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authority, and trusts and clinicians sought to defend theirs. This competitive behaviour began to 
calm down as individuals and institutions became more confident in their roles. The new health 
authorities clearly adopted their responsibility to hold ~roviders accountable for the services they 
provided, and it was this factor which particularly prompted attention to be focused upon 
evidence-based clinical practice and the provision of efficient and effective services in the NHS. 
The fact that purchasers were given limited budget allocations by the government clearly showed 
that they were not free to make purchasing decisions as they saw fit, based upon available 
evidence. Instead, they were limited and somewhat frustrated by the restrictions put on them, 
both political and economic. Beta Interferon was a frequently cited case-a decision not to 
purchase this drug, based upon the available evidence, was over-ruled by the government on the 
back of what interviewees believed was heavy political pressure from the drug companies. On a 
similar note, trust managers reported a frustration with what they saw as the purchasers' 
interference in their own organisation and management processes. If trusts were meant to be 
independent providers, as they believed they were, trust managers and clinicians felt that they 
should be able to provide the care that they believed most appropriate for their patients. At the 
same time, however, the contractual nature of the purchaser/provider divide meant that the NHS 
internal market was a managed one, and it was managed locally by the health authority. The 
result was that there was conflict concerning how far the organisation and management of the 
NHS was devolved and how this manifested itself. It was a persistent thorn in the side of trusts, 
and caused a significant amount of conflict between them and the health authority. It also 
contributed to a more overt debate concerning the financing of the NHS, as the fixed nature of 
contracts meant that any additional activity beyond contractual obligations could not be 
performed, unless extra provision was made. 
All health authorities were expected by the government to ensure that trusts made annual 
efficiency savings of 3%. Trusts were also required to reduce waiting lists and reach Patient's 
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Charter standards (DH 1992b). Together, these issues took precedence over most other 
considerations, although as the second case study particularly demonstrated, this manifested itself 
in a variety of ways.. Some health authorities only asked for savings on paper, whereas others 
looked for the savings in cash tenns as was the situation in the second case study. This caused 
considerably more difficulties to the trusts and even less opportunity for health care workers to 
reflect upon their working practices, as it was so much harder for trusts to find cash as opposed to 
paper savings. The problems inherent in using these crude measures of activity were described in 
each of the cases. Particularly significant was that, although the government was keen to see 
more patients treated outside the hospitals, the efficiency index worked against this and created a 
disincentive to reduce day-case episodes and reduce expensive procedures. To that extent, some 
believed that the system encouraged trusts to overspend and underperfonn. The crudeness of the 
output measures used, however, still had some effect upon clinicians, as they did not want to 
come at the bottom of the league tables. The evidence was, therefore, that devolution was more 
about rhetoric than reality and the result was a source of concern to both purchasers and provider 
organisations. The government established output targets and devolved responsibility for 
reaching them, such that within the trusts, the intention was a corporate nonnalisation to 
centrally-defined output goals, a concentration upon numbers and output, and an increase in the 
business-mindedness of many trust workers. 
The devolution of pay bargaining can be seen as an illustration of the separation of policy from 
politics and policy from organisation and management. Failure of the policy was seen as a 
management problem and the central trust managers interviewed saw the issue as extremely 
frustrating, and one which placed them fully in the media spotlight. They were being targeted in 
the media as the villains of the peace, much more so than the government. This was particularly 
highlighted in the third case study, where one chief executive was experiencing pressures from 
working within what he termed a "media goldfish bowl", In the light of this debate, the 
following section will focus upon the devolution of pay bargaining, which was an issue of 
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significance to all interviewees and one which, analysis revealed, warranted further discussion in 
its own right. 
8.2.1 The devolution of pay bargaining and its implications on research 
The issue of pay bargaining provided an ideal case in itself of the nature of devolution in the 
English National Health Service. The frustration of central trust managers was clear, as they had 
been asked by the Conservative Government to negotiate localised pay deals. The reaction from 
the professions to this move was swift and strong. The professions had the public sympathy, and 
the media spotlight was fixed upon the managers. The unrest was of clear concern to the 
government, who were, as a result, giving conflicting messages to managers and causing 
considerable confusion in the system. Devolution, it transpired, was more rhetoric than reality; 
an attempt to devolve responsibility for economising to local managers. The issue focused 
attention more on what clinicians did and their personal efficiency, through staff appraisals and 
more tightly-defined job descriptions. However, the evidence was that it also increased inter­
professional divisions amongst (non-medical) clinicians, notably between those in community 
and those in acute trusts. In practice, shortages of skilled, trained staff also meant that clinicians 
were in a strong position, they could choose where they wanted to work or, indeed, whether to 
work in the NHS at all. They could, after all, opt to work in the private sector. This control, 
however, did not apply to doctors, who remained largely as they were, reflecting their elevated 
position in policy-making processes. 
One of the most interesting (and relevant to this thesis) factors to arise from the analysis was that 
given the limited financial conditions of the NHS, other methods of making jobs more attractive 
had to be found, and R&D was seen as one such method. It offered the promise to clinicians of 
experience and training unavailable elsewhere. The case studies illustrated that for nurses, 
midwives, therapists, dietitians and other P AMs, R&D was just as under-developed in the 
teaching hospitals as elsewhere. All trusts were competing on an equal basis and were looking to 
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develop their R&D profiles accordingly and in the process, make themselves into more attractive 
employers. 
In conclusion, therefore, the government were reluctant to relinquish control over employment 
policy and simply devolved operational responsibility to local managers to implement what in the 
end were centrally-<iefined pay awards. The managers bore the brunt of public attention but were 
frustrated by the mixed and confused messages from government. This issue was a source of 
considerable stress to all sectors of the service. The devolution of pay bargaining did increase 
managerial control, but to a limited extent and only over the non-medical occupations. New 
contracts of employment were being more tightly defined, but the major overall impact was to 
contribute to an increased bureaucratisation of the professions, local frustration at all levels, and 
considerable confusion, which ultimately resulted in a return to the old national systems of pay 
councils. 
8.2.2 Accountability to the centre 
The notion of accountability was clearly a driving factor towards many of the issues covered in 
this thesis. Government demands for the trusts and professions within the NBS to be held 
accountable for the services they provided resulted in an increased openness and focus on the 
process of decision-making rather than whether the final decision was right or wrong. The 
argument was that if the process was just, then so would be the outcome. This was particularly 
highlighted in the second case study by the health authority's dilenuna concerning the purchase 
of Beta Interferon. However, an increased openness of decision-making brought rationing 
increasingly into the public arena. Accountability in this way, brought the notions of efficiency, 
economy, effectiveness, quality and adherence to national clinical practice guidelines much more 
to the fore, as they were increasingly taken into account in the processes of NHS decision­
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making. Responsibility for ensuring this accountability was devolved to health authorities, which 
they made concerted efforts to cany out. The contractual nature of the purchaser/provider split 
clearly allowed this to develop and the result was an increased awareness in trusts of what they 
were doing, why, and an increased sense of business awareness. 
Directors of public health ultimately took public accountability for service provision, in 
consultation with doctors. The Child B and Beta Interferon cases provided a perfect illustration 
of this and the implications of these cases has been referred to throughout the analysis. The 
result was that the issue of rationing became much more explicit and in the open. However, the 
establishment of so-called 'Citizen's Juries' used in one of the health authorities to aid decision­
making, was one way that purchasers could involve the public in making these difficult decisions; 
it devolved accountability to the users of these services themselves. The local purchasers and 
providers were, therefore, distanced from the political implications of the service decisions made. 
In terms of doctors' accountability, they continued to hold on to the traditional notion of 
accountability to their individual patients rather than to the purchasers or managers. Their 
autonomy as practitioners could continue, so long as their creditability and trust in the eyes of 
their patients was maintained. That said, by asking whether doctors were really providing the 
most appropriate treatment, managers were potentially introducing a notion ofdoubt in the minds 
of patients and, therefore, into the patient-doctor relationship. Ifdoctors' clinical autonomy and 
authority in the minds of their patients was questioned, then a major element of their power 
would, consequently, be threatened. l However, the evidence from this study, was that public 
attention focused upon the managers, notably the public health consultants, when the public did 
challenge clinical decisions. The debate in the public mind centred upon purchasing services for 
a patient regardless of cost, if there was any chance of survival, whereas for managers, 
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purchasing decisions were made with costs very much in mind. The paradox for public health 
consultants, therefore, was that they felt accountable to the public, but were accountable, firstly to 
the government. However, their accountability to the government to make cost-based purchasing 
decisions was a dilemma and source of irritation to them, as the government sought to avoid 
being drawn into the rationing debate. Accountability, therefore, had direct implications and 
reached into the heart of power and control in the NHS. 
One additional effect of the increased profile of accountability, as with the devolution of pay 
bargaining, was a further increase in the amount of bureaucracy governing the NHS. More forms 
had to be filled in and appropriate documentation accumulated in order to satisfy the demands of 
managers and insurers. More auditing, as a measure of accountability was also a contributing 
factor, of course. Nevertheless, such levels of accountability appeared to contribute to a changing 
focus on the nature of knowledge required and used. The pressures upon clinicians, and most 
importantly upon public health consultants to purchase and provide services with costs featuring 
very heavily in their consciousness, was symptomatic of this changing conception. This chapter 
has, so far, described a situation in which there has been an increased focus upon economising, 
output and outcome measures in the NHS, as managers and clinicians have been required to meet 
the demands of government to reach certain targets, with audit used as a principal method of 
controL This has contributed to raising levels of business awareness and acumen in the NHS. In 
the light of the evidence, the following section will further explore these issues and evaluate 
Michael Power's (1994; 1997) notion that there has been an 'audit explosion' and that service 
specific values are being displaced by more abstract financial and quantitative values and 
categories of knowledge. 
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8.2.3 The audit explosion? 
Audit was central to this culture of accountability and was the principal method of evaluation 
noted by interviewees. Audit was increasing in profile and was increasingly entering the contract 
process, but still played a limited role in the life of most clinicians. Audit was intended to be a 
major indicator of clinical effectiveness and was linked to research, evaluation and quality issues. 
Trust managers were increasingly attempting to develop the profile of audit (under their 
supervision) and make it appear a normal and natural process. However, the case studies 
indicated that what was important was that at least the processes to conduct audit were in place. 
Audit, nevertheless, was seen as a central element in the creation of an 'evaluative' culture in 
trusts. The principal interest of audit managers, in general, related to auditing documentation, 
Patient Charter standards (DB 1992b) and some quality standards. In this way, central and 
management-defined subjects were the object of surveillance, but this audit was principally 
directed at the non-medical professions. A notable point that was raised, was in the 
acknowledgement by one interviewee in chapter seven, of the overtly panoptic nature of the 
conduct of the trust -organised audit. 
A principal hurdle to overcome, therefore, was convincing clinicians of the legitimacy of the 
process and to make it appear normal and natural. The doctors in trusts appeared to carry on 
much as they had done in the past, but junior medical staff were, reportedly, far more inclined to 
audit their work than the senior consultants, principally because of changes to medical education. 
The knowledge and traini.ng these young doctors received meant that they had the skills and 
opportunity to prospectively audit their own work2, which other staff were denied. There was also 
little inclination noted for doctors to be more open regarding the sharing of audit results with 
managers. As such, the ability to control effectiveness agendas from outside the medical 
profession was extremely limited. The agenda for managers to gain such access was a long-term 
one, but this was their intention. Indeed, the most difficult people to encourage to audit their 
work, interviewees revealed, were the academics in teaching hospitals. Again, this illustrated a 
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lack of accountability and openness in what they did. However, on a similar note, it was 
interesting to learn that the vast majority of managers in trusts and health authorities did not 
audit their own work. The focus of attention was on clinicians in this respect. Strategies to make 
audit more acceptable centred upon acceptance by association with creditable professional bodies, 
such as the GPs' via the Medical Audit Advisory Group (MAAG), and nurses, employed as 
specialist audit managers. However, there was still a long way to go. The upshot was that, what 
surveillance of clinical activity there was by management, was directed at the nurses, midwives, 
therapists, dietitians and other PAMS. 
Evidence from the three case studies indicated that the call for more multi-disciplinary audit to be 
conducted had not had a significant impact and the majority of audit conducted was still medical 
audit. Analysis of interviews revealed that there was still little control over medically-led audit 
but more direction over clinical audit. The medical profession also undertook more audit because 
they had more allotted time for the task and more history and knowledge of audit methods, 
particularly prospective audit. An example of prospective audit was demonstrated in the third 
case study, in the case of a pacemaker implantation service. The old methods of funding audit 
also favoured the medical profession and the acute trusts, as this was where the majority of 
doctors worked. The change in the method of funding audit, from a figure based on the number 
of consultants in a trust, to a resident population-based figure, was greeted favourably in the 
community trusts as going some way to balancing the inequity in funding arrangements. But the 
culture had been already set. The wide geographical dispersal of staff in community trusts was 
problematic and the amount of money, overall, available for audit, was reduced. In practice, 
therefore, the audit explosion was somewhat tempered. As a result, audit had increased in profile 
in the community, but was still not as prominent as it was in the acute trusts. Nevertheless, it 
was clear from interviewees that a significant amount of medical practice itself was still not 
audited.. If audit was the principal method of surveillance of clinical behaviour, therefore, then it 
was not very successful. It draws some interesting questions concerning the application of the 
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Foucauldian model to research and development in the NHS, which will be discussed in the 
conclusions. 
8.3 Knowledge, economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
The following section will assess what came to represent a significant issue from the three case 
studies: the successive attempts by the Conservative Governments over the 1980s and 1990s to 
control the production of knowledge. Clearly, this issue of the nature of control over what kind of 
knowledge, and how, and by whom, is fundamental to understanding research and development 
in the English NBS. More specifically, the case studies illustrated a change in the nature of 
values in the National Health Service. 
A principal requirement of all trusts was to break even. The strict spending limits imposed by the 
government severely limited the ability of purchasers, notably the public health consultants, to 
make the purchasing decisions they would have liked. As the NHS had limited resources, there 
was a general awareness that the pressure from government was to deliver efficiency gains above 
all else. A principal problem was, however, that the measures of reponsiveness demanded by the 
government were seen as crude and meaningless, eliciting much concern and criticism in all 
sectors of the service. 
The community trusts felt particularly aggrieved by these measures, but it was generally 
recognised that the knowledge demanded was politically motivated and mitigated against the 
efficient and effective working of the NBS. As such, economy, efficiency and effectiveness, the 
three driving values characterising Power's (1994) Audit Explosion, initially appeared to be as 
relevant to the NHS in this analysis. However, the evidence was that the concentration of 
attention for health service managers was on economy and efficiency measures. Effectiveness 
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largely remained a matter for clinicians (notably doctors) and university hospital departments, 
and was largely outside of the control of the government and managers.3 Instead, the attention 
of health authorities focused upon ineffectiveness; the elimination of ineffective clinical (not 
management) practice, rather than the promotion of effective practice. The evidence from the 
case studies was that research and audit agendas continued to be dominated by the medical 
profession, whilst, at the san1e time, the amount of evidence regarding effectiveness of clinical 
practice was not comprehensive, particularly for the non-medical professions. However, effective 
medicine and clinical care was not always cheaper than existing forms of treatment. The focus, 
therefore, was on seeking efficiency and economising measures; the drive for efficiency gains 
took precedence over most other considerations, particularly where, as in the second case study, 
the health authority requested efficiency savings in the form of cash returns. Managers were 
accessing, interpreting and using the results of research and using that knowledge to challenge 
existing clinical practice and, as a result, were increasingly controlling the terms of public 
discourse in the NBS. The issue is a significant one and has distinct implications for medical 
autonomy, more of which will be discussed below. 
The case studies revealed that there was no evidence to suggest that the emphasis on primary and 
community services had threatened medical superiority. Research in the primary and community 
care sectors was underdeveloped in comparison to the acute sector. However, community trusts 
were looking to gain more research funds and to develop more of an evidence (knowledge)-base 
to their work. The change in the method of funding audit was also seen by community-based 
interviewees as an aid for them to achieve this aim. But the research was very limited in scope, 
with complaints expressed that community trusts were being held back from increasing their 
knowledge bases. The result was that any change in knowledge production would only occur if it 
was tightly controlled. At the same time, the way that efficiency was measured worked against 
community trusts, making them appear as comparatively inefficient. This, in tum, limited their 
potential to threaten the medical superiority of the hospital consultants and was a source of major 
306 
irritation to community trust managers and clinicians. The case studies, particularly Cambridge 
and Huntingdon, illustrated the reaction of a dominant teaching hospital and health authority 
managers to "those around them, when the non-teaching trusts sought to consolidate and 
, 
strengthen their position. The reaction of the managers and doctors m the teaching hospital was 
quite hostile. The lack of outcome indicators prompted the community trust to set up a research 
and development unit to increase their knowledge base, but resistance to it was vehement. The 
acute trust clearly tried to put as much pressure on the health authority to limit this activity, 
arguing that research should only be conducted by reputable research centres. If the trust 
invested its own money in research, then they were accused ofbeing over-funded. 
The first case study illustated an attempt to centralise nurse research and establish some form of 
professional knowledge-producing 'core', but, in contrast to the medical profession, there was no 
agreement within the profession, even over how to achieve this aim. Now, the higher education 
institutions (HErs) were competing for nursing research moneys, but the skilled personnel were 
thin on the ground and, despite developing a strategy, was unlikely to become reality. There was 
also perceived to be a bias in research funding bodies against the qualitative research 
methodologies favoured by the nursing professions, physiotherapists and PAMs. However, others 
involved in those committees claimed that the qualtiy of the proposals in general were very poor. 
The upshot was that the non-medical professions in question were unlikely to develop a 
knowledge 'core' even if they wanted to. 
Despite value for money, costing, economising and efficiency issues increasingly dominating the 
terms of public discourse in the NHS, a crisis was not avoided. This was characterised by three 
particular features represented in the case studies: the Child B case, the media campaigns 
launched by trusts, and the subsequent closure of a provider unit in Suffolk. Trust managers were 
also increasingly trying to control health care professionals through gathering more information 
on their work, in particular, to get an idea of the research activity of doctors and other clinicians 
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in trusts. In the first case study (Bedfordshire) the evidence suggested that this was an onerous 
task for which there was little enthusiasm and, consequently, little chance of success. However, 
in the third case study, local trusts had made much more of an effort by employing specialists 
charged with managing research, audit and effectiveness. Similarly, the Project Register System 
and Culyer declarations reflected the desire to increase knowledge on what clinicians actually did 
and introduce a notion of accountability to the centre into health care research provision. Large 
sums of money were given to teaching hospitals for teaching and research, but so far as the 
research element was concerned, there was little knowledge of how the biomedical researchers 
spent that money. 
The problems with the Project Register System and Culyer declarations were highlighted., 
beginning, fundamentally, with problems of defining what 'research' and 'development' actually 
meant. The distinction was far more clear to the academics than it was to the managers and local 
clinicians. Audit for the managers and clinicians overlapped with research, where the focus was 
on evaluation. And this was important because, whilst academics and central NHS R&D 
departments talked of creating a 'research culture', others within the service-notably central trust 
managers4 talked more of creating an 'evaluative culture'. This was a key issue to emerge in the 
case studies. The reforms of the NHS, therefore, did encourage initiative and innovation, albeit 
in a managed and bureaucratised fashion. In the light of this, the following section will assess 
the evidence presented in the three case studies on one distinct aspect of this innovation and 
changing nature of 'relevant' knowledge-health services research. 
8.4 Research policy and politics 
The following section will assess the rise of health services research and the changing nature of 
research and development policy in the English NHS. Scambler (1996) viewed applied research, 
308 
notably health services research, as a response from sociologists to a 'crisis of the welfare state' 
and argued that this was indicative of a 'McDonaldisation' of academic life. The wider issues, 
Scambler argued, were being ignored in preference to these short-term system needs. Whilst in 
many ways Scambler is right, the concentration on the statel1ifeworld he described should not 
ignore the professions or the fact that the general thrust of the NBS refonns, which he claimed 
were given assent by sociologists might in some ways deserve assent. However, the thesis 
presented here, does make the links between the state/lifeworld Scambler called for, whilst at the 
same time recognising that the NHS was not as functional as it could or should be. The general 
thrust of the Research for Health strategy (DH 1991b, 1993a) strategy, upon analysis was needed 
and this fact cannot be ignored. Like all neo-Marxist explanations, Scambler's is useful for 
explaining macro policy and political issues, but is of less use in the analysis of meso-level 
activity, and contributes nothing to explanations of micro-level behaviour and activity. These 
limitations were outlined throughout the course of this thesis. Of particular debate within 
Marxist circles, however, is the relationship of the professions and the state, and this issue is 
examined in chapter nine. 
In the analysis above, a clear distinction is made between 'research' and 'development' policy. 
This is significant. The evidence from the case studies revealed that research policy was the 
province of the universities and teaching hospitals and those constituting the 'medical core' 
(Larson 1990), whereas 'development' policy was of rather more relevance and interest to others. 
In view of this distinction, the following section is divided into the two specific halves. What was 
clear from the analysis of the case study material was that the general issue of R&D, straddles 
several themes from the point of view of this thesis. Research and development and evidence­
based clinical practice have, therefore, featured throughout the course of this chapter. However, 
they relate most prominantiy to the debate on knowledge, discussed above, and on professions, 
experts and control, which follows this section. This indicates R&D's importance to the NBS in 
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general. It also illustrates the need to expand Power's thesis to include research and development 
as a feature in its own right characterising modem public service organisations. 
8.4.1 Research policy 
Like Larson (1990), Macdonald (1995) noted that the maintenance of exclusive rights to a 
knowledge base was essential to the dominance of a profession. The related issue of how 
knowledge was controlled in the NHS has already been considered above. It is clear from the 
three case studies that NHS research policy between 1991-95 was in a state of change. During 
this period, there was a disparity between the government's desired role and direction for NHS 
research and development policy and how this was translated and adapted by the established 
research community to maintain their existing position. In effect, there were two lines of official 
policy and they were not compatible. 
Central R&D policy followed a linear, top-down model of implementation, with the vast majority 
of local managers and clinicians in the case studies having no involvement in its development or 
with the regional plans arising from it. Once regional policy and plans had been developed, then 
local managers were approached, principally in the health authorities, to see how they could 
implement the policy in their districts. There was no 'local' ownership of the policy as such. 
The first case study indicated how the changing structures of the NHS also hindered the 
development and implementation of the strategy and regional plans for R&D, most notably 
because of the restructuring of the Regional Health Authorities (RHAs). If the RHAs were meant 
to be driving the strategy and forming the regional R&D committees, how would this be affected 
by uncertainty over their future role and power? Interviewees were not sure and, as a result, 
reluctant to be drawn too much on this aspect. The case studies, one and three in particular, also 
showed that with the change from district health authorities to health authorities, local 
management structures were also being rearranged, and only when these had been established 
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would they be able to look at making the links and developing new local policy and services 
themselves. 
The upshot, is that organisational and structural changes to the NHS hinders the implementation 
of R&D policy, and in the overall scheme of things, R&D plays a supporting role to other policy 
objectives. At the same time, as the activity that was generated from central R&D policy was 
focused at the teaching hospitals and distant regional R&D committees, it was also seen to be the 
property of the biomedical researchers (doctors) within those centres. In other words, it was seen 
to be entirely focused upon research, rather than development. It was felt that given the power of 
these doctors, it would be unlikely that the national director of R&D could change their practice, 
and this would apply also to the regional R&D committees, even if the research committees and 
NHS R&D Directorate wanted to change the medical domination of local cultures. The Research 
for Health strategy (DH 1991b, 1993a), therefore, was also of little interest or relevance to the 
other professions in the service. However, the doctors in the teaching hospitals were also seen by 
local doctors interviewed, as separate from themselves and similarly, the teaching hospitals were 
seen as a separate entity from the rest of the service. This indicated that it was a mistake to view 
professions as one coherent homogenous group: in fact, there were some quite profound 
differences within the professions themselves. Policy does need to be sensitive to such 
distinctions, in order to be successfully developed and applied, and it was clear that this was not 
allowed for in the Research for Health strategy (ibid). 
Chapter three described the evolution of the Research for Health strategy (ibid), explaining that 
its primary concern was to reorganise NBS-funded R&D to support the objectives of the Health of 
the Nation (DH 1992a). This was reflected in the fonnation of Regional R&D strategies, as the 
case study number two illustrated in particular, which noted amonst other things how they 
focused on achieving quantifiable health targets. However, this case study also showed how, 
although the link to the Health of the Nation was made, it was not seen as a paramount one by 
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the Regional R&D Directorate (RRDD). The focus of attention for national and regional R&D 
policy-makers was to apply clear business and management principals to the conduct of research. 
The case studies illustrate how these changes, rather than controling the production of 
knowledge, resulted in the bureaucratisation of the knowledge producers (the biomedical 
researchers) in the teaching hospitals. 
The initial Research for Health 'strategy (DH 1991b) was clearly a very progressive strategy when 
released. A good deal of emphasis was placed on the development and implementation of the 
results of research, although the framework was poorly conceived and there appeared to be little 
knowledge or ideas on how the development and implementation of research would actually take 
place. A linear, top-down framework for implementation was adopted, with implementation 
believed to somehow 'naturally' occur following the dissemination of research results. This was 
the traditional method of implementation and one which had not worked, as the very Research 
for Health strategy paid testament. However, implementation, as chapter three described, was 
later identified as a national priority for R&D and a national advisory group established to 
identify relevant priorities. The advisory group then commissioned and funded a number of 
research studies, via a process of competitive tendering. The advisory group worked under the 
title of 'The evaluation ofmethods to promote the implementation ofresearch findings' and was 
led by Professor Andy Haines of North Thames RHA (NBS E 1998). The group first identified 
twenty priorities for R&D, that were not approved until 1995. The first call for proposals was in 
July 1995; thirty-two projects were recommended for funding at a cost of £4m (Appendix 12). 
However, this was four years after Research for Health (DH 1991b) was launched. In the 
meantime, however, analysis of the case studies showed that NHS R&D policy could be separated 
into two distinct elements-'research' policy and 'development' policy, with the implementation of 
research results seen as an element of development policy. Nevertheless, this approach was 
indicative of NHS policy making in general. 
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Policy was formulated at national and regional level by elite groups; in this case, principally 
those from the major knowledge-producing organisations (the old universities and teaching 
hospitals). Local organisations were, subsequently, expected to implement this policy. There 
was, therefore, a clear separation between research policy and the organisation and management 
of services to satisfy the demands of that policy. It was clear from the case studies that research 
policy was intended to apply management and business principles to research, but instead, 
resulted in the bureaucratisation of research workers and the production of medical knowledge. 
After the initial radical move of introducing the Research for Health strategy in 1991, there 
followed a move by the existing research community-notably the bio-medical researchers in the 
teaching hospitals-to recapture the agenda for their own ends. Research committees set up were 
dominated by individuals from these centres, and continued to be so, even after the Culyer 
Reports' (1994) recommendations for broader membership (Appendix 2). Furthermore, 
representation from the teaching hospitals went up to the House ofLords and in this way, ensured 
that their interests were taken into account at all levels ofpolicy-making. 
The Project Register System (PRS) and Culyer declarations were important features of the 
research strategy, but how these were conducted and implemented was devolved to the teaching 
hospitals themselves. The result was a snow-balling process of information gathering in trusts, 
which took a considerable amount of time and effort to produce results that were ultimately 
voluntaristic declarations of activity by those doing the research. The teaching hospitals, 
ultimately, devised their own criteria for (at least) maintaining their own existing levels of 
funding. These methods were, subsequently, fed back up and incorporated into national policy. 
The teaching hospitals and the 'knowledge producers' within those teaching hospitals were able 
to maintain their existing dominant position. The system, therefore, reflected the elitist of 
research policy-making, with the group at what Larson (1990) called the 'core' of the medical 
profession granted privileged access and respresentation to central and regional policy-making 
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bodies. These groups sought to adapt and make official research policy to meet their own ends. 
However, the Conservative Government's desire to gain control over these 'knowledge producers' 
but not knowing how to actually achieve this goal, without being drawn into a long protracted 
conflict, resulted in a highly bureaucratic version of events. In the end, R&D after the Research 
for Health reforms (DH 1991b, 1993a), was little different from what had gone before. 
Regional committees were dominated by individuals with a vested interest in existing research 
networks. Indeed, the clinical school in the second case study was shown to have direct links to 
the House of Lords and the relevant select committees. Not only were the medical profession in 
the 'core' informed earlier and more comprehensively, but they were able to have direct influence 
over central policy-making bodies. The behaviour and attutude of members of the medical 'core', 
therefore, remained unchanged. However, the reforms attempted to make the process of 
allocating research moneys more open and accountable. Particularly notable in this was the 
disassembly of the old SIFT -R arrangements, leading up to, and following the Cu/yer Report 
(Culyer 1994). The payment of service costs for research was particularly interesting, as the 
Medical Research Council (MRC) sought to retain its privileged position. Its deal, negotiated 
with the Department of Health, seemingly in isolation and without the involvement of other 
parties, could be seen as an example of elitist policy-making between the government and 
representatives of the medical profession. However, the resistance of regional directors of R&D 
and other researchers to the MRCs' negotiating, from which they were excluded, and the impact 
that this was likely to have on the teaching hospitals themselves, indicated that this was an ill­
conceived and hurried one-off agreement between an elite group and the government. The final 
outcome was still a favourable one to the MRC, however, and indicated the closeness of groups 
representing medical research to the centre of government and their ability to secure preferential 
funds. This was also underlined the fact that the MRC was the only research body to have an 
observer on each of the major research committees of the NBS. The only difference was that 
more openness in the process was demanded, although again, this was still not particularly open 
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to public scrutiny and there were no lay or patient representatives on the majority of committees. 
However, upon closer examination, it was revealed that there was little, if any, idea of how data 
for the Project Register and Culyer declarations could be actually obtained, just that the data 
should be obtained. The result was that the teaching hospitals were making up their own policy, 
with the aim of maintaining (or improving) their own position. And the methods of achieving 
this were fed back to central policy-making bodies and key individuals, which in tum, influenced 
thinking about the nature of national (central) policy. 
There was an improvement in the links between those involved in health research evident, once 
regional policy was developed. Each purchaser and provider organisation was asked to identify a 
'Lead Research and Development Officer' (LRDO) who was expected to act as the principle 
conduit of information between the RRDD and their organisation. Having said this, of course, 
anything was an improvement on nothing! It was through these link persons that R&D policy 
was intended to be communicated and implemented, although there were problems (discussed 
above). 
The subsequent relaunch of the Research for Health strategy in 1993 and the publication of the 
Culyer Report a year later (1994) indicated that the government recognised that NHS R&D had, 
firstly, failed to move in line with their thinking regarding the NHS, and, secondly, failed to 
support NHS policy in general. The early indications were that the Health of the Nation targets 
(DH 1992a) were not being met, even though the Conservative Government had arguably chosen 
target areas that were relatively easy to meet, with the original nineteen priority areas of the 
Green Paper (DH 1991a), reduced to seven in the White Paper (DR 1992a). The case studies 
revealed, instead, the role of the medical profession in the teaching hospitals, and the part played 
by the 'core' of the profession in developing regional policy, in recapturing research agendas and 
retaining their dominant position. The second case study, in particular, clearly showed how, 
although health services research did gain in profile, existing researchers were able to establish 
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new replacement groups to fund biomedical (laboratory-based) researchs. This was so, despite 
the distinction and separation made in terms of NHS funding made in the Research for Health 
strategy (op.cit.). Similarly, in all these case studies, the destination of money for research 
funded from regional sources continued to go to the established research centres (the teaching 
trusts and old universities) for research based in those centres. However, this was not all the 
result of conspiracy and cunning; there were other factors involved, which were discussed in 
'knowledge, economy, efficiency and effectiveness' (above). A regional manager of R&D also 
discribed his difficulty in convincing researchers and academics in the teaching hospitals of the 
legitimacy of health services research as an academic discipline. 
There were some initiatives which were intended to pump-prime research in order to broaden the 
setting in which it took place. Two such examples were, at the national level, the National 
Primary Care Research and Development Centre and, at the regional level, The Institute of Public 
Health at Cambridge. Primary and community care research was still very thin on the ground in 
the cases studied, but a considerable effort was being made by the community trust in the second 
case study (which was also a teaching trust) to develop its own research profile. However, the 
case study illustrated the health authority and acute teaching trusts' resistance to this and the 
ensuing struggle. The reasons for this resistance were principally based on the contention that 
the community trust did not have the quality and pedigree necessary to conduct research. But 
there was, comparatively, little history of community-based research in Cambridge and 
Huntingdon, or elsewhere, and, as such, it was new to the majority of researchers. Similarly, if 
the research were funded by external research bodies, the quality (in theory) should be controlled. 
The scenario in the case of the acute teaching trust at least, was that they were simply using their 
power and influence to gain as much NBS funds (both research and service funds) as possible, at 
the expense of the other trusts. The doctors and managers in the acute teaching trust were united 
in their efforts to claim as much funding as possible for their organisation, and added a further 
complication to the traditional model of the medical profession. 
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Clearly, managers and doctors were prepared to collaborate in order to maintain existant 
dominant systems and protect the centres of medical knowledge production. Research and 
development iri primary care settings was just as under-developed in the areas covered by the case 
studies as anywhere else. There were attempts to redress the situation by the regional health 
authority, but what there was appeared to concentrate upon developing GPs research skills, and 
neglected other occupations. However, it was believed by some interviewees that GPs were so 
overworked that they could not do anything like R&D, due to insufficient time. By and large, 
however, there appeared to be little overall change to the setting in which most NHS-funded 
research was conducted. However, as health services research was a relatively new discipline. the 
number of trained researchers was seen as quite low. There was a desire to increase the number 
ofhealth services researchers, though, and therefore, increased demand for 'new' research skills. 
Training programmes in R&D, organised by the NHS Executive Regional Offices, were a 
progressive step towards training more personnel with health services research skills. Although 
health services research was a relatively new discipline and, indeed, was not seen as a valid 
academic discipline by some established biomedical researchers, the focus on it in the Research 
for Health strategy (DH 1991b, 1993a) was seen as an opportunity by some of the newer 
universities to gain research and training funds. This created a flurry of activity to establish 
health services research centres in many universities, new and old, but the newness of the 
discipline meant that there were comparatively few individuals equipped with the actual skills to 
teach, train and conduct health services research. In addition, the regional R&D training 
strategies were being developed alongside a long awaited national R&D training strategy. As 
such, regional strategies were being prepared whilst trying to second guess and not contradict 
what RRDDs believed national policy would be. As a result, there was some scepticism whether 
Regional Offices were devising training strategies that, in the end, could not be delivered. 
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However, the increased competition for research funds from the newer university centres was still 
a potential threat to the established (medical) research centres, but the power of the doctors and 
central trust managers was such that, again, dominance was maintained. However, the fact that 
an increasing amount of research projects were health services research and were supposed to be 
multi-disciplinary, meant that social scientists were likely to be one of the biggest winners from 
the changes. This appeared to be confirmed by the case studies, where new centres within the old 
'finns', such as the Institute for Public Health in Cambridge, were expanding and recruiting 
individuals with a social science background. More specifically, the need for more statisticians 
and health economists was recognised in Regional NHS committee meeting minutes, indicating a 
changing focus of the NHS R&D reforms towards an emphasis on quantitative and financial 
categories of knowledge, but this was still a relatively small part of the whole. Furthermore, the 
randornised controlled trial (RCT) remained the benchmark against which health services 
research (and, of course, medical research) was to be judged. The results of RCTs were the most 
highly rated of the forms of research accumulated by the Cochrane Centre and appeared to be the 
ones most likely to be used to change clinical practice, most probably because they were awarded 
considerable legitimacy by the medical profession. The fact that numbers and statistics played 
such an important role in the RCTs, however, would appear to contradict Power's (1994) 
contention that quantitative forms of knowledge as a means of increasing control and 
accountability are undermining 'first order' experts, as quantitative research methodologies were 
the nann for the medical profession anyway. However, the way that this knowledge is used, and 
the role financial and economic considerations played in decision-making was becoming more 
overt. This issue is discussed later in this chapter. 
The situation was different for the other occupational groups, such as nurses, however, as their 
work was rather more social, with an emphasis on caring and the process of care and far less 
suited to evaluation by RCT. As such, their values could be said to have been rather more 
affected than those of the medical profession. However, they could not be said to have been 
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displaced or surpassed by those of managers. Rather more significant was the increased role of 
financial knowledge in both research and clinical decision-making, and this did, therefore, have a 
rather more profound impact upon all clinicians, and the terms ofpublic discourse in the NHS. 
8.4.2 Development policy 
Beyond the teaching hospitals, in the local district general hospitals and community trusts, the 
development of research was seen as equal, if not more important than actually doing research. 
This was not because the managers and clinicians were not interested in research, although one 
doctor interviewed did state that a reason some might be working in his district general hospitals 
was that there was no research activity. Nevertheless, of more concern to trust managers was the 
development of an 'evaluative culture'. This linked research, development, information 
technology (IT), employment conditions, education and audit together and was a distinctive 
feature to emerge from the analysis of all the case studies. 
It was argued from some quarters that a major difference was the propensity of managers and 
clinicians in shire and district general hospitals to be more likely to change their practice than 
those in the teaching hospitals. The reason for this was that the professions in the teaching 
hospitals had been in a very dominant and comfortable position over the years and they were 
reluctant to relinquish their power. The evidence of the case studies supported this contention. 
Similarly, the structural and organisational changes to the NHS had led to the now larger outer 
London districts increasing their relative position vis Ii vis the shrinking inner London districts. 
For this reason, it was also stated from some quarters that some of the most talented and 
progressive NHS managers were now to be found in local health authorities, where they were 
more able to change local services. However, the connection between a general need for change 
and a recognition of personal need for change in clinical behaviour was not always made, and the 
indication was that consultants would keep up-to-date in their own specialism, but not necessarily 
in other aspects of their work. Indeed, the case studies revealed that conducting research was not 
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seen by clinicians as beneficial to their work; there was no perceived incentive or time available 
for them to conduct research, the funds for training in research skills was not available locally, 
and the non-medical professional associations were not proactive in developing research. 
Interviewees did not feel that anybody was 'driving' the strategy either. What had had an impact 
on local services, and, as a result, increased knowledge and awareness of R&D, was not attributed 
to the Research for Health strategy (DH 1991b, 1993a), but to increased demands for clinical 
accountability from government. However, the Culyer Report (1994) was seen by those outside 
the teaching hospitals as providing them with an opportunity to gain some funds for research, as 
it called for more research to be conducted there. Local managers, therefore, did attempt to 
develop research and development activity, albeit in a limited capacity and focused upon 
identifying and resolving locally identified problems. 
There were small pockets of research activity locally, but knowledge, experience, and interest was 
limited. There was little evidence of a 'research culture' in the NHS in general, nor was it seen 
as necessarily desirable or relevant by interviewees. In addition, a research culture was not 
evident accross the whole of the teaching hospitals, where, in the second case study, interviewees 
at Addenbrooke's noted, nurses, midwives, physiotherapists, dietitians and other PAMS were not 
generally research 'active'. However, there was clearly some difference of opinion over who 
should drive R&D locally: the purchasers or trusts themselves. This was indicative of the 
changing climate of the NHS. In their new roles, health authorities were looking at the effective 
investment of their purchasing funds to make efficient and economic purchasing decisions. This 
required an increasing amount of information on which to base such decisions. However, the 
limited number of trusts operating outside major conurbations raised doubts in some 
interviewees' minds about whether the purchasers really had much power over providers, as 
I patients, in reality, had little choice over where they could be treated and were unlikely to want to 
be moved far from their home. Nevertheless, interviewees who were not working for trusts, saw 
I the ability of health authorities to hold trusts accountable for the services they provided, as 
I 
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determining the local success (or otherwise) of the Research for Health strategy (DH 1991b, 
1993a). This was despite the fact that most managers and clinicians had neither seen, nor read, 
the strategy. As such, local policy making was clearly ahead of national R&D policy in 
responding to the new demands and arrangements of the service. Trust-based interviewees, in 
contrast, saw their trusts as independent, and believed they should be able to determine their own 
R&D priorities. Although control over the production of knowledge by the government and NHS 
managers may have been limited, the evidence was that there was more control possible over the 
dissemination of that knowledge. However, control over the implementation and take-up of that 
knowledge was another matter, and this was where the development of an 'evaluative culture' 
was seen as important by managers. 
There were a large and increasing number of publications on the market, more practice 
guidelines coming out based on the meta-analysis of research results and via the new centres such 
as the Cochrane Centre and the York Centre for Reviews and Dissemination. However, 
clinicians of all types interviewed stated that their workloads were such that there was very little 
time for them to be able to read and reflect on them. There was also no discernible incentive or 
threat to make them reflect. In any case, the ability of an individual to change their clinical 
practice was often beyond their control. Changing treatments or the management of care 
involved a co-ordination of effort to ensure a consistency of service provision within trusts. 
Change, in other words, needed to be managed, and required individuals to work together as a 
team and not as individuals. Change, therefore, has a collective dimension and is not dependent 
on individual action alone. However, the evidence was that health care workers were not taught 
to manage the change process and that normalisation and change were not normal and natural 
aspects of their working life. The reforms encouraged innovation, therefore, but managed 
innovation and were quite tightly controlled. But as the money saved annually through the 
demands for greater efficiency, was not retained by trusts, there was evidence to suggest that the 
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incentive to innovate was limited and the reforms may have even worked in the opposite direction 
and encouraged trusts to overspend and under-perform. 
Initially, as the Bedfordshire case study illustrated, the workload of clinicians was believed to be 
so large that any attempt to form a research interest group had failed. Implementation of the 
results of research was similarly hindered by a lack of finances available to trusts. Instead, offar 
more concern was the pressure to meet output targets, Patient's Charter standards (DR 1992b) 
and a corporate normalisation to output and efficiency targets. Ultimately, therefore, the 
evidence suggested that an increasing emphasis was being placed upon quantitative and financial 
forms of knowledge in the NHS. This was supported, as the analysis of Regional NBS research 
and development group minutes indicated, by an increased call for statisticians and health 
economists to be included in research teams. The implications of this upon research values was 
discussed above. Nevertheless, the evidence indicated that the terms of public discourse in the 
NHS were being increasingly dominated by management issues, as Patient's Charter standards 
(ibid), waiting lists and efficiency indexes, and the like, featured so heavily in purchasing 
negotiations and in the press. Similarly, finance issues related to rationing have been given 
prominence in this thesis, because of their increasing significance to the NHS and, in particular, 
the role of managers in defining them. As a result, it can be concluded that whereas service 
specific values were not being replaced by more abstract quantitative and financial categories of 
knowledge as Power (1994; 1997) contended, financial considerations were playing an 
increasingly overt role in decision-making, medical knowledge production and in public 
discourse concerning the NHS. 
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8.5 Professions, experts and control 
The above analysis began to evaluate the power and control of the production of medical 
knowledge and those representing the core of the medical profession. This section continues the 
debate and will focus more specifically on the impact of the NHS reforms on the professions, to 
evaluate Power's notion that there has been a displacement of experts of the 'first order', such as 
nurses and doctors, with experts of the 'second order', such as managers and accountants. The 
issue is one which has featured throughout this thesis, most notably in the preceding two sections, 
and forms the crux of this thesis. The case studies illustrated how power was negotiated and 
renegotiated between professions and the state. As Light (1995) observed, 'professionalism is a 
force in history and society not sufficiently recognised by neo-classical economists, by Marxists, 
or by theories of the state. Although never wholly independent from the culture, political/legal 
structure and economy of a society, professionals are a distinct, institutional power' (Light 1995: 
39). The case studies presented in this thesis describe one such process of negotiation. 
The case studies, illustrated how there was increasing control over the way knowledge was used 
in the running of local services. Outside the teaching hospitals, this manifested itself in attempts 
by central trust managers, to create an 'evaluative culture'. The creation of such a culture was 
seen as a way of linking accountability, education, audit, research and development and 
employment issues together. However, this control was principally directed at the non-medical 
professions. The public health consultants in the health authorities, by contrast, played a major 
role in regulating the NHS, most specifically, through service developments and ensuring cost 
effective-service provision. All new service developments now had to be fully evaluated before 
being introduced. They, themselves, worked closely with doctors to regulate what knowledge was 
used and how. An essential element of medical power was control over the application of medical 
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knowledge, as chapter three and the case studies has showed. This was central to the notion of 
medical autonomy, which enabled doctors to rise up and dominate the hospital division of labour. 
Through the drawing up and implementation of treatment plans, doctors have been given the 
power to commit resources and define the needs of their patients. Managers cannot control 
diagnosis, which is in any case an interpretive and uncertain process. Macdonald (1995) and 
others, have noted the relationship between technique and knowledge as central to this 
'professional project' but as a potential weak point of the professions. If technique and 
knowledge could be separated, Macdonald (1995) argued, other professions would be able to 
encroach. Clinical autonomy, therefore, was cucial to doctors' status and authority. 
The evidence from case studies suggested that doctors kept up to date in their own particular 
medical specialism, but less so in other aspects of their day-to-day work. As such, by calling 
doctors accountable to managers and public health consultants, clinical autonomy and the doctor­
patient relationship was threatened, potentially undermining a fundamental element constituting 
the medical profession. The evidence reported in the newspapers and presented in chapter three 
suggested that doctors believed that this was an attempt to systematise and rationalise their jobs, 
but this was not supported by the evidence in the case studies. However, such challenges rarely 
reached the public sphere and were made by the medically-trained public health consultants using 
knowledge and language that were most acceptable to the doctors. When they did become public, 
the buck was passed back to the NHS managers and public health consultants, who were blamed 
for preventing patients from receiving the treatment that, as in the Child B case, may have 
prevented an early death (Weale 1995). The doctors, therefore, were increasingly embroiled in a 
network of bureaucracy, but still retained their favourable position in the eyes of the patients, and 
public and the media, who focused their attention and vented their spleens on the managers. 
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The result was increased bureaucratisation of the professionals in the NHS. The advent of 
Cochrane reviews, practice guidelines and the like, threatened to routinise some aspects of 
medical decision-making. However, this was still very limited, although the longer term aim of 
central trust managers was to introduce a notion of resource usage explicitly into clinical (notably 
medical) decision-making. Associated with central trust managers' desire to exercise more 
control was the contribution of LT., which played a key role in gathering information on 
clinicians. But this knowledge was used by managers as a counter-power over purchasers as well 
as, if not in preference to, making clinical decision-making more transparent. However, financial 
limits on spending prevented trusts from developing the kind of information systems that they 
wanted. The evidence was that, although some aspects of medical knowledge had been 
rationalised, this rationalisation was limited, and would remain so in the forseeable future. 
What was clear, was that if most doctors only had limited research experience, were not given 
formal training in critical appraisal skills, and most of the results of research were ignored 
anyway, then questioning their decision-making was a very necessary role. The evidence 
presented in the first case study in particular, noted the lack of a connection made by doctors 
between the need for change and a recognition that elements of their own behaviour and clinical 
practice might need to change. To an extent, therefore, improvements in efficiency and 
effectiveness were blocked by medical arrogance and the new public managers were unable or 
unwilling to change this. The issues involved are many and complex, and are discussed further 
in chapter nine. 
1 For further discussion, see 'profession, experts and control'. 

l Prospective audit, however, is a contentious term. The definition ofresearch, development and audit outlined at the begining 

ofthe thesis, described audit as retrospective. Prospective audit, therefore, can be seen as a tenn for small-scale research. This 

has implications for establishing the level and nature of research being conducted in the NHS, but also, ofcourse, for assuring 

the quality ofthat research. 

1 See the following section on research policy and politics for a depth analysis ofthis issue. 

4 Those based in centr.al trust headquarters. 

5 See 'research policy and politics' in chapter six. 
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CHAPTER 9 

CONCLUSION 
9.1 Introduction 
The thesis takes as its framework the work of Michael Power (1994, 1997), which is evaluated for 
the first time against primary evidence from the National Health Service. By adding research 
policy and politics and the rise of health services research to the features characterising the Audit 
Explosion (Power 1994) and the Audit SOCiety (Power 1997) in the NHS, Power's thesis is 
developed and improved. In his work, Power drew on his own professional background 
(accountancy) and concentrated his attention on public administration. Not surprisingly, he did 
not consider the wider sociological implications of his work. Power did briefly discuss the 
auditing of academic research, arguing that the conditions for making science into an auditable 
object were now in place (power 1997: 101). However, he did not reflect upon how research 
agendas themselves might fit into this 'audit society' which he characterised. Nor did he collect 
any primary data for his thesis, stating that 'it can be said that the evidence in this book is 
insufficient and heavily selective. To some extent this charge is reasonable. The analysis 
attempts scope rather than depth' (power 1997: 143). The analysis presented in this thesis goes 
some way towards addressing these issues, to developing and evaluating Power's work applied to 
the English NHS, and to present a new analysis of R&D policy in the context of these 
developments. By adding research policy and politics and the rise of health services research to 
the features characterising the audit explosion or audit society in the NHS, Power's thesis is 
developed and improved, and new theory, therefore, generated. The wider sociological 
implications of the whole are also explored, in order to present a thesis which adds significantly 
to the body of knowledge concerning NHS R&D policy and to understanding the wider NHS as a 
whole. The following chapter will explore the work of Foucault, which is re-evaluated in the 
light of the above analysis. The thesis represents a new approach and contribution to the 
understanding of NHS R&D policy and the first attempt to provide such an in-depth, research­
based analysis. 
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From the time it was established, until the 1980s, the NHS can be described as a classic example 
of a corporatist organisation. It was underpinned by the consensus politics of the post-war period 
and remained a relatively stable organisation throughout this time. This is not to say that 
dissenting voices were not evident, but conflict was, by and large, contained within the policy 
networks, which characterised the NBS. However, from the 1970s, discontent with this political 
consensus was beginning to emerge. Chapters one and three established how this discontent 
found political experience in the Thatcher Government's approach to the public sector, including 
the NHS. With this increasing dissatisfaction with the public sector came the strategy of control 
and accountability. The Conservative administration moved towards a system of management in 
which audit played a central role. The term 'audit' was characterised by Michael Power, in his 
Demos publication The Audit Explosion (power 1994). Power later developed his thesis to 
describe Britain as a society becoming an 'audit society' and that a gulf was opening up between 
poorly-rewarded "doing" and highly-regarded "observing" (Power 1997). This has particular 
relevance to the work of Michel Foucault (notably his work on powerlknowledge) and to the 
sociology of the professions in England. This chapter will, consequently, evaluate the relevance 
of Foucault's work to the thesis and assess the wider sociological implications of research and 
development policy in the English National Health Service. 
The Conservative Government's reforms of the NBS were examined in some detail in chapter 1 
and their impact assessed in the case studies. In contrast to the neo-Marxist explanation that the 
concentration on audit measures and upon economy, efficiency and effectiveness measures in the 
NHS was an attempt to maintain profitability in recession, the curb on public spending during 
this period was due to rising health care demand and costs. This had put a considerable strain on 
the system. This was exacerbated by a Conservative Government which was ideologically opposed 
to increasing taxation and public spending in order to meet this extra demand.This created a 
great deal of conflict between the government and health care professions in the late 1980s and 
facilitated what can be described as a critical situation in the NBS. The ensuing health care 
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reforms, such as Working for Patient's (DH 1989) sought to address the crisis facing the NHS 
without increasing the investment from public funds and avoid a 'legitimation crisis'. Scambler 
(1996), as indicated in Chapter eight, saw the rise of health services research as part and parcel 
of this crisis, and called for more holistic analyses from sociologists. This thesis attempts to 
make the wider links Scambler called for and look at the wider context in which NHS R&D 
policy is based. 
The case studies confirmed the elitist nature of decision-making in the NHS, but especially that 
concerning NBS R&D policy and the relationship of the state to representative (structural) 
interest groups. Policy networks were identified in the case studies, and the methods, type and 
degree of change explained. Appendix 13 summarises the major issues and conclusions to 
emerge from the case studies and there is not need to reiterate these here. Rather, they will 
inform this concluding chapter of the thesis. 
The occupational strategy of the 'free' professionals, of which the medical profession is the 
exemplar, try to keep state intervention at bay. The key role the medical profession played in the 
legislative process was again illustrated by Parry and Parry (1976) as they described the 
establishment of the National Health Insurance Act (1911) and the National Health Service. The 
support of doctors was essential to the establishment of the NBS and in order to (eventually) 
secure their support, the medical profession were given powers and included in the bureaucratic 
administration of the service, such that their professional self-interests were maintained. The 
result was that the NHS came to represent what could be described as a classic example of a 
corporatist organisation. The medical profession had direct links to the (welfare) state, and 
played a key role in maintaining, legitimising and managing it. Macdonald (1995) saw this 
exclusivity as essential to what he called the 'professional project'. This was an issue explored in 
chapter three of this thesis, where Larson's (1990) work was used to explain how control in 
health care was dependent upon control of 'those who know'. This has become a central 
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consideration of this thesis, as the Conservative Government sought to gain more control over 
NBS R&D, and research workers. 
As nurses, physiotherapists, and dietitians do not diagnose, there was not the barrier to 
management and government control that the medical profession had exerted around its area of 
knowledge and expertise. The evidence from the case studies was that managers were more 
succesful in their interventions towards the paramedic professions in the NHS. This manifested 
itself in a number of ways, for example, in controlling continuing education and R&D activity, 
and these issues and the reactions to them were explored in some depth. Exclusivity, however, 
also related to the ability of a professional group to control their membership and to prevent 
others from encroaching on areas of service that they felt could be supplied by themselves, as 
Parry and Parry (1976) illustrated in their book, The Rise of the Medical Profession. The case 
study analysis illustrated how the doctors continued this defensive strategy against challenge from 
NBS managers and from consumer groups. 
9.2 Marketisation, centralisation, devolution and accountability 
Issues such as the devolution of pay bargaining were not issues for the medical profession in the 
way they were for other professional groups. Pay continued to be dealt with centrally for the 
medical profession and did not reach local agendas in the same way as it did for other 
professional groups. The devolution of pay bargaining was a feature of the NHS, which analysis 
of case studies revealed was of particular concern and notoriety. It went to the heart of the issue 
of control over roles, perfonnance and control directly (although not of the medical profession). 
This, as discussed in the analysis above, led to job descriptions being more tightly specified by 
managers. Interviews revealed that it was seen as a positive step by central trust managers, in 
order to gain more control over tlleir workforce and pay according to perfonnance. However, the 
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messages coming from the government at the time (1995) were contradictory and the likelihood 
of a new (Labour) Government taking office in the forthcoming general election, which was 
believed would be against such pay bargaining, resulted in a rather chaotic scenario. The 
increased number of nursing auxiliaries also had an impact on the work of nurses, ridding them 
of some of the more mundane aspects of their work. At the same time, tighter control of 
education and training was seen as a way of moulding the nurses and P AMS into professions 
with values and knowledge of more use to managers and the government. 
The result was a paradox for the NBS, therefore, and a challenge to the Conservative 
Government's reforms. Would the government want to save wage costs and improve efficiency 
through making the workforce more individualised, or did they want to improve the quality and 
effectiveness of the service by emphasising teamwork, to implement treatments and care of 
proven increased benefit to the patients and to the NBS? This is equivalent to the problems 
thrown up in the Foucauldian power/control paradox of the panopticon, outlined in chapter three. 
The more efficient is the panoptic system, the more oppressive it becomes, and the more overt 
control thus is. The effort of NBS trust managers in the case studies was to try to achieve a bit of 
both, raising efficiency and quality. Locality management and the clinical directorate system 
necessitated more multi-professional team working, but had a negative effect on inter­
professional cohesion. However, there was some resistance to these management systems, with 
nurses and physiotherapists, for instance, deciding to continue to meet as professional groups 
anyhow. Doctors appeared not to have been affected at all. Instead, on the basis of the evidence 
from the literature, and from the case studies, the professions in the NBS were becoming 
increasingly bureaucratised but were not becoming deprofessionalised, de-skilled or 
proletarianised. This example of bureaucratisation was tested throughout this thesis, principally 
through: 
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• 	 the contractual nature of health care provision enveloping purchaser and provider 
organisations in long protracted negotiations over contracts, and so on, requiring 
considerable amounts of paperwork and,of course,contracts; 
• 	 pay bargaining and the move towards individualised negotiation over job contracts and 
performance; 
• 	 demands for accountability, which required forms be completed to satisfy the demands of 
insurers and of managers regarding performance; 
• 	 the audit explosion. More audit monitoring means more forms to complete; 
• 	 measures of responsiveness, such as the requirements to meet Patient's Charter standards 
(DH 1992b); 
• 	 bureaucratisation of the production of clinical knowledge, through the contractual basis of 
NBS research funding, Culyer declarations etc.; and 
• 	 a large increase in clinical guidelines, such as 'Effectiveness Matters' memos and 
publications, enveloping workers in a complex network of writing. 
Through such a complex bureaucratic system, control could at least be 'seen' to be exercised over 
the process of NHS work, even if it was not actually exercised and, therefore, satisfy public 
demands for accountability in service provision. However, the whole issue assumes that 
managers, the 'corporate rationalisers' that Aldford (1975) characterised, would necessarily want 
to interfere with medical autonomy and take full controL The evidence suggested that they would 
have liked to, but at the same time were reluctant to become too involved, as they would be 
directly implicated in making rationing decisions. At the same time, the Conservative 
Government was somewhat reluctant to fully devolve organisation and management 
responsibility too far, in practice, for the same reasons. It was somewhat prescriptive in its 
approach to service management and delivery, despite its claims to the contrary. The result was 
that the government's calls for value for money in service provision did not especially open up 
performance to wider scrutiny, and the outcome, therefore, supports Harrison and Pollitt's (1994) 
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contention that'A measure of clinical autonomy is therefore protective of managers, as wen as of 
politicians' (Harrison and Pollitt 1994: 142). The challenge of the corporate rationalisers also 
assumes homogeneity amongst managers throughout the NHS. This is clearly not the case. 
Chapter three examined the relevance of Aldford's (1975) work to the thesis, focusing on this 
management issue. North (1995) maintained that the broad thrust of Aldford's work remained 
salient. However, the evidence from the case studies presented in this thesis suggested that 
although purchaser and provider managers did share a desire to raise efficiency, they did so for 
different reasons and were often in conflict with each other. The case studies also showed how 
the organisation and management within trusts had resulted in the formation of clinical 
directorates in acute trusts, and locality management in community trusts. These structural 
changes created a system of central trust managers located in offices and ward or community-
based clinical and locality managers. These latter individuals were primarily clinicians, who 
were also managers. However, they generally held personal values nearer to those of clinicians, 
although they recognised and (reluctantly) accepted the constraints of management, and the need 
to include economising and efficiency factors into decision-making. Consequently, there were 
also significant differences between managers even within trusts and, as such, managers could 
not be seen as one coherent group. 
9.3 Knowledge, economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
The evidence from the case studies illustrated an attempt by the ConseIVative Government to gain 
more control over the production of knowledge in the NHS. Power's contention regarding the 
changing value of knowledge appears relevant, when compared to the realities of the NHS 
depicted in the three case studies. The three Es - economy, efficiency and effectiveness - were 
each prominent in the debate, with economy and efficiency categories of knowledge taking much 
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more of an overt role in the provision of health services. Effectiveness, or, rather, the definition 
of what constituted effective service provision, continued to remain in control of the medical 
profession. This control over what \vas 'valid' knowledge was central to the medical profession's 
conception of autonomy and was a central feature of this thesis. This was because research and 
development was used to define effectiveness. The control of research and development agendas 
in the NHS and the control of 'those who know' - the research workers - was a key to controlling 
the medical profession. This struggle over control of the professions will be discussed at length 
in the following section of the thesis. Nevertheless, the case study analysis illustrated that in the 
provision of NHS services, the way that the effectiveness knowledge was used became a 
significant issue and feature of control. As demands for accountability in service provision were 
made by the government, and, increasingly the public, health authority managers were 
increasingly using the results of research to satisfy these demands. However, NHS trusts, notably 
the non-teaching trusts, ".ere also seeking to develop 'evaluative cultures' in their organisations, 
and use the results of research and audit to demonstrate their efficiency and effectiveness to 
purchasers. 
The creation of a 'research culture' and 'change mindedness' in practitioners was of clear 
concern at all management levels of the service. Tllis was to ensure a nornmlisation of clinical 
practice to guidelines, ensuring the consistent provision of effective clinical services. The York 
Centre for Review and Dissemination and the Cochrane Centre were developed to help with this 
process, to bridge the gap between research and practice. As such, they could be seen as attempts 
to manage, or control the dissemination and utilisation of knowledge. Systematic reviews were 
conducted on specific subjects, with the attempt to produce succinct, accessible guidelines on 
clinical practice. Indeed, it was argued by some interviewees that if there was a total 
concentration upon development rather than research, they would not mind, because so much 
research was yet to be utilised. By challenging the doctors' ability to correctly treat a patient, or, 
rather, treat them more effectively, the purchasers were challenging a fundamental relationship at 
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the heart of medical practice, that is, the one between the patient and doctor. The patient must 
have absolute confidence in the doctor's ability and authority, as this is what they define as 
professional knowledge (Friedson 1970). However, such challenges rarely reached the public 
domain; instead they were made by the medically-trained public health consultants using 
knowledge and language that were most acceptable to the doctors. The role of public health 
consultants is further discussed below. 
The evidence from the case studies confirmed the medical profession's role in the legislative 
process and described how the biomedical researchers, in particular, were incorporated into state 
policy-making circles, and how they were able to influence and dictate research policy. Privileged 
groups were given access to elite policy circles; the best example of this was the .MRC, which 
was allowed to (at least) observe major NHS R&D committees. The groups making policy at all 
levels were generally closed and elitist, with research committees at regional and national-level 
dominated by biomedically-trained individuals from the teaching hospitals. 
The doctors from the teaching hospitals (what Larson termed the medical 'core') worked to 
maintain their elevated positions and professional self-interest. However, it was clear that the 
state did depend upon professional knowledge to run the NHS and, indeed, did not, on the whole, 
interfere with medical autonomy. When it did, the issues of under-funding and rationing came 
into the open and created a very uneasy situation for the government. The medical profession, 
consequently, remained protected behind the government. and its dominance remained relatively 
undented. 
The biomedical researchers within the teaching hospitals represent a 'core' of protected 
knowledge producers and of knowledge production. There was a 'them and us' mentality 
amongst interviewee's across the cases, including doctors, regarding research funding. However, 
whereas Larson saw this medical core as protected by the profession, this was true only to a 
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certain e:dent. The protection of the means to produce new knowledge was extended to exclude 
members of the medical profession itself, by demarcationary closure, i.e. controlling other 
professionals knowledge development (see Macdonald 1995: 132) if they were not from the 
medical core (i.e. the knowledge-producing core of the profession). According to Larson (1990) 
any dissenting voices from the profession would be ones from its margin, but the case studies 
revealed that this was not the case and dissent was expressed from rank and file doctors. 
Nursing, physiotherapy, nor dietetics professions could be seen as possessing a 'core' in the same 
way as the medical profession had secured for itself (Larson 1990). They did not have the power, 
history, depth of knowledge nor expertise to develop such a core and could not develop into a 
profession in the same mould as the medical profession, even if they had wanted to. The 
evidence was that any development towards a more formal professional organisation would be 
formed through the support of the state, rather than independently of it, and in a bureacratised 
form. 
9.4 Professions, experts and control 
The analysis of the formation of knowledge-based professions gives insight into the formation of 
modern society and how modern class systems developed. The professions were, as Macdonald 
(1995) pointed out, an element of a 'process of state formation' although their action and 
behaviour were not made with state formation in mind. Similarly, the competitive nature of class 
formation and domination indicates the market-based nature of modem capitalist society. The 
analysis of how professions continued to operate, therefore, gives insight into the maintenance of 
an economic and cultural hegemony in society. The evidence from the case studies suggests that 
the state can be seen as falling somewhere between the Marxist and Weberian accounts. The 
state is partly an independent force which can be influenced by different politically represented 
336 
interests via the working of the democratic process. Class and related social stratification are 
central to this conception. In this way, Foucault's conception of the medical profession was not 
applicable to England, as he talked of a profession organised through the state, rather than one 
which was independent of it. His conception largely described a continental European profession 
rather than a British one. However, what appeared consistent between the medical profession 
Foucault described and the British one was the strategies of power (panopticism) used, a body of 
knowledge (bio-medicine) and its application. 
The state for Foucault was characterised by a powerful bourgeois-controlled society, through a 
system of self-amplifying (panoptic) power, of which the professions were part. Professions for 
Foucault, therefore, developed through the state (Foucault 1977a). However, his conception 
described the development of professions in France. This thesis shows that the situation was 
different in England, where professions such as the medical profession developed independently 
of the state. HO\vever, for other health care professions, such as physiotherapists and nurses, 
there was evidence from the case studies to suggest that a more European version of professions 
may have been adopted, with clinical autonomy from doctors and managers awarded, in 
exchange for increased managerial input into recruitment and education. Foucault's work on the 
medical profession, despite its limitations, is useful as a method of understanding, but is not 
wholly applicable to the English NHS. The application of Foucault's ideas to countries other 
than France was one that had received little enthusiasm from historians and sociologists of the 
professions, but has been rather more of interest to medical sociologists such as Armstrong 
(1983). This thesis goes some way to redressing this situation. 
Marxism relies on a theory of the state, with class relations constituting the basic unit of Marxist 
analysis, and the state is a reflection of class relations in civil society. The changing nature of 
research agendas and debate concerning definitions of valid knowledge have been explained by 
neo-Marxists such as Habermas, as resulting from a crisis in the welfare state (Pusey 1987). This 
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issue was examined earlier in this chapter. However, if the medical profession established itself 
through a collective class strategy, but also through the inactivity of the state was able to become 
a professional group independent of the state, was it a corporate group? The social and physical 
relationship was not mutual, but the economic one was. The medical profession should be seen 
as an elitist group, within a corporatist framework. The two notions, elitism and corporatism, are 
not contradictory, as corporatism is a form of elitism, as chapter two demonstrated. Although the 
group may be largely free from state intervention, the state did rely on it to manage the NHS. The 
relationship of a profession to the state is characterised by its social, political and economic utility 
to maintaining hegemony, a stable society. The case study analyses indicated how ultimately 
there was little enthusiasm from Conservative Governments between 1991-95 or NBS managers 
during this period, to fully challenge the power of the medical profession, as this would have 
brought the issue of rationing into the public arena. Indeed, it would have raised questions about 
their commitment to the NBS. 
The evidence presented in the case studies and cross-case analysis illustrated that it was the 
public health consultants within the health authorities, in particular, who were given 
responsibility for holding clinicians and trusts accountable for the services they provided, It was 
they who played a surveillance role upon clinical behaviour, by increasingly demanding evidence­
based clinical practice. In The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault (1973a) described the evolution of 
public health in Europe. The medical sociologist, Armstrong (1983, 1995) has developed on 
Foucault's ideas in his own work. He has examined the expansion of medical specialisation and 
surveillance in Britain, and how it has contributed to the establishment of public health medicine. 
Public health medicine has been supported by health screening and health promotion. However, 
a criticism levelled at Armstrong by Bird and Short (1984) was that he did not give consideration 
to what doctors actually did, but concentrated instead on medical theory. The thesis presented 
here, in contrast to Annstrong's, places more emphasis on the work of public health consultants 
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and their views, whilst explaining how their role has developed into the surveillance of other 
health care professions, including doctors. 
Parallels can be drawn between the nature of public health's control of the population in general 
and to its role regarding the purchasing, provision and control of health care in the NHS. 
Foucault described how the 'specific disease is always more or less repeated, the epidemic is 
never quite repeated' (Foucault 1977a: 24). The parallel with the NHS, as the case studies 
illustrated, was that, with the evidence published by the Cochrane Centre for instance, a specific 
form of clinical practice is always repeated, but the pattern of its implementation is never quite 
repeated. In other words, the most effective and efficient forms of clinical practice were not 
universally applied. Similarly, just as a 'medicine of epidemics could exist only if supplemented 
by a police' (Foucault 1977 ibid.), the same police are required to supervise the nature and 
pattern of service delivery and promotion of health. The police in this instance, were the health 
authority managers, specifically, the public health consultants and their 'multiple gaze' fixed 
upon a 'collective phenomenon' to form an 'imprecise science', constituting the surveillance of 
clinical behaviour and giving public health medicine an enhanced political status 'at the state 
level, of a medical consciousness whose constant task would be to provide information, 
supervision, and constraint' (Foucault 1977a: 16). It can be concluded, therefore, that the 
specialisation of medical knowledge which has enabled public health doctors to monitor the 
population, have been applied to the monitoring (surveillance) of health care workers. However, 
this was the outcome of Conservative Government reforms of the NHS, especially from the 
separation of the purchaser/provider functions, rather than at the instigation of the profession. 
This, again, could be seen as an attempt by the government, to organise a profession, in this case, 
the public health profession, so that it was more amenable to their control. The government 
tried, therefore, to make the profession more like a European one, increasingly organised through 
the state, rather than independent of it. 
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In the introduction to chapter three, the notion of resistance to power was discussed, with 
Foucault arguing that power was delegated to managers in areas of high social resistance. 
Neither Foucault or Annstrong addressed adequately the processes of resistance used by those 
individuals subjected to the gaze, despite Foucault's recognition of their importance. Resistance 
was returned to in the conclusion to chapter three, where the fonnation of clinical directorates 
and GP fundholders were seen as two examples of divide and rule, developed by the Conservative 
Government in the 1990s, which, combined with a systematisation of medical knowledge, divided 
the NHS workforce in an attempt to make them conform. However, what is not clear from 
Foucault's work is how these managers differed from the 'police' he described. The roles of 
these individuals are not clearly differentiated and explained by Foucault. This has implications 
for this thesis, as it was clear from the analysis of case studies, that public health consultants, GPs 
and clinical managers were all clinicians who also managed and held other clinicians 
accountable. Were they all , therefore, 'police', 'managers' or both? The evidence suggested that 
they were both. They were one of Foucault's classic 'police' groups, but they also had delegated 
responsibility for managing clinicians who were difficult to control by the government. The 
expansion of this divide and rule, with public health consultants, clinical managers and GPs, 
therefore, the 'chiefs' to whom power was delegated. 
In Foucault's tenns, this would be a specialisation of the police (doctors and other clinicians) 
supervising the police (doctors and other clinicians). Similarly, chapter three of this thesis, 
outlined how Foucault believed that managers would be employed in areas of difficulty until the 
functions of those managers were automised. Public health consultants appeared to be one such 
manager and doctor, therefore, were used to control doctors. Locally, therefore, medically-
trained personnel were used to control 'those who know'. It was clear from the analysis of case 
studies that doctors would only accept the medical authority of, and be accountable to, other 
doctors. However, the evidence from case studies was that the skills required of the public health 
consultants were not fully developed as the situation was new to them. This meant that 
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surveillance was not complete (an 'imprecise science'), nor techniques fully developed and 
neither would they be for some time. 
The analysis of case studies revealed that it was as mistaken to view the medical profession as 
one homogenous group, as it was to consider managers in the same way. Perhaps it would be 
better to view the profession as rather more amoebic in shape and character than is depicted by 
writers such as Larson (1996). Most notable in the analysis above, of course, was the clearly 
perceived divide between GPs, doctors working in the teaching hospitals, public health 
consultants and others in the wider NHS. Although they were all part of the same 'professional 
project' (Macdonald 1995) there was clearly an element of competition. This competition arose 
in two specific contexts: in the first case, it was between GPs and public health consultants, as 
purchasers of health services, and trust-based doctors; and in the second case, it was between 
teaching hospital consultants and all other categories of doctors. The teaching hospital 
consultants are in the knowledge producing core of the profession and were determined to retain 
their power and dominance in the light of increased competition from outside. 
It was clear that the majority of doctors did not want to do research and were content to maintain 
the status quo. At the same time, the dissenters did not want to take any direct form of action 
that would change the system itself, and nor were they looking to change things too radically. 
Instead, they just wanted to have some access to research resources. But this was resisted, largely 
on the grounds that the quality of research projects could not be assured. The 'legitimacy' of 
knowledge from the teaching hospitals was used to discredit others, including other doctors, 
when it was deemed necessary. The professions, consequently, were rather more 'messy' than 
usually portrayed in the literature and in the various models of political theory, as was the state, 
Macdonald (1995) , however, is a notable exception to this rule, rightly observing that: 
'Conflicts tend to get resolved in the long run, but at certain points in time dissension within 
an occupation seems to be more significant that anything else in determining the direction in 
which the state/profession relationship develops. The roots of discord lie in the forms of 
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professional organization and in the nature of professional knowledge and practice, and as 
these are bound to change, internal or internecine conflict may at any time re-emerge as the 
dominant influence on a profession's development, and thus on its relation with the state' 
(Macdonal~ 1995: 119). 
Nevertheless, this competition has highlighted divisions in the ranks of the medical profession, 
although it was by no means enough to threaten them as a body. What is also interesting is the 
fact that trust managers and doctors within individual trusts were working together to at least 
maintain their trusts' existing levels of funding and service provision. In this way, doctors and 
trust managers did share common aims, although the methods to reach those aims differed. 
Doctors and managers in the community trusts and district general hospitals were not intending 
to threaten or displace the teaching hospitals, merely respond to the demands of purchasers and 
government, to maintain their own level of service. However, collectively, these managers and 
doctors could obviously present a challenge to the limited resources available, and as such, the 
response of the doctors in the teaching hospitals was staunchly defensive. The NHS reforms had 
introduced an element of competition into the provision of health care, therefore, although 
perhaps not in the way originally intended by the Thatcher Government. Although there were 
full time researchers working in the teaching hospitals, they were led by NHS employees, the 
hospital consultants, who, being consultants, also taught trainees and practised medicine on the 
wards and in private practice as well. Similarly, some of the consultants working in the district 
general hospitals taught at the medical school and a small number of others undertook research. 
The distinction between the medical knowledge creators, teachers and practitioners that Larson 
(1990) described, therefore, were not as distinct as she implied. Instead, the case studies in this 
thesis indicated that there was a clear distinction between the teaching hospitals and those 
working in them and the rest of the NHS. The thesis illustrates the nature of the struggle for 
control over the production of research in the NHS, specifically the nature of the biomedical 
researchers and research managers in the teaching hospitals to recapture and maintain their 
dominant position, specifically through: 
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• dominating research committees at all levels; 
• 	 having representation on all relevant policy-making bodies through to the heart of 
government 
• 	 having a research methodology-the RCT, which was seen as the bench mark for quality 
research; 
• 	 having a government which was inactive in defining methods to achieve policy objectives, 
thus allowing the profession to reassert its dominance. 
The 	third of Aldford's (1975) groups, the 'repressed' community interest groups had had a 
slightly higher profile in the NBS, the case studies illustrated, but were still 'repressed'. The 
health authority in the second case study did have responsiveness as one of their defining 
principles and the implications of this were extensively discussed, with, for instance, citizen's 
jury arrangements being used to define some priorities. Indeed, health authorities were all 
required to gain public involvement in decision-making and did so through public consultation 
over purchasing plans. However, much as Elston (1993) noted that medical science and practice 
was generally criticised in areas where clients were not actually ill, so it was with the contribution 
from citizen's juries, which, in the second case study, were used to prioritise fertility services. 
For example, under health authority guidance, reproductive services were assessed to establish 
funding priorities. This was not surprising, as the process was new to the health authority, was 
being piloted by them, and as the service in question was in a 'soft' area which did not threaten 
core services or lives. However, the system of citizen's juries was expensive and time consuming 
and, therefore, not something that could be used very often. Similarly, the 'Child B' case 
received much attention during the course of this thesis as it represented a tragic, but defining 
moment for the NBS. This could be seen as the first major challenge to medical decision-making 
from a member of the public - a consumer of health care (or, rather, the father, on behalf of his 
child). 
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This example illustrated how, when things went wrong, attention was focused on the health 
authority managers, notably the director of public health. The doctors, on the other hand, were 
able to retreat and escape the public gaze, even though the director of public health made his 
decision on their advice. The ultimate result of course, was tragic. It posed a dilemma for public 
health consultants in general rather than trust-based doctors, as the third case study (Suffolk) 
highlighted. Given the finite resources available to fund the NHS, the individual versus 
population needs debate (rationing) was a continuing dilemma, which, it was claimed by a public 
health consultant, had not been addressed by the effectiveness agenda and left them rather 
exposed. 
In conclusion, the primary evidence analysed here, is in contrast with Dent's (1995) contention. 
The 'radical readjustment' (as Dent termed the NHS reforms) was radical, but some what 
tempered in the process of implementation. The result was the increased bureaucratisation of 
health care professionals and their work. This equally applied to all elements of the medical 
profession, including those in the teaching hospitals. New public managers, therefore, had 
increased their profile, but had neither displaced, nor subordinated trust-based doctors. Control 
over the other professions was rather more overt and, indeed, there were some protests about 
them taking over and rationalising services. However, the evidence was that this was not on the 
agenda of trust or purchaser managers. 
9.5 	 Foucault, research and development, power, knowledge and 
control 
What appeared consistent between the medical profession Foucault described and the British one 
was the strategies of power (panopticism) used, a body of knowledge (bio-medicine) and its 
application. Shore and Roberts (1995) saw the concept of panopticism as evident in the 
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government reforms of higher education. The research assessment exercise (RAE), the authors' 
argued, concentrated on quantity, rather than quality. although the distinction between quantity 
and quality was blurred by the research selectivity panels, who acted as judges in the RAE 
process. In an attempt to gain more funding and attention, Shore and Roberts continued, new 
'research centres' were being established as 'unique selling points' (Shore and Roberts 1995: 
14). The result was an emphasis on economising measures at the expense of efficiency and 
quality in higher education. 
For the thesis, the relevance and applicability of Foucault's works were initially evaluated in 
Chapter three. A major problem with power and normalisation in the Foucauldian sense, 
through the use of audit and the publication of output and outcome indicators, was that Foucault's 
conception did assume a rather one-sided notion of power. There was an over-concentration 
upon the 'victim' in Foucault's work, with power expressed downwards on 'helpless' individuals. 
The reality portrayed in the case studies was rather more complex. Policy and power, therefore, 
cannot and should not be seen in a vacuum and should be firmly placed in context. Working 
priorities, both personal and institutional, are dependent upon a whole number of priOlities, 
policies, agendas, all having influence. The prominence of anyone issue on individual policy 
(working practice) is, therefore, dependent on a whole series of others, all inter-related and 
battling for prominence; that is, a plurality of discourses. 
Academics who researched media audience behaviour, such as Morley and Silverstone (1990) 
used the tenn 'polysemy'. However, whilst polysemy refers to a plurality of discourses all 
competing for attention, there is a dominant, overriding message, a preferred 'reading' of a 
discourse. At the same time, the human subject is not merely a passive recipient of messages, but 
interprets them in accordance with his/her own set of beliefs, values, politics and power. These, 
as the analysis has indicated, are in large part framed by the occupation of the individual. The 
way that those messages are translated into action is dependent upon the cultural position of the 
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individual at the point of expression; that is, on the social, political and economic context of the 
interaction. As a result, Foucault's notion of there only being individuals and society (despite his 
continued reference to the 'bourgeoisie' in his writing) is not a valid one. Groups, that is 
structural, occupational (class) groups, playa leading role in framing behaviour. Power, 
therefore, is not merely expressed downwards, but also upwards and it is this interface that also 
requires examination. Nevertheless, Foucault's notion of discourse is an interesting and useful 
one in understanding one aspect of power relations in the NHS. 
The parallel in this thesis is that different, sometimes competing policies, guidelines and 
strategies can be seen as polysemic in nature, that is, official, national and regionally-defined 
approaches and those at the local level. Indeed, the NHS could be characterised by the level of 
paperwork it creates, which envelopes managers and clinicians in a 'network of writing'. In this 
way, the political, social and economic significance awarded these policies (who 'drove' them 
and how prominent they were in local and national agendas) was a central element to changing 
behaviour or not. This was evident upon analysis of data, with marketisation and the resultant 
separation of the purchaser/provider roles indicating a distinct challenge to power relations 
regarding the delivery of health services. However, the evidence was that this separation was not 
complete and the political sensitivity of the government meant that it was reluctant to fully 
relinquish its role in directly legislating for local services. This thesis has sought to examine 
research and development policy within this context. The Research for Health strategy (DH 
1991b, 1993a) was one discourse (policy) amongst many in the NHS, and has to be viewed within 
this framework. 
Consultants worked in their own specialisms, largely free of, or ignoring, management agendas. 
They largely kept up-to-date in their own specialty and implemented new services on their own 
initiative. The management (control) of development, therefore, was additionally problematic. 
Education and training, was seen as an important element to facilitate development, but 
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clinicians needed to have the time to develop themselves and be reflective. As the Bed.fordshire 
case study illustrated, this social reflexivity (Giddens 1994: 6) had to be a constant process in an 
environment which was 'change minded', as otherwise, one 'tablet of stone' would just be 
replaced with another. The requirement, therefore, was for clinicians to continually reflect and 
normalise their behaviour accordingly. HO\vever, this all had resource implications. 
Nonnalisation was not just about individuals stepping back and reflecting on their practice, as 
changing practice involved a whole set of other factors, issues and people. It was normally not in 
an individual's ability to change on hislher own. Trusts, purchasers, GPs, the NHS Executive and 
governments also had to be change oriented. 
For these reasons, whilst the Foucauldian theory of normalisation might have appeared applicable 
at first sight, on the whole, it did not fit the circumstances. The individualisation of inmates in 
the panopticon is not a transferable metaphor to the health service, as the structural groups were 
strong, despite the concerted effort by government (and its agents) to weaken them, through for 
instance, devolving pay bargaining. Such attempts proved to be not very successful. In any case, 
there was an inherent problem with this model, in that the ability of an individual to normalise 
and change their clinical practice was often beyond their control. Changing treatments or the 
management of care involved a co-ordination of effort to ensure a consistency of service provision 
within trusts. Change, in other words, needed to be managed, and required individuals to work 
together as a team and not as individuals. Change, therefore, has a collective dimension and is 
not dependent on individual action alone. 
In the light of the evidence presented in the case studies, therefore, panopticism can be seen as a 
useful theoretical concept but is only partially applicable. It does have parallels in the NBS, but 
they are limited. The main idea of panopticism is how to apply power downwards in a 
technologically-controlled way. The case studies illustrated the development of 'flatter' 
management structures in trusts, with central managers (the chief executives, clinical directors, 
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accountants etc.) based in trust headquarters. In contrast, clinical and locality managers were all 
practising clinicians, who also held budgets and performed management duties, but who worked 
on the wards or in the community. The central trust managers were working in unobserved 
solitude, separated from the wards and clinicians. From these centres, trust strategies and policy 
were developed and implementation devolved. Departmental budgets were established and the 
clinical and locality managers were expected to organise services and comply with these budgets. 
Similarly, information required for Patient's Charter (DH 1992b) waiting lists and the like, were 
fed into computers on the wards and relayed back to trust headquarters. Some interviewees felt 
that they were being observed from afar, indeed, one in the Third case study (Suffolk) spoke of 
being watched by a 'Big Brother' but this was not universal. Instead of the normalisation of 
individuals by getting them to conform to behavioural norms, the evidence here suggests that the 
NHS was more oriented towards a corporate normalisation to centrally-defined output norms. 
The techniques of observation used, therefore, were rather myopic and inefficient and left much 
space for interpretation, avoidance and conflict. 
As a theoretical concept, panopticism is useful but clearly is a rather one-sided, top-down view of 
power. It takes little (if any) account of existing networks and places too much emphasis on the 
individual as victim. The medical profession (in particular) as objects of power, clearly could 
never be seen as victims, nor as powerless. Indeed, prospective audit (despite its limitations) was 
used to generate knowledge to be used as a countervailing power. An example, illustrated in the 
Suffolk case study, was where a doctor was encouraged by the medical director, to prospectively 
audit the introduction of a pacemaker transplant service. This was so that the results could be 
taken to the purchaser, to be used to justify the services value, worth and the reason why it should 
be purchased. In a panoptic conceptualisation, power is directed downward at the individual, with 
the intention of reducing/minimising lateral ties and splitting the workforce into a series of 
separated individual workers, operating within their pre-defined 'cells'. However, the case 
studies illustrated how strong the structural forces (the professions) were in resisting this power. 
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Although, as the conclusion to chapter three indicated, Foucault argued for the analysis of the 
resistance of power - by identifying and observing each competing force and the methods of 
counter-attack used - it appears he did underestimate the power of groups. This was particularly 
, 
so in the case of professional groups. The case studies illustrated how, in the English NHS, this 
omission was a major limitation to Foucault's analysis. 
Increasing bureaucracy in the production of NHS services and increased bureaucratisation of 
NHS professionals, was a feature of the NHS. This was characterised in the case studies by rising 
numbers of managers, more fonn filling and paperwork, which were produced in response to 
increased demands for accountability in the provision of health care and research and 
development services. This bureaucratic control was, and is, a very visual, but ineffectual and 
inefficient technique of power, the limitations of which were described in the case studies. The 
concept of panopticism, similarly, would involve considerable resources in tenns of time and 
money to work for clinicians to be able to reflect and nonnalise behaviour. However, time and 
money were two resources that were clearly in short supply in the NHS, as the case studies 
illustrated. Likewise, the evidence from Ignatieth (1978) and others, such as Macdonald (1995) 
was that the panopticon, as an actual prison, was never constructed as Bentham intended. So far 
as England is concerned, Foucault described a form of power that was never utilised in the 
schools and institutions he described. It appears that panopticism is better used as a metaphor 
and way of visualising the application of power in its absolute form, rather than as a technique of 
power used in the everyday world. In contrast to some critiques of Foucault's work, this may 
have been what Foucault meant. Indeed, as chapter three highlighted, Foucault did see the 
panopticon he described as an ideal type, but this does not negate its usefulness as a theoretical 
concept. 
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POSTSCRIPT 
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The following section is a brief post script to the thesis and is intended to demonstrate the thesis' 
relevance to the NBS, now that a Labour Government is in office. Since 1997, when the Labour 
Government came into power. a number of reforms to the NHS have been proposed. This 
postscript is not intended to provide a definitive review of them, but briefly assess their 
significance to the thesis. 
The New NHS lv/adem - Dependable White Paper (DH 1997) laid the foundation to replace the 
NBS internal market. However, it was made clear that ministers did not want to impose a 
wholesale ill-conceived and untested reorganisation upon the NBS. Rather, a more 
developmental, reflective approach was proposed, although the work involved was significant, 
and the timescales proposed - comparatively short. Significant in the proposals were the 
formation of up to ten Health Action Zones. These were intended to be joint initiatives between 
the NBS and other organisations, such as community groups and the voluntary sector, to develop 
strategies and improve the health of their local populations. 
Health Action Zones were intended to target effort on a number of areas where there was scope 
for the health of local people to be improved by better integrated arrangements for future 
treatment and care. In the first instance, a small number of areas were to be identified, to work 
with the centre to develop this new approach and explore its potential. This work was expected 
to link in with, and inform, work on development and implementation of the White Paper (DH 
1997), and support the further development of Health Action Zones. All the parties concerned in 
the Health Action Zones were, subsequently, expected to play their full part in implementing the 
strategies they had agreed, and deliver, working within existing resources, measurable 
improvements in public health and in the outcomes of quality treatment and care. 
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The reorganisation illustrated that the Labour Government had continued. with the trend set by 
the previous Conservative Government, to devolve responsibility for decision making, whilst 
retaining overall control, by setting frameworks of national standards and monitoring 
performance. Likewise, they also placed emphasis on improving the use of NHS resources, 
noting efficiency, quality and performance in particular, as important considerations (DH 
1997:6). Associated with these considerations, the central importance of evidence-based health 
care was made clear: 
the take-up of research findings on clinical and cost effectiveness is uneven and unsystematic. 
In order to sustain the NHS, while making it both modern and dependable, this \Vhite Paper 
proposes a new drive for quality (DH 1997: 10) 
Key features of the White Paper were as follows: 
• 	 the establishment of a National Institute for Clinical Excellence to lead on cost and clinical 
effectiveness, drafting new guidelines and disseminating them; 
• 	 the establishment of Primary Care Groups (local GPs and community nurses working 
together) to commission local services; 
• 	 the establishment of multifunds - groups of GP Fundholders who agree to pool their budgets 
and work together; 
• 	 quality standards built into service agreements; 
• 	 a new system of clinical governance in primary care and NHS Trusts, to ensure that 
standards were met. This was backed by a statutory duty for quality in NHS Trusts; and 
• 	 a Commission for Health Improvement was established to 'support and oversee the quality of 
clinical governance and services at local level and to tackle shortcomings. It will be able to 
intervene where necessary' (DH 1997: 19), 
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Although much emphasis was placed in the White Paper on primary care, notably Primary Care 
Groups, Health Authorities were given the responsibility for policing those PCGs, holding them 
accountabre and allocating funds to them. It was expected that fewer Health Authorities covering 
larger areas would emerge. This suggests that HAs might become reinvented RHAs (DH 1997: 
23). 
Linking Research and Development more in line with the stated emphasis on efficiency and 
quality, a new research programme on service delivery and organisation was devised, and an 
emphasis was placed on disseminating and utilising existing research findings. Indeed, after 
1998, the Advisory Groups, which established and managed the National Programmes of 
Research and Development (such as the Mental Health and Learning Disabilities Group), were 
superseded by a tripartite framework of three broad programmes of research. These were the 
Health Technology Assessment Programme, which was, and had been, seen as the centre piece of 
the NHS programme (DH 1998a: 15); a new Service Delivery and Organisation Programme; 
and a New and Emerging Technologies Programme. 
It is clear from these arrangements, that the Labour Government were placing much emphasis 
upon the dissemination and utilisation of the results of research, which was an issue which was 
equally strong in the White Paper as it was in the original Research for Health strategy (DH 
1991a). The thesis goes some way to explaining why these two situations are the same. The 
thesis, therefore, remains as relevant to the NHS today as it did in 1991 when it was started. 
More recently, and again following the previous government's general policy direction, a more 
prominant role for public health was proposed for the NHS (DH 1998b). Our Healthier Nation 
(DR 1998b) proposed that public health action should be more based on the evidence of what 
works. In line with the Labour Government's 'third way' approach towards public services, an 
emphasis was placed on individual responsibility for health, but with the state playing some role 
in maintaining a healthy SOCiety: 
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Health is not about blame, but about opportunity and resonsibility. Everyone has a part to 
play - Government, national organisations, local services, communities, families and 
individUals. Our Healthier Nation sets out a third way of tackling the problems of ill health 
that our country faces (DH 1998b: 19). . 
A national contract for better health was proposed and a ne\v Minister for Public Health was 
appointed (Tessa Jowell). It was the government's stated intention, that research and 
development be refocused onto public health, and that public health action should be more 
explicitly based on the available evidence of what worked, drawing on research commissioned 
from the Cochrane Centre. 
The information needs and requirements for public health and the role of public health 
consultants in decision-making was a particular feature of the thesis. The new government's 
emphasis on public health, therefore, further indicates the topicality of the thesis to the present 
day. Similarly, much of the debate in the thesis concerned the 'D' (development) part of R&D, 
and how the results of research could be used (or not) to improve clinical services. This appears 
to be a principal interest of the Labour Government, rather than doing more research, and as 
such, the continued relevance of the thesis is maintained. 
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APPENDIX 1 Key reccomendations of the Therapy Professions 
Group Report 
(DR 1994f) 
• 	 Greater representation on central and regional R&D committees of the NHS Executive: 
• 	 Greater representation on ethics and local trust R&D funding committees; 
• 	 Greater representation on relevant university funding agencies grant awarding bodies; 
• 	 The encouragement from managers to support therapists undertaking high quality, relevant 
research; 
• 	 The encouragement of purchasers to write research components into contracts; 
• 	 The establishment of NHS Executive Research and Development Directorate post doctoral 
therapy fellowships; 
• 	 An increase in the number of annual research awards made to therapists; 
• 	 The encouragement of the research councils to develop schemes to increase the availability of 
doctoral and post-doctoral research awards for therapists; 
• 	 The payment of locum cover for clinician researchers and the establishment of more 
secondments and joint appointments; 
• 	 The establishment of three levels of research workers, seen as essential to the development of 
careers in therapy research - research assistants, senior reserearch workers and project 
leaders; 
• 	 Improvements to the career structure for therapists; 
• 	 To conduct a mapping exercise to establish the range of methodologies used in R&D to 
strengthen current reviews of research already prioritised by the NHS; 
• 	 Fully involve therapists in all aspects of the NBS Research and Development Information 
Strategy (NBS R&D ISS), such as the Cochrane Centre and the NHS Centre for Reviews and 
Dissemination; 
• 	 The (NBS R&D ISS) be made more explicit to therapists; 
• 	 Encourage medical libraries to hold broader collections of health services research material; 
• 	 Include the role and contribution of he therapy professions in the evaluation of the NHS R&D 
strategy: 
• 	 Include therapy departments in tenders for multi -disciplinary health care research 
programmes. 
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APPENDIX 2 Key recommendations of Culyer 
• 	 Create a national forum for information exchange between national bodies funding research 
in the NBS. 
• 	 Review the membership of the CRDC to include more input from purchasers, providers and 
key R&D commissioners, i.e. HEIs. 
• 	 Review the concordat with the !v1RC over service costs. 
• 	 DRD' s should be the focal point for R&D in each region, leading a group to identify regional 
research priorities, and commissioning and managing R&D. 
• 	 Develop and publish the principles and criteria to guide the use at all levels of NHS R&D 
funds. 
• 	 Take control of all the schemes for funding service costs and amalgamate them into one. 
• 	 See the accumulated funds as a levy on all purchasers funds and determine them annually. 
• 	 Include service costs in all research contracts. 
• 	 Purchasers should be allowed to support and fund their own research where external funding 
cannot be found and supplement their appointed levies when required. 
• View NBS R&D-related funding according to three categories: 
., Direct and Indirect costs. 
• 	 Service costs for projects and programmes, either NHS or externally funded. 
• 	 Costs for maintaining research facilities and staff not reasonably attributable to a particular 
project or programme. 
• 	 A research assessment exercise, similar to the HEFCE or London Postgraduate hospitals ones 
should be used to determine facilities costs. this should be reviewed every three or five years. 
• 	 The NHS:ME should formulate and publish the criterion to receive this funding and interim 
costing techniques for research by 1995/96. 
• 	 Phase in these new methods offunding. 
• 	 Make direct and service costs accessible to professionals working in primary and community 
care settings. 
• 	 Form an R&D commissioning unit in each NHSE Regional office. 
• 	 Create a national database to hold information on all NHS research, however funded. 
• 	 The NHSE should develop costing and accounting methodologies for R&D related activities, 
published in national manuals from 1996/97. 
• 	 Developing a human resource strategy for the NBS which includes training and general 
personnel issues. 
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APPENDIX 4 Interview Protocol 
Background . 
Role and research background of interviewee 
Professional background? 
Research background? 
Marketisation, centralisation, devolution and accountability 
Marketisation in the NHS and the impact of marketisation on research 
Has the creation of purchasers and providers promoted the formation of a more evaluative 
culture? 
Have you noticed a change in the last four years with regard to R&D? 
Has the health care market promoted the use of R&D? 
How has the health care market impacted upon practice here? 
How are your relations with the purchasers? 
Do purchasers require you to use research to substantiate service provision? 
Can you give examples? 
Who chose them, when, why, how? 
How is research incorporated into contracts? 
Can you give me an example? 
How do the purchasers implement this? 
Devolution, accountability and pay bargaining 

What impact has the devolution of pay bargaining had upon the trust? 

How has it affected relations between management and the occupational groups? 

How have the demands for accountability affected service provision? 

Knowledge, economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
Value for money, economv, efficiency and effectiveness 

How do you access the results of research? 

Where do you get information on best practice from? 

Is the information easy to digest? 

How can the results of research be made more useful to you? 

Have you a specific interest? 

How do you evaluate/monitor your own work? 

Who evaluates your organisations/your work? 

How/what's your ex-perience of this/what do you think ofit? 

How prominent a role does efficiency, economy and effectiveness play in decision-making? 

Auditing and governance; types of audit and the audit process 

To what extent has audit had an impact upon practice? 

What is the relationship between R&D and audit? 

How is audit organised? 

What are your views on audit? 

What uses do you see for audit and R&D? 

To what extent does the Health of the Nation impact upon practice? 

Is there a gap between research and practice in your organisation? 

Is there a research culture in your organisation? 

How do you create one? 
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Evaluation, research, its implementation and development 
How does your organisation, or you, keep up-to-date? 
Where do you get your information from? 
How do you measure quality? 
How do you evaluate it? 

What do you do with it? How? 

How do you use it? 

How do you implement it? 

What are the problems associated with research and research implementation? 

Can you think of any problems confronting you regarding R&D? 

Have you encountered any problems regarding the implementation of R&D? 

How familiar are you with the literature concerning implementation? 

Professions, experts, knowledge and discourse 
Professions, experts, knowledge and discourse 

How do the professional groups react? 

How do professions vary in their attitude and approach to R&D? 

How do professions vary in their attitude and approach to health services research? 

What professions are involved in R&D here? 

What are they doing? 

Do they work together? 

Are there any specific problems? 

What opportunity are people given to develop their education? 

Are there any in-house courses in research skills/evaluation/appreciation? 

Research policy and politics 
Knowledge of health research policy, dissemination and utilisation 

Are you aware of the Research for Health strategy? 

If so how/if not, why not? 

Types of research, research activity and training 

How prominent a role does R&D feature in your organisation? 

What research is going on in your organisation? 

Where, why, who's doing it? 

Relationships to universities? 

How do you see your organisation's position in terms of R&D in comparison with others? 

How does research in a community unit fare in comparison to an acute unit? 

Has the Regional R&D office contacted you? 

When, how, what did they say, have they done anything, have they included your organisation in 

any way? 

Are you aware of the way R&D is now organised? 

Have you been involved in any bids for funds or been included in any projects? 

What was your experience of this? 

How does their treatment of community-based research compare? 

Research ethics and surveillance 

What is your impression of ethics committees/what's your experience of them? 

What do you think their role should be? 

Do they need to be/how can they be improved? 

362 

APPENDIX 5 Interviewees for Bedfordshire case study 
North West Thames Regional Health Authority 
Tony Bates, Regional Manager ofR&D 
Sheila Adam, Regional Director of Public Health 
Bedfordshire Health 
Duncan Eaton, Chief Executive 
Martin Woolaway, Director of Public Health 
Paul Kitchener, R&D Lead and Public Health Consultant 
Tony Wood, Vice Chancellor, University of Luton and Chairperson, Bedfordshire Family Health 
Services Authority 
Bedford Hospital 
Ken Williams, Chief Executive 
Rosie Kennedy, Director of Nursing 
Mabel Blades, Chief Dietitian 
Tony Ogborn, Consultant Obstetritian and Gynaecologist 
Anne Clarke, Physiotherapy Manager 
Bedford and Shires Community and Health Care NHS Trust 
Tim Skelton, Chief Executive, and 
Marjory Keene, Director of Professional Development 
University of Luton 
Kate Robinson, Dean, Faculty ofHealth Care and Social Studies 
Kathy Havill, Head of School of Nursing, University ofLuton 
Luton and Dunstable Hospital NHS Trust 
Nick Finer, Consultant and Director of R&D 
Jenny Hunt, Nursing Practice Advisor 
Dietitians, (combined acute and community service) 
North Bedfordshire Community Health Council 
Valma James, Researcher. 
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APPENDIX 6 The national structure for R&D in the NHS 
(at the time of interviews, Wessex Regional Health Authority, 1992) 
!\ATIO!\.-\.L STRUCTL'RE FOR R&D I'\ THE !'1m 
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W2SME: 
Central R&D Committee 
I 	 I 

I 

National R&D 
[I Pian 
 II 

i 

I 

I 

I 

! 
I
Centrally 	 Regionally 
Funded 	 Funded 
Programs 	 Regional R&D Programmes 
Committees 	 in National 
Priorities 
, 
I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 
 Regional R&D Plans 
I 

I I I 

Responsive Mode lnfrastructure Regionally 
Funding lnfoI"J:nation Service Funded 
Support 	 Programs in 
Regional 
Priorities 
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APPENDIX 7 Management and committee structures of the North West 
Thames Regional Health Authority 
(at time of interviews, Bates, A.R 1992) 
tanding Group on Health Technologies 
& Expert Advisory Groups 
~ead Directorates) 
standing working sexual healthmental health group 
Strategy & Public 
Health 
Figure. Research and Development Structure 
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-----
-----------
The R&D Directorate will be supported by: 
• the Regional R&D Committee 
• aseries ot Working Groups . 
ORGANISATIONAL FRAM EWORK 
I ~:: I ' DI":!~'" 
~ ~ I DofH 
.---' ,," 
Regional 
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\ 
\ 
\ R&D 
Dlr.ctorat••AIDS/HIV Purch••• rl!wi ental Other 
& Sexual Provider 
Prolect Support 
ReglonaHealth - formulation 
Health In ter lac e 
- collaboration 
• management 
- dlaaemlnatlon 
Information 
Admlnlatratlon 
Purchasers -......,,\ 

Providers ) 

"- Researchers ," / 

The Regional R&D Committee and the Working Groups will have a significant role in raising 
the profile and giving momentum to the R&D initiative throughout the Region. A wide 
representation within the Regional R&D Committee and the working groups will provide 
opportunity both for an accessible framework and for determining needs and priorities and 
making an effective response to Regional needs. 
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APPENDIX 9 Interviewees for Cambridge and Huntingdon case 
study 
Anglia and Oxford Regional Health Authority 
Richard Himsworth. Regional Manager of R&D 
Cambridge and Huntingdon Health Commission 
Ron Zimmern, Director ofHealth Policy and Public Health 
Steve Clark, Director of Finance and Purchasing 
Martin Evans, Director of Public Affairs 
Hinchingbrook Health Care NBS Trust 
Bob Henderson, Medical Director and R&D Co-ordinator 
Martin Dadds, Contracts and Information Director (Accountant) 
Janet Rawson, Director of Nursing 
Colin Borland, Consultant 
Gill Gamlin, Physiotherapy Manager 
Paula Noble, Dietetics Manager 
Anne Allen, Practice Development Adviser (Health Visitor) 
Papworth Hospital NHS Trust 
Noreen Caine, Director of Research and Development 
Lifespan Healthcare Cambridge NBS Trust 
Richard Taylor, Chief Executive 
Woody Caan, R&D Manager 
David Vickers, Medical Director 
Pat Lambert, Director of Clinical Services 
Karen Bell, Director of Human Resources 
Janet Round, Therapy Manager 
Ruth Palmer, Professional Development Advisor for Nursing and Project Co-ordinator, Primary 
Care 
Addenbrooke's NHS Trust 
Dr Brown, Medical Director, Immunologist and Chair, R&D Strategy Committee 
Jill Canning, Audit Manager 
Rosie Kennedy, Chief Nurse 
David Pillsbury, R&D Contracts Manager 
Caroline Heyes, Head of Dietetics Service (district-wide service) 
Jill Hodge, Manager of Physiotherapy Service 
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APPENDIX 10 Interviewees for Suffolk Case Study 
Suffolk Health Authority 
John Rodriguez, Public Health Consultant 
Vijay Kumar, Public Health Consultant 
Ipswich Hospital NBS Trust 
Brian Websdell, Chief Executive 
Maggie Page, Dietetics Manager 
Sheila Battley, Physiotherapy Manager 
Sue Craggs, Clinical Director, Clinical Services 
Ian Scott, Medical Director 
Don Elliot, Clinical Director, Theatres and Anaesthetics Directorate 
Sally Cockrell, Director of Quality and Nursing 
Allington NHS Trust 
A. J. Ranzetta, Chief Executive 
Jane Mitchell, Director of Community Services 
Pat Whelan, Locality Manager and Professional Head of Physiotherapy 
Dot Myhill, Locality Manager and Professional Head of Nursing 
Chris Nourse, Medical Director 
Peter Holden, Director ofLearning Disabilities 
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APPENDIX 12 The evaluation of methods to promote the 
implementation of research findings 
An advisory group to the NBS Central Research and Development Committee (CRDC) 
identified 20 priorities for Research and Development (R&D) in the area of the evaluation of 
methods to promote the implementation of research findings and these priorities were 
ratified in 1995. 
Responsibility for the national programme on the evaluation of methods to promote the 
implementation of research findings (implementation methods programme) was taken 
forward by North Thames RHA under the directorship of Professor Andy Haines (who was 
also the Chairman of the Advisory Group). Dr Janet Wisely, also the programme manager of 
the national programmes on the PrimarY / Secondary Care Interface (PSI) and Mother and 
Child Health (MCR) was appointed to manage the programme. Professor Andy Haines has 
since stepped down as Director (April 1997) and Professor Sally C Davies, the R&D 
Director for the Regional Office, is now the programme director. An eighteen member 
commissioning group under the Chairmanship ofDr Jeremy Grimshaw was established to 
advise on the programme. 
The first call for proposals was issued in July 1995 which resulted in 32 projects being 
recommended for funding at a total cost of £4 million. A second call for proposals was 
issued in February 1997 which resulted in 3 projects being recommended for funding. All 3 
projects have now started and their project summaries are available to view on this 
homepage. 
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rity Areas 	 http:,'iw,vw.optm.gov . ukidolvntrd! rd/implcm/priority.' indl:lC. h 
Priority Areas 
First Round 
1. 	 Influence of source and presentation of evidence on its uptake bv health care 

professionals and others 

2. 	 The principal sources of infonnation on health care effectiveness used by clinicians 
3. 	 The management ofuncertainty and communication of risk bv clinicians 
4. 	 Roles for health service users in implementing research 
5. 	 Why some clinicians but not others change their practice in response to research 
findings 
6. 	 The role of commissioning in securing change in clinical practice 
7. 	 ProfessionaL manageriaL organisational and commercial factors associated with 
securing change in clinical practice, with a particular focus on trusts and primary care 
providers 
8. 	 Interventions directed at clinical and medical directors and directors of nursing in 
trusts to promote evidence-based care 
9. 	 Local research implementation and development projects (such as GRiPP) 
10. 	 Effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of audit and feedback to promote implementation 
of research findings 
11. 	 Educational strategies for continuing professional development to promote the 

implementation of research findings 

12. 	 Effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of teaching critical appraisal skills to clinicians, 
patients/users, purchasers and providers to promote uptake of research findings 
13. 	 The role of undergraduate (pre-qualification) training in promoting the uptake of 

research findings 3Cf 3 

lotl' Areas 	 http://www.open.gov.uk! dohintrd! rdiimplcm/priorityiindcx.h 
14 	 The impact of clinical practice guidelines in disciplines other than medicine 
15 	 Effectiveness and cost-effectiveness ofreminder and decision support svstems to 
implement research findings 
16. 	 The role of the media in promoting uptake of research findings 
17. 	 Impact of professional and managerial change agents (including educational outreach 
visits and local opinion leaders) in implementing research findings 
18. 	 Effect on evidence - based practice of general health policy measures 
19. 	 The impact of national guidance to promote clinical effectiveness 
20. 	 The use of research-based evidence bv policv makers 
5econd Round 
Applications were invited for: Rigorous evaluations of the effectiveness ofinten;entions to 
improve the uptake ofresearch findings in practice. 
and suggested interventions were: 
• 	 interventions targeting professionals (educational approaches, local opinion leaders) 
audit and feedback, reminders and decision support, marketing approaches and 
multifaceted interventions); 
• interventions targeting patients; 

• organisational interventions (eg. contracting processes). 
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xploring why some clinicians ...change their practice http://www.open.gov.uk.idolvntrdJrdJimplcmJpnority/iirstiOS.ll 
Priority Areas: First Round 
Exploring why some cli nicians but not others change their 
practice in response to research findings 
Description and Justification 
Clinicians are crucial to the process of implementation of the findings of medical research. 
Understanding why they either implement or do not implement the results of good research 
and why some continue with practices that have been superseded would enable the 
development of strategies to close the gap between good research and delivery of effective 
and appropriate care to patients through education and training of clinicians that focuses on 
specific problems. 
Research in this area should focus on both the clinicians and the medium of delivery of 
research findings but not the quality of the research - which in this instance is assumed to be 
good. How important are characteristics of the individual clinician in predicting uptake of 
research findings? These include factors such as age or whether the individual is in a training 
or a career grade. Participation in research may also be a factor as some evidence suggests 
that clinicians entering patients in trials are more likely to make use of research-based 
evidence. 
The relationship between the clinician and the sources of research and with his/her 
organisation may be very important. Reasons for not implementing research-based findings 
may include attitudes and motivation; problems with access to the relevant information or 
the format in which the information is presented; the value the individual clinician places on 
the particular research; the value he/she places on different modes oflearning about the 
research; views of the relevance of the results of research findings to their particular practice 
to difficulties of working within an organisation. Work to date in this area emphasises the 
different responses of individuals to the uptake of innovation - from the innovators and early 
adopters to the rather cruelly described laggards. Another important area suggested by 
Professor Jack Dowie is "cognitive mismatch" . This focuses on decision making and 
suggests that those who seem unable to incorporate research findings into practice may act 
in this way because previous training and socialisation have not equipped them with the 
appropriate skills. 
Research Approach 
loring why some clinicians ... change th(;ir practice Imp:!/www.open.gov.ukidohintrdird/implcmipriorityitirst:O 5 _ h . 
There are clearly a number of areas within this topic that could be researched. Approaches 

to research in this area should include (1) systematic review of the medical and non medical 

literature and (2) observational studies aim at generating hypotheses that could be tested at a 

later stage. The disciplines relevant to research in this area might include educational, 

cognitive and organisational psychology and sociology. 
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Priority Areas: First Round 
Exploring why some clinicians but not others change their 
practice in response to research findings 
Description and Justification 
Clinicians are crucial to the process of implementation of the findings of medical research. 
Understanding why they either implement or do not implement the results of good research 
and why some continue with practices that have been superseded would enable the 
development of strategies to close the gap between good research and delivery of effective 
and appropriate care to patients through education and training of clinicians that focuses on 
specific problems. 
Research in this area should focus on both the clinicians and the medium of delivery of 
research findings but not the quality of the research - which in this instance is assumed to be 
good. How important are characteristics of the individual clinician in predicting uptake of 
research findings? These include factors such as age or whether the individual is in a training 
or a career grade. Participation in research may also be a factor as some evidence suggests 
that clinicians entering patients in trials are more likely to make use of research-based 
evidence. 
The relationship between the clinician and the sources of research and with his/her 
organisation may be very important. Reasons for not implementing research-based findings 
may include attitudes and motivation; problems with access to the relevant information or 
the format in which the information is presented; the value the individual clinician places on 
the particular research; the value he/she places on different modes oflearning about the 
research; views of the relevance of the results of research findings to their particular practice 
to difficulties of working within an organisation. Work to date in this area emphasises the 
different responses of individuals to the uptake of innovation - from the innovators and early 
adopters to the rather cruelly described laggards. Another important area suggested by 
Professor Jack Dowie is "cognitive mismatch" . This focuses on decision making and 
suggests that those who seem unable to incorporate research findings into practice may act 
in this way because previous training and socialisation have not equipped them with the 
appropriate skills. 
Research Approach 
): Exploring why some clinicians ... change [heir practice http://www .open.go v.Ukido hlntrdirdlimplemlprioritylfirs[/05 .h 
There are clearly a number of areas within this topic that could be researched. Approaches 
to research in this area should include (1) systematic review of the medical and non medical 
literature and (2) observational studies aim at generating hypotheses that could be tested at a 
later stage. The disciplines relevant to research in this area might include educational, 
cognitive and organisational psychology and sociology. 
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COtnll1issioned Studies: Ongoing 	 http://www.open.gov.ukJdohmtrdirdlimplemJcommissJongoillg.htm#sccondrou 
Commissioned Studies: Ongoing 
First Round 
Imp IVI 1-11 ARMSTRONG 
Project title A qualitative study of GP's reasons for changing or not changing 
their prescribing behaviour in two areas 
Lead researcher Dr David Armstrong, United Medical and Dental School 
Imp IV1 2-11 CULLUM 
Project title Nurses' use of research evidence in decision-making: a 
descriptive and analytical study 
Lead researcher Dr Nicky Cullum, University of York 
Imp 1\'1 3-10 WYATT 
Project title 	 Investigation of Doctors' ability to understand and use clinical 
prognostic models when different metrics are used to describe 
model performance 
Lead researcher 	 Dr Jeremy Wyatt, Imperial Cancer Research Fund 
Imp M 3-12 BISSELL 
Project title . Self-medication and the communication of risk: the case of 
deregulated medicines 
Lead researcher Nlr Paul Bissell, University of Manchester 
Imp M 3-16 EDWARDS 
Project title A systematic review of risk communication - improving effective 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
iumissicned Studies: Ongoing 	 hnp://\vww.open.gov.ukJdohintrdin.lJimplemlcommiss/ongoing.htmllsecondrou 
clinical practice and research in primary care 
~ad researcher Dr Adrian Edwards, University of Wales College ofMedicine 
mJ.\tI 4-13 COULTER 
roj ect title 

ead researcher 

np ~I 4-16 GAN~ 
'roj ect title 
_ead researcher 
fiP l\tI 4-21 SlVIITH 
Proj ect title 
~ead researcher 
imp M 5-23 YATES 
Proj ect title 
Lead researcher 
Availability of information materials to promote evidence-based 
patient choice 
Professor Angela Coulter, Development Centre King's Fund 
Increasingly effective? Evaluating improvements in the ability of 
health information services to provide information on clinical 
effectiveness 
Nfr Robert Gann, The Help for Health Trust 
Effective communication: an evaluation of touchscreen displays 
for providing information on prenatal diagnosis 
Dr A Pat Smith, Aberdeen Royal Hospitals NBS Trust 
Understanding the reasons for change, or not, in clinical practice 
- the case of dilatation and curettage 
Dr John Yates, University ofBirmingham 
Imp 1\'15-40 HEWISON 
Proj ect title Uptake of effective practices in Maternity Units 
Lead researcher Dr Jenny Hewison, The University ofLeeds 
Imp 1\'1 5-41 NEWTON 
Proj ect title Social networks and the use of research in clinical practice 
Lead researcher Dr John Newton, University of Oxford 
!!.nP M 10-11 SCHOFIELD 
Project title 	 Evidence based secondary prevention of heart disease in primary 
care: a randomised controlled trial of three methods of 
implementation 
....................................____.J\ 

): Commissioned Studies: Ongoing http://www.open.gov.ukldohJntrd1rdJimplemJcommiss!ongoing.htm#secondrou 
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Imp M 10-16 BAKER 
Project title 
Lead researcher 
A randomised controlled trial of the effectiveness of prioritised 
audit criteria in implementing change 
Dr Richard Baker, University ofLeicester, Eli Lilly National Clinical 
Audit Centre 
Imp M 11-10 ROGERS 
Proj ect title A randomised trial of the effectiveness of strategies directed 
towards education & implementation and the adoption of 
evidence based development in primary care 
Lead researcher Dr Stephen Rogers, University College London & Royal Free 
Hospital Schools ofMedicine 
Imp M 11-26 lVlcINTOSH 
Project title 
Lead researcher 
Imp M 12-8 DEEKS 
Proj ect title 
Lead researcher 
Imp M 12-9 TAYLOR 
Project title 
Lead researcher 
Using informal learning in the implementation of research 
findings 
Ms Aileen McIntosh, University ofHull 
Systematic review of studies of effectiveness of teaching critical 
appraisal 
:Mr Jonathan Deeks, Institute ofHealth Sciences 
A randomised controlled trial of the effectiveness of critical 
appraisal skill workshops on health service decision makers in 
the South & \Vest region 
Dr Rod Taylor, University of Exeter 
Imp IVl 14-32 THOlVIAS 
Project title 
Lead researcher 
Systematic review of the effectiveness of guidelines in professions 
allied to medicine 
Dr Lois Thomas, University ofNewcastle Upon Tyne 
ltcl 
Imp M 15-4 LOGAN 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
D: Commissioned Studies: Ongoing 	 http://www.open.gov.ukldohintrd/rdlimpiem/commiss/ongoing.htm#secondrou 
Proj ect title A randomised trial of a simple prompting system in promoting 
appropriate management of iron deficiency anaemia & its 
influence on clinical outcome 
Lead researcher Dr Elisabeth Logan, The King's 1'vlill Centre for Health Care Services 
. ~nS Trust) 
Lrnp 1\'1 15-9 ECCLES 
Project title An evaluation of computerised guidelines for the management of 
two chronic conditions 
Lead researcher Professor Martin Eccles, University ofNewcastle Upon Tyne 
!.mp 1\'115-11 WYATT 
Project title 	 A Cochrane systematic review of the effects of paper and 
computer-based reminders and decision support on clinical 
practices and patient outcomes 
Lead researcher 	 Dr Jeremy Wyatt, Imperial Cancer Research Fund 
Imp IVI 15-12 THAPAR 
Project title Comparing a patient held reminder card to a doctor held 
reminder card to improve epilepsy care in the community 
Lead researcher Dr Ajay Thapar, University ofManchester 
Imp 1\11 15-19 BOWNS 
Project title 	 Maternity Guidelines Implemented on Computer - (l\'IaGIC) 
Lead researcher 	 Dr Ian Bowns, University of Sheffield Medical School 
Imp M 15-21 SZCZEPURA. 
Project title Systematic review of economic studies of reminders and decision 
support systems 
Lead researcher Dr Ala Szczepura, Warwick Business School, University of Warwick 
Imp LVI 16-19 PHILO 
PrOject title The role of the media in public and professional understanding 
of breast cancer 
Lead researcher Dr Gregory Philo, University of Glasgow 
!m.P l.Y1 17-12 mBOTSON 
:0: Commissioned Studies: Ongoing http://'W·ww.open.gov.ukldohlntrdJrd/implem!commiss!ongoing.htm#secondrou 
Project title Is the involvement of opinion leaders in the implementation of 
research findings a feasible strategy? 
Lead researcher Dr Tracy Ibbotson, University of Aberdeen 
Imp M 1 i-13 GRLvISHA\V 
Proj ect title 
Lead researcher 
Prevention of deep vein thrombosis: A randomised trial of three 
different strategies to implement evidence based guidelines 
Dr Jeremy Grimshaw, University of Aberdeen 
Imp M 19-15 STR-\NG 
Project title 
Lead researcher 
Second Round 
The injecting drug taker & the community pharmacist: impact 
of new DoH guideline, and obstacles to a broader 
service-providing base 
Professor John Strang, National Addiction Centre (Institute of 
Psychiatry) 
Imp M R2-25 CHEATER 
Project title 
Lead researcher 
An evaluation of the effectiveness and cost effectiveness of audit 
and feedback and educational outreach in improving nursing 
practice and health care outcomes 
Dr Francine Cheater, Eli Lilly National Clinical Audit Centre, 
University ofLeicester 
Imp M R2-34 CLARKE 
Project title 
Lead researcher 
Imp M R2-64 PITTS 
Project title 
Lead researcher 
Development and piloting of evidence-based materials Clinical 
Guidance Tree, Decision Board & Leaflet for decision-making in 
prophylactic oophorectomy 
Dr Aileen Clarke, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine 
Effective practice: a randomised trial of dissemination and 
. implementation strategies for guidelines for the appropriate 
extraction of third molar teeth 
Professor Nigel Pitts, University ofDundee 
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APPENDIX 13 Conclusions 
Marketisation, centralisation, devolution and accountability 
Devolution 
• 	 Although the reforms of the NBS appeared to make a separation between 
central policy and politics, and between policy and organisation and 
management, the evidence was that this was more rhetoric than reality. 
• 	 The government was reluctant to relinquish control of the functions it had 
devolved because of its sensitivity to public and media attention. 
• 	 The evidence was that the government was also believed to be sensitive to the 
demands and lobbying of the pharmaceutical companies and, subsequently, 
prepared and calculated guidelines for prescribing, overruling local evidence­
based purchasing decisions. 
• 	 The marketised and contractual nature of the NBS reforms created confusion 
and conflict between purchasers and providers as to how far devolution should 
go. 
• 	 The contractual nature of the reforms brought issues of (under) funding into the 
public arena. 
• 	 Variations in styles of implementation led to conflict being rather more overt in 
some districts than others. 
• 	 Measures used to monitor activity were crude and often mitigated against the 
efficient and effective operation of the NBS. 
405 
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• 	 The measures encouraged and reinforced a corporate response, rather than 
individual normalisation, to centrally-defined targets. 
• 	 Monitoring focused on numbers and output, rather than on quality and 
effectiveness. 
• 	 The government was able to distance itself from the politics of service provision 
and blame managers for failures in delivery and management, rather than be 
blamed for the failure of its own policy' agentification'. 
Accountability 
• 	 Calls for increased accountability of service providers led to increased openness 
and focus on the processes of decision-making in the NBS. 
• 	 By making the decision-making process more open, rationing issues were also 
made more overt and public. 
• 	 Directors of public health, were, ultimately, responsible for the purchasing of 
health services for their populations. 
• 	 By holding doctors more accountable for the level and quality of services they 
provided, medical autonomy was threatened. 
• 	 The finite funds available to purchase health care meant that public health 
consultants were caught in a paradoxical situation between being accountable to 
their resident population and individual patients, whom they might have to deny 
care and treatment if the cost-benefits were poor. 
• 	 Accountability to managers and insurers increased bureaucracy in the NBS. 
• 	 Issues about costs were introduced much more overtly into decision-making. 
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411 	 Audit was used as a tool to ensure accountability. 
Audit 
411 Audit was the principal method used to evaluate clinical services. 
• 	 Audit had rapidly expanded its profile in the NHS. 
• 	 Ensuring that processes were in place to conduct audit was as important to trust 
managers as actually conducting audits. 
• 	 The non-medical professions were more affected by management-defined audit 
agendas than were the doctors. 
• 	 Audit was not seen as a normal and natural aspect of the NHS. 
411 Doctors, on the whole, did not share the results of medical audit. 
411 Doctors retained control of 'effectiveness' agendas. 
• Most managers did not audit their own work. 

411 The majority of audit was, and continued to be, medical audit. 

• 	 Audit was more a feature of acute than community trusts. 
Knowledge, economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
• 	 The government had attempted to gain more control over the production of 
knowledge in the NHS. 
• Financial categories of knowledge were increasingly overt in the NHS, as were 
I efficiency and economy measures. 
I 
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• 	 Effectiveness remained in the control of doctors. 
• 	 Health authorities concentrated on ineffectiveness, I.e. the elimination of 
ineffective clinical practice, rather than effectiveness as the promotion of 
effective clinical practice. 
• 	 Efforts to establish and develop effectiveness measures in community trusts 
were resisted by the established biomedical researchers in the teaching trusts. 
• 	 Knowledge was used as a counter-power by trust managers and clinicians in 
order to maintain and develop clinical services. 
• 	 The medical profession had a protected knowledge producing 'core' of 
researchers, based in the teaching hospitals. 
• 	 Other professions did not posses such cores of their own. 
• 	 A concentration on economy and efficiency did not prevent crises in the NBS 
from occurring. 
• 	 Trust managers were increasingly gathering more information on the work and 
activity of clinicians. 
• 	 There was little knowledge of what the doctors in the medical 'core' actually 
did. 
• 	 Measures were taken to redress the situation and make the doctors more 
accountable for the care they provided. 
• 	 The difference between audit and research was not clear to health care workers. 
• 	 District general hospitals and conununity trusts were taking steps to create 
'evaluative' cultures. 
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• The NBS refonns did encourage some initiative and innovation, but In a 
managed and bureaucratised form. 
Research policy and politics 
Research policy 
• 	 Research for Health was a very progressive and radical policy when launched. 
• 	 Although Research for Health was presented as a R&D strategy, in practice, 
'research' policy and 'development' policy were separate entities. 
• 	 'Official' research policy was developed centrally and regionally. 
• 	 Development policy was developed locally (although there was a national 
dissemination centre). 
• 	 Research policy was seen to relate to, and be the province of, doctors in the 
teaching hospitals. 
• 	 There was a separation between research policy and the organisation and 
management of services to meet the demands of that policy. 
• 	 Doctors in the teaching hospitals were seen as separate and elitist by doctors in 
the rest of the NHS. 
• 	 Although Research for Health (DR 1991b, 1993a) was oriented to support the 
government objectives for the NHS, the links made in regional R&D plans to 
the Health of the Nation (DR 1991a) was not seen as paramount by some 
regional R~D policy-makers. 
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• 	 Although the 1991 strategy played great emphasis upon development, the 
model for development and implementation used was the traditional linear, top­
down framework, which was kTIown to be ineffective. 
• 	 Under this model, the development of research was seen to 'naturally' occur 
after the dissemination of results. 
• 	 Implementation was later identified as a national priority for NHS funding and a 
programme of research to evaluate methods of implementation launched. 
Results of the majority of projects have yet to be published (Appendix 12). 
• 	 Research policy was an attempt to apply business and management principles to 
the commissioning and conduct of research. 
• 	 Attempts were made to formulate databases in order to gain more knowledge 
on research activity in trusts and what doctors actually did, to more directly 
target research funds. 
• 	 Methods to implement this policy were devolved to local managers and 
clinicians. 
• 	 These methods were, ultimately, voluntaristic declarations and reports of 
activity, which were produced by local managers and clinicians, and were as 
much about maintaining existing levels of funding and market dominance as 
anything else. 
• 	 These methods and the results were fed back and incorporated into central 
policy. 
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• 	 Rather than gain more control over producers of medical knowledge, the system 
resulted in making their positions more bureaucratic, but at the same time, 
awarded them greater legitimisation by the state. 
• 	 Policy-making in the NHS was corporatist, with a privileged group granted 
access to policy-making committees. 
• 	 NHS research policy failed to adequately support NBS policy in general and 
was, subsequently, relaunched in 1993. It was subj ect to further reorganisation 
in 1994, after the findings of the Culyer Report (1994). 
• 	 The traditional core members of the medical profession were able to retain their 
domination over other professions in the NBS and, consequently, recaptured 
research agendas to make them their own. 
• 	 Effort was made to spread the base of research, but met with only limited 
success. 
• 	 Localised efforts to conduct research in trusts were resisted by the teaching 
hospitals, who tried to keep activity confined to their own university sector. 
• 	 Social scientists, most notably health economists, were likely to be one of the 
biggest winners to emerge from the changes in the nature of research. 
• 	 Although all NHS research funded under the auspices of the Research jor 
Health strategy was intended to be health services research, doctors in the 
teaching hospitals were able to recapture funds and reform biomedical 
committees. 
• 	 The strategy was seen as an opportunity by universities to compete for NBS 
funds for research. 
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• 	 Health services research as a discipline, was just as under-developed in the 
teaching hospitals and 'old' universities as elsewhere. 
• 	 The number of researchers with health services research skills was limited. 
• 	 Training strategies were being developed to help remedy this situation, but there 
was some doubt as to whether they could deliver. 
• 	 The randomised controlled trial (ReT) remained the benchmark for judging 
research methods and quality. 

Service-specific values were not being replaced, but financial categories of 

knowledge were playing an increasing role in knowledge production and 

decision-making. 

Development policy 
• 	 Managers, excluding those employed in teaching hospitals, were more 
interested in creating an 'evaluative' culture, of which research was a part, 
rather than establishing a research culture per se. 
• 	 There was evidence to suggest that managers and clinicians in the shire and 
district general hospitals were more change-minded than those in the teaching 
hospitals. 
• 	 A large proportion of clinicians did not see conducting research as beneficial to 
their work or careers. 
• 	 The research strategy was not felt to be driven by anybody in the NBS outside 
of the teaching hospitals. 
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• 	 Localised innovation and research was driven by demands for accountability, by 
GP fundholders and by local competition. 
• 	 The Culyer Report (1994) was seen by local managers and clinicians as 
providing them with an opportunity to secure research funds for themselves. 
• 	 A research culture was not evident beyond the teaching hospitals, nor amongst 
the nurses, physiotherapists and P AMS working in them. 
e 	 Reflecting the problems arising over devolution of responsibilities, discussed 
earlier, there was conflict between some trusts and health authorities over 
independence to develop research activity. 
e 	 Local policy-making was ahead of national and regional R&D policy III 
responding to service demands. 
• 	 Although the government was able to control the dissemination of research 
results via guidelines, the Cochrane database, the York Centre etc., other areas 
of development were far more difficult to control. 
• 	 Changing practice was not just about individual action and needed to be 
managed and co-ordinated. 
• 	 As trusts were unable to retain funds saved annually in responding to demands 
for increased efficiency, the incentive to innovate was reduced. 
• 	 With the ever increasing emphasis placed on output, efficiency and economising 
measures in the NHS, clinicians were left with little time to reflect upon their 
clinical practice. 
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Professions, experts and control 
• 	 Increasingly, public health consultants were regulating the development of new 
services within clinical practice, demanding proof of effectiveness before they 
would commission them. 
• 	 Public health consultants, therefore, were controlling the application of new 
knowledge into clinical practice. 
• 	 The regulation of knowledge had direct implications for medical autonomy. 
• 	 This regulation was resisted by doctors, who responded by claiming that 
managers were preventing their patients from receiving the care and treatment 
they needed. 
• 	 Knowledge about service prOVIsIon was also used to exert power by trust 
managers and clinicians against purchasers. 
• 	 Doctors were not proletarianised, de-skilled or de-professionalised, but were 
bureaucratised. 
• 	 Although aspects of medical knowledge could be seen as being rationalised, 
medical knowledge, in general, had not been rationalised. 
• 	 The medical profession was not predominantly, an evidence-based profession, 
but was more evidence-based than other professions. 
• 	 Managers were more interventionist towards the non-medical clinicians, as the 
non-medical clinicians did not diagnose, and had less control over recruitment 
and access to their profession. 
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• 	 The bureaucratisation of professions gave the impression that control and 
accountability were being exercised, even if they were not. 
• 	 Managers did not want to fully control doctors, as they would implicate 
themselves in making decisions over rationing. 
• 	 Demands for value for money did not fully open up clinical performance to 
wider scrutiny. 
• 	 Medical autonomy also protected managers and politicians. 
• 	 Clinical managers in acute trusts, and locality managers in community trusts, 
were alike, as they were both practising clinicians and shared similar aims and 
values. 
• 	 Similarly, Central trust managers and health authority managers were alike, as 
they had common aims and values. 
• 	 Managers in general, therefore, could not be seen as a homogenous group of 
'corporate rationalisers'. 
• 	 Public health consultants have had their role expanded, extending their 
surveillance from the population to health care professions. 
• 	 This surveillance was incomplete, and the techniques used were not fully 
developed. 
• 	 The medical profession should be viewed as amoebic in shape, rather than as 
one coherent unit. 
• 	 Although the medical profession shared fundamental values and characteristics, 
there was a clear divide between those based in the teaching hospitals and 
others. 
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• 	 The doctors were very defensive towards any measures that they believed posed 
a threat to their levels of funding for services or research, for example, 
aggressively restricting members of their own profession from competing. 
• 	 Biomedical researchers within the teaching hospitals represented a 'core' of 
protective/protected knowledge-producers. 
• 	 The relationship between professions and the state was rather more 'messy' 
than was typically characterised in the literature. 
• 	 Although the case studies show policy to be dominated by corporate groups, 
there was competition within these groups, and local alliances (networks) were 
formed in order to secure favourable rewards for these networks. 
• 	 Consumers of health care had gained increased input into health care and 
research agendas, but these were still very limited. 
• 	 Major challenges from consumers had begun to occur, as the 'Child B' episode 
bore testament. 
• 	 The challenged did not threaten medical autonomy, as they were characterised 
as purely financial (management) decisions. 
• 	 Since the completion of this thesis, this situation has changed dramatically, with 
the case of the Bristol heart surgeons (see post script). 
• 	 There had not been a displacement of experts of the 'first order' with experts of 
the 'second' order, but the professions have become increasingly 
bureaucratised. 
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